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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INYESTirxATE THE ABMINISTKATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECUEITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
PART 3
SEPTEMBER 14, 18, 19, 20, 25, 1951
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
r^
Ersfem Bnsiness BrricS
DEC 24 1952
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
22848 WASHINGTON : 1951
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chwirman
HARLBY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Wasliington HOMER FERGUSON, Micliisran
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey
J. G. SouRwixE, Counsel
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Other Internal Security Laws
PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM B. JENNER, Indiana
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations
JAMES O. EASTLAND,"^Mississippi, Chairman
PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
ROBERT MORRIS, Special Counsel
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
II
CONTENTS
Testimony of — Page
Carter, Edward C 896
Colegrove, Prof. Kenneth 905
Dooman, Eugene H 703
Fortier, Brig. Gen. L. Joseph (retired) 843
Kornfeder, Joseph Zack 864
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C. (retired) 775
Widener, Mrs. William Harry 755
in
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
miDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1951
United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Other Internal Security Laws
OF the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 424,
Senate Office Buildino;, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.
Present : Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Smith of North Caro-
lina.
Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; Robert Morris,
subcommittee counsel ; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The chair regrets that, due to the absence of the chairman from
the Senate for 2 weeks, the matter of these hearings has been delayed.
They will proceed more expeditiously from now on.
Wlio is our witness today, Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Eugene Dooman.
The Chairman. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are
about to give before this subcommittee of the Committee on the Judi-
ciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth,
and notliing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Dooman. I do.
TESTIMONY OF EUGENE H. DOOMAN, LITCHFIELD, CONN.
Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter,
please, Mr. Dooman?
Mr. Dooman. Eugene H. Dooman, and my home is at Litchfield,
Conn.
Mr. Morris. What is your present occupation, Mr. Dooman?
Mr. Dooman. I am retired.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, will you tell us what positions you have
held in the United States State Department?
Mr. Dooman. Well, from the beginning, in 1912, when I entered the
Foreign Service, I was first assigned to the Embassy at Tokyo to study
the Japanese language.
After several years' tour of duty in several of the consulates in
Japan, I was assigned to the American Embassy at Tokyo as third
secretary in 1921.
I remained there until 1931, when I was transferred as first secre-
tary of the Embassy at London.
703
704 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
From 1933 to 1937 I had the Japanese desk in the Far Eastern
Division of the State Department, and in that last year I was trans-
ferred to Tokyo as counselor of the American Embassy.
In 1942 after my return from Japan I was assigned to the Embassy
in Russia as minister consular. I returned to the State Department
in 1942 and after doing various things I was assigned in February
1945 as Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the State, War,
and Navy Coordinating Committee.
And I retired on the 31st of August 1945.
Mr. Morris. Will you explain the importance of that Far Eastern
Committee mentioned as your last position held in the State Depart-
ment ?
Mr. DooMAN. It had previously been found that discussions be-
tween the various departments — that is, primarily the State Depart-
ment, the War Department, and the Navy Department — in connec-
tion with problems that arose out of the war through negotiations
were unsatisfactory.
And in 1944, I believe it was, a committee was formed, known as
the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee. The members
of that committee were the Assistant Secretaries of those repective
Departments, the Chairman being James Dunn, who was Assistant
Secretary of State.
Under the Coordinating Committee there were two subcommittees,
one for Germany and one for Japan, and it was the function of those
committees to formulate a joint agreement or meeting of the minds
of the three Departments on various problems that had both political
and military content.
Tlie Subcommittee on the Far East, of which I was Chairman, then
had the function of developing and formulating policies with respect
to Japan primarily, which had both military and political content.
I would therefore say that it was the original source of all of the
ultimate decisions that were made in the field of policy respecting
Japan.
Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Dooman, can you recall that Owen Lattimore
was proposed at one time as a consultant to the chief of the China desk
of the Department of State?
Mr. DooMAN. I can; yes.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us your recollection with respect to that
particular incident, Mr. Dooman?
Mr. DooMAN. At that time, which must have been early in 1945,
I was, as I have just said, acting as Chairman of this Far Eastern Sub-
committee of S WINK, and I was therefore not primarily interested
in the functions and operations of the Far Eastern Division, or the
Far Eastern Office, as it was then called.
But one of the men in the office told me that papers were going
through the State Department calling for the appointment of Dr.
Lattimore as adviser to the China Division, the papers having been
initiated by the Chief of the China Division.
Mr. Morris. Who was that ?
Mr. DooMAN. That was Mr. John Carter Vincent.
I discussed the matter with Mr. Ballantine, wiio was then Director
of the Far Eastern Division, and pointed out that Lattimore at that
time, and for several months previously, had been using every oppor-
tunity to discredit the then Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Grew.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 705
And I pointed out that it would be incongruous for a man who had
expressed himself so freely on Mr. Grew to be occupying a position
under Mr. Grew.
With that I reported the matter to Mr. Grew, and he then called up
the administrative people who had charge of appointments and or-
dered that the papers be quashed.
Senator Eastland. Wliat did Mr. Lattimore have to say against
Mr. Grew ? What was the complaint against him ?
Mr. Doom AN. That would take a long time.
Senator Eastland. Was it because he had been opposing com-
munism in the Far East and because he wanted a peace treaty that
would prevent the Communists from getting Japan?
The Chairman. By "he," you refer to Mr. Grew ?
Senator Eastland. Yes, sir.
Mr. DooMAN. The principal cause of complaint Avas that Mr. Grew
had advocated an attitude on the part of the United States of nonin-
terference with the Japanese themselves in the form of government
which they wanted to institute.
In other words, if they wanted to keep the Emperor, by all means
let them keep it. If they wanted to disestablish the monarchy, by
all means let them disestablish it.
Senator Eastland. Why would the Communists want the Emperor
overthrown ?
Mr. Dooman. The point which you have mentioned. Senator, was
one of the cardinal points of the Communists not only in the United
States but also throughout the world. They knew perfectly well, of
course, that communism and a monarchial system were incongruous.
Therefore, the first thing was to get rid of the monarchial system.
They knew also that the communalistic type of society which has
existed in Japan for 2,000 years existed largely because of the Em-
peror being a sort of an element which brought the Nation together.
Now, this is the type of thing which I do not understand myself,
and I do not believe any occidental can, but nevertheless, it is a fact.
Senator Eastland. Lattimore understood that fact?
Mr. DooMAN. Lattimore understood the fact that it was the Em-
peror who did bring it together.
Senator Eastland. His opposition to Grew was that Mr. Grew was
favoring a policy after the war was won that would prevent the Com-
munists from getting Japan. That is it in a nutshell, is it not?
Mr. DooMAN. That would be — if I were to answer your question,
Senator, it would be largely question of opinion.
Senator Eastland. That is your judgment?
Mr. DooMAN. That is my judgment.
Senator Eastland. And Mr. John Carter Vincent was urging the
appointment of Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. Was that a question ?
Senator Eastland. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Senator Eastland's proposed question was: Was Mr.
John Carter Vincent urging the appointment of Owen Lattimore at
that time?
Mr. Doom AN. Yes.
As I mentioned in my testimony, the papers calling for the assign-
ment of Lattimore as adviser to the China Division were initiated
by Vincent.
706 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris, Mr. Chairman, at this point, since we have gotten into
the subject, I think it is appropriate that we should introduce into
the record a resohition of the Communist Party at this juncture with
respect to the policy toward Japan.
Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate the resolution that has been dis-
cussed so far today ?
Mr. Mandel. This is a mimeographed copy of excerpts from a
magazine called Political Affairs for July 1945, the official organ at
that time of the Communist Political Association.
It is headed "The present situation and the next tasks."
The Chairman. That is published where?
Mr. Mandel. In Political Affairs, July 1945, published in New
York City.
These excerpts are taken from a draft resolution of the national
board of the CPA, which is the abbreviation for the Communist
Political Association, as amended and approved by the national com-
mittee on June 20.
This draft is now submitted for the further consideration of the member-
ship and for final action by tlie emergency national convention of the CPA on
July 26-28.
The following excerpts are quoted [reading] :
This growing reactionary opposition to a truly democratic and anti-Fascist
Europe in which the people will have the right to freely choose their own forms
of government and social system has been reflected in many of the recent actions
of the State Department.
This explains wliy, at San Francisco, Stettinius and Connally joined hands
with Vandenberg — the spolvesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of
American finance capital. * * *
It is this reactionary position of the American big business which explains
why Washington, along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of
preventing a strong, united and democratic China ; and why they bolster up the
reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shelv regime and why they harbor the idea
of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a
reactionary bulwark in the Far East.
In the vital struggle to crush feudal-Fascist-militarist Japan, it is necessary
that American labor collaborate in the prosecution of the anti-Japanese war with
all democratic forces who favor and support victory over Japanese imperialism.
However, labor and other anti-Fascists must take cognizance of the fact that,
amongst those big-business circles who desire military victory over Japan, tiiere
are influential forces, including some in the State Department, who are seeking
a compromise peace which will preserve the power of the Mikado after the war,
at tlie expense of Cliina and the other Far East peoples, and directed against
the Soviet Union. Similarly, there are powerful capitalist groupings, including
many in administration circles, who plan to use the coming defeat of Japan for
imperialist aims, for maintaining a reactionary puppet Kuomintang regime in
China, for obtaining American imperialist domination in the Far East. * * *
In the opinion of the Communist Policy Association, such a program should
be based on the following slogans of action :
* * * * * * - *
Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary
ofBcials. * * *
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced into
the record the excerpts of the extracts from Political Affairs of July
1945, which was read by Mr. INIandel. I would like to introduce that
into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.
The Chairman. It will be so marked and received.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 234," and is
as follows:)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 707
[From. Political Affairs, July 1945]
The Present Situation and the Next Tasks
Di-aft resolution of the National Board, CPA (Communist Political Associa-
tion), as amended and approved l)y the national committee on June 20. This
draft is now submitted for the further consideration of the membership and
for final action by the emergency national convention of the CPA on July
26-28 (p. 579) :
t^ ***** *
This growing reactionary opposition to a truly democratic and anti-Fascist
Europe, in which the people will have the right to freely choose their own forms
of government and social system, has been reflected in many of the recent
actions of the State Department. This explains why, at San Francisco, Stet-
tinius and Connally joined hands with Vandenberg — the spokesman for Hoover
and the most predatory sections of American linance capital * * * (p 58O).
It is this reactionary position of American big business which explains why
Washington, along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of prevent-
ing a strong, united and democratic China ; why they bolster up the reactionary,
incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming
to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary
bulwark in the Far East * * * (p. 581).
In the vital struggle to crush feudal-Fascist militarist Japan it is necessary
that American labor collaborate in the prosecution of the anti-Japanese war
with all democratic forces who favor and support victory over Japanese im-
perialism.
However, labor and the other anti-Fascists must take cognizance of the fact
that, amongst those big-business circles who desire military victory over Japan,
there are influential forces, including some in the State Department, who are
seeking a compromise peace v.iiich will preserve the power of the Mikado after
the war, at the expense of China and the other Far East peoples, and directed
against the Soviet Union. Similarly, there are powerful capitalist groupings,
including many in administration circles, who plan to use the coming defeat of
Japan for imperialist aims, for maintaining a reactionary puppet Kuomintang
regime in China, for obtaining American imperialist domination in the Far
East * * * (p. 583).
In the opinion of the Communist Political Association, such a program should
be based on the following slogans of action :
* * * * * * *
Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary
officials * * * (p. 584).
Mr. DooMAN. May I add something to that story about the papers
for appointment ?
Mr. MoRPas. By all means, Mr. Dooman.
Mr. Dooman. I just recall now that about 2 weeks after this episode
Dr. Isaiah Bowman, president of the Johns Hopkins University, came
to see the President. That mnst have been then, I think it was, along
about February of 1945. He came to see the President and asked the
President to intervene on behalf of Dr. Lattimore with the State
Department. And the matter was brought to the attention then of the
State Department and no further action was taken.
May I correct it again? This must have been about April of 1945.
Mr. Morris. What position did John Carter Vincent hold at that
time, Mr. Dooman, at the time these papers for employing Mr. Latti-
more as consultant were submitted ?
Mr. Dooman. He was Chief of the China Division.
Mr. Morris. Did he hold any other position in the State Depart-
ment ?
Mr. Dooman. Not at that time,
Mr. Morris. Was he associated with one of the area committees?
Mr. Dooman. Well, yes. The far-eastern area was an intradepart-
708 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
mental committee at which there "was an attempt made to get a con-
sensus of opinion about various policies concerning the Far East.
And the coni]iosition of that committee varied with the problems that
were discussed.
But, generally speaking, the standing members of that were Dr.
Blakeslee, who was chairman. Dr. Hugh Borton, who was secretary,,
and then the Chief of the Japan Division, Mr. Earl Dickover; INIr.
Ballantine, Director of the Far Eastern Office, and myself as chair-
man of this far eastern subcommittee.
And then, depending on the problems to be discussed, there was
representation from other divisions of the Department who were
interested in that particular problem.
For example, if we were discussing the question of the mandated
islands, we would have representatives from the Legal Section and
from, we will say, the European Section, and so on.
Mr. Morris. Could you say this was a policy-making committee,.
Mr. Dooman?
Mr. DooMAN. It was a policy-developing committee.
Mr. Morris. Was John Carter Vincent a member of that com-
mittee ?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes; he could come in whenever he wanted to. As
a matter of fact, he chose not to come very often. He was usually
represented by a man from his office called Julian Friedman.
The Chairman. You were asked the question: Was John Carter
Vincent a member of that committee.
I would like to have an answer to : Was he a member of that com-
mittee?
Mr. DooNAN. Well, as I tried to explain, the membership in that
committee was a fairly loose thing, because it varied with the subjects
to be discussed. There were no officially appointed members of the
committee. There were certain standing members, those primarily
concerned with Japan.
And then the composition of the committee was extended, depend-
ing upon the character of the subject to be discussed. Naturally^
China would be very much influenced by whatever policies we set
up for Japan, and, therefore, it was quite right and proper that the
China Division should be fully familiar with whatever was going on
in the committee.
The Chairman. "When John Carter Vincent did attend, did he have
full authorit}' the same as any other member of the committee both
to speak, act, and vote?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir.
. The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. Did you testify, Mr. Dooman, that when Mr. John
Carter Vincent did not attend he sent a representative?
Mr. DooMAN. Sometimes they both came.
Mr. Morris. Sometimes both Julian Friedman and John Carter
Vincent came?
JNIr. Dooman. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Did Julian Friedman take a position and express him-
self at these meetings?
Mr. DooMAN. Not very often.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 709
Mr. Morris. Did you ever make any charges against Julian Fried-
man at that time in connection with his attendance at the area meet-
ings ?
Mr. DooMAisr. No; I did not make any charges because that implies
that I complained to somebody else, some higher authority.
The Chairman. Let me interrupt again. I may have lost track of
this.
Who was Julian Friedman ?
Mr. DooMAN. Julian Friedman was a member of the China Divi-
sion of the State Department.
The Chairman. Very well.
]Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the rec-
ord at this time a letter which indicates Julian Friedman's associa-
tion with the State Department, and at the same time his connection
with the Institute of Pacific Kelations, which composition is being
considered by this committee.
Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate both of those documents ?
Mr. Mandel. The first is a letter from the State Department to the
Honorable Pat McCarran, dated April 23, 1951, signed by Eldridge
Durbrow, Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel.
The letter reads as follows :
My Dear Senator McCarran : Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the
Secretary, concerning Julian R. Friedman, has been referred to me for reply.
A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior
economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from October 5, 1945, until the
termination of his employment on November 12, 1946.
As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was
effective November 13, 1946. Consequently, it had been decided to abolish the
Auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November
12, 1946. In proceeding with the liquidation of the Auxiliary, it was necessary
to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or
Auxiliary officers, including Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman's record shows that
his services were terminated without prejudice.
I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs.
Sincerely yours.
The Biographical Register of the State Department, dated October
1, 194.5, on page 106, lists the positions held by Julian Friedman, which
I would like to put into the record.
I can read them, if you desire.
Mr. Morris. I do not think it is necessary, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mandel. I also submit Security in the Pacific, a preliminary
report of the ninth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations
held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945, on page 1061, which
shows that Julian Friedman was a member of the conference secre-
tariat.
And further I submit a circular distributed by the Institute of
Pacific Relations showing a meeting held announcing a new IPR
study,^ Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel
Epstein, with a supplement called Labor in Nationalist China,
1945^8, by Julian R. Friedman.
Introduce that circular into the record.
Mr, Morris. I would like to introduce into the record, to have
marked as the next consecutive exhibits, the four documents just
described and read by Mr. Mandel.
710 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The first is a letter from the State Department to the chairman on
Julian Friedman's position in the State Department.
The second is the Biographical Register excerpt.
The third is the record from Security in the Pacific, the Institute
of Pacific Relations publication, showing that Julian Friedman was
a member of the conference secretariat, and the fourth being a throw-
away indicating that Julian Friedman had written the publication
under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The Chairman. They may be inserted in the record and properly
identified.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 235, 236,
237, and 238," and are as follows :)
Exhibit No. 235
Department of State,
Washington, April 23, 1951.
The Honorable Pat McCarran,
United States Senate.
My Dear Senator RIcCarran : Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the
Secretary, concerning Julian R. Friedman has been referred to me for reply.
A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior
economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from October 5, 1945, until
the termination of his employment on November 12, 1946.
As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was
effective November 13, 1946. Consequently it had been decided to abolish the
Auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November
12, 1946. In i)roceeding with the liquidation of the Auxiliary, it was necessary
to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or
auxiliary oflScers including Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman's record shows that
his services were terminated without prejudice.
I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs.
Sincerely yours,
Eleridge Durbrow,
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel.
Exhibit No. 286
Julian R. Friedman : App. div. asst. in the Dept. of State, Sept. 2, 1943 ; asst.
to chief Div. of Labor Relations, Sept. 1, 1944; divisional asst., Nov. 20, 1944;
asst. sec. of comm., United Nations Conf. on Int. Org., San Francisco, 1945; re-
search and analysis asst., May 17, 1945. (Biographic Register, Dept. of State,
Oct. 1, 1945, p. 106.)
Exhibit No. 237
Julian R. Friedman
conference membership
Conference Secretariat :
* « *
Julian Friedman
* * *
(Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., Jan. 6-17, 1945, p. 161.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 711
Exhibit No. 238
Announcing a new IPR study, Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China,
by Israel Epstein (159 pp. mimeographed), $2.25.
With a supplement : Labor in Nationalist China, 1945^8, by Julian R. Fried-
man. Chapters: The War and Industry; Hours and Wa,i,'es ; Migrant Skilled
Workers; New (Local) Workers; Women and Children in Industry; "Coolie"
Labor; Conscript, Contract, and Slave; Kuomintang Labor Law and Decrees;
Labor Organizations and the Labor Movement * * * with a documentary ap-
pendix with the text of important Natioi.cilist and Communist labor laws and
policy statements.
International Secretariat, iNSTifUTE of Pacific Relations
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. T.
[Attached]
Please send me copies of "Labor Notes on Nationalist China."
$2.25 enclosed Bill me (Postage added).
I am an IPR member entitled to $1.80 price.
Name
Address
Mr. Morris. I think we have shown in past hearings the connec-
tion between Mr. Owen Lattimore and the Institute of Pacific Ke-
lations to a great extent, and John Carter Vincent.
I think we may as well at this point show the connection of John
Carter Vincent with the Institute of Pacific Relations.
INIr. Mandel. I have a letter dated November 12, 1945, addressed
to E. C. Carter, that was taken from the files of the Institute of
Pacific Relations. I read the first paragraph :
In answer to your letter of November 1, there is attached hereto a list of
the present board of trustees of the American Council, listing the dates of
their election, the amounts of their current contribution, and the largest amount
they have ever contributed.
On this list we have the name of John Carter Vincent.
Mr. Morris. In other words, this shows that John Carter Vincent
was in 1945 a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of
Pacific Relations. I would like that introduced into the record and
marked as the next consecutive exhibit.
The Chairman. From what source does this come ?
Mr. Mandel. It comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific
Relations.
The Chairman. Very well. It may be marked and filed with the
committee.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 239" and is as
follows:)
November 12, 1945.
Dear Mr. Carter : In answer to your letter of November 1, there is attached
hereto a list of the present board of trustees of the American Council, listing the
dates of their election, tlie amount of their current contribution, and the largest
amount they have ever contributed.
712 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The answers to your other questions can be summarized as follows :
The most active trustees in the New Yorli area are those on the executive
committee. Of these, Callj;ins, Barnett, Huggins, Jessup, and McConaughy have
been the most active. Morris has regularly attended meetings, made a special
gift to the library of some books in his father's collection, is available for
advice, but is neither a large contributor nor will he assume any responsibility
for fund raising. Seymour regularly attended meetings the first 6 months
after my arrival but has been reorganizing a new company and so has been un-
available for anything more than telephone comment for some months. He is
more allergic to Kohlberg's charges than most members of the committee, but
is unquestionably of value in money raising, as he is well known downtown
and generally well liked. The most important person to rely upon Seymour's
judgment currently is E. B. Kilner of the Associated Telephone Services, who
has repeatedly told me that his company is on the verge of supporting us bv
a contribution of $1,000 to $5,000 or withdrawing their current $250 support
entirely.
In Seattle, the most active members of the board are Martin and Allen. Other
active people in Seattle are Greenwood, Baillargeon, and Fuller, although Reg-
inald Parsons has renewed a good deal of his old interest. Allen is a potential
troublemaker but I find he can be handled by talking as tough to him as he talks
to you. If the current plans for a National Conference of Amco go through
and Allen is completely sold on our bona fides, he will be of considerable use
in money raising in the Northwest. It would be unwise to rely on Ben Kizer
in that area as many of the Seattle businessmen, although close friends of Ben,
regard him as an outsider by virtue of his Spokane connections.
The most active members of the board in San Francisco are Greenslade, Allen,
-Hmma McLaughlin, Hunter Galen Fisher, Brayton Wilbur, and Wickett. Of
these, Brayton Wilbur and Wickett are the most important in money raising.
<Jalen Fisher has contributed articles to the Far Eastern Survey. Mrs. Mc-
i,aughlin, Mrs. Dorothy Rogers (not a national board member), and Lynn White,
Jr., president of Mills (not a national board member) have been most active in
the school program and in general membership activities.
In Los Angeles, Rosecrans, although technically chairman of the now defunct
Los Angeles committee, has done little more than make his annual contribiition,
Arthur Coons is the spearhead in that neighborhood and, if Rosecrans can be
persuaded to give Coons a go-ahead signal, a Los Angeles committee can very
easily be reconstituted. Harvey Mudd is interested — almost entirely in re-
search— but would probably be available for financial support if a research
program centered at the Huntington Library were undertaken. Dr. Millikan is
interested in such a program and would put on a meeting in Huntington Library
for discussion of such activities.
In Chicago, an entire new slate of trustees is required with the exception
of the Quincy Wrights. Edward Embree freely admits that he has only a small
portion of his time available for the IPR and would like to be relieved of re-
sponsibility. The same is true of McNair; and, Colegrove, although willing to
talk, is carrying a torch against us because of our handling of India and the use
of people like Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshal.
In other sections of the country, the most interested trustees, as shown by
correspondence, are Jerome Green and Mortimer Graves, both of whom have
written cements on articles in the Survey and are interested in activities gen-
erally.
Apart from the executive committee, Fisher, Ned Allen, Mortimer Graves,
Arthur Coons, Brayton Wilbur, and Morison represent the only individuals on
the naticmal board of trustees with whom there has been correspondence on
anything other than renewing their contributions.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
713
Exhibit No. 239
AMCO board of trustees
Greene, Jerome D
Wild, Payson
Chapman. Mrs. Ralph..
Embree, Edwin R
Wright, Mrs. Louise
Allen, Riley H
At.'ierton, Frank C
Dillinsham, W. F
Looniis, Ciiarles F__
Morison, George Abbot.
Bamett, Eusrene E
Calkins. Robert D
Chamberlain. Joseph P_
Field, Frederick V
Gilchript, Huntington.-.
Hoggins, G. Ellsworth..
Jessup, Piiilip C
LTice, Henry R
McConaushv, James L..
McCoy, Frank R
Morris, Lawrence
Parker, Philo W
Seymour, Lawrence D_
Kizer, Benjamin H
Martin. Charles E.
Allen, Captain
Charles, Allan E...
Davis, Joseph S
Fisher, Galen M...
Do.
Orady, Henry F
Greenslade, Admiral
Do
McLaughlin, Mrs. A
Rowell, Chester
Sproul, Robert G
Wickett, F. A
Do
Do
Wilbur, Brayton
Wilbiu', Ray Lyman
Rosecrans, W. S
DeCaux, Len
Fairbank, John
Graves, Mortimer
Lattimore, Owen
Thomas, Elbert D
Vincent, John Carter
Btick, Pearl S
Emeny, Brooks
Emeny, Brooks and Mrs.
Hoffman
Notestein, Mrs. A
Trippe, Juan
Yarnell, Admiral H. E...
Year
elected
1928.
1943..
1924-3;
1943.
1929.
1932.
1937.
1933.
1943.
1943.
1937...
1943...
1935-..
1927...
1927.
1927-
1927.
1934-
1943-
1943'
1943.
1927.
Present contribution
Date
Nov. 15, 1944-
Aug. 7, 1945.-
Nov. 2, 1944.-
Mar. 19, 1945.
June 18, 1945.
1943
1913
1043
Dec. 16, 1944.
June 5, 1945.-
ucc. 21, 1944.
Mar. 12, 1945.
Aug. 4, 1944..
1944
Dec. 29, 1944.
1944
Julv 20, 1945-.
Dec. 16. 1944-
Jan. 12, 1945..
Oft. 13, 1944.-
Oct. 20, 1944..
Aug. 7, 1945- .
Julv 13, 1945.
Dec. 15, 1944.
Jan. 30, 1945
Feb. 12, 1945
Jan. 20, 1945
Dec. 1, 1944.-
Julv 3, 1945, New
York.
Mar. 6, 1945
Oct. 31, 1944.
Feb. 7, 1944..
Dec. 6, 1944..
Dec. 6, 1944 -.
Feb. 8, 1945..
Apr. 6, 1945 -.
Jan. 26, 1945.
Jan. 26, 1945.
Mar. 14, 1945....
May 2, 1944
Jan. 5, 1945
Feb. 26, 1945
Mar. 8, 1937
Nov. 20, 1944--.
Mar. C, 1945
Complimentary-
Dec. 26, 1944
Oct. 25, 1943
WPF
Mar. 28, 1945....
July 18, 1945
i:>ec. 30, 1944
Nov. 0, 1944
Amount
$10
5
10
10
10
25
650
100
250
10
10
10
500
760
25
650
10
2.500
10
25
25
25
25
50
10
10
15
5
25
50
100
10
50
75
10
10
40
150
100
10
5
5
10
10
"""'25
500
2, 500
100
100
2,500
Highest contribution
Date
19.30
Jan. 2.3," 1943."!!-]
i94U--!".---]
Dec" "21", "1943 .". . - '.
19.38
Oct. "23",""r9'43,
WPF, 3 vears.
Feb. 24, 1942
a"u?"""'i"7, " "1943,
WPF.
1940," 'N"e"w"Y"o"rk ." '.
1940, San Fran-
cisco.
i946-""'"""I""'
December 1929...,
June 30, 1941
Mar. 29, 1944
Sept. 21, 1944
Dec. 14, 1944
1942
1940
June8","f938"."--!.
Amount
$10, 000
25
250
25
1,000
12, 600
300
50
10
275
315
450
500
25
5
100
350
100
300
20
714 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, could you describe for us Owen Latti-
more's position with respect to Japan at the time of the episode we
have just had testimony concerning?
Mv. DooMAN. Mr. Morris, may I remind you that I have not an-
swered the last question that you put to me?
Ivlr. Morris. I am sorry.
The Chairman. I was going to draw that to your attention. I did
not think the last question had been answered. You interrupted
him with the insertion of some material.
Mr. DooMAN. You asked me whether I had made any charges against
Julian Friedman, and I said I had not made any charges because that
implied that I had complained to some higher authority.
The fact was that a very short time after statements had been made
in secret meetings of this Far East Area Committee, the proceedings
and the statements made by various individuals immediately were
quoted in various left-wing periodicals and newspapers There were
literally dozens of such occasions
Senator Eastman. Such at P]\I ?
Mr. Dooman. That would include PM.
It so happens that among all these instances that actually occurred,
I happened to keep one, and that was in the Nation of February 3,
1945, where there appears an article by one Pacificus, entitled "Danger-
ous Experts."
Amoncr other things here is the following paragi\aph which I would
like to read, if I may. I might say that Dangerous Experts refers
among others to myself.
Mr. Doornail not only believes in retaining the emperorist system minns some
of tlie more militaristic forms of emperor worship, but also thinks that the only
elements we can rely on in Japan are tlie business leaders, court circle aristo-
crats, and bureaucrats.
It SO happened that at one of the meetings of the Far Eastern Area
Committee, a few days before this article was published, we were dis-
cussing the question of education, and I pointed out that the big busi-
ness leaders, members of the aristocracy, the people in the professions
in the higher levels, included by far the largest majority of those who
had been educated at Yale and Harvard and Cambridge and Oxford,
and other universities, both in England and the United States.
If there was any value whatsoever in reeducation along our lines it
was obvious, then, that either these people had enjoyed the benefits of
our educational facilities and were, therefore, the most progressive ele-
ments, or there was no value whatever in reeducation. You could not
have both.
Now, I did make that statement. This is a garbled version of what
I said. But the important thing is that it appeared a few days later
in The Nation.
"Well, by a process of elimination in a number of instances of this
kind, I found that outside of those who were more or less standing
members of the committee who appeared every time and who were
completely reliable, that Friedman was the constant element.
I therefore went to Friedman and I taxed him with being the source
of information for these articles that appeared in Amerasia, in PM,
The Nation, New Republic, and so on. He denied that he had given
any of this information to unauthorized persons.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 715
He said that he reported only to his chief, who was then Mr.
Vincent.
The Chairman. Mr. who?
Mr. DooMAN. Mr. Vincent.
Mr. INIoRRis, That being Jolni Carter Vincent'?
Mr. DooMAN. John Carter Vincent.
Mr. MoKRis. Mr. Doonian, woukl you tell us to the best of your
ability the position that Owen Lattimore took at that time with respect
to Japan '( This is in 1945.
Mr. DooMAN. Well, there is a wliole library that could be made up
of statements made by Mr. Lattimore diu'ing that period. I suppose
the best known, the one most frequently quoted, is a book called
Solution in Asia, which was published, I think, in about February
1945, and was very widely circulated during the spring and early
summer, in fact until the surrender of Japan.
In general, he took the position that the Japanese people, when
they were defeated, would rise in rebellion against the system and
overthrow the monarchy; that there were elements in the State De-
partment, the so-called reactionary Fascist elements, who knew noth-
ing whatever about Japan except what they had picked up from people
in high social levels in Japan, and that these elements were intended to
use the prestige and the force of the influence of the United States
to keep the Emperor in power against the will of the Japanese people.
Another point which* he made was that the chief militarists were
not the war lords. General Tojo and others, but the big industrial
leaders. That these, the army and the navy, were merely puppets and
instruments of the big industrialists.
Therefore, his position was that we should allow the Japanese people
to have their revolt and disestablish the monarchy and that we should
then try these industrialists as war criminals and put them out of
the way so that they would never be in a position of influence.
And, third, that the Japanese system, economic system, should be
completely broken u]) and a highly developed competitive economic
system should be instituted.
Now, as I say, these statements can be found in a great many places.
Mr. Morris.' Will you give us whatever documentation you can?
Mr. DooMAN. I have here, for example, a radio discussion, a round-
table discussion that was carried out, I believe, under the auspices of
the University of Chicago. It was along about July 8, 1945.
Now, I notice that the press recently quoted Dr. Lattimore as hav-
ing said that his position had been consistently one of urging that
we do not interfere in the event that the Japanese wanted to disestab-
lish the monai\ hy. That is not the whole story.
In Solution in Asia, he makes this statement, which I cannot quote
textually, but it runs somewhat along these lines. He says :
I will venture the political prophecy that the Japanese people will themselves
revolt and disestablish the monarch.
Now, the suggestion at the same time, at that time — that is, before
the surrender — that people like Mr. Grew and myself were intending
to keep the Emperor in power implied, then, that we proposed to use
the influence and the position of the United States to prevent the exer-
cise by the Japanese people of their own will.
'22848— 52— pt. 3 2
716 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Well, let me say at this point that this whole discussion about the
Emperor carried on by the leftist press at that time was a piece of
sheer lunacy. If the Japanese people wanted to get rid of the Em-
peror there was obviously notliing we could do to keep him in ; if, on
the other hand, the Japanese people wanted to keep the Emperor it
would have been a piece of folly on our part to have disestablished
a monarchy.
Senator Eastland. Did John Carter Vincent endorse those views
of Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. DooMAN. I never heard him express that opinion, except prob-
ably indirectly through — and this is only an assumption — no, Sena-
tor ; if I may correct my statement, I will say no, I have never heard
him express it.
Senator Eastland. When Mr. Grew resigned, what place in the
Department did Mr. Vincent get ?
Mr. DooMAN, ]\Ir. Grew retired, or at least presented his resignation
on or about the 14th of August. I may be off a matter of a few days or
so. But the day he retired, or presented his resignation, it was an-
nounced in the papers that Mr. Dean Acheson has been appointed as
Under Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson having previously re-
tired as Assistant Secretary of State with the announcement that he
was going to resume private practice.
Mr. Acheson then returned to the State Department somewhere
around the 25th of August 1945. And the day after he returned there
he announced that I would be replaced as chairman of the Far Eastern
Subcommittee of Swink by Mr. Vincent.
Senator Eastland. I would like also to know, if I am not getting too
far afield
Mr. JMoRRis. That is all right.
Senator Eastland. The difference in what was advocated by John
Carter Vincent for Japan and the policies that the Communists put
over in Eastern Europe. I would like to know the difference between
the policies that he advocated f oi;^ Japan' and the policies that the
Communists put over in Eastern Europe.
Mr. DooMAN. Well, sir, I am not competent to discuss authoritative-
ly what the Communists put over in Eastern Europe, but I can tell
you what was done in Japan.
And it may, perhaps, occur to you that there are certain very dis-
tinct analogies between what was done there and what was done in
Eastern Europe.
Senator Eastland. They were practically the same ; were they not ?
Mr. DooMAN. I would prefer, if I may. Senator, to describe
Senator Eastland. Wliat is it ? You have discussed it, in executive
session. Is it not your judgment, now, that the policies that Mr.
Vincent attempted to put over in Japan were the same as the policies
that Russia dictated for the satellite countries?
Mr. DooMAN. Well, I am trying to be as accurate
Senator Eastland. What is your judgment?
Mr. Doom an. My judgment is it is the same.
Senator Eastland. They were the same ?
Mr. DouMAN. Obviously the same. But I would like to amplify
that, if I may.
Senator Eastland. I want you to. I want you to explain what our
State Department attempted to do in Japan, and the similarity with
what Russia did in the satellite countries.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 717
Mr. DooMAN. On Sepember 22, 1945, the White House released
a paper, which was entitled, "The United States Initial Post-Surren-
der Policy for Japan." That paper was the work of our committee,
the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, for a period of about 7 or
8 months, except for certain important changes which I will refer to.
As I was to retire from the State Department on the 31st of August
I asked Mr. Dunn, as chairman of SWINK, to call a meeting for the
express purpose of adopting this paper that we had been working
on for a long time; namely, the United States Initial Post-Surrender
Policy for Japan.
That paper was adopted by SWINK on the 29th of August, and on
the 29th of August that was telegraphed out to General MacArthur as
a firm United States policy for Japan.
However, in this release that was issued on the 22d of September,
it was pointed out, or it was clear, that the paper had been reopened.
On September 6 — mind you, on September 6 — by September 6, JSIr.
Grew had retired as Under Secretary, and had been replaced by Mr.
Acheson. I had retired and had been replaced as chairman of the far
eastern subcommittee by Mr. Vincent.
Well, I was very much interested in seeing whether there had been
any changes. And I found these, which I will quote. These were
among the changes that had been made in the paper after it had
been adopted on the 29th of August [reading] :
Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribution of income and of
the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the
policy of the Supreme Commander —
(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the
economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort
solely toward peaceful ends.
Please do not ask me to explain what that means.
(&) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and bank-
ing combinations which have exei'cised control of a large part of Japan's trade
and industry.
It is on the basis of these two clauses that work was undertaken to
destroy, first of all, to eliminate the capitalist class in Japan.
Senator Eastland (presiding). Who attempted to eliminate the
capitalist class in Japan?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator Eastland. Who attempted to eliminate it?
Mr. DooMAN. These were the instructions sent from Washington.
Senator Eastland. That was the American State Department?
Mr. DooMAN. W^ith the concurrence of the Navy Department and
the War Department.
These were the instructions sent to General MacArthur through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Senator Eastland. That was the work of John Carter Vincent, was
it not?
Mr. DooMAN. He was chairman at that time of this Far East sub-
committee.
Senator Eastland. Go ahead. Excuse me.
Mr. Morris. May I just keep the record straight. It may be unneces-
sary, but may I point out that Mr. Dooman is testifying that this is
the promulgation of American policy, and it represents a document
that Mr. Dooman worked upon while he was officially connected with
the State Department.
718 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
And lie noticed that when the program was finally promnlgated
these were the changes that had been made by his successors from the
program that had been adopted by Mr. Dooman and Mr. Grew prior
to that time.
Mr. DooMAN. That is so.
Senator Eastland. That was the Acheson- Vincent program there ?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator Eastland. What did they attempt to put over under that
program ?
Mr. DooMAN. The first thing that was done, and this was in 1946,
was to levy a capital tax of from 60 to 90 percent on all property in
excess of $1,000.
Senator Eastland. Did Russia do that in the countries of Eastern
Europe?
Mr. Dooman. Well, that is why I hesitate to answer your questions
directly, Senator, because I do not know whether they did, or not.
1 know that the end means was achieved by perhaps the same means,
or by other means ; I don't know.
Senator Eastland. All riffht. Go ahead.
o
Mr. DooMAN. You can imagine what that meant. That is, a capital
tax of from 60 to 90 percent of all property above $1,000. That almost
at one stroke wiped out the capitalist class.
The excuse for that was that it was necessary to prevent an inflation.
At that time, if I am correct, in my recollection, the Japanese yen
was pegged to the dollar at 15 yen to the dollar. And this was a
measure purportedly to prevent any further inflation.
It was not more than a month or two after this thing was carried out
that the yen then was pegged at 50 to 1. In other words, it had de-
clined by more than a third. That was the ostensible reason given.
Of course, as anybody could see, it would not have been an effective
one. But it did have the effect
Senator Eastland. Go ahead. What were the other things that
were proposed ?
Mr. DooMAN. The next thing was,- and this is somewhat contro-
versial, but perhaps a good case might be made out for it, but as
everybody has seen today, after this thing has been in effect for some
years, the thing is not working.
The next thmg was to expropriate ail land in excess of 5 acres
held by any one owner.
Senator Eas'ixand. That was a Communist system, was it not?
Mr. Dooman. Well, Senator, in Poland I think they put the limit
at 200 acres at that time. But in Japan, where 85 million people are
trying to make a living off an area
Senator Eastland. I understand, but they were following now
the Communist system, were they not?
Mr. Dooman. Yes.
Senator Eastland. Go ahead.
Senator Smith. May I ask him one question?
The Chairman. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. I understood you to say just now the yen was first
pegged at 15 to 1.
Mr. Dooman. Yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 719
Senator Smith. Later on at 50 to 1. And then you made the obser-
vation that that was a decline of one-third. It would decline 300 i)er-
cent, would it not ?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes ; that is right.
Senator Smith. You were in error about the one-third?
Mr. DooMAN, Yes.
Well, all land was expropriated in excess of 5 acres. There was
an ostensible effort to pay them compensation for this land, but by
this time they were paying for land in yen which had depreciated to
one one-hundred-and-eightieth of the nominal value of the land.
For example, if the land had been valued in 1920, as it was — that
was wlien the financial panic was taking place — if the land was valued
at $1,000 an acre, they paid the owners of the land at $1,000, but in
currency that had depreciated to one one-hundred-and-eightieth of the
value.
In other words, if a man had $1,000 in land, he was paid one-one-
hundred-and-eightieth.
There was virtually confiscation of all land above 5 acres.
Senator Eastland. Go ahead and describe what else there was.
Mr. DooMAN. Then all holdings by any one individual in any large
corporation in excess of 3 percent were confiscated. There were more
polite terms used. That is, they were transferred to a go t^ernment
pool.
And then the Japanese Government was ordered to sell those shares
in a certain order of priority to farmers' cooperatives, labor unions,
and shopkeepers, at whatever price might be offered.
And, furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered to dis-
regard any relationship between the price offered and the real value ;
and, furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered to finance
any bids for the shares by farmers' cooperatives and labor unions.
So that the net result was then to destroy the previously existing
capitalist class. As a capitalist class they no longer exist. Their
places have been taken by hordes of black marketeers and Chinese and
Formosan thugs of various kinds who have been engaged in illicit
trade of various kinds and have then amassed this enormous fortune.
The net result was then to replace people who had traditionally had
property with these black marketeers and thugs and blackguards of
various kinds.
Senator Eastland. Were those recommendations favored by Gen-
eral MacArthur ?
Mr. DooMAN. Let me cite in reply to that the statement made by
INIr. Acheson in reply to General MacArthur's pronouncement to the
Japanese people. I think it was on the first anniversary of the occu-
pation where General MacArthur had indicated that he looked for-
ward to the time when the American occupation in Japan could be
reduced to some figure below 200,000 soldiers.
■That aroused great resentment in the State Department, and at
that time Mr. Acheson issued the statement that General MaciVrthur
or the military occupation were there merely to carry out the orders
of the executive in Washington ; that they were not the f ormulators
of policy.
By implication policy was formulated in Washington.
720 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Therefore, in general, one would say that it didn't really make —
I don't know whether General MacArthur approved or disapproved.
Senator Eastland. What other policies were there ?
]SIr. DooMAN. Well, in the draft of this initial policy paper, which
had been prepared under my chairmanship, with regard to people who
were suspected of being war criminals or being militarists, it was
provided that they should be purged; that is, removed from any posi-
tion of authority, in the light of their own personal record, as brought
out by some form of judicial investigation.
In other words, a man would stand or fall on his own personal
record.
As you will see from that statement that I just read out, people
were removed from office on the basis of their occupation. Practically
the whole executive branch of Japanese business, from chairmen of
boards down to section chiefs, practically the whole white-collar ele-
ment in Japanese big business was removed at one stroke. Not because
there was any record against them, but because they occupied certain
positions. They destroyed it.
Senator Eastland. Was it not an attempt to destroy Japanese
capitalism?
Mr. DooMAN. It was an attempt to destroy and eliminate the brains
of Japanese business.
Senator Eastland. If you destroy the brains, you destroy
_ The Chairman. Wait a minute. Let us see if we can get the ques-
tion and answer together. The question was : Was this not an effort
to destroy Japanese capitalism, and you converted that into saying
Japanese brains. Let us get them together.
Mr. DooMAN. Well, I am saying
The Chairman. Answer the Senator's question.
Mr. DooMAN. In my opinion it was. I would like to stress that
in my opinion it was.
Senator Eastland. All right.
What else did they attempt to put over?
Mr. DooMAN. Just following thaf question, following that point,
I want to quote from this round-table discussion of the University of
Chicago on July 8, this statement attributed to Mr. Lattimore
[reading] :
That includes a lot of economic and political action as well because we can-
not forget that the civilian warmakers, that is the big industrialists and
financiers of Japan, are really primarily even more responsible for Japan's
going to war than the military and the navy, since the army and navy are only
the striking instruments and the tools.
Now, after the occupation about 12 of the leading Japanese indus-
trialists were put in prison, and they were held m prison for 18
months while every effort was made to dig up evidence which would
warrant their being put on trial, just as the military and political
people were put on trial and later condemned.
They were held, as I say, for 18 months, and released because there
was no evidence.
Now, if we are then to follow Mr. Lattimore, we obviously did a
great injustice to General Tojo in hanging him, because according to
Mr. Lattimore, we released his lords and masters and hung the tool
and the instrument.
Senator Eastland. Wliat other things were in the policy for Japan ?
IXSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 721
Mr. DooMAN. I have with me a copy of a paper known as Far East
Commission 230. This is a paper of considerable length, Senator,
in which all of the principles are laid out for the atomizing of Japa-
nese industry.
Senator Eastland. The what? I did not understand.
Mr. DooMAN. The atomizing, the fragmentation of Japanese in-
dustry. It is a very long paper.
The general purport was to see to it that the Japanese economy, not
only in industry but in banking and in every other field, should be
reduced to the smallest possible element.
The Chairman. How is that tied in here? Who is the article by?
Mr. DooMAN. Well, it was a paper. It Avas introduced as follows :
To the Far Eastern Commission by the Secretary General, Mr. Nel-
son T. Jonathan, under a paper which reads as follows [reading] :
The enclosure, a statement of proposed policy with respect to excessive con-
centrations of economic power in Japan, submitted by the United States, is cir-
culated herewith for the consideration of the Far East Commission and is refer-
red to Committee No. 2, economic and financial affairs.
Who prepared this paper, I have no means of knowing.
Mr. Morris. Is it an official publication of the State Department?
Mr. Doom AN. This has been released
The Chairman. You can answer that yes or no.
Mr. Dooman. I don't know.
The Chairman. Is it an official publication of the State Depart-
ment ?
Mr. DooMAN. I do not know.
This is a privately printed paper I have before me.
Mr. Morris. Where did you obtain that, Mr. Dooman ?
Mr. DooMAN. This was obtained, and given to me by a friend of
mine, Mr. James Lee Kaufman, an American lawyer in New York,
who went out to Japan and discovered the existence of this paper,
and he had it privately printed and distributed among his friends,
and he also had a copy of it reproduced, or summarized in an issue for
News Week 2 years ago.
Senator Eastland. Where did he get the paper in Japan?
Mr. DooMAN. He was told of the existence of this paper, and was
told if he went to a certain office he could find it. So he went to
this — I don't know where — some repository of documents and asked
a young lady
Senator Eastland. It was there to guide the occupation forces, was
it not ? It Avas a policy to guide our occupation, was it not ?
Mr. DooMAN. I was getting around to that in just a second, Senator,
if I may. I am answering the question.
The Chairman. The question has been propounded to you. Was
it or was it not there to guide our occupation forces?
Mr. D(^OMAN. This paper was submitted through the Far Eastern
Commission for consideration, and it was never adopted by the Far
Eastern Commission.
However, in draft form, it w^as sent out to Tokyo to the occupa-
tion authorities in the economic section and they acted on it.
Senator Eastland. It was sent by our State Department ?
Mr. Dooman. Sent by whom, I do not know. But it was sent to
the occupation authorities and they acted on it.
722 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
And when the disclosure was made by my friend, Kaufman, that
this paper had been acted on, it was then disavowed as merely being
a draft and merely presented to the Far Eastern Commission for
consideration.
But the point I want to emphasize was that it was, for all practical
purposes, an official document, because it was on the basis of this
that various instructions were sent to the Japanese Government.
Senator Eastland. As a matter of fact, to put it very mildly, there
is a striking similarity between the American policy toward Japan
and the policies laid clown by Russia to the satellite states in Eastern
Europe, is there not ?
Mr. DooMAN. I think that would be a fair statement to state.
Let me amplify that, if I may. You may remember that there had
been, before this establishment of this Far Eastern Commission, in
existence in London, the so-called European Commission of which
the members were representatives of the United States, England,
Eussia, and, I believe, France. And it was pretty well known in the
discussions before the Far Eastern Commission what the ideas of the
Russians were with regard to Germany, with regard to the treatment
of Japan.
Therefore, when it came to the question of Japan, there were those
elements who, knowing what the Russians wanted in Germany,
assumed that they would be satisfied with parallel policies in Japan.
Senator Eastland. Of course, what Russia wanted was to set up
a chaos and a system by which they could move in;- was that not it?
Mr. DooMAN. I think so.
Senator Smith. May I ask a question?
The Chairman. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Are there now in positions of power and trust in
the American Government any of the men who were responsible for
the enunciation of this policy you have described to us ?
Mr. DooMAN. Oh, yes.
Senator Smith. Who are they ?
Mr. DooMAN. Some, I say are resi5onsible, from the chain of com-
mand.
Senator Eastland. Name them, please.
Mr. DooMAN. In 1945 when this initial post surrender policy was
promulgated, the responsible people were, from the top, Mr. Byrnes,
Secretary of State.
Senator Smith. Mr. Byrnes.
Mr. Dooman, Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State; Mr. Acheson, Under
Secretary of State; John Carter Vincent, as chairman of the Far
Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, and also Director of the Far East-
ern Division; Mr. Edward Barton, who is still an economist, I be-
lieve ; he is the economist in charge of economic affairs for the occupa-
tion of this area ; James Pennfield, and then
Senator Smith. What position is he in now ?
Mr. Dooman. I believe he is in Yugoslavia as counselor of the Em-
bassy, I believe.
Mr. Morris. "Wliat was his position at that time?
Mr. Dooman. He had just returned from the Far East and was
assigned as deputy to Mr, Vincent in the Far East Subcommittee of
SWINK.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 723
Now, subsequently — and this is hearsay — the people who have been
busy on Japanese affairs, Japanese policies, in addition to those I
have named, would include Mr. John Allison, and — what is his nar^e
now — an economist, Barnett. I don't know what his first name is.
Barnett.
I think those are the principal ones.
Senator Smith. Well, now, is there any indication of any activity
by the top two men you mentioned in the furtherance of this policy,
Mr. Byrnes or Mr. Acheson ? Is there any evidence at all, indication
of activity on their part toward favoring the carrying out of that
policy ?
Mr. DooMAN. Well, in m}^ personal knowledge, and this requires —
well, my personal knowledge, I can recite one case.
In the spring of 1945 there was a meeting of the full Committee of
SWINK, the chairman at that time for that day being Mr. McCloy,
John McCloy, wdio was then Assistant Secretary of War. And the
committee as a whole had been discussing some European matter with
which I was not concerned, and, therefore, I came into the room when
they had completed their discussion of this European problem.
And I noticed among the people present was Mr. Dean Acheson.
Now, he had been called in, apparently, for consultation on the Euro-
pean problem, and he had nothing whatever to do with the problem
that I w^as to discuss, wdiich w^as the question of the Japanese political
system.
However, he staved on. He was then Assistant Secretary of State
for Congressional Kelations. He had nothing to do with this officially.
And I made my report to the committee, and at the end of that
report Mr. McCloy said, turning to Mr. Acheson :
Dean, yon are a great authority on far eastern matters. What do you think
of what we have just heard?
And the reply was :
I have discovered that far eastern experts are a penny a dozen. And you
can find some experts which will support any point of view that you care to have.
And I, myself, do not go along with what we have .Inst heard. I prefer to be
guided by experts who think more along my point of view.
From then on he quoted virtually textually from this Solution in
Asia by Dr. Lattimore.
Senator Smith. Do you mean he quoted from this paper that you
mentioned ?
Mr. DooMAN. Where Dr. Lattimore had said that the Japanese
people, he predicted that the Japanese people would rebel and dis-
establish the monarchy, and that if the monarchy existed it would
be only because there are certain Fascist groups in the State Depart-
ment who used the prestige of the United States.
Senator Smith. Did he approve of this policy that was enunciated
about practically confiscation of property?
Mr. Dooman. Oh, yes; he was Under Secretary of State.
And, as I say, I don't know, except from the fact that he would
have been in the chain of command. That paper could never have
gone through.
Senator Eastland. Who appointed Vincent?
Mr. Dooman. I think I testified that the day after Mr. Acheson
returned as Under Secretary of State
724 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Eastland. Just name him. Who appointed Vincent ? Jast
name the man.
JNIr. DooMAN. Mr. Acheson.
Senator Smith. Is there any indication that Mr. Byrnes, the Sec-
retary of State, knew about this at all ?
Mr. DooMAN. No ; there is no indication.
Senator Smith. That surprises me that that had developed, and
I ask you specifically was there any evidence that Mr. Byrnes him-
self knew about this promulgation or enunciation of policy?
Mr. DooMAN, No; there is no indication to my knowledize.
Mr. Morris. May I get back to the episode you have just testified
to. When did that take place ?
Mr. DooMAN. It was in the spring of 1945.
Mr. Morris. Were you thoroughly conversant with Owen Latti-
more's Solution in Asia at that time?
Mr. DooMAN. Thoroughly.
Mr. Morris. When you heard INIr. Acheson enunciate his views on
Japan, is it your testimony that they coincided with the views ex-
pressed by Owen Lattimore in Solution in Asia ?
Mr. DooMAN. Exactly.
Mr. Morris. Did his view on experts being a dime a dozen coincide
with the views of Owen Lattimore at that time?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes; his opinions about certain types of experts;
yes. He had a very dim view of experts who did not agree with him.
As a matter of fact, he said, in effect, in his book. Solution in Asia,
that people like myself had spent a long time in Japan, but we were
spending all of our time with very polite people, ^nd we really didn't
know very much about what was going on.
Mr. ]\IoRRis. May I get back to some previous testimony that we
have not completely finished.
I asked you earlier if you would document as much as possible your
expression of Owen Lattimore's views at that time. You had given
a rather precise summary of what his views were, and then I asked you
if you had any documentation to support that.
I also offer you just by way of assistance in connection with that
extracts from Mr. Lattimore's Solution in Asia that may aid you in
answering the question I have just put to you.
Mr. DooMAN. Here is a very reminiscent phrase.
The Chairman. W.ait a minute. What are you testifying from?
Mr. Morris. These are extracts from Owen Lattimore's book,
Solution in Asia.
The Chairman. All right. •
Mr. DooMAN (reading) :
Washington is full of experts who will tell you that the Japanese are mysteri-
ous, fanatical, and not to be understood by any ordinary use of the intellect. The
same experts are also addicted to citing bits of lore which, they tell you con-
descendingly, explain why the Japanese always do this or never do that.
Here is an example of the attempts on the part of Dr. Lattimore to
put into ridicule people who did not agree with his point of view.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 725
Tliere is missing from this that quotation to which I have just re-
ferred, and I think it runs :
As a political prophecy —
whatever that may mean —
As a political prophecy, the Japanese people will disestablish the monarchy
unless there is interference on the part of people in the State Department.
The Chairman. You are attempting to quote now from Latti-
more's
]\rr. DooMAN. From memory, yes. I do not have a copy of the book.
Mr. MoRKis. "VVe have a copy here, Mr. Chairman. I think we
might ask Mr. Dooman if he would put the precise quotation in if
possible.
Is it page 189, Mr. Dooman ?
Mr. Dooman. Well, this is not the quotation I have in mind :
I assume that the Japan of the future will be a republic.
That follows another reference where he says, as a matter of politi-
cal— will you give me just a minute?
Mr. Morris. Yes, Mr. Dooman.
Mr. Dooman. Here it is. It is on page 187 [reading] :
As a matter of political prophecy, I agree that the Japanese people are likely
to overturn the throne unless we prevent them.
Mr. Morris. Thank you, Mr. Dooman. Will you proceed with your
documentation of views of Owen Lattimore which you have testified
to here today ?
Mr. Dooman. Would you like further references to Mr. Lattimore's
opinion about the Emperor?
Mr. Morris. Yes; I think if you would -put in a few more of those,
Mr. Dooman ; those extracts are of no assistance to you, are they, Mr.
Dooman ?
Mr. Dooman. Yes ; on page 189, 1 quote as follows [reading] :
If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an Emperor, well and good.
If not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated
that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible
for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned,
preferably in China, but under the supervision of a United Nations Commission
to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to mem-
bers of Zaibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an
agrarian reform program, conspmiously without his sanction and by order of
the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service
and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining
members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New
vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy.
The Chairman. From what did you read that extract ?
Mr. Dooman. I am reading from page 189 of Solution in Asia,
by Owen Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the whole of the
Solution in Asia laid in the record ?
The Chairman. You mean that book ?
726 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
•
Mr. Morris. Yes ; as well as the document referred to by the witness
on the Round Table Conference from which quotes have been taken.
The Chairman. I do not think we will put the book in the record.
We will make it a part of the files of this committee.
Mr. Morris. I meant make it a part of the files of the committee.
The Chairman. The excerpts are from the book, are they not ?
Mr. Morris. We have read the excerpts from the record, Mr. Chair-
man.
The Chairman. They are from this?
Mr. Morris. Some excerpts are from Solution in Asia, IMr. Chair-
man, and others are from this publication of the Round Table Con-
ference.
The Chairman. You want all of these put into the record ?
Mr. Morris. So much of them as have been quoted by Mr. Dooman.
The Chairman. Veiy well.
Mr. Morris. Meanwhile, I would like both of these documents made
a part of the file of the record.
Tlie Chairman It will be made part of the record so much as you
select as havino; been testified to by the witness, but I may say that it all
has not been testified to.
(The documents referred to were filed for the information of the
committee.)
The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. JMoRRis. Mr. Dooman, we have not finished the line of question-
ing before which concerns the official attitude or the attitude of John
Carter Vincent with respect to these particular discussions.
Now, you said, to your own knowledge you have never heard John
Carter Vincent give expression to any views that coincided with those
of Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Dooman. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Do you know of any official publications of the Far
Eastern Division of the State Department that would show that the
views of the head of that Department coincided with the views ex-
pressed by Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Dooman. Yes ; I have already — I thought I made it clear that
primarily this initial post-surrender policy for Japan was one for
wliich ]\Ir. Vincent would have primary responsibility, and I have
tried to show that.
]Mr. Morris. How do you know that, Mf. Dooman?
Mr. Dooman. Because ipso facto he was an ex officio. He was chair-
man of this committee that produced that document.
Mr. Morris. In other words, he was the working chairman of the
committee?
]Mr. Dooman. He was the working chairman of that committee.
Mr. Morris. The reason I ask that, Mr. Dooman, is that awhile ago
you gave expression to the view that Mr. Byrnes, as Secretary of
State, you did not know that he personally shared the views put forth
in this publication ?
Mr. Dooman. No; I did not.
The question was whether I knew the people who were responsible
and I mention Mr. Byrnes as being responsible by reason of the chain
of command, he being the Secretary of State and the person ultimately
responsible.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 727
Mr. JkloRRis. But is it your testimony, then, that John Carter Vin-
cent, in addition to being the nominal head of tlie Far Eastern Divi-
sion of the State Department and your successor in SWINK, that he
was an active member, working member ?
Mr. Doom AN. Yes. May I say that he was more than the nominal
director of the Far Eastern Office, he was the actual working director
as of the 7th of September, 1945.
Mr. Morris. That is right. It is your testimony that Mr. Byrnes, as
Secretary of State, his work in that position did not necessarily coin-
cide with the position taken by
Mr. DooMAN. Mr. Byrnes actually had very little interest in the
Far East.
Senator Smith. What I was trying to fix, Mr. Dooman, was that
it was inconceivable to me that Mr. Byrnes had any such ideas.
Mr. DooMAN. I tried to make it clear. I mentioned Mr. Byrnes
among those responsible purely on grounds of chain of command.
Senator Smith. Yes.
The Chairman. The responsibility that you apply to Mr. Byrnes,
if I understand it, stems from the fact that he was Secretary of State
and that all mentioned in your testimony were under him; is that
correct ?
Mr. Dooman. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, are there any other promulgations of
policy that you are acquainted with either directly or from your
reading knowledge of them that you care to put into the record at this
time 'I
Mr. Dooman. Very much.
Mr. Morris. Will you proceed, then, Mr. Dooman?
Mr. Dooman. Mr. Chairman, this is a fairly long story, and I hope
you will bear patiently with me while I go into it.
The Chairman. Well, I want to know what the question is now,
please.
Mr. Morris. Will you read the question back, please ?
(The reporter read the pending question, as follows:)
Mr. MoEEis. Mr. Dooman, are there any other promulgations of policy that
you are acquainted with either directly or from your reading knowledge of
them that you care to put into the record at this time?
The Chairman. Promulgation of policies as to what ?
Mr. Morris. Promulgation of far-eastern policy with respect to
Japan.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Smith. By whom? Anybody connected with the State
Department ?
Mr. Morris. By the State Department, particularly the Far East-
ern Division thereof.
Senator Smith. That is all right.
Mr. Dooman. You wnll notice that all through my testimony I have
referred constantly to this question of the Emperor.
In March or April of 1945, Colonel Dana Johnson, w^ho was Chief
of Psychological Warfare in Hawaii, came to Washington and saw
Mr. Grew and myself. His conclusion, drawn from interrogating
high-ranking Japanese prisoners of war, was that the Japanese weie
ready to surrender but that the various statements and the trend oi
728 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
public opinion with regard to the question of the monarchy was such
that so long as the Japanese were left with the impression that the
Emperor was personally to be tried as a war criminal and punished,
that the monardiial system would be disestablished, so long as those
ideas were assumed to be public opinion and would be implemented
as American policy after Japan's surrender, that the Japanese would
not surrender.
Shortly thereafter on, I think it was the I7th of April
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did he tell you that was his opinion?
Mr. DooMAN. He did, sir.
On April 17, there was a change of government, a general retired
as Prime Minister and there was a reconstitution of the Government
at the head of which was Admiral Suzuki, who was then Chamberlain
to the Emperor and who had been throughout his career a moderate.
He took that as a very clear signal that the Japanese were ready to
surrender, ready to talk about this matter.
Furthermore, we had the advantage of reading messages between
the Japanese Government and their Ambassador in Moscow, and it
was clear from these and other indications that the Japanese were
ready to surrender if only it were made clear that this trend of opin-
ion that had been developed by the leftist press in the United States,
namely, that the Emperor would be tried as a w^ar criminal and the
monarchial system disestablished, it was made clear that those were
not policies of the United States.
We then started on preparing a document. About the middle of
May, Mr. Henry Luce came back from a visit to the Pacific, and he
was very much aroused. He said that the failure of the American
Government to persuade the Japanese to surrender was causing, was
doing, great damage to the morale of the American forces who had
fought through Saipan and Tarawa, and who were anticipating then
the assault on Japan and were fearful of the losses that would have
to be paid there.
Mr. Grew, who saw Henry Luce^ explained to him that we were
working on that eifort, we were working on a plan along those lines.
It was, I think, on the Sltli of May, if that happens to be, if my
recollection is correct.
Mr. Morris. 1945 ?
Mr. DooMAN. 1945. It was on a Saturday that Mr. Grew called me
in and instructed me to have ready Monday morning a paper which
he would then present to the President outhning the policies that the
United States would follow if Japan surrendered.
I then prepared that paper and took it to Mr. Grew on Monday
morning.
So far as the portion relating to the Emperor is concerned, my
original draft reads as follows — this was paragraph 12 [reading] :
The occurying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon
as these objectives —
namely, those previously enumerated —
have been accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peace-
fully inclined, i'esi)ousible government of a character representative of the
Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present
dyujisty if the peace-lovinj^ nations can be convinced of the genuine determination
of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible
the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 729
Mr. Grew approved the draft and called a meeting of the Policy
Committee of the State Department. The Policy Committee of the
State Department at that time consisted of the Assistant Secretaries of
State and the Legal Adviser. He read this document to them, and
there was no dissent until he came to that paragraph which 1 have just
read. There was then a violent reaction on the part of Mr. Acheson
and ^Ir. MacLeish.
Mr. MoKRis. What position did both of those gentlemen hold at
that time?
Mr. DooMAN. I was not present at the meeting but the whole idea
of allowing the monarchy to remain was distasteful.
Mr. Morris. To Messrs. Acheson and MacLeish ?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes,
Mr. SouKWiNE. Mr. Dooman, if you were not present at the meet-
ing, I think you ought to explain how you knew what took place.
Mr. Dooman. This was immediately told to me by Mr. Grew after
the meeting.
Mr. SouRWiNE. What you are describing, then, is Mr. Grew's de-
scription of what took place at the meeting 'I
Mr. Dooman. That is correct. Mr. Grew said that this committee
was, after all, advisory to him, and that he was ultimately responsible,
and that he would take the responsibility for presenting that docu-
ment to the President with the recommendation that he include that
document within a speech which he was to deliver at some appropriate
occasion.
On the 28th of May, with Judge Rosenman, he went in to see the
President. The President read it over and he said that he would
approve, accept, the document, provided that it was agreeable to the
armed services.
On the 29th of May, Mr. Grew, Judge Rosenman, and myself
attended a meeting in Mr. Stimson's office.
The Chairman. Whose office?
Mr. Dooman. Mr. Stimson, who was then Secretary of War.
This was at the Pentagon. There were present Secretary Forrestal,
Mr. McCloy, Mr. Elmer Davis, who was then Director of the Office of
War Information, Mr. Grew, myself. General Marshall, and I should
say in addition about 10 to 12 of the highest military and naval
officers — who they were I do not remember at this time.
We had prepared copies of this paper for distribution so that eacti
member present would have a copy.
Mr. Stimson, who was in the chair at the meeting, said that he
approved the document right along, he went right along with the
paper. In fact, he thought, as a matter of fact, that we did not give
sufficient allowance to the Japanese for their capacity to produce as
they had in the past such progressive men as Baron Shidihara, Hama-
guchi, and Wakatsuki, and others. These are former Japanese Prime
Ministers.
Mr. Forrestal read it over and he agreed. Mr. McCloy agreed also.
The Chairman. Agreed, or approved?
Mr. Dooman. Approved. Mr. Elmer Davis reacted very violently
and would have none of it.
Mr. Morris. What position did he hold at this time?
730 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. DooMAN. He was, as I said, Director of the Office of War Infor-
mation. Various other officers approved of it, but there was a feeling
that the publication of that document
Mr. Morris. Vincent was not present?
Mr. DooMAN. No. As a matter of fact, information on this was re-
stricted to a very small number of people, those people that I have just
indicated.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You were present at this conference ?
Mr. DooMAN. I was present.
Mr. SouRWiNE. When you speak of Mr. Davis having reacted vio-
lently, you were there and saw the reaction ?
Mr, DooMAN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. How did Mr. Davis react, what was the nature of
his violent reaction ?
Mr. DooMAN, He did not approve, he did not approve of anything
which might be construed in any way as forming a basis for a negoti-
ated surrender.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that what he said?
Mr. DcOMAN. Yes; that was, in effect, what he said. However, the
thing was pigeonholed because of the view among the military people
that the publication of this document at that time would be premature.
Mr. Morris. What military people?
Mr. DooMAN. Well, principally, General Marshall.
Mr. Morris. Did not General Marshall express disagreement?
Mr. DooMAN. No ; he weiit along with the paper but his statement
was that the publication of the document at that time would be, and
this word I remember textually, "premature." With that, the paper
was set aside for the time being. However, a very short time after
that, it was a matter of perhaps 2 or 3 weeks
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the time again, the week and month,
if possible ?
Mr. DooMAN. The 29th of May 1945, that this meeting took place
in Secretary Stimson's office. Within a very short time, I should say
a matter of a fortnight, information was available in the State De-
partment that Dr. Lattimore had called on the President and had re-
monstrated very strongly against any position or decision taken by
this Government which would enable the monarchy to remain in
Japan.
Mr. SouRAviNE. What do you mean "information was available in
the State Department," Mr. Dooman ?
Mr. DooMAN. Well, you understand, Mr. Sourwine, that so far as
Japan was concerned, I was in a rather key position, and there was
information passing iDack and forth between the State Department
and the White House which was very closely guarded.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean official information?
Mr. DooMAN. Official information.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean you learned of Mr. Acheson's protest to
the President from official^
Mr. DooMAN. Mr. Lattimore's
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore's protest from official papers which
came across your desk ?
Mr. DooMAN. No ; word of mouth.
Mr. Sourwine. Who told you ?
Mr. DooMAN. Mr. Grew.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 731
Mr. Sour WINE. Did anyone else tell you ?
Mr. DooMAN. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. What you meant by information becoming avail-
able was that Mr. Grew told you ?
Mr. DooMAN. It was Mr. Grew who told me.
The Chairman. All right, go ahead.
Mr. DooMAN. Now, Mr. Lattimore had been using every opportu-
nity for a period of a year or more to propound the doctrine that the
Japanese people would overturn the monarchy and that there were a
group of people in the State Department, Fascists and reactionaries,
who were going to keep the Emperor in power against the will of the
Japanese people.
But, to me, it was very queer that once a decision — now, mind you,
up to that time, there had been no decision within the State Depart-
ment on the question of the Emperor. There was a trend of thinking
but there was no decision until the recommendation was made to the
President. To me, it was very queer that immediately, well, within
a matter of weeks, 2 or 3 weeks after that decision was made, that Mr.
Lattimore went to the President and remonstrated with this decision.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, are there any other incidents or episodes
or official reports that you know that would document your views on
Owen Lattimore, which you are now testifying to?
Mr. DooMAN. I would like to identify this document that I have
been talking about if I may.
Mr. Morris. I think we should put that into this record, too, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. DooMAN. This document, as I say, was put aside.
The Chairman. You say "this document," and we have been deal-
ing with a number of documents. Is this the document which you
prepared at the instance of the Secretary ?
Mr. DooMAN. As the Acting Secretary of State.
I am proceeding now to identify the document.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. DooMAN. This paper, then, was taken by Mr. Stimson to Pots-
dam. I arrived myself at Potsdam on the 13th of July, and I was
told by Mr. McCloy, who was then there, that Mr. Stimson was in
active discussion with Mr. Churchill with regard to that document
and I heard later, I believe also from Mr. McCloy, that there was an
agreement between Mr. Stimson and Mr. Churchill, and that they had
then gone to Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes and had received an accept-
ance of the document. It was then telegraphed to General Chiang
Kai-shek, and on May 29, it was promulgated then as the Potsdam
Proclamation to Japan, and it was on the basis of that document that
Japan surrendered.
May I also add, for the benefit of — I do not want to take credit that
really belongs to somebody else, but I would like to put on record
here that the preamble to the Potsdam Proclamation was taken from
a document prepared by Douglas Fairbanks, who was then in the
Navy Department in the Psychological Warfare Department.
The Chairman. Douglas Fairbanks ?
Mr. DooMAN. Douglas Fairbanks.
I would like to make acknowledgment, if I could, of his contribution
2284S— 52 — pt. 3 3
•732 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to a paper which, after all, is part of history.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You are referring to the movie actor i
Mr. DooMAN. The movie actor.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Father or son ?
Mr. DooMAN. Son.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.
Mr. DooMAN. Yes. . -, ^r ^ »
Mr. Morris. Have you finished with that episode, Mr. Dooman {
Mr. DooMAN. Yes. ^^ ^^ ^-s^
The Chairman. Do I understand now that he started out to identity
this instrument and he does not identify it ?
Mr. Morris. Will you describe in detail so that we might make that
a part of our record if the chairman deems it necessary?
Mr DooMAN. Yes. This was entitled when prepared: "Draft
Proclamation by the Heads of the State, U. S.-U. K.-Chma," and it
was then ultimately issued on the 29th of July at Potsdam, by Prime
Minister Attlee, Mr. Truman, and General Chiang Kai-shek, and
when Kussia came into the war, the Soviet Union then adhered to this
document. , . • i i.
The Chairman. Let me go back and get the document straight
again, please.
Is this the document that you are now testifying to the same docu-
ment that you prepared at the instance of the Assistant Secretary of
Stale?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is that the one that was rejected at the instance
of General Marshall ?
Mr. DooMAN. It was later signed.
The Chairman. That is what I mean, but temporarily, at least, laid
aside ?
Mr, DooMAN. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. That is the document that afterwards was adopted
at Potsdam?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And the preliminary to that, the preamble to that
was prepared by Douglas Fairbanks ?
Mr. DoOMAN. Yes, sir. I would like to mention this thing that the
only portion of my draft which was changed, not in substance but in
text, was that paragraph 12 which I have just read ; that was cut down
to read that the Japanese might have such form of Government as
they desired.
The Chairman. Had your document set up or attempted to set up
the continuation of a monarchy ?
Mr. Dooman. Well, I haven't read it ; that the occupation of Japan
should cease —
when a responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese
people had been set up. This may include a constitutional monarchy under
the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine
determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will
render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.
As I say, that particular paragraph was cut down to the effect that
such type of government as they pleased, in accordance with the
wishes of the Allies, or something of that sort.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer this now.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 733
Mr. DooMAN. Excuse me, that includes some other papers.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this introduced
into the record in its entirety, it is only three pages and I would like to
have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. It reads: "Draft
Proclamation by the Heads of State, U. S., U. K., USSR-phina."
The Chairman. Now, this instrument that I now hold in my hand,
consisting of three pages, was that the entire instrument that you
prepared at the instance of the Assistant Secretary of State ?
Mr. DooMAN. That was prepared at the direction of Mr. Grew, then
Acting Secretary of State.
The Chairman. Acting Secretary of State.
Mr. DoOMAN. Yes.
The Chairman. Was this the entire instrument?
Mr. DoOMAN. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Going back a little bit, this was the instrument
which was discussed in the Pentagon at the time Mr. Marshall was
present, and it was at his instance, laid aside?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. This is the instrument that was shown to the Presi-
dent in the White House ?
Mr. Dooman. As I recall, on the 28th of May.
The Chairman. This may be inserted in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 240" and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 240
Deatt Proclamation by the Heads of State U. S.-U. K.-[U. S. S. R.]-China
[Delete matters inside brackets if U. S. S. R. not in war]
(Completed in Department of State May, 1945)
(1) We, — The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great
Britain, [the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union] and the President of the Republic
of China, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred
and agree that the Japanese people shall be given an opportunity to end this
war on the terms we state herein.
(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British
Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from
the west [have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union
and] are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is
sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute
the war against Japan until her capitulation.
(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of
the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example
to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably
greater than that which, when apijlied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid
waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German
people. The full application of our military power backed by our resolve will
mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and
just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.
(4) Are the Japanese so lacking in reason that they will continue blindly to
follow the leadership of those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent
calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation?
The time has come for- the Japanese people to decide whether to continue on to
destruction or to follow the path of reason.
(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no
alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of
those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world
conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be
impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
734 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof
that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, Japanese territory shall be occupied
to the extent necessary to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are
here setting forth.
(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokliaido, Kyushu, Shikohu
and such minor islands as we determine.
(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be
permitted to return to their homes, with the opportunity to lead peaceful and
productive lives.
(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or de-
stroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals,
Including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic
tendencies among the Japanese shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom
of speech,' of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental
human rights shall be established.
(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as are determined
to offer no potential for war but which can produce a sustaining economy and
permit the Japanese to take their part in a world economic system, with access
to raw materials and opportuniies for peaceful trade.
(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as
soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established
beyond a doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character
representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional mon-
archy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced
of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace
which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism
in Japan.
(13) We call upon the Japanese people and those in authority in Japan to
proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces and
to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action.
The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
The Chairman. Let me go back again for a question or two. What
part of that was prepared by Douglas Fairbanks ?
Mr. DooMAN. It was the preamble.
The Chairman. What do you call the preamble?
Mr. DooMAN. The preamble consists of those paragraphs preced-
ing the numbered paragraphs in that paper.
The Chairman. Preceding?
Mr. DooMAN. Preceding the nuihbered paragraphs.
Mr. Morris. The first paragraph here is a numbered paragraph.
The Chairman. That is correct, the first paragraph is a numbered
paragraph.
Mr. DooMAN. My recollection was faulty. It consists of para-
graphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. In other words, paragraphs 1 to 4, inclusive,
were prepared by, largely by, Mr. Fairbanks.
The Chairman. Where was Mr. Fairbanks at that time?
Mr. Dooman. He was in the Psychological Warfare Section of
the Navy Department at that time.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, when you testified in executive session
on July 11, 1951, at the beginning of your testimony with respect to
a conflict of views between yourself and Mr. John Carter Vincent,
you said then :
My view was then that a country such as Japan with a population far in
excess of what it could support without colonies was in very grave danger of
being communized unless certain of the natural resources available on the con-
tinent could be made available to the Japanese. Vincent's position always was
that the opportunities for these 70- or 80-million Japanese to make a liveli-
hood should be restricted as much as possible to what they could find on their
own metropolitan area of Japan, the four main islands.
Senator Eastland. Whose policy was that?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 735
Mr. DooMAN. That was the general policy, Vincent's.
Senator Eastland. Vincent's?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes.
Now, I wonder, Mr. Dooman, if you would, either from your own
personal experiences or from your reading of official documents pub-
lished by Mr. Vincent or Mr. Vincent's division, support that testi-
mony.
Mr. DooMAN. Well, those views were set forth in a broadcast under
the auspices of the State Department. I think it was carried on in
D. C. on the night of October 6, 1945.
Mr. Morris. What is your recollection of that broadcast ? Did you
hear the broadcast, or did you read a transcription of it?
Mr. DooMAN. I read a transcription of it in the newspapers.
The Chairman. By whom was the broadcast made ?
Mr. Dooman. There were several people who participated in it.
General Hilldring, who was a member of SWINK for civil affairs
matters. Captain — I can't remember his name now, but he is now
the President's naval aide — Captain Davidson.
Mr. Morris. Do you have a copy of that transcription with you,
Mr. Dooman?
Mr. Dooman. No, sir ; I do not.
Mr. Morris. What is your recollection of what took place on that
broadcast ?
Mr. Dooman. Well, it was substantially along the lines testified to
previously by me in the executive session.
Mr. Morris. Namely, that Vincent's position always was that the
opportunity for these 70 or 80 million Japanese to make a livelihood
should be restricted as much as possible to what they could find on
their own metropolitan area, the four main islands?
Mr. Dooman. That's right. In other words, emphasis was to be
laid on agriculture and fishing and such minor industries as they could
support.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that transcription
inserted in the record because of its considered importance.
The Chairman. What transcription ?
Mr. Morris. This is the transcript.
Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document?
Mr. Mandel. This is headed "Department of State Bulletin, Our
Occupation Policy for Japan." The date of the bulletin is October
7, 1945, and it gives the participants in this broadcast to which Mr.
Dooman has referred.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, I offer you this and ask you if there are
any particular passages you would like to underscore in that trans-
cript.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to introduce the
whole transcript into the record.
The Chairman. That is a photostatic copy of the original?
Mr. Morris. Pardon, sir?
The Chairman. This is a photostatic copy of the original?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel has so identified it.
Mr. Mandel. Yes.
The Chairman. That is taken from the files of the State Depart-
ment?
736 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Mandel. That photostat was made at my direction by the
Library of Congress.
The Chairman. All right. It will be inserted in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 241" and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 241
[From the Department of State Bulletin. October 7, 1945]
OiTR Occupation Policy fob Japan
Participants
John Cartehj Vincent : Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of
State, and Chairman, Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating
Committee.
Maj. Gen. John H. Huxdring : Director of Civil Affairs, War Department.
Capt. R. L. Dennison: U. S. Navy, Representative of tlie Navy Department
on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.
Sterling Fishek : Director, NBC University of the Air.
[Released to the press October 6]
Announcer : Here are headlines from Washington:
General Hilldring Says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese Big Business, Will Be Broken
Up ; States We Will Not Permit Japan To Rebuild Her Big Combines ; Promises
Protection of Japanese Democratic Groups Against Attacks by Military
Fanatics.
John Carter Vincent of State Department Forecasts End of National Shinto;
Says That the Institution of the Emperor Will Have To Be Radically Modified,
and That Democratic Parties in Japan Will Be Assured Rights of Free
Assembly and Free Discussion.
Captain Dennison of Navy Department Says Japan Will Not Be Allowed Civil
Aviation; Predicts That Japanese Will Eventually Accept Democracy, and
Emphasizes Naval Responsibility for Future Control of Japan.
Announcer: This is the thirty-fourth in a series of programs entitled "Our
Foreign Policy," featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by
Government officials and Members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the
people of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service men and
women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed
Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also
available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain
them.
This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast
on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan", Participating are Mr. John Carter
Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department ;
Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department;
and Capt. R. L. Dennison, U. S. N., Navy Department representative on the Far
Eastern Subcommittee of the State. War, Navy Coordinating Committee. They
wil be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the
Air. Mr. Fisher —
Fisher: No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio, and
general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate
has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious
of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese.
Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much
of the confusion surrounding this debate.* But it also raised many questions —
questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have
asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned — the State, War,
and Navy Departments — to interpret further our Japan policy.
General Hilldring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at
least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our
policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by telling us just how that
policy is determined.
Hilldring: Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will
try to explain how it is made. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee —
1 Bulletin of Sept. 23, 1945. p. 423.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 737
"SWING", we call it— formulates policy for the President's approral, on ques-
tions of basic importance. On the military aspects, the views of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the
approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces
in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we
think he is doing it very well.
Fisher : Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern subcommittee of which you are chair-
man does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it.
Vincent: That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far
Eastern policy and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters.
We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with
which General Hilldring is associated and with which Captain Dennison and
I sit in an advisory capacity.
Hilldring: The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing
the Secretaries of the three departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James
Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, and the Under Secretary
of the Navy, Artemus Gates.
Fisheb: Mr. Vincent, I'd like to kno^^ whether there is a — shall we say —
strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department.
Vincent: No, tliere is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There
is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and the
State Department. I can assure you that General INIacArthur is receiving our
support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment.
Fisher: There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian
advisers.
Vincent : That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists
have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has
welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with
specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to
send more and more such people out.
Fisher : As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern subcommittee, Captain
Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation.
Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in,
and voice in, the policy for Japan.
Dennison : We have a vital interest in it. The 2 million men and the 5,000
vessels of the United States Navy in the Pacific and the vital role they played in
the defeat of Japan are a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country
separated from us by 4,500 miles of ocean. Its continued control will always
present a naval problem.
Fisher : What part is the Navy playing now in that control?
Dennison : Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this
duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General
MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in civil-
affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the
former Japanese mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands.
Fisher: Does that include Okinawa?
Dennison : Yes.
Fisher: That's not generally known, is it?
Dennison : No, I believe not. I'd like to add — besides these immediate duties
the United States Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan long
after our troops are withdrawn.
Fisher: Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as chairman of the subcom-
mittee which drafts our occupation policy, can you give us a statement of our
over-all objectives?
Vincent : Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces
and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratise Japan — to
encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will
not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.
Fisher: And how long do you think that will take?
Vincent : The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the
Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this : The occupation will continue
until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue
until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its
form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American
democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic
tendencies.
738 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Fisher: General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy
Japan ?
Hilldking: To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of
clairvoyance I don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish
our aims. We must stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until
we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned.
Fisher: To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain
and the Soviet Union, take part in formulating occupation policy?
Hilldring : That is not a question which soldiers should decide. It involves
matters of high policy on which tlie Army must look to the State Department.
I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question.
Fisher: Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it?
Vincent: Immediately following the Japanese surrender, the United States
proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission as a means of
regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries
interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced
recently that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies
for tlie control of Japan." In addition to the four principal powers in the
Far East, a number of other powers ar§ to be invited to have membership on the
Commission.
Fisher : Coming back to our first objective — General Hilldring, what about the
demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone?
Hilldring : Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is
virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning disarmed
soldiers to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems and
food and housing problems are serious delaying factors.
Fisher : And what's being done about the Japanese troops in other parts of
Asia ?
Hilldring : It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on
shipping are urgent, and the return of our own troops is the highest priority.
Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated ; the return of
Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place.
Fisher : Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the
Japanese forces scattered through Asia?
Dennison : It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close to
three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacitic, and for
the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home.
Fisher: And what is being done with the Japanese Navy?
Dennison : The Japanese Navy has been almost completely erased. There's
nothing left of it except a few battered hulks and these might well be destroyed.
Fisher: Now, there are some other, less obvious parts of the military sys-
tem— the police system, for example. JThe Japanese secret police have been
persecuting liberal, anti-militarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what
will be done about that?
Vincent : That vicious system will be abolished, Mr. Fisher. Not only the
top chiefs but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its
hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America
will liave to be substituted for it.
Dennison : We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and
not an ai'my in the guise of police.
Hilldring : As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already
abolished the Kempai and political police.
Fisher : It seems to me that a key question in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent,
is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese Government,
from the Emperor on down.
Vincent: Well, one of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes
in the Constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the Constitution which would
hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible to the
people of Japan must be removed.
Fisher: Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible govern-
ment?
Vincent: The institution of the Emperor — if the Japanese do not choose to
get rid of it — will have to be radically modified, Mr. Fisher.
Dennison : The Emperor's authority is subi'ect to General MacArthur and
will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Direc-
tives sent to General MacArthur establish that point.
» See p. 545.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 739
FiSHEE : Can you give us the substance of that directive that covers that point,
Captain Denuison?
Dennison : I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur
said:
"1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the
state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You
will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission.
Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an uncon-
ditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain
any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.
"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to
the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does
not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders
issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, in-
cluding the use of force." ^ That's the directive under which General MacArthur
is operating.
Fisher: That's clear enough. . . . Now, General Hilldring, you have to do
with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main differ-
ence between them?
Hilldring : Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Re-
duced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again
breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism
of control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national Gov-
ernment, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government,
and our controls must, in general, be imposed locally.
Fisher: Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of
the national Government in Japan?
Hilldring: The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the
national Government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese Gov-
ernment available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole
complicated machine required for the administration of a country of 70 million
people. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By
cleaning up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool, we are
saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are
requiring the Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing the
specifications.
Fisher: But some people argue. General, that by utilizing the Japanese Gov-
ernment we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't
this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry
persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression?
Hilldring: Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japa-
nese groups or individuals, eitlier in government or in industry. If our policy
requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be re-
moved. The desires of the Japanese Government in this respect are immaterial.
Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur.
Dennison : Our policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not
to support it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to
feel out the situation.
Fisher: Would you say. Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went
to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite?
Dennison : In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General
MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has corre-
spondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those policies.
Fisher : He certainly has. Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians,
Mr. Vincent? Some of them look pretty guilty to me.
Vincent : Well, the Higashi-Kuni cabinet resigned this week. The report today
that Shidehara has become Premier is encouraging. It's too early to predict
exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it
will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found by
General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, he will go out.
Fisher : Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni cabinet be tried as war
criminals?
Vincent : We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we
can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being
war criminals will be arrested and tried. Cabinet status will be no protection.
« Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 480.
740 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Hiixdeing: We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they
are beins arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is
applying in Germany are being used in Japan.
Dennison : Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they
are punished — not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not.
fisher: All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let
me ask you this : Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu — the big indus-
trialists— who have cooperated with the militarists and profited by the war,
among the guilty?
Dennison : We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall
that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.
Fisher: General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big indus-
trialists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making pov»-er?
Hh-ldring: Under our policy, all Fascists and jingos — militarists — will be
removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and
education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's
war-making power. That means the big combines must be broken up. There's
no other way to accomplish it.
Fisher: What do you say about the big industrialists, Mr. Vincent?
Vincent: Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those
members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as Gen-
eral Hilldring has just said, we intend to break the hold those large family com-
bines have over the economy of Japan — combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
and Sumitomo, to name the most prominent.
Fisher: And the financial combines as well?
Vincent: Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already
taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of
their loot.
Fisher : Well, there's no feeling here of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu."
Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?
Dennison : There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr.
Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and
arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occu-
pation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about
this war, whether he is of the Zaibatsu, or anyone else, is going to be arrested
and tried as a war criminal.
Fisher : General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany
has been to send Americans over to help rebuild the big trusts, like I. G.
Farbenindustrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed
in Japan. What about that?
Hilldring: I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are not rebuilding the big
trusts in Germany, we have not rebuilt them, and we are not going to rebuild
them in the future. The same policy will -prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only
will we not revive these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans
or the Japanese to do so.
Fisher: And that applies to all industries that could be used for war pur-
poses ?
Hiixdring: The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or
maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as
naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the
reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a
modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steeel,
as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equip-
ment.
Vincent : This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese
economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war.
Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and
natural resources to the ends of peaceful living.
Fisher: Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything
being done to combat unemployment — among the millions of demobilized soldiers,
for example?
Vincent: Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving
their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing
and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruc-
tion work to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any
attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll
give them all the encouragement we can.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 741
Fisher: What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out
of heavy war industry'''
Vincent : They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to
retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy
will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more
and more for their domestic market.
Fisher : They'll have to have some foreign trade of course to keep going.
Vincent: Of course, but not the unhealthfnl sort they had before the war.
A large portion of Japan's pre-war foreign trade assets were used for military
preparations, and not to support her internal economy ; after all, scrap-iron and
oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign
trade far below the pre-war level and still have a standard of living comparable
to what they had before the war.
FisHEK. Tliere have been some dire predictions about the food situation over
there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our
policy be on food?
HiLLDRixG : General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does
not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this
winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other
occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy popu-
lations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that
might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The
Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports.
FiSHEB : They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going
to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?
Dennison : We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy — that's
the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships
shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's
imports, in order to keep her from rearming — and the best way to do that may
be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.
Fishee: Then, Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot
of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some
Japanese transport planes to resume operations.
L^ENNisoN : That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of Gen-
eral MacArthur's directive in this field, no civil aviation will be permitted in
Japan.
Vincent: Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a spe-
cific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.
Fisher : In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of
the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big indus-
trialists will be?
Vincent: Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agri-
culture on a more democratic economic basis. Our policy favors a wider dis-
tribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade.
But those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself —
and will, we expect.
Fishee: And the labor unions? What about them?
Vincent: We'll encourage the development of trade-unionism, Mr. Fisher,
because that's an essential part of democracy.
Fisher. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals
are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?
Vincent: General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons
imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.
Fisher : That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces
in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?
Dennison : Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies
among the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to
adopt a constructive reform program.
Vincent: All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured
the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation author-
ities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political
parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all
barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press.
Fisher : I take all this to mean that the democratic and anti-militarist groups
will be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group
tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?
Vincent: It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides
calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan". It
742 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies
of the government are to be permitted and favored".
Fisher: And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force
to attain their objectives?
Vincent: In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where
necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve
liberal or democratic political ends the Japanese may even use force.
Dennison : We are not interested in upholding the status quo in Japan, as
such. I think we should make that doubly clear.
Fisher: One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been
the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand
that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are get-
ting together in one party — a Socialist party. What stand will we take on
that. General Hilldring?
HiLLDRiNG : If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every
encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in
Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attack by military
fanatics.
Fisher: You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way
for the democratic forces.
Hilldring : We're prepared to support the development of democratic gov-
ernment even though some temporary disorder may result — so long as our troops
and our over-all objectives are not endangered.
FisHBH : I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will
be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that makes a religion of
nationalism and which is called "National Shinto"?
Vincent : Shintoism, in so far as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not
to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, as a state-directed religion is to be
done away with. People will not be taxed to support National Shinto, and there
will be no place for Shintoism in the schools.
Fisher : That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.
Vincent : Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemina-
tion of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in any form will
be completely suppressed.
Fisher: And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That
will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.
Vincent : Yes, but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their
schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalistic learnings
are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.
Dennison : That's where the real change must stem from — the school system.
The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes
for the older generation as well.
Fisher : And that may take a very long time. Captain Dennison.
Dennison : How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives
into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through
all channels — school texts, press, radio, and so on.
Fisher: What's the basis for your optimism. Captain?
Dennison : Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many
Japanese outside of Japan. Take for example the Japanese-Americans in
Hawaii. They used to send their children to Japan at the age of about 7, I think,
to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life they
found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great
majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They proved
their loyalty there during the war.
Fisher: What accounts for that loyalty?
Dennison : Simply that they like the American way of life better. At seven,
it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they like, but as they get older
they learn to understand and appreciate the more important things as well. I
believe the people in Japan will like our ways too. I think once they have a
taste of them — of real civil liberties — they'll never want to go back to their old
ways.
Hiixdring: I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite
possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining
the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to craek^
they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctri-
nated with one basic idea : obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 743
Vincent : Or it may make it more difficult, General. It depends on how you
look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if
there's to be a real, working democracy iu Japan.
HiLLDRiNG : I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight.
And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.
Fisher : Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese
under the occupation?
Vincent : The press has told you a lot, Mr. Fisher. I can say here that recent
indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious
about the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness
to cooperate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military
domination they've undergone, only time and encouragement will bring about
the emergence of sound democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle
the East", or hustle General MacArthur. Reform in the social, economic, and
political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully
fostered.
Fisher: Well, thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you. General Hilldring
and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupa-
tion policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic
policy — one that's aimed at giving no encouragement to the imperialists and
every possible encouragement to the pro-democratic forces which are now begin-
ning to reappear in Japan.
Announcer : That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the
Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office
of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department ; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring,
Director of Civil Aff:airs, War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, Navy
representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Co-
ordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee.
This was the thirty-fourth of a series of broadcasts on "Our Foreign Policy,"
presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain
printed copies of these broadcasts at 10 cents each in coin. If you would like to
receive copies of the broadcasts, send $1 to cover the costs of printing and mailing.
Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to the NBC
University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. NBC also invites
your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special State
Department program on our Latin American policy, with reference to Argentina
and the postponement of the inter-American conference at Rio de Janeiro. Our
guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who has just re-
turned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of
American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for this im-
portant program. . . . Kennedy Ludlam speaking from Washington, D, C.
INIr. DooMAN. Will you give me just a minute? Here is one quo-
tation.
The Chairman. Let me have the question now, please.
(The record was read by the reporter as follows :)
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, I offer you this and ask you if there are any par-
ticular passages you would like to underscore in that transcript.
The Chairman. Let the record show that the counsel handed the
witness the photostatic copy of the transcript of a radio speech.
Mr. DooMAN. I will have to read several quotations from other
people here.
Mr. Morris. Please do.
Mr. Dooman. This is General Hilldring speaking [reading] :
Hilldring. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or
maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as
naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the
reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a
modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, as
well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equipment.
Vincent. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese econ-
omy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under
744 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural
resources to the ends of peaceful living.
Fisher. Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything
being done to combat unemployment — among the millions of demobilized soldiers,
for example?
Vincent. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their
economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishinsi and the
production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work
to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by
the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all
the encouragement we can.
That, I think, is indicative of the thinking of Mr, Vincent, in other
words, that the Japanese would have to subsist primarily on the re-
sources that they found within their own islands, main islands, and
confine their efforts largely to agriculture and fishing and the develop-
ment of consumer goods.
As I remarked previously, here were today 85,000,000 people sup-
posed to be able to make a living off an area equivalent, roughly, to
one-quarter of Pennsylvania, and with no natural resources in the way
of iron, steel, coal, cotton, wool, or any of the primary raw materials.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, are there any other documents that you
care to introduce into the record at this time to support the conclusion
just arrived at, your conclusion?
Mr. DooMAN. Well, I refer to a statement made by General Mac-
Arthur, I think it was on the 1st of September, in which
Mr. Morris. What year ?
Mr. DooMAN. 1946, excuse me. This was the first anniversary of
the setting up of the occupation in Japan. At that time, he issued a
statement to the Japanese people warning them of the dangers from
the left as well as from the right.
In other words, he was warning them of the dangers of communism.
As a matter of fact, a short time after that, in February 1947, the
Communists tried to take over the country by means of a general strike
which was prevented only by General MacArthur preventing it.
However, the Herald Tribune, as of September 3, 1946, publishes a
dispatch from Mr. John C. Metcalfe, its correspondent in Washington,
stating that there was in effect, that there was considerable unfavor-
able reaction in the State Department to General MacArthur's pro-
nouncement to the Japanese people.
It quoted at that time, this article quoted, as follows ; if I may read :
State Department sources said no directives had been sent to General Mac-
Arthur indicating any desire on the part of the administration here to raise the
cry of "communism" in Japan. The source said they were taken completely by
surprise by comments in the MacArthur statement, such as that the Japanese
islands might become either "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous
springboard for war."
The incident was considered here as particularly irritating since it came in
the midst of delicate American-Soviet relations elsewhere in the world.
The aim of American foreign policy in the Far East is establisJiment of a
just and durable peace, the State Department sources said. It is aimed at
"building a bridge of friendship to Soviet Russia" and is not intended to set up
"a bulwark against communism" or to inspire anti-Soviet feeling, the sources
added.
The Chairman. That was what year?
Mr. Dooman. September 3, 1946.
The Chairman. 1946?
Mr. Dooman. Yes.
The Chairman. And published in what publication?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 745
Mr. DooMAN. The New York Herald Tribune.
Mr. Morris. Do you know who the sources referred to in that arti-
cle are^
Mr. DooMAN. I do not know first-hand, I only know from rumor.
The Chairman. Do you know that writer, byline writer?
Mr. IMoRRis. John C. Metcalfe?
Mr. Doom AN. No ; I do not know him.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I offer that, introduce it into the evi-
dence, for whatever probative value it may have.
The Chairman. It may be admitted.
(The document marked "Exhibit No. 242" is as follows 0
Exhibit No. 242
[From the New York Herald Tribune, September 3, 1946]
MacArthur Blast Against Reds Draws State Department's Fike
(By John C. Metcalfe)
Washington, September 2. — General Douglas MacArthur, Allied Supreme Com-
mander in Japan, was charged by State Department sources today with having
launched on his own initiative an anti-Coiumuuist campaign in violation of
American policy directives to him from President Truman.
The charge, unofficial in character, was based on General MacArthur's pub-
lished statement yesterday on the first anniversary of Japan's formal surrender.
In the statement, he suggested that in certain circumstances the Japanese people
might fall prey to those seeking to impose the "philosophy of the extreme radical
left."
It was stated bluntly at the State Department today that General MacArthur
made public his statement "without any consultation" in advance with American
officials directly responsible for the foreign policy of the United States.
controversy threatens
The development threatened to revive an old controversy between General Mac-
Arthur and Washington policy makers. President Truman made it clear 6
months ago that he, in consultation with James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State,
is responsible for policy and that General MacArthur's job is solely to carry out
that policy under White House directives forwarded to him by the War Depart-
ment.
State Department sources said no directives had been sent to General Mac-
Arthur indicating any desire on the part of the administration here to raise the
cry of "communism" in Japan. The sources said they were taken completely by
sui'prise by comments in the MacArthur statement such as that the Japanese
islands might become either "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous spring-
board for war."
The incident was considered here as particularly irritating since it came in
the midst of delicate American-Soviet relations elsewhere in the world.
The aim of American foreign policy in the Far East is establishment of a just
and durable peace, the State Department sources said. It is aimed at "building
a bridge of friendship to Soviet Russia" and is not intended to set up "a bulwark
against communism" or to inspire anti-Soviet feeling, the sources added.
statement held unwarranted
"There is nothing which the Japanese have done since their surrender to
warrant the statement issued by General MacArthur," one official commented.
General MacArthur's task is to "neutralize Japan" and to get along with the
other interested Allied powers, it was explained. If the United States holds any
fears about its security, it will counter any Soviet threat with a strong Navy
and Air Force, it was said.
Private advices from Tokyo gave the following information today :
"The emphasis on important developments in Japan has shifted from General
MacArthur to the doings of the Japanese. One is apt to get (from headquarters)
a completely false view of what is going on in this country. Listening to the
746 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
military authorities one wonders why the occupation is not ended right now.
Actually, however, the Japanese are no more ready to govern themselves on a
democratic basis than they were a year ago. The Conservatives are firmly in
the saddle and are doing all in their power to preserve the status quo.
"Everyone must be aware by now that the Allied Council here is a farce and
that the Far Eastern Commission seems to us out here like something on an-
other planet."
DEMOCJRAOY PREFEEBED
At the state Department it was said that if the Japanese have a tendency to
go anywhere they will "most likely turn toward democracy" as the preferred
type of government. But it was also pointed out that the Japanese, like the
Germans, are primarily interested in extricating themselves from their unhappy
situation and will take any course that might lead to a way out. They are playing
off democracy against communism, it was said, and statements like those by
General MacArthur are extremely helpful to them.
Department officials, moreover, were particularly annoyed by the MacArthur
statement because of the disturbing situations in Korea and China.
"Maybe General MacArthur thinks he is bolstering Mr. Byrnes at the Paris
Peace Conference, but he is not helping the situation in the Far East with his
comment," a State Department official said. •
Diplomatic observers also pointed out that American-Soviet relations at the
Paris Conference, in Yugoslavia, Poland, Greece, and at the United Nations
Security Council are none too calm. They were, therefore, particularly disturbed
by anything resembling a move to launch an anticominunist campaign in Japan.
State Department sources considered the whole incident as "undoubtedly
especially embarrassing" to Maj. Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko, Soviet representative
on the Allied Council for Japan, which meets at Tokyo.
There was no indication tonight whether the State Department would make
any official comment, since most officials were away for the Labor Day week end.
Mr. Morris. Are there any other incidents or episodes concerning
this part of the testimony that you care to add at this time ? If there
are, we ask you to do so.
Mr. DooMAN. Well, I can't recall any, offliand, bearing on this par-
ticular point.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, do you know what the attitude of the
State Department, or any individuals in the State Department, was
with respect toward Japanese Communists ?
Mr. DoOMAN. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Did you have any personal experience with Japanese
Communists ?
Mr, DooMAN. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Would you explain those to the committee, Mr. Doo-
man?
The Chairman. Did you have any personal experience with Jap-
anese Communists, that is your question ?
Mr. Morris. That is right.
Did you experience the State Department's policy with respect to
Japanese Communists first hand?
Mr. DooMAN. May I submit that the question is perhaps not
relevant to the situation as it existed, because the State Department
had no policy at that time with regard to
Mr. Morris. Any individuals in the State Department, Mr. Doo-
man.
Mr. DooMAN. Well, some time in May I believe it was. May or
June, I think it was May, there returned
Mr. Morris. 1945?
Mr. DooMAN. 1945.
There returned from China a Foreign Service officer named John
K. Emerson, who, before the war, had been one of my subordinates
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 747
at the American Embassy in Tokyo. I understood that he had been
sent to Yenan. Yenan in China then was the capital of the Chinese
Communists. There were present at that time in Yenan a Nosaka,
the leading Japanese Communist, and other leading Communists.
Mr. Morris. Is Nosaka the same as Susumo Okano, head of the
Japanese Communist Party?
Mr. DooMAN. I believe the latter is a pseudonym. I believe that
Emerson had been sent to Yenan to study methods used by the Japa-
nese Communists in Yenan in indoctrinating Japanese prisoners of
war taken by the Chinese. As I said, he returned to Washington in
about May of 1945.
The Chairman. Who did?
Mr. DooMAN. Emerson. He brought back a report describing at
considerable length the method used by the Japanese Communists
with respect to Japanese prisoners of war, and as I recall, he recom-
mended that Japanese prisoners in American stockades be then turned
over to Japanese Communists in the United States for indoctrina-
tion along methods used by the Japanese Communists in Yenan.
At that time he was also invited to come over to OSS, the Office of
Strategic Services, where I was helping with my own services in
the field of psychological warfare to address a group on what he had
found in Yenan. At that time he displayed a large number of posters
and papers of various kinds and he also showed me a number of letters
that he had brought from Yenan. These letters were written by
Japanese Communists in Yenan to certain Japanese Communists who
were then employed by OSS in psychological warfare against Japa-
nese.
Mr. Morris. That was the episode, Mr. Dooman ?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with a publication that is entitled
"Eighteen Years in Prison'' by Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga, published
by the Japanese Communist Party in 1948 ?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes; I have a copy of that book. The title in
Japanese is "Gokuchi juhachi-nen" which means Eighteen Years in
Jail.
Mr. Morris. That publication, which is in Japanese, which you
understand, Mr. Dooman, indicates that it was published by the
Japanese Communist Party? A translation here from the Library
of Congress, Mr. Dooman, indicates that it was published by the
Japanese Communist Party in 1948.
Mr. Dooman. Oh, yes. I see. It was published by the Japanese
Communist Party, yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, on page 159 to 161, there is described an
episode which involves individuals concerned with the Institute of
Pacific Relations.
I ask you if you have any supplementary or corroborative knowl-
edge of the facts described by these two Japanese Communists in the
publication that you have in your hand.
I think it would be best if I read the episode referred to, Mr.
Dooman, and ask you if you had read it in the book and whether you
know of any corroboration of it.
Mr. Dooman. All right, sir.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you describe what this is, please ?
2284S— 52^pt. 3 4
748 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Mandel. This is a translation from the book entitled "Eighteen
Years in Prison," the last chapter written by Yoshio Shiga, pages 159
to 161, published by the Japanese Connnunist Party in 1948 and
translated by Andrew Y, Kuroda, Japanese Section, Orientalia Divi-
sion, the Library of Congress.
JMr. MoRius. Will you read the episode to which we are referring,
Mr. Mandel?
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
THE DOCK OF FREEDOM
At last the day came when we could become active asain. That day came after
those who called us traitors had turnod Japan into a ruined wastoland, had talcen
the lives of a million people and had destroyed all peace and happiness.
On August 15 (1945) all hands in the prison, from the warden on down, as-
sembled around a radio speaker, to hear a transcribed broadcast of the so-called
August Voice. It was hardly intelligible because of the terrible static, but
I cauglit the passing phrase of "bear the unbearable." At any rate, I was sure
that Japan had lost the war.
The prison officials, from then on, had become like men without spirit. We
had demanded many times our immediate release. However, it was to no avail.
We were still held in the jail even at the end of September. On October 4, how-
ever, the SCAP directive was issued ordering the release of political prisoners,
and that settled the situation.
By the end of September, a reporter of the American Army had come three
times to investigate. He asked tlie warden if he still kept political prisoners
in his jail. The warden's answer was always "No." On September 30, however,
Mr. Isaac of Newsweek, and M. iMarukyusu and M. Giran of a French news
agency came to the prison. They did not ask altout the political prisoners. In-
stead, they merely requested to see the prison. The prison authorities reluctant-
ly si lowed' them lirst the work shop. Next they requested to see the wards. After
they went through the wards, they requested next to see the solitary cells. The
Fuchu Prison is an American style cross-shaped building, with the solitary cells
at the center. As they can>e to the section which contained the solitary cells,
the three newsmen asked the prison authorities point-blank : "You have political
prisoners here, don't you?" The officials, taken olT guard, tried to evade the
question and replied, "No; we don't." They told them, "Then we will bring
in American soldiers and see. Is that all right?" So tinally the prison officials
admitted holding such prisoners and said, "That over there is their detention
quarters " The three newsmen came rushing to our section, RI. INIarceuse
shouting aloud. "Where is Mr. Tokuda? Where is JMr. Shiga"?" That was the
first voice of the outside world we heard for those long years.
From that day on, until we came out of the jail— about 10 days — war cor-
respondents of various newspapers came to see us. From SCAP also came Mi*.
Emerson, Dr. Norman, and Lieutenant Colonel Davies. They asked, "What
are you going to do after your release?" They also told us about the policies
of SCAP. "On October 10, at 10 o'clock in the morning, we came out of the
prison. It was raining. The great iron doors were swung open and we com-
rades arm-in-arm stepped out into the world of freedom after an imprisonment
of 18 years. We were all moved very deeply when we were met by those com-
rades who, with red flags in their hands, were waiting for us in the rain. Some
of them had been there since the previous night.
"Then we plunged into our new activities with renewed spirit."
Mr. INIoKRis. Now, ISIr. Dooman, this committee is interested in the
episodes that are reported in that book.
I ask you if you will supplement the facts presented in this book
from whatever knowledge you have of the episode.
Mr. DooMAN. Well, what knowledge I have is derived largely
from — is largely second-hand. I was not there, naturally, and I have
no first-hand information.
Mr. Morris. Have you heard about these episodes from State De-
partment officials?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 749
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what you know about it from the
sources that we reco^iize are second-hand ?
Mr. DooMAN. Well, there are two categories. I have heard from
State Department people, other State Department people, who were
there at that time. Also I have heard of this from a large number of
Japanese whom I met in New York since the war, because this thing
became a sensation among the Japanese people, it was talked about
from hand to mouth, it was talked about from person to person, al-
though there was no reference to this in the papers. It was a matter
of general discussion among the Japanese.
Mr. Morris. Was it a matter of common knowledge among the
Japanese ?
Mr. DooMAN. It was a matter of common knowledge among the
Japanese. I gather so from the fact that perhaps a dozen people,
dozen Japanese, with whom I have talked of the matter since the war
in New York were quite familiar with the story.
Now, combining these two sources, that is, from State Department
officials wlio were there and from what tlie Japanese themselves said,
this was in efl'ect the substance of what I heard; that Harold Isaac
and a French correspondent who was known to be a Communist went
to this prison. Fuchu Prison, and the events took place pretty much as
described by Shiga, in his book.
The story then continues that they came back, Isaac and this
Frenchman came back and reported their experience to John Emerson
in SCAP headquarters.
A few days later, Emerson and, I believe, Herbert Norman
Mr. Morris. Who was Herbert Norman ?
Mr. DooMAx. Herbert Norman was a Canadian, member of the
Canadian Foreign Service, who had been in Tokyo before the war,
and who had been sent back by the Canadian Government to Japan
as soon as the occupation started to undertake the repatriation of
Canadian citizens left in Japan during the war. When he got through
with that, he was assigned to Counter-intelligence under SCAP. The
story goes on to say that Emerson, and I believe they weren't quite
certain whether Norman went with Emerson or not, a few days later
went back to this prison and demanded to see Tokuda and Shiga and
the other Communists.
The story further continues, and tliis was a matter that was gener-
ally talked about by the Japanese in Tokyo at that time, was that on
the day they were released, apparently October 10, following the or-
der by General MacArthur for the release of political prisoners, that
Emerson and Norman went in a staff car to the prison and brought
Shiga and Tokuda back to their homes.
The Chairman. Who are Shiga, and Tokuda?
Mr. Doomax. Shiga was one of the top leaders of the Japanese
Communist Party.
Mr. Morris. "Wliat was the effect of that on the Japanese population
from what you know, Mr. Dooman ?
Mr. Dooman. The effect of that, as said by one of the Japanese to
me, was to add 100,000 new members to the Japanese Communist
Party.
Mr. Morris. In other words, the prestige accorded by the Ameri-
can and Canadian officials in transporting Japanese Communists in
750 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
an official limousine afforded the Japanese Communists a certain
amount of reputation?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes, a substantital increase in prestige and standing,
of course.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, do you know from your own knowledge
anything of the report prepared by Ambassador Pauley on Japanese
reparations? Are you acquainted with that document?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes.
Mr. Morris. AVill you tell us what you know about that document
with respect to the policy he enunciated therein ?
Mr. DooMAN. Mr. Pauley, who was sent out as Reparations Com-
missioner or Ambassador, made a survey, was supposed to make a
survey, of the Japanese industry potential and needs and what could
be removed for reparation purposes. He took with him, as his eco-
nomic adviser, Mr. Lattimore, Owen Lattimore ; and, without knowing
first-hand, the belief is quite general that Mr. Lattimore wrote the
report which Mr. Pauley submitted when he returned to the United
States.
Well, the report, which I believe, is readily accessible, in effect pro-
vided for the "pasteurizing" of Japan — that is, the reduction of Japan
to, as has been previously indicated in that broadcast by Vincent, to a
very simple economy ; that is, one of primarily agriculture and fishing,
plus small consumer industries.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to press Mr. Dooman
as to his knowledge that Mr. Lattimore did write the Pauley repara-
tions report inasmuch as Mr. Lattimore has acknowledged in executive
session, his connection with that particular report.
Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lattimore has acknowledged ?
Mr. Morris. In executive session.
The Chairman. Do you propose to oiler that to the committee in
open session ?
Mr. Morris. Yes ; I will do that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DooMAN. I may add that, in general, the report reflects the
view set forth by Mr. Lattimore and others and the Nation, and so on :
the general concept that Japan should be reduced to a very simple
type of economy.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention so much to intro-
duce, although I will do that since you ask, any of the executive session
we had with Mr. Lattimore, but I was making that suggestion to
account for the fact that I was not going to press Mr. Dooman as to
how he knew that Mr. Lattimore wrote that particular report.
The Chairman. I have no desire to direct you as to how you present
the evidence, but I just thought, if you had it available for the open
session, it would probably clarify some things because Mr. Dooman
testifies largely from hearsay in that regard.
Mr. Dooman. On that particular point.
Mr. Morris. In that particular point.
We have sat for it, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dooman, did you have any dealings with John K. Fairbank?
Mr. Dooman. No. Only periodically.
Mr. Morris. Well, you did encounter John K. Fairbank in your
official capacity ; did you not ?
Mr. Dooman. Yes.
mSTTTUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 751
Mr. Morris. Would you describe your connections with John K.
Fairbank, whatever they were ?
The Chairman. Who is he ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have had John K. Fairbank's asso-
ciation with the Institute of Pacific Relations set forth in the record at
great detail.
We have also had testimony on the part of three witnesses in con-
nection with his association in connection with the Communist Party.
I am asking Mr. Dooman if he had encountered at all Mr. John K.
Fairbank in his associations.
T]ie Chairman. All right.
Mr. DooMAN. I understood Mr. Fairbank was in that section of the
Office of War Information which dealt with psychological warfare
against Japan.
Now, the practice was that — I believe it was — once a month a group
would come over from the Office of War Information with a draft
program of the propaganda that was to be directed against Japan
for the ensuing month, and the various targets and subjects which
were to be dealt with were set forth on a piece of paper, and the pur-
pose of their visit to the State Department was to get clearance on
these targets.
As I say, my contacts with Mr. Fairbank were limited primarily to
those visits to the State Department when he brought over these pro-
grams of proposed psychological warfare.
Mr. Morris. From your association, what was his view toward
these
Mr. DooMAN. I don't know what responsibility or what part Mr.
Fairbank played in the formulation of these programs — that is, the
setting up of the targets — but I found that invariably in these pro-
grams there would be found an item directing the psychological war-
fare toward creating in the minds of the Japanese an attitude of re-
sentment and opposition to the Emperor and to the monarchial system.
At that time we had not come to any decision as to what our policy
should be in that resepect, and I invariably red-penciled these items
referring to the Emperor. However, they would always appear either
overtly or covertly in the next program that would be presented.
There was, in other words, a persistent effort on the part of the
Office of War Information to get our approval toward phychological
warfare directed at the relationship between the Japanese people and
the Emperor.
The Chairman. You say you underscored it in red ?
Mr. Doom an. I crossed out with a red pencil.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I made reference to the executive ses-
sion that we had with Mr. Owen Lattimore here on the 13th of July
1951 ; and from the executive minutes, on page 15, 1 would like to read
the following excerpt.
The Chairman. Was the witness testifying under oath at that
time?
Mr. Morris. The witness, Mr. Owen Lattimore, was testifying under
oath.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
Mr. Morris. After you returned, Mr. Lattimore, what was your next assign-
ment as far as the Government was concerned?
752 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. I was a member of the American Mission to Japan on the
subject of reparations.
Mr. MoREis. In that assignment, you were on the payroll of the State Depart-
ment; were you not?
Mr. Lattimore. I understand that it was a White House mission ; that all or
some of the members including myself were on the State Department payroll.
Mr. Morris. How long were you on that payroll, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Four or five months, from about October 1945 to about Febru-
ary or March 1946.
Mr. Morris. What part did you play in the preparation of the report of that
mission?
Mr. Lattimore. I helped to draft the report in Tokyo.
Mr. Morris. To what extent did you help?
Mr. Lattimore. Quite largely.
That is the acknowledgement I referred to.
Mr. Chairman, I may as well finish the paragraph, however. [Con-
tinues reading :]
Mr. Morris. Will you describe that for us, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, when we were in Tokyo, we had a number of experts
with us, economists, engineers, and so forth ; each expert was given access
through General MacArthur's headquarters to figures and data on Japan. Each
person assembled his own material, and I was largely responsible for the con-
tinuous writing of the report. Each expert was responsible for his own figures.
I would like to have that incorporated in the record, Mr. Chair-
man.
The Chairman. It is in the record now; you have read it.
Mr. Morris. I think with respect to the, extracts from the book
Eighteen Years in Prison, inasmuch as it was read by Mr. Mandel,
nothing more is necessary.
With respect to the book itself, I suggest that it be filed with the
records of the committee.
The Chairman. Very well.
(The book referred to was filed for the information of the com-
mittee.)
Mr. MoKRis. Thank you.
The Chairman. That instrument that you had there a minute ago,
which is a transcript from this book, has not been admitted in the
record; it was read by Mr. Mandel.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel read that. However, if you think it is
necessary, I will introduce that into this record.
The Chairman. Yes.
(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 243" and is as follows :)
Exhibit No. 243
[Translation 1]
The Dooe of Freedom *
At last the day came when we could become active again. That day came
after those who called us traitors had turned Japan into a ruined wasteland, had
taken the lives of a million peoijle, and had destroyed all peace and happiness.
On August 15 [1945] all hands in the prison, from the warden on down, assem-
bled around a radio speaker to hear a transcribed broadcast of the so-called
august voice. It was hardly intelligible because of the terrible static, but
1 Translated by Andrew Y. Kuroda, Japanese Section, Orentalia Division, the Library of
Congress.
2 Last chapter, written by Yoshio Shiga, pp. 159-161. From Gokuchu juhachi-nen (18
years in prison) by Kyuichi Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga, published by the Japan Communist
Party, 1948.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 753
I caught the passing phrase of "bear the unbearable." At any rate, I was sure
that Japan had lost the war.
The prison officials, from then on, had become like men without spirit. We
had demanded many times our immediate release. However, it was to no avail.
.We were still held in the jail even at the end of September. On October 4, how-
ever, the SCAP directive was issued ordering the release of political prisoners,
and that settled the situation.
By the end of September, a reporter of the American Army had come three
times to investigate. He asked the warden if he still kept political prisoners in
his jail. The warden's answer was always "No." On September 30, however,
Mr. Isaac, of Newsweek, and M. Marukyusu [Marceuse?] and M. Giran [Gil-
land?],^ of a French news agency, came to the prison. They did not ask about
the political prisoners. Instead, they merely requested to see the prison. The
prison authorities reluctantly showed them first the workshop. Next they re-
quested to see the wards. After they went through the wards, they requested
next to see the solitary cells. The Fuchu Prison is an American-style cross-
shaped building, with the solitary cells at the center. As they came to the sec-
tion which contained the solitary cells, the three newsmen asked tlie prison
authorities point-blank: "You have political prisoners here; don't you?" The
officials, taken off guard, tried to evade the question, and replied, "No ; we don't."
They told them, "Then we will bring in American soldiers and see. Is that all
right?" So, finally the prison officials admitted [holding such prisoners] and
said, "That over there is their detention quarters." The three newsmen came
rushing to our section, M. Marceuse shouting aloud, "Where is Mr. Tokuda?
Where is Mr. Shiga?" That was the first voice of the outside world we heard
for those long years.
From that day on, until we came out of the jail — about 10 days — war corre-
spondents of various newspapers came to see us. From SCAP also came Mr.
Emerson, Dr. Norman, and Lieutenant Colonel Davies. They asked "What are
you going to do after your release?" They also told us about the policies of
SCAP.
On October 10, at 10 o'clock in the morning, we came out of the prison. It
was raining. The great iron doors were swung open, and we comrades, arm in
arm, stepped out into the world of freedom after an imprisonment of 18 years.
We were all moved very deeply when we were met by those comrades who, with
Red flags in their hands, were waiting for us in the rain. Some of them had been
• there since the previous night.
Then we plunged into our new activ-ities with renewed spirit.
Mr. Morris. The volume itself is in Japanese, which Mr. Dooman
has translated for ns.
The Chairman. It will become a part of the files of this committee.
Mr. DooMAN. Just to bring that Pauley report into proper per-
spective, may I add that the following year — I think it was 1947 —
a mission was sent out by Mr. Strike, one of the leading consulting
engineers in this country. He sent to Japan a large group of, I think,
over 20 consulting engineers that went out to Japan, and they returned
with a report generally overruling the Pauley report, and the report
of the Strike committee in turn was then upheld by another mission
consisting of Mr. Johnson, who was president of the Chemical Bank
in New York or chairman of the board of the Chemical Bank, and Mr.
Paul Hoffman, who, between them, submitted a report which virtually
wiped out the recommendations of the Pauley mission.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, do you know Lawrence Salisbury, who
was editor of Far Eastern Affairs, which was the publication of the
American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mr. DooMAN. I did.
Mr. Morris. Did he ever make any effort to change the personnel in
the State Department, to your knowledge ?
' These names are difficult to Identify from their transcription into the Japanese
syllabary.
754 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. DooMAN. Well, he is the ringleader of a group of men in the
Far Eastern Division, who protested against the assignment of Dr.
Hornbeck as director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, when Secre-
tary of State Stettinius organized, carried out, his reorganization of
the State Department in, I believe, January 1944.
As a result of that rebellion, which was successful, Dr. Hornbeck
was then, I believe, sent to the Netherlands as Ambassador.
JMr. Morris. In other words, it was a successful movement ?
Mr. DooMAN. It was a successful movement.
Mr. Morris. And you say Mr. Salisbury was the ringleader?
Mr. DooMAN. Yes.
Mr. Morris. You know that from your own experience?
Mr. DooMAN. I know that from personal laiowledge.
The Chairman. Anything further, Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. I think not.
Have we neglected anything that we should know, Mr. Dooman?
If you know of anything within the scope of our inquiry, the chairman
and I ask that you present that knowledge to this committee.
Mr. DooMAN. "Well, my purpose, Mr. Morris, has not been to give
you any evidence as to whether this, that, or the other man was a
Communist or not, because I am in no position to give you any such
evidence.
My purpose in testifying here was to indicate in general that policies
put forward by the left-wing press, from the Daily Worker right
down through the line, were in effect substantially translated into
United States policies and to indicate from personal knowledge how
that operation was carried out.
Mr. Morris. That is right.
May the record show, Mr. Chairman, that at no time was Mr.
Dooman asked whether or not any particular person was a Communist.
The Chairman. The record will speak for itself in that regard.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, would you identify for the record as much
as you can, who Lawrence Salisbury was, with respect to his con-
nection with the IPE. ?
Mr. Mandel. Our files show that Lawrence Salisbury was at one
time the editor of Far Eastern Survey, official organ of the American
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Morris. Was he a State Department officer, according to your
files?
Mr. Mandel. Editor of Far Eastern Survey, Official Organ of the
American Council of IPR, former Foreign Service official, 12 years in
Japan, 5 years in China, and 2 in Manila, and 5 in the Department of
State.
Mr. Morris. You know that from our records, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. That comes from the biographical register of the
State Department.
The Chairman. Was he serving in the State Department while he
was writing for that publication ?
Mr. Mandel. No, sir.
The Chairman. When is your next meeting, Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. Next Tuesday at 10 a. m.
The Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until that
time.
(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., Friday, September 14, 1951, the hear-
ing was recessed until 10 a. m. Tuesday, September 17, 1951.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1951
United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. G.
The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424,
Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presid-
ing.
Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Ferguson.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris,
subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.
The Chairman. The subcommittee will come to order.
Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Morris'^
Mr, Morris. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Will you kindly stand and be sworn ?
You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give
before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth, so help you God ?
Mrs. Widener. I do.
TESTIMONY OP MRS. WILLIAM HARRY WIDENER, NEW YORK, N. Y.
The Chairman. Let the record show the witness is here under
subpena.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, last Friday during the testimony of
Eugene Dooman the name of Julian Friedman turned up. Accord-
ing to Mr. Dooman's testimony, Julian Friedman was John Carter
Vincent's assistant. John Carter Vincent was then head of the Far
Eastern Division of the State Department and Mr. Dooman would
attend the Far Eastern area committee meetings for John Carter
Vincent. Mr. Dooman testified in the course of the day that he sus-
pected that Julian Friedman was the person responsible for leaks of
classified information from those meetings to the left wing press and,
according to Mr. Dooman's testimony, he made specific charges against
Julian Friedman to Julian Friedman.
I thought it would be appropriate this morning to have someone
here who had encountered Mr. Julian Friedman,
Mrs, Widener, will you give your name and address to the reporter,
please.
Mrs. Widener. I am Mrs. William Harry Widener. My address is
829 Park Avenue, New York City.
755
756 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. What is your occupation, Mrs. Widener ?
Mrs. WiDENEE. I am a writer and a housewife, a professional writer.
Mr. Morris. Are you qualified in any way as a writer for the United
States Government, Mrs. Widener?
Mrs. Widener. Yes. I wrote free lance scripts on a WAE basis for
the Voice of America from January 1, 1951, to the end of May 1951.
I applied for classification as an information expert and I received
such classification.
INIr. Morris. Do you have any record of that classification with you?
Mrs. Widener. Yes ; I have.
Mr. Morris. Would you mind letting me have it so I might put it
in the record, please ?
Mrs. WiDNER. Here it is.
Mr. Morris. Will you identify these papers for us, Mrs. Widener?
What are these papers ?
Mrs. Widener. They give a classification for me as an information
specialist from the United States Civil Service Commission, a notice
of rating from the Department of State.
Mr. Morris. What is your rating?
Mrs. Widener. They are dated June this year — radio, GS-12, radio,
GS-11, radio, GS-11, periodicals and publications, GS-11.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like these in the record.
The Chairman. I would like to know what these signify and what
the designations testified to by the witness signify. What does GS-11
mean ?
Mrs. Widener. As I understand it. Senator, when I was taken into
the Voice of America on a WAE basis, I filled out a civil service appli-
cation stating my qualifications.
The Chairman. What is a WAE basis and what does it mean ?
Mrs. Widener. 1 was on a purchase order basis. The Voice of
America ordered from me eight scripts a month. They paid me $40
per script. I was up for what they called classification under civil
service and investigation by the security officers.
" When I filed my papers, I had to-state what qualifications I would
have for such an appointment with the State Department. I happen
to speak several languages. I had to give the entire history of my edu-
cation, my background for security investigation and for professional
qualifications a list of my publications in the writing field and my
experience.
I was told to start out to be classified in that field ; GS-12 was a very
good classification. I believe it was not in the lowest category.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Morris. I would like to have those introduced in the record by
way of describing the witness.
The Chairman. Those instruments, are they from your own hand,
or just what are they ?
Mrs. Widener. Those were sent to me by the Department of State,
Senator.
The Chairman. What is the object of this, Mr. Morris?
Mr. Morris. To establish who Mrs. Widener is. They are just for
a description of the witness.
The Chairman. A copy of each will be inserted in the record by
reference and filed with the committee.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 757
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 244 and
245" and filed in the committee's files for the record.)
Mr. MoREis. Do you know a man named Clark Andrews ?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes.
Mr. Morris. How long have you known Clark Andrews ?
Mrs. WiDENER. I first met Mr. Andrews, 1 believe, in 1946.
Mr. Morris. On how many occasions, approximately, have you met
Mr. Andrews ?
Mrs. WiDENER. A great many. He was a fiance of a friend of mine.
Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, can you recall an experience that you
had regarding Clark Andrews in the spring of 1947 that would be of
interest to this committee ?
The Chairman. Read the question again, please, Mr. Reporter.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that you could pin that down
more, Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, would you tell us who Clark Andrews is?
Mrs. Widener. Mr. Andrews was a radio producer.
Mr. Morris. Wliat was his occupation when you first met him?
Mrs. Widener. He had returned from China where he had been in
radio, I believe, in Chungking.
Mr. Morris. What year was this ?
Mrs. Widener. In 1946 when I first met him. The pertinence would
be in reference to Mr. Julian Friedman whom you mentioned to Sen-
ator McCarran.
Senator Ferguson. Andrews had been in private radio work in
China?
Mrs. WroENER, No, sir; with the Armed Forces, I believe.
Senator Ferguson. Working for the United States Government ?
Mrs. Widener. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. What was he doing in the spring of 1947 ?
Mrs. Widener. He was a radio producer for the American Broad-
casting System.
Mr. Morris. You have testified that you had previously met him
on numerous occasions ?
Mrs. Widener. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Do you recall an episode that involved Mr. Friedman
and Mr. Andrews ?
Mrs. Widener. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Will you give us an account of what happened on that
particular occasion?
Mrs. WroENER. One evening in the spring of 1947 Mr. Andrews
telephoned my home
The Chairman. Where was this ?
Mrs. Widener. In New York City — and asked if I would care to
join him and his fiancee after dinner to meet a very special friend that
he would like me to meet, a very brilliant man and a man who had
been in China.
At that time I was not married to Mr.Widener, but I was married
to a composer, and my husband was not really included in the invita-
tion. He was busy with music and professional duties. I accepted the
invitation to go along. When I reached the home of my friend, my
friend didn't feel well and retired. I remained with Mr. Andrews.
758 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
We had a long talk and discussion. He said to me that his friend
was expected but might be a little late. We chatted and waited. I
should say certainly more than an hour later Mr. Andrews said to me,
"Confidentially, I want to tell you that the man you are going to meet
is absolutely brilliant. In fact, he is one of the top brains of the
Communist Party."
At that moment the doorbell rang and the gentleman appeared.
Mr. MoREis. Did he account for the delay in any way of Julian
Friedman in arriving ?
Mrs. WroENER. Mr. Friedman accounted for the delay. Mr. Fried-
man came in. I didn't know his name at that moment. Mr. Andrews
introduced Mr. Friedman to me as Mr. Julian Friedman. He said that
he was very sorry to be late and to have kept us waiting, but that he
had been occupied with a case that was being heard, a very important
case, in arbitration in New York City before Mr. James Fly.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that James Lawrence Fly ?
Mrs. WiDENER. I don't know his middle name.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is it the Mr. Fly formerly with the Federal Com-
munications Commission ?
Mrs. WiDENER. I believe so.
Mr. Friedman said he was delighted that the case seemed to be going
very well and that
Mr. Morris. This is the case of which James Fly was the arbitrator?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir. And he said, "You see, I am conducting
the defense from behind the scenes." I said, "May I ask what you
mean by 'behind the scenes?'" He said to me, "It is an extremely
complicated case. It is a case involving a worker" — I think he said
social welfare worker or social service worker — "who was dismissed
from New York City employ and who claimed she was unjustly dis-
missed because of her political beliefs."
I said, "Wliat are her political beliefs?" He said, "Well, of course,
she is a Communist but she is saying that she is not a Communist."
I said that that struck me as very complicated indeed. Mr. Friedman
said, "Of course, since she is a member of our party, I am defending
her, but not out in the open."
Then Mr. Andrews interrupted the conversation and talked about
me and my professional activities and what I had done. He and Mr.
Friedman began to discuss China and international politics. I lis-
tened for quite a while. Mr. Friedman said to me, "I had a very
interesting time in China." I said, "Well, when did you leave?" I
remember I asked him what he was doing. He said that he was with
the State Department. Prior to Mr. Friedman's arrival Mr. Andrews
had told me that Mr. Friedman had graduated with the highest honors
from Harvard University. I believe he graduated either with magna
or summa cum laude.
Mr. Friedman took up the story of his going to China. He said to
'me that after he graduated from Harvard University he entered the
State Department and that eventually he was sent to China where he
was connected, I believe, with the Embassy in Shanghai, our Em-
bassy there. He said, "I was able to do very useful work there, but
eventually I got in a very tough spot." I asked him what he meant
by a "tough spot." He said, "I really was on the spot. I was doing
very good work for our cause, the Communist cause."
Mr. Morris. He said it was the Communist cause.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 759
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir ; "in China, but somebody must have gotten
wise to me." .
He was asked to write a report on the Communist Chinese labor
movement.
The Chairman. Let me have that again, please. "He said
Mrs. WiDENER. Mr. Friedman said to me : "I was asked to write a
report on the Chinese Communist labor movement." He said, "That
put me in a tough spot. Naturally I wouldn't write anything against
the party. If I did write what I wanted to write, it would tip my
hai]d and destroy my usefulness. So I wrote a report that any 14-
year-old boy could have written and got myself dismissed without
prejudice."
Senator Ferguson. Dismissed from the State Department, you
mean ?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir.
Senator Eastland. Without prejudice?
Mrs. WiDENER. I asked him then what does "dismissed without
prejudice" mean ? He said, "It means exactly what it says."
Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, may I interrupt at this time? Mr.
Chairman, at our last session we introduced a letter from the State
Department official indicating that Mr. Friedman had been dismissed
without prejudice. That is a part of our record.
The Chairman. Is that letter available now ?
Senator Ferguson. Did you understand that he was dismissed be-
cause he had written such a poor report ?
Mrs. WiDENER. I understand Mr. Friedman told that he wrote a
report that any li-year-old child could have written.
Senator Ferguson. Can you tie that with his dismissal, the report?
I mean what he said.
Mrs. WiDENER. He said to me that he got himself dismissed with-
out prejudice.
Senator Ferguson. Because of writing this report?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is what he said ?
Mrs. Widener. Yes, sir. That isn't exactly his every word.
Senator Ferguson. But that is the substance of what he said ?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir ; that was my understanding.
Senator Eastland. Was Mr. Andrews in China?
Mrs. WiDENER. I have no knowledge of Mr. Andrews' activities in
China whatsoever.
Senator Eastland. Was he in China ?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. He did show a sympathy and friendliness toward the
Communist movement ?
Mrs. WiDENER. He showed friendliness toward Mr. Julian Fried-
man.
Senator Eastland. Had Mr. Andrews been with the State Depart-
ment ?
Mrs. WiDENER. I do not know.
Senator Eastland. Who was he with in China ?
Mrs. WiDENER. I only know that he said he had been with radio.
He was in the Armed Forces and had been with our United States
radio in China.
760 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman, Let the Chair interrupt here. The letter referred
to is one dated April 23, 1951, over the signature of Elbridge Dubrow,
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, and is addressed to me.
It has "Exhibit No. 235" on it. It says [reading] :
Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the Secretary concerning Julian R.
Friedman has been referred to me for reply.
A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior
economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from August 5, 1945, until
the termination of his employment on November 12, 1946.
As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was
effective November 13, 1946. Consequently it had been decided to abolish the
auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November
12, 1946. In proceeding with the liquidation of the auxiliary, it was necessary
to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or
auxiliary officers including Mr. Friedman. Mr, Friedman's record shows that
his services were terminated without prejudice,
I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs.
Sincerely yours —
That is now an exhibit in this case.
Senator Ferguson. Hasn't the State Department ever made an
explanation as to what they mean "your services are terminated with-
out prejudice"? Prejudice to what?
The Chairman. I take it to mean prejudice, but you may apply
again and be reemployed. That is just a guess on my part.
Go ahead, Mr, Morris,
Mr, Morris. What happened then, Mrs. Widener ?
Mrs, Widener, Up to that stage I had been listening very carefully
to what Mr, Friedman had been saying. He stopped talking, I said,
"Mr. Friedman, I would like to ask you a couple of questions if I
might," He said, "Certainly," I said, "When you said to me before
you were conducting a defense in an arbitration hearing for someone
who claimed that she was being unjustly treated because of a charge
against her political beliefs, you also told me that she was a member
of the Communist Party, 1 can't understand the need for 'behind
the scenes,' If she is sincere in her membership in the Communist
Party and it is a legal party, why doesn't she say she is a member of
the Communist Party and stand on her rights to belong to it, and why
do you need to be 'behind the scenes' if you believe that she is right?"
He said to me, "Those things are very complicated and you have to
go about them in the most suitable way,"
I said, "I would like to ask you another question. When you joined
the State Department, didn't you take an oath of allegiance to the
United States Government?" He said, "Yes, I did," I said, "Well,
you yourself say to me you graduated from Harvard with honors
and you told me that in the performance of your duties you wrote a
report that any 14-year-old child could have written. How do you
reconcile that with your sworn duties?
He said to me, "Well, I believe that the end justifies the means."
We got into a discussion of ends and means.
Mr, Morris, Did he say what his end was ?
Mrs, Widener, No, he did not; not specifically in that way, but I
think it came out what at least I believed his end was eventually. I
said to him that I believed the use of the wrong means can preclude
a riglit end. He went into further discussion, saying that to achieve
the objective you liave to use whatever tools were necessary to that
objective. I said to him, "I think what you have just told me is the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 761
most immoral story that I have ever heard, and I would like to ask
you one more question: Do the means that you advocate to achieve
an end include violence?"
The Chairman. Include what?
Mrs. WiDENER. "Include violence."
He said, "Yes, if necessary."
I stood up and I said : "Sir, it is my own belief that what you have
just said to me is treason, and I cannot remain here." I said, "I want
you to know that I don't consider myself bound by any confidence as
to what 1 have listened to here and I want you to know that I am going
to report you to the proper authorities."
Senator Ferguson. Did you report him to anyone?
Mrs. WiDENER. Eventually I did.
Senator Ferguson. To whom?
Mrs. WiDENER. To the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
But I would like your indulgence to continue, if I may.
Senator Ferguson. I did not want to interrupt you, but I wanted to
know what you did and whether you did report.
Mrs. WiDENER. I did eventually as the result of more knowledge,
I would say, of that particular subject.
The Chairman. Let me interrupt you there.
At this interview that took place, who was present in the course
of this conversation ? The picture I have, it was your friend who had
invited you there and Mr. Friedman and yourself; is that correct?
Mrs. WiDENER. There was Mr. Andrews, Mr. Julian Friedman, and
myself.
Senator Ferguson. Was this to be a dinner party ?
Mrs. WiDENER. No, sir. I was invited after dinner.
Senator Ferguson. Just merely to come to the home?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Was it Mr. Andrews' home ?
Mrs. WiDENER. It was the home of his fiancee.
Senator Ferguson. Did she just retire to another room?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir. She was not feeling well.
Senator Ferguson. She retired to another room in her home?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Which left you and Andrews and Friedman
together talking?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir, Mr. Andrews and myself. Then after Mr.
Friedman's arrival, Mr. Friedman, Mr. Andrews and myself.
Senator Ferguson. The invitation came from Andrews and not
your friend?
Mrs. WiDENER. Let's put it this way: Mr. Andrews telephoned
me and I spoke to him on the telephone.
Mr. Morris, Did you gather they were trying to get you to do
something for them? Was that the purpose of this visit?
Mrs. WiDENER. I didn't gather anything. I was simply — I went
home alone. It was 2 o'clock in the morning. I am not accustomed
to going home unaccompanied at that hour. I left.
Senator Ferguson. What could you have done to help them in any
manner ? I am not clear as to the reason they would invite you and
carry on this conversation. I can see part of the conversation, that
part about his being late and he gave you that, and that started this
762 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
conversation; but he carried it on into China and how he got dis-
charged and all.
Mrs. WiDENER. I suppose, Senator — I don't like to suppose— —
Senator Ferguson. 1 do not want you to suppose. I am trying to
get a reason.
Mrs. WiDENER. I have a certain record as a professional writer. As
a person during the war I had a radio show called Women of the
World. It won a citation of merit from the Eadio Institute of
America for the promotion of international understanding in the
women's field. I had a certain reputation. I think it was natural
that anyone interested in politics might discuss them with me, espe-
cially foreign politics.
Senator Ferguson. Particularly anyone who was desirous of carry-
ing out propaganda would have a source through you to get certain
propaganda carried out ; is that correct ?
Mrs. WiDENER. That would be a possible source.
Senator Ferguson. If you took up their cause ?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did they in any way ask you to take up this
cause of communism?
Mrs. WiDENER. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Or the cause for this worker that had been
discharged ?
Mrs. WiDENER. No, sir. Most of the conversation that took place
was between Mr. Friedman and me after Mr. Friedman's arrival.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you say your success with your radio show
Women of tlie World marked you in circles familiar with that produc-
tion as a liberal ?
Mrs. WiDENER. I think, Mr. Sourwine, perhaps the fairest way to
answer is to say I think if anyone is in professional activity and field
of public information they speak out in public. They say what they
think out in public and the public, the press, and the critics judge
them.
I had had favorable press notices and favorable comment. I feel
that I would have — in general, people like to discuss politics with
you or any professional activity if you are in that field. I was in
that field.
The Chairman. The query naturally arises, as has been evinced by
the questions of Senator Ferguson, and it is in my mind, as to why
would one in Mr. Friedman's position open up the whole subject to
you without first having known what your turn of mind was on that
subject. In other words, he disclosed to you his communistic leanings
and his communistic attitude, according to your statement, without
having first determined, so far as we know now, what your turn of
mind was.
Mrs. WiDENER. I would like to say this: I think Mr, Andrews on
several occasions had made very complimentary remarks about what-
ever qualities I possessed. Mr. Friedman knew when I met him, or
seemed to know, that I was a professional writer and commentator, a
speaker. I don't think my work was of national importance or of such
prominence that everybody would know about me.
Mr. Morris. Clark Andrews met you on numerous occasions?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. He knew all about my activity.
Mr. Morris. You had seen him on very many occasions?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 763
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes.
Mr. Morris. You were introduced to Mr. Friedman by Mr. An-
drews ?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes; I was.
Mr. Morris. Everj^tliing he indicated was that he had discussed you
prior to your meeting?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. Mr. Friedman, the first thing he did was
apologize for his being late, apologize to me.
Mr. Morris. He knew you were going to be present when he arrived?
Mrs. WiDENER. I assume if he apologized to me for being late that
he must have expected to meet me.
Senator Ferguson. Was your profession discussed?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes; oh yes; certainly, in the course of normal
conversation.
Senator Ferguson. How long did this conversation take with Fried-
man ? You say you left about 2 o'clock.
Mrs. WiDENER. My best recollection is that Mr. Friedman arrived
about 11 o'clock or shortly thereafter, 11 o'clock at night. And I
know that I left close to 2 o'clock in the morning.
Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, in the course of the 1-hour conversation
with Mr. Andrews and the 3-hour conversation with Mr. Friedman,
did Mr. Andrews tell you that Friedman was a Communist?
Mrs. WiDENER. Mr. Andrews said to me: "Confidentially, I want
you to know that this man is one of the top brains in the Communist
Party."
Mr. Morris. Then subsequently did Mr. Friedman acknowledge he
was a Communist?
Mrs. WiDENER. When he said, "our party" and said the social worker
or social-service worker was a Communist "in our party," and when
he spoke of "our cause in China" and said "Naturally, I would not
do anything to hurt our cause, the Chinese Communist cause," it was
obvious.
Mr. Morris. Did you report this conversation to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Mrs. Widener?
Mrs. WiDENER. I did after making an inquiry.
Mr. Morris. What inquiry did you make ?
The Chairman. Just a moment before she answers.
Some time back the witness asked to be permitted to continue and
Senator Ferguson, Senator Eastland, and I think myself broke in on
what you wanted to continue with. Do you have something that you
want to bring out there ? There was an interruption.
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Excuse me.
Mrs. WiDENER. Thank you.
The following morning after that conversation I received a tele-
phone call from Mr. Andrews who said that "Well, we certainly took
you for a ride last night. You really fell for a practical joke."
I said, "Maybe it was and maybe it wasn't, but I would like to tell you
this : I am going to make every effort and do my level best to find out if
it was or it wasn't." I did make that effort.
I knew a presswoman in the United States Mission to the United
Nation. Her name is Sarah Hodgekinson.
The Chairman. How do you spell that?
22848— 52— pt. 3 5
764 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mrs. WiDENER. H-o-d-g — I am not sure whether there is an "e" —
k-i-n-s-o-n.
I telephoned Miss Hodgekinson and said that I would like to come
and see her. I went down to the United States Mission to the U. N. and
saw her. I said, "If I am not imposing on you, I would like to ask
you if you can get some information for me. I would like to know if
there was a Julian Friedman in the employ of the State Department
in China."
She said, "That is not hard to find out and I will be glad to do so."
So she excused herself and came back and said, "Yes, there was." I
said, "Well, then, may I ask you could you get me more information
about Mr. Friedman ? And she said, "Well, I can try. What would
you like to know ?" I said, "Can you find out for me if he is a graduate
of Harvard University and if he graduated with honors."
She said, "You know, we have a direct line to Washington here and
I will go in and ask the Department if I can use it, and I will try to
find out for you." So I waited for, I guess, 20 minutes or half an hour.
She came back and said, "I have checked on it for you. Yes, Mr. Fried-
man did graduate from Harvard and he graduated with high honors."
Then I said "Could I ask you to find out one more thing for me if I
am not intruding or embarrassing you in any way?" She said, "No;
not at all. It is all a matter of record." I said, "Would you find out
if Mr. Friedman was dismissed without prejudice?"
She again left the room and came back and said "Mr. Friedman was
dismissed without prejudice." She said, "Why do you want to know
all this?" I said, "Because I had a long conversation with Mr. Fried-
man last night and it disturbed me very nuich." I said, "Do you know
anything about an arbitration case taking place before James FlyT'
She said, "No ; I don't know." I said, "Well, I would like to find out."
I phoned a reporter that I knew and he was out. She said, "Why
don't call — " I forget what name, the name of a reporter she knew.
She said, "I will get him on the phone and find out." She did get her
friend on the phone. He said, "Yes, there was a case before Mr. James
Fly and it was being heard and it was a question of a dismissed
worker." ''
Then I told Miss Hodgekinson about the conversation I had with
Mr. Friedman. In the meantime the newspaper reporter had said
that the World-Telegram newspaper had been following this case
very closely, the New York World-Telegram. Sarah Hodgekinson
said to me, 'Well, if it has to do with a Communist problem, Mr.
Frederick Woltman on the New York Telegram knows a great deal
about the Communist activities, and why don't you call him?" I
said that I had never met Mr. Woltman but I said I would. She
said, "You can call him up and say I said to call him," which I did.
I asked Mr. Woltman was there such as case as had been described
to you and did he know if a Mr. Julian Friedman was appearing in
the case. He said "Not on the record but off the record he is; not
on the scene, off the scene." I felt that verified the information that
had been given to me. I reported it to the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation.
Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, is it your testimony that at the termina-
tion of your session with Julian Friedman you told him you felt
free to report the incident to the necessary authorities.
Mrs. Widener. I did.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 765
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that the next day you corroborated
certain parts of the story told to you by Mr. Friedman in order to de-
termine whether or not he was telling you those things in jest?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes.
Mr. Morris. In making those efforts to verify details of the story,
did you find that in fact those things he told you the night before
were indeed true?
Mrs. WiDENER. I did.
Mr. Morris. Did you as a matter of fact report the incident to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes; I did.
The Chairman. Do you remember how long after this incident
you made the report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, approxi-
mately ?
Mrs. WiDENER. The morning I went down to the United States Mis-
sion to the United Nations and saw Sarah
The Chairman. That was the morning after?
Mrs. WiDENER. That was the morning after. In the afternoon I
spoke to Mr. Woltman.
The Chairman. To whom?
Mrs. WiDENER. Mr. Woltman on the New York World-Telegram.
I believe it was that afternoon or the next morning I reported it to
the authorities.
The Chairman. You reported it where, to the Washington office of
the FBI or to the FBI re])resentative in New York?
Mrs. W^iDENER. To the New York office,
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I recommend that we request of
the State Department the report by Julian Friedman referred to by
Mrs. Widener in her testimony on the Communist Chinese labor
movement ?
The Chairman. Will you kindly write that out so that I can make
the request ?
Mr. Morris. I have it here. It is in regard to the Chinese Com-
munist labor movement, and I will use the exact wording in the testi-
mony by Friedman.
Mrs. Widener has testified Friedman told her he wrote such a report
and described the report.
The Chairman. That request will be made at once.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that you re-
quest also further information about his discharge, what they meant
by without prejudice, the facts surrounding his dismissal.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris, Mrs. Widener, while you were working with the Voice
of America did you encounter any publication of the Institute of Pa-
cific Eelations in any way ?
Mrs. Widener. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Will you describe whatever you did encounter?
Mrs. Widener. I think I must have a record of the date. I was
given an assignment to write a script for the Voice of America cover-
ing confidential material that was sent by our Embassy in Moscow bade*
to the United States. The report was written by, if my memory serves,
me correctly, Mr. John Stines. It covered conditions for women — I
only wrote about the women's field, of course, for the Voice of Amer-
ica— it covered conditions for women in central and southeast Asiatic
766 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
parts of the Soviet Union. Mr. Stines' report covered in a very thor-
ough way the deplorable or what he considered the deplorable condi-
tions for women there, the fact they were being forced into heavy in-
dustry, into labor in pig iron production and heavy production des-
tined for, I suppose, such things as armaments and so on.
The report was given to me to cover for a script for the Voice. I
took it home. It was given to me to take home. When I studied it, I
felt I needed a great deal of research material to write an effective
script for it. So I went back to the Voice and I put in a request to the
editor-in-chief if he could suggest good sources of research material.
He said to me that the Foreign Affairs Publication section of the State
Department had issued a very excellent bulletin on these deplorable
conditions in the Asiatic regions of the Soviet Union and he would
give that to me to study. No one at the Voice could find it. I waited
a long time and though all other copies were in order in the files, this
particular copy was missing. I waited quite a while, while they looked
it up. Then the editor-in-chief said he would send me over to the
research library of the Voice of America, which is about a block and
a half away from the building in which I work. I did go over there.
I was given a book issued under the sponsorship of the Institute of
Pacific Affairs as research material for this script.
Mr. SoTjRwiNE. You mean the Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. I am sorry. Institute of Pacific Relations.
When I took the book home and I started to try to do my research,
really, I am sorry, I just burst out laughing, because it was diametri-
cally opposite Mr. Stines' report. The research in this book was
diametrically opposed to everything in Mr. Stines' report.
Senator Ferguson. What was the name of it ?
Mrs. WiDENER. Let me see. Either the Central Southeastern Soviet
Russia — let me think — or Middle Eastern. I just can't quote the title
to you. I Iniow the author.
Senator Ferguson. Who was it?
Mrs. WiDENER. William Mandel. When I opened the book I was
very much interested to see the Office of War Information was in it.
Wlien I noticed that I thought I would get some really good material
for my script. But I couldn't use it. It was my belief and feeling
that the book was largely Communist propaganda. At least if Mr.
Stines' report and other material thart I had studied on the subject
consistently is accurate, then this book is inaccurate. It paints con-
ditions there in those regions of the Soviet Union as a kind of paradise.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that we
have introduced into the record evidence that Mr. William Mandel
is a member of the Communist Party, in addition to the fact that we
did show some connection of his with the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions. I mention that to show the fact this is germane testimony.
Was that the end of that episode, Mrs. Widener?
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have taken, in executive session,
testimony by an adviser of the Free China Labor League who spent
•Some time on Formosa and in Shanghai. This gentleman is now cur-
rently in Europe. We have the choice today of either taking his
executive session testimony and introducing it into the public record,
or we can wait until he returns from Europe and he will give the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 767
testimony in person. I think it is a decision that should be made by
the chairman and the committee, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ferguson. He was sworn. The testimony was taken in
regular executive session?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
The Chairman. Who was present? What Senators were present
and where was it taken ?
Mr. Morris. It was taken in executive session here in Washington.
I know Senator Ferguson was present because it took place in the
Senator's room. I think Senator Eastland was also present, but the
transcript will show it.
The Chairman. The witness is now in Europe ?
Mr. Morris. Yes. We summoned him to be here today. His wife
notified us last week he could not be present for he is in Europe for
a period of about 2 months. We have the decision of deciding whether
or not we should use his executive session testimony and make it
public, or wait until he returns from Europe.
The Chairman. It would be the view of the Chair that we would
defer until we can have the witness present, but that view of the
Chair will be governed by the will of the committee.
Senator Ferguson. I would say normally that should be the pro-
gram. I do not think we should delay the hearings because of the
present condition when this could be made public.
The Chairman. I think I will take that up in committee in execu-
tive session at a later date as to what the 'decision will be. If it is
necessary, we can use the executive testimony. I would prefer to
have the witness appear and testify in open session.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, for security purposes I feel we should
not give his name, but this is the executive session taken Friday,
July 6, 1951, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.
The Chairman. Very well. That will be taken up by the com-
mittee in executive session and we will come to a conclusion on it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have here some evidence by Mr.
Mandel which would corroborate the episode related by Mrs. Widener
in connection with Mr. William Mandel's book.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Mandel.
Mr. Mandel. I have here a little pamphlet entitled "IPR books,
1950-51, Institute of Pacific Relations." It lists new and forthcom-
ing publications on the Far East and the Pacific area. On page 24
of this list we find The Soviet Far East and Central Asia, by Wil-
liam Mandel, inquiry series. This is the book we have.
The Chairman. Does that title "The Soviet Far East" refresh your
memory any?
Mrs. Widener. Yes, it does. Could I see the book?
The Chairman. Certainly.
Senator Ferguson. Please see whether you can identify that as
the book.
Mrs. Widener. Yes; this is the book that was given to me.
I would, if I may, like to call attention to something that struck
me when I looked at the book. It has a foreword. I read the fore-
word. It was the first thing I read. Before I had read any of the
book, it struck me that the foreword is, well, it is double talk.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?
768 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Sour WINE. Mr. Chairman, at this point I think the entire fore-
word should be made a part of the record and then the witness can
comment on it if she likes.
The Chairman. Very well.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
The Soviet Pak East
(By William Mandel)
FOREWORD
This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the
Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the
Far East.
It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American
Russian Institute.
The study has been submitted in draft to a number of authorities, many of
whom made suggestions and criticisms which were of great value in the process
of revision.
Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final
text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study.
The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the
view of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any
of the national councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility
of the author.
During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. I.
W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors.
Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international
secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection
with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss
Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of
this responsibility.
In the general conduct of this inquiry into the problems arising from the con-
flict in the Far East the institute has benefited by the counsel of the following
advisers : Prof. H. F. Angus, of the University of British Columbia ; Dr. J. B.
Condliffe, of the University of California; M. Etienne Dennery, of the Ecole
des Sciences Politiques.
These advisers have cooperated with the chairman and the secretary-general
in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the inquiry
conform to a proper standard of sound anji impartial scholarship. Each manu-
script has been submitted to at least two of the advisers and although they do
not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or any of the studies,
they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the subject of the inquiry.
The purpose of this inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems
arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide
members of the institute in all countries and the members of IPR conferences
with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East
with a view to indicating the major issues, which must be considered in any
future adjustment of international relations in that area. To this end, the
analysis will include an account of the economic and political conditions which
produced the situation existing in .July 1937, with respect to China, to Japan,
and to the other foreign powers concerned ; an evaluation of developments dur-
ing the war period which appear to indicate important trends in the policies
and programs of all the powers in relation to the far eastern situation ; and
finally, an estimate of the principal political, economic, and social conditions
which may be expected in a postwar period, the possible forms of adjustment
which might be applied under these conditions, and the effects of such adjust-
ments upon the countries concerned.
The Inquiry does not propose to document a specific plan for dealing with the
far eastern situation. Its aim Is to focus available information on the present
crisis in forms which will be useful to those who lack either the time or the
expert knowledge to study the vast amount of material now appearing or already
published in a number of languages.
The present study, "The Soviet Far East," falls within the framework of the
first of the four general groups of studies which it is proposed to make as follows :
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 769
I. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the
present course of the policies of western powers in the Far East; their territorial
and economic interests; the effects on their far-eastern policies of internal
economic and political developments and of developments in their foreign poli-
cies vis-a-vis other parts of the world ; the probable effects of the present conflict
on their positions in the Far East; their changing attitudes and policies with
respect to their future relations in that area.
II. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present
course of Japanese foreign policy and possible important future developments;
the extent to which Japan's policy toward China lias been influenced by Japan's
geographic conditions and material resources, by special features in the political
and economic organization of Japan which directly or indirectly affect the formu-
lation of her present foreign policy, by economic and political developments in
China, by the external policies of other powers affecting Japan; the principal
political, economic, and social factors which may be expected in a postwar
Japan; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which
could aid in the solution of Japan's fundamental problems.
III. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the
present course of Chinese foreign policy and possible important future develop-
ments; Chinese unification and reconstruction, 1931-37, and steps leading toward
the policy of united national resistance to Japan; the present degree of political
cohesion'and economic strength; effects of resistance and current developments
on the position of foreign interests in China and changes in China's relations with
foreign powers ; the principal political, economic, and social factors which may
be expected in a postwar China ; possible and probable adjustments on the part
of other nations which could aid in the solution of China's fundamental problems.
IV. Possible methods for the adjustment of specific problems, in the light of
information and suggestions presented in the three studies outlined above;
analysis of previous attempts at bilateral or multilateral adjustments of political
and economic relations in the Pacific and causes of their success or failure ; types
of administrative procedures and controls already tried out and their relative
effectiveness ; the major issues likely to require international adjustment in a
postwar period and the most helpful methods which might be devised to meet
them ; necessary adjustments by the powers concerned ; the basic requirements
of a practical system of interaational organization which could promote the
security and peaceful development of the countries of the Pacific area.
Edwakd C. Cakter, Secretary General.
Mrs. WiDENER (reading) :
This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the
Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the
Far East,
I took tliat to mean that the Institute of Pacific Eolations sponsors
this book. I think anybody would. [Continues reading:]
It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American
Russian Institute.
The study has been submitted in draft to a number of authorities, many of
whom made suggestions and criticisms which were of great value in the process
of revision.
Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final
text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study.
The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the views
of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the
national councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the
author.
During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the genei'al direction of Dr.
J. W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his suc-
cessors. Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Evei-y member of the
international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in
connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L.
Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Plilda Austern, who have carried the
major share of this responsibility.
In the general conduct of this inquiry into the problems ai'ising from the con-
flict in the Far East, the institute has benefited by the counsel of the following
advisers —
770 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
May I say that I take the word "institute" here to mean the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations, and it seems to me that this foreword — "so
far as we are publishing it, but we are not responsible for it" — is
double talk. I mean, to a professional writer it is. It seems to me
that way, anyway. [Continues reading :]
Prof. H. F. Angus, of the University of British Columbia ; Dr. J. B. Condliffe,
of the University of California ; M. Etienne Dennery, of the Ecole des Sciences
Politiques.
These advisers have cooperated with the chairman and the secretary-general —
I take that to be the chairman and the secretary-general of the
institute.
The Chairman. What else would you take it?
Mrs. WiDENER (continues reading) :
in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the inquiry
conform to a proper standard of sound and impartial scholarship.
Now, it seems to me before they said they were not responsible for
the opinions expressed in this book. Here they are guaranteeing its
impartiality.
Each manuscript has been submitted to at least two of the advisers ; and,
although they do not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or
any of the studies, they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the
subject of the inquiry.
The inquiry is being conducted, I understand, by the Institute of
Pacific Relations. The more I read this foreword, frankly — I did feel
like Alice in Wonderland.
Mr. Morris. It is your testimony that that book was given to you
as a guide in your writing ?
Mrs. WiDENER. Oh, yes, sir. This was given to me as research mate-
rial. It was the only material given to me.
The Chairman. ]3y whom was it given to you ?
Mrs. WiDENER. By the research library of the Voice of America.
Mr. Morris. Can you think of an individual in there ?
Mrs. WiDENER. I don't know the name of the librarian who gave it
to me, but I do know it was given to me. [Continues reading :]
Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the
members of IPR conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the
situation in the Far East.
Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries
and the members of the IPR conferences, and then it goes on. Then
it says it does not propose to document a specific plan for dealing with
the Far East situation. Then it goes on to guarantee that these are the
contingencies. Anybody can read it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out again we have
had testimony before this committee that Mr. William Mandel, the
author of that volume, was a member of the Communist Party. This
episode is brought forth at this time, Mr. Chairman, simply as one
episode that this particular witness is able to testify to and is offered
for that purpose.
Mrs. WiDENER. May I say something?
Mr. Morris. If it is pertinent ; yes.
Mrs. WiDENER. If you will permit me, I would like to make a sug-
gestion here. I think this kind of thing is typical of the plight of the
serious researcher and student and would-be accurate writer and re-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 771
porter. I feel that if a book such as this exists in a Government
library, for research purposes, a book which is I do not believe im-
partial, that somehow or other that book should be labeled so that the
researcher who is writing for the Voice of America, or any other
agency of the United States Government, knows when they are pick-
ing a book up such as this that this is in truth not an impartial fac-
tual document, or at least it is not when compared with the Govern-
ment's own information.
I have no way of judging any of this information, except by what
was given to me, but I do know what was given to me by the State
Department on this subject whicli was in direct refutation of what
is in this book.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then you feel, when the Gov-
ernment has in its library of research for the Voice of America a book
and they present that book to a person to get out a script for the
Voice, they in a way sponsor the accuracy of the information in the
research book?
Mrs. WiDENER. I should think that the book in the research library
would be classified as Communist propaganda or else Marxian-So-
cialist views, or Lenin-Stalin views. So, when you pick it up and
read it, yovi know what you have. These are very complex, difficult
matters covered in this book. If I had not been given special informa-
tion by an expert, written by an expert in our own Embassy, how
could I have any knowledge of the existing conditions in the central
Asiatic part of the Soviet Union ?
Senator Ferguson. You could have accepted it as being the truth
and the facts and given it on the air in your script.
Mrs. Widener. I could have accepted this book if I had not had any
other information. If I had received an assignment and was given
by my own Government this book to write about, which I was, it
seems to me I would have accepted this as material suitable.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, at the Friday session we introduced
documents showing Mr. Julian Friedman was connected with the In-
stitute of Pacific Relations. I think Mr. Mandel has one more con-
tribution to make to that list.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Mandel. I have here an issue of the Spotlight on the Far East,
published monthly by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern
Policy, which has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General.
This is the issue of April 1947. On page 5 we find an article under
the heading "Guest Column," by Julian Friedman, entitled "China's
Unions Refuse to be Puppets." Under his name it says [reading] :
For the past 2 years the author was United States labor attache in China. He
became personally acquainted with all ranks of trade-unionists and speaks with
authority on the Chinese labor movement.
I would like to put the article, which is brief, into the record and
just quote a portion of it by way of example.
The Chiang Kai-shek government is absolutely opposed to trade-unionism
because it means democracy, a menace to Chiang's plutocracy. Genuine trade-
unionists are certainly opposed to the present antilabor National Government —
and so on in the same strain.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this whole column
introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.
772 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This is a column tliat Julian Friedman wrote for the Committee for a
Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which has been termed "a subversive
organization" by the Attorney General.
Mr. Sour WINE. It is at least a column which appeared in that pub-
lication under his name.
Mr. Morris. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. I see there is a photograph. Is that fi photo-
graph of Friedman ? Maybe the witness can identify it as being the
person she spoke to on the night she has been talking about.
Mrs. WiDENER. It resembles ; I wouldn't say positively.
Mr. Morris. Let the record show it is a very small photograph, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The photograph shows head and shoulders and the
entire photograph is less than an inch square, and it is square.
Mrs. WiDENER. It resembles the person, but I wouldn't say posi-
tively it was the person.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. I would like that exhibit made part of the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 246" and is
as follows :)
Exhibit No. 246
[From, the Spotlight on the Far East, vol. II, No. 4, piihlished monthly by the Committee
for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, New York, N. Y., April 1947]
GUEST COLUMN
China's Unions Refuse To Be Puppets
(By Julian Friedman)
[Photograph]
For the past 2 years the author was United States labor attach^ iu China.
He became personally acquainted with all ranks of trade-unionists and speaks
with authority on the Chinese labor movement.
Genuine trade-unionists are not easy to find in Kuomintang China. To
reach them, you have to visit obscure, innocent-looking alleys or out-of-the-way
fields in the suburbs of the cities.
But it is most dangerous for them to be known as trade-unionists or to work
openly for real trade-unionism.
The Chiang Kai-shek government is absolutel.v- opposed to trade-unionism
because it means democracy, a menace to Chiang's plutocracy. Genuine trade-
unionists ai-e certainly opposed to the present anti-labor National Government.
Many were originally either company-union or Kuomintang headquarters
appointees. There were also secret-society agents and gangsters in labor roles.
The latter are quickly exposed today by the workers themselves.
As for the company-union and bureaucratic-union officials, the workers have
given them every opportunity to work for the real trade-union movement. So,
they now face this dilemma : serve as Kuomintang stooges and 'finks' and lose
support among the workers or fight with the workers and be attacked by the
Fascists.
That several have chosen the latter course has enraged the National Govern-
ment and Kuomintang, which has retaliated with arrest, threats of violence,
expulsion from official labor circles, purging of official unions, and reorganizing
them.
Nothing illustrates the change in labor so aptly as the Shanghai anti-civil-war
demonstration of June 23, 194G. On the day before, the Government had called
official trade-union representatives to a meeting and dictated resolusions which
said that no workers or unions would participate in tlie demonstration, and that
any persons in the demonstration could not be considered workers. The resolu-
tions were "unanimously adopted" because the Government chairman said so,
with no one else given a chance to speak. But more than 100,000 workers
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 772
turned out the next day. And the representatives who had "passed" the resolu-
tions the previous day marched at their head.
The Chairman. Is there anything else?
Mr. Morris. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. When did you wish the committee to meet again?
Mr. Morris. Tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, Mr. Chairman. We
will have General Wedemeyer as a witness.
The Chairman. Are there any questions, Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. IS^o.
The Chairman. The committee stands in recess until tommorrow
morning at 10 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 11. 15 a. m. Tuesday, September 18, 1951, the hear-
ing was recessed until 10 a. m. Wednesday, September 19, 1951.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
wednesday, september 19, 1951
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, of the Cominiittee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. C.
The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424,
Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran ( chairman) presiding.
Present : Senators McCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, and Jenner.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Mor-
ris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.
The Chairman. The subcommittee will come to order.
General Wedemeyer, will you stand and be sworn, please?
You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give
before tiie subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary will be the
truth, the whole trutli, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
General Wedemeyer. I do.
TESTIMOITY OF LT. GEN. ALBEKT C. WEDEMEYER, (RETIRED),
AVCO, NEW YORK, N. Y.
The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. General, will you give your name and address to the
reporter, please?
General Wedemeyer. A. C. Wedemeyer, AVCO, 420 Lexington
Avenue, New York City.
Mr. Morris. What is your present occupation?
General Wedejieyer. I am vice president and a member of the board
of directors of AVCO.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell the committee what service commands
you have held in the American Army with respect to the China
theater.
General Wedemeyer. I was designated theater commander and
chief of staff to the Generalissimo in the fall of 1944 when General
Stilwell was relieved from those two posts.
Mr. Morris. How long did you hold that position?
General Wedemeyer. Approximately 2 years.
Mr. Morris. That would be, then, until the fall of 1946?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. What was your next command then. General?
General Wedemeyer. I commanded the Second Army with head-
quarters in Baltimore.
Mr. Morris. That was the end of your China command ?
775
776 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
General Wedemetee. That is correct. I went out to Qiina again in
1947 for 2 months.
Mr. Morris. What was the purpose of that trip, General ?
General Wedemetee. I was sent out there as an envoy of the Pres-
ident to make a survey of conditions in China and Korea.
Mr. Morris. Did you write a report as a result of that survey ?
General Wedemeyer. I did.
Mr. Morris. Is that the report which is now referred to as the
Wedemeyer report on China?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, when you assumed command of
the China theater what civilian members were there on duty at that
time? This is now in the fall of 1944.
General Wedemeyer. What civilian members were on duty on my
staff?'
Mr. Morris. On your staff.
Genera] Wedemeyer. I had four political advisers who had been
serving is that capacity on General Stilwell's staff. They included
Mr. Jack Service, Mr. John Davies, Mr. Raymond Ludden, and Mr.
John Emmerson.
Mr. Morris. How long did they remain as political advisers to your
command after your arrival?
General Wedemeyer. Only a few months.
Mr. Morris. General, during that period of time were you able to
form an opinion of the various political reports that they submitted
at that time?
General Wedemeyer. My analysis of the reports submitted by those
gentlemen could not properly be called an intelligent or thorough-
going analysis, and this is the reason : In my judgment, if I had it to
do over again, I would have more carefully analyzed those reports,
but at that time, that is, at the time I assumed command of the theater,
the Japanese were pushing us around and it looked for a ^yhile as if I
were going to have difficulty remaining there and to retain China in
the war. I had two areas of strategic importance— Kunming and
Chungking. Kunming was the terminal of my principal base of sup-
ply. All of my supplies, as you gentlemen know, came over the
"hump" by air. We were cut off from the outside world except by air,
so if I lost that, China might be put out of the war.
The other area of importance was the seat of the wartime govern-
ment in Chungking. If I lost that, psychologically and militarily
China again might be out. So I was hard put to it to retain my situa-
tion there, to stabilize the military situation, with the result that I
neglected the political, diplomatic, or psychological factors which I
properly should have taken heed of and taken appropriate steps.
These four men who were political advisers, two or three of them I
had known previously. I had met them socially over in India when
I was serving there with Lord Louis Mountbatten.
Mr. Morris. Who were they ?
General Wedeinieyer. I met John Davies, John Emmerson, and Jack
Service. I had not met, prior to my assuming command in China,
Raymond Ludden.
Mr. Morris. General, did the recommendations of these four po-
litical officers coincide with American policy at that time?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 777
General Wedemeyer. At that time the American policy, as I inter-
preted it, was to keep China in the war and to support the Chinese
Nationalist Government. There were no clear-cut American policies
enunciated, insofar as I can recall, pertaining to China or any other
area of the world. Theater commanders in remote areas had often-
times to interpret or try to conjecture what was desired in a broad
sense, what was desired to accomplish what the Government wanted.
However, I felt that my job in China was to continue China in the
war, to contain as many Japanese in that area fighting so that they
could not be removed from the area and sent over to oppose General
Mac Arthur and Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific. As I stated, also to
support the Chinese Nationalist Government which our own Govern-
ment recognized as the sovereign government in that area.
So everything that I did militarily or otherwise was in consonance
with that interpretation of American policy in China. If I had fol-
lowed the advice of these four advisers, some of the advice that they
embodied in these reports, in my judgment I would not have been
carrying out my directive, nor would I have been following the policy •
of my country in that particular area.
Senator Ferguson. When you say "the policy," are you speaking
about the policy as laid down by the military or by the State Depart-
ment, or was there a difference?
Gejieral Wedemeyek. Senator Ferguson, I made a real effort back
in 1040, 1941, 1942, and 1943 to determine American policy or policies
insofar as our own country was concerned which were not clearly
enunciated. Most of them were found in the Constitution, tlie bill of
rights, and so forth, but our policies pertaining to other areas of the
world were never, in my judgment, clearly enunciated. That goes
right up to today. I don't think many people in our country know
what we are striving to do in the Far East, in the Middle East, or in
Western Europe today. The objectives established are too nebulous
and, in my judgment, until we do have clearly enunciated policies by
the appropriate authorities, not by the military but by civilian authori-
ties, as is contemplated in our Constitution, we are going to have a
difficult time in accomplishing what I think the American people be-
lieve to be our national objectives.
I said all of that because oftentimes as a theater commander I
had to take action in the absence of clearly enunciated policy. I had
to take action that inevitably created policy. Then if that action
that I took had been wrong or had been subject to criticism on the
part of our people, I would have been to blame. The military is as-
suming responsibility that they should not. But if the policy hap-
pened to be in consonance with the views of the American people,
then the military would not be criticized. I just mention that because
I think it is a vacuum that must be filled.
Senator Eastland. What was the policy that your political ad-
visers put forth ? What was their advice to you ?
General Wedemeyer. Sometimes it is quite implicit. Senator. Other
times it is veiled, but the idea was to give more support to the Com-
munist forces in lieu of the Nationalist forces. These reports would
play up the shortcomings, the maladministration and the unscrupu-
lousness of Nationalist leaders, play up the orderliness or the poten-
tialities of the Communist forces in Yunan.
778 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I could not support the Communists' political party and still carry
out what I believed to be the American policy in the area.
Senator Eastland. Those policies were pro-Communist, were they
not?
General Wedemeyer. I would not state that categorically, sir. I
remember a newspaperman out there whom I thought was an out-and-
out Communist. The reason I thought so, after considering it more
carefully, I was sure that he was so critical of the Nationalists. There
was much to be criticized in the Nationalist set-up. There was mal-
administration and there were dishonesties.
Senator Eastland. That was true with regard to the Communists,
too, was it not ?
General Wedemeyer. No, sir. It was a smaller set-up. The op-
portunities w^ere not quite tliere.
Senator Ferguson. The Communists were not in power and did not
have the opportunity ?
General Wedmeyer. That is right, sir.
Senator Eastland. If the Communists had the opportunity
General Wedemeyer. They w^ould act just the same way; yes, sir.
Senator Eastland. Knowing that these advisers favored the Com-
munists over the Nationalists?
General Wedemeyer. That is implicit in these reports, if you will
read them over.
Mr. Morris. Were these reports critical of the Nationalist Govern-
ment that you were there to clef end and uphold ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that ?
The Chairman. I would like, if it is possible, for the general to
designate which, if any, of the four people he has named rendered the
reports that he makes mention of, the four advisers who were on his
staff.
General Wedemeyer. Actually, Senator, I do not recall ever receiv-
ing a written report from Mr. John Emmerson. The other three did
submit written and oi^al reports to me. I stated clearly, sir, that I did
not give them the attention that I properly should have, but I was
involved in a military situation.
Mr. Morris. General, to whom were these reports made? I mean
these reports that we are discussing.
General Wedemeyer. They were submitted to me as theater com-
mander.
Mr. Morris. Were they submitted through the State Department
representative in China? They were State Department employees,
were they not ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. They were all Foreign Service offi-
cers, professionals.
Mr. Morris. Do they report to you through the ranking State De-
pai'tment representative in China ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes. When I assumed command of the thea-
ter, Mr. John Davies — I believe he was the senior one of the group —
reported to me, indicated what they had been doing for General Stil-
well, and expressed the desire to cooperate and to assist me in every
way possible. All of them spoke Chinese. They were all Chinese
language students. I think two of them were born out there, the sons
of missionaries.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 779
Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, may I refer you to the first report
that is on that list of papers there in front of you on the table and
that you will see is a report made by John S. Service. It is one of the
reports that we are discussing.
Mr. Chairman, I am now referring to Report No. 40 from the United
States Army Observer Section, APO 879. This is a report from
John S. Service to General Stihvell, conmianding general, USAF-
CBI. It is dated October 10, 19M.
Are you acquainted with that memorandum. General ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. It was not submitted to me, of
course, but when I assumed the command of the theater in order to get
background for my duties, I read every document I could possibly get
hold of in my headquarters. This document I definitely read at that
time.
Mr. Morris. Is there anything outstanding in that memorandum
that made an impression on you in the past ?
General Wedemeyer. A¥hen I read it over I just recalled being
impressed with the writer's criticism of the Chinese Nationalist Gov-
ernment. There were criticisms emphasized throughout the paper.
When I took command of the theater, I found the American military
were criticizing the Chinese military and the relations were not good.
It was not a happy situation. I recall vividly visiting the Chinese
headquarters to obtain from the Chinese generals a resume of the
situation as it existed at that time. I went over there with my chief
of staff, a general named Hern. I was astounded at the attitude of
the Chinese. They were correctly polite, but I did not get any infor-
mation from them. I decided either they did not have any informa-
tion or there was an intolerable situation that just couldn't continue.
So I suggested to the generalissimo that we set up a combined staff.
I would sit at the head of this table and next to me would be the head
of the Chinese Army. On my right would be one of my staff officers,
say my Intelligence officer; and sitting next to him would be the
Chinese Intelligence officer. That worked beautifully. At first the
Chinese were not very cooperative. They were very quiet. When
the war was over they gave a party for my staff officers, indicating
that marvelous relationship had developed. That just was a thing
because it permeated the field where we got better cooperation between
the military Chinese and American. *
I mention that because when I got over there there was no coopera-
tion and there was mistrust and suspicion prevailing in the theater.
These reports on the civilian side just played up that same philosophy
that pervaded in the theater.
Mr. Morris. General, may we get back to this report? Is there
anything outstanding in that particular report that you would care to
comment on at this time ?
General Wedemeyer. In my judgment the military capabilities of
the Communist forces in Yunan were not great, were invariably over-
emphasized in this and other reports submitted to me by these political
advisers.
I think I am qualified to speak knowingly on that subject, because
I am a trained military man and those men were not. On the political,
economic, and diplomatic side I would feel inclined to yield to their
views and opinions.
22848— 52— i>t. 3 6
780 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Mr, Chairman, in this particular report there is cer-
tain underscoring. I think it would be appropriate if Mr. Mandel
were to read the underscored portions of this report and we can have
particuhir questions addressed to General Wedemeyer concerning the
views expressed therein.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
With tlie glaring exposure of the Kuomintang's failure, dissatisfaction within
China is growing raiDidly. The prestige of the party was never 'lower, and
Chiang is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader.
The Chairman. I think before that question is discussed by the
general you had better lay a foundation. Whose report is this?
From where does it emanate?
Mr. Morris. This is a report of John S. Service dated October 10,
1944, and it is submitted to General Stilwell, commanding general,
USAF-CBI, on that date.
As testimony has brought foi'th, General Stilwell was the predeces-
sor of General Wedemeyer. This letter came to the attention of Gen-
eral Wedemeyer when he assumed command in China.
The Chairman. Now, General, the underscored matter is drawn to
your attention. Do you wish to discuss it?
Mr. Morris. Do you have any comment on that particular aspect of
the Service report ?
General Wedemeyer. From the American viewpoint as expressed to
me by practically everyone with whom I came in contact, that state-
ment might be said to epitomize the entire American viewpoint toward
Chiang Kai-shek and his government when I arrived in the theater in
October 1944.
The Chairman. "\Ylien you say "the entire American viewpoint,"
just what do you encompass by that expression ?
General Wedemeyer. Mr. Chairman, practically everyone with
whom I spoke felt that there was nothing that could be done construc-
tively to keep China fighting in the war.
The Cpiairman. That is those with whom you spoke in that theater?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. And Mr. Wallace was out there, the
then Vice President. He stated that nothing but a miracle could keep
China fighting in the war. He was quoted in the papers saying that.
That was the pessimistic view uniformly expressed to me when I
went over there to assume command by military and by civilians with
whom I came in contact.
Senator Ferguson. General Wedemeyer, I wonder whether this was
in line with what you thought to be the policy [reading] :
Our dealings with Chiang Kai-sheli; apparently continiie on the basis of the un-
realistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause. It is
time, for the salje of the war and also for our future interests in China, that we
take a more realistic line.
He was the head, was he not, at that time of the Nationalist Govern-
ment ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, he was.
Senator Ferguson. How could that be in line with your idea of the
policy of the United States in China, that sentence?
General Wedemeyer. It was not, Senator. I state categorically these
reports were not in consonance with my interpretation of my directive
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 781
or of American policy. That contravenes American policy as I under-
stand it, sir.
Mr. MoKRis. Mr. Mandel, will you read the second underscored pas-
sage?
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
In the present circumstances, the Knoinintang is dependent on American
support for survivaL But we are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang.
Then, skipping down —
We need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition. The party and Chiang
■will stick to us because our victory is certain and is their only hope for continued
power.
General Wedemeyer. My comment on that is this : The Communist
Party in the U. S. S. R. was dependent upon America for support
during the war. We gave plenty of it to the U. S. S. R., much more
than we ever gave to China. A statement like that is just inane, in
my judgment.
JNIr. Morris. Did we need the Chinese Government in the war,
General Wedemeyer?
General Wedemeyer. We needed it just as much as we needed the
U. S. S. R. Any diversion of the Japanese effort that could be ac-
complished, it was sound to do so. The Chinese were containing in
their fighting with the Japanese a million and a half Japanese that
might have been deployed against our boys coming up through the
Philippine Archipelago and through the Ryukyus.
So the fact that the Chinese fighting, not as well as we would like
them to have fought, but doing increasingly better as the war went
on, they contained one million and a half Japanese which I think was
creditable and under the circumstances, a very great contribution.
Mr. Morris. So it is your testimony we did need the Chinese Gov-
ernment at that time to that extent ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; just as today we need Franco, any-
one that will help us in this struggle against communism. We may
not approve of everything they do. We may not go along with their
governmental structure, but if they can help us in our struggle, I
say use them. We needed them then.
Mr. Morris. On the basis of your entire experience in China would
you say that the situation as described to you by the political officers
was erroneous in this respect ?
General Wedemeyer. In my judgment they were erroneous.
Mr. Morris. In other words, you were able to make use of the
Chinese Nationalist forces?
General Wedemeyer. If I had followed the advice I would not
have been carrying out my orders.
Senator Ferguson. General Wedemeyer, isn't the w\^y this would
read and what you have said make it apparent that if you had followed
the political advice you would have tried to take the Communist Gov-
ernment in China as lining up with the United States and have noth-
ing to do with the Nationalists ?
General AVedemeyer. Yes, sir ; I think that is a fair statement.
Senator Ferguson. Their advice was to recognize in effect the Com-
munist Government in China ; whereas, you felt as we were then recog-
nizing the Nationalists that that. was the Government that you were to
782 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
support and to get the Nationalists' aid in your efforts in China ; is
that correct ?
General Wedemeyer. I think that is a fair statement. The Chi-
nese Communists offered me command of their army and I notified
the Joint Chiefs of Staff back in America. I, through the Ambassa-
dor, also notified the President that I did not want command of the
army. At that time I recognized the implications of communism
in the Far East as I did in Europe. I did not want to support people
whom I knew were operating under the aegis of the Kremlin.
Senator Ferguson. You felt that the best interests of America
would be served if the Nationalists were recognized?
General Wedemeyer. Not only for America but for the world, for
the Far East.
Mr, Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read further?
Mr. Mandel (continues reading) :
We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang government. All the other
groups in China want to defend themselves and fight Japan. Any new govern-
ment under any other than the present reactionary control will be more coopera-
tive and better able to mobilize the country.
Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that paragr.aph, please, General
Wedemeyer ?
General Wedemeyer. Here I am commenting on China in regard
to experts' political views. It makes me rather vulnerable. But in
my experience, which is only 5 years in China, or over 4 years, I
found that most of the Chinese cannot read or write. They do not
understand a thing about political philosophies, political structures,
and economic structures. They mean nothing to them. They want
shelter, food, and peace.
When he talks, when this man writes about other parties, there are
not other parties over there worthy of the name. Tliere was no other
leadership through which I could work, except Chiang Kai-shek on
the one hand, and on the other Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist
leader. They were quite well organized, these Communists, and very
articulate, much more so than Chiang Kai-shek, and very intolerant
of criticism which Chiang was not. He did permit people to criticize
him.
Mr. Morris. Did the Chinese Communists help j^ou in your confining
the Japanese on the mainland ?
General Wedemeyer. No, sir. I did make the effort to coordinate
our military operations over there. They were operating in sporadic
efforts to the north of wartime capital up in the Yunan area and
Shansi Province. They never launched a concerted attack in coordi-
nation with those attacks that I was putting on down below.
Now I should say in fairness to those people when my fliers would
be shot down behind the Japanese lines, frequently the Chinese Com-
munists would facilitate the return of those fliers. I don't want to
overemphasize that point because I don't want it to be given dispro-
portionate emphasis. But that is true. At times they did do that.
But their military operations did not make the contribution so often
one reads in the press or hears about on the radio. The military opera-
tions of the Chinese Communists, at least while I was in command of
the theater, were not significant.
Mr. Morris. You say that on the basis of fact you were the theater
commander ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 783
General Wedemeter. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. General, I call particularly your attention to the next
sentence in the paragraph that Mr. Mandel has just read :
Any new government under any other than the present reactionary control will
be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the country.
Would you comment on that ?
General Wedemeyer. As I stated, there were only two broad polit-
ical parties, one the Communists and one the Kuomintang. The splin-
ter parties were absolutely impotent. There were not enough people
involved. If we threw over the Kuomintang, it meant we were going
to assume support and cooperate with the Communists.
Mr. Morris. Would that then have been true, namely, that under any
other than the present reactionary control, to use Mr. Service's words,
the Communists would have been more cooperative ?
General Wedemeyer. The Communists, in my judgment — and I
have tried to be objective, I have tried to find good in Marxist
theories — the Communists will cooperate when the advantage accrues
to them. At no time will a Communist cooperate otherwise. That
was applicable then and it is applicable now. We are naive if we
think otherwise.
Mr. Morris. Will you continue reading, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel (continues reading) :
We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or
democratic China. All the people and all other political groups of importance
in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the
country, now and after the war.
Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that, General Wedemeyer ?
General Wedemeyer. Again I do not know what other groups he is
talking about. You had the professors
Mr. Morris. Certainly the Communists were one of those groups.
General Wedemeyer. They were the major group. There were
only two major groups there. There were splinter parties made up of
a few of the intelligentsia and they were not significant. _ They had no
power. They were not articulate, so I think you can disregard them.
Mr. Morris. As a matter of fact, General, the Chinese Communists
have not proved to be friendly to the United States and they have not
looked to us for the salvation of their country then or after the war ;
is that correct ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes. The Chinese Communists have no
friendly attitude toward anyone, in my judgment, except the Kremlin.
They certainly have no friendly attitudes or friendly intentions to-
ward countries that they call capitalistic nations. Their objective is
to destroy caj^italism. Their avowed intention is to destroy capital-
ism, expressed to me personally.
Mr. Morris. General, their performances, particularly during the
past year, would seem to be a complete refutation of that statement,
would they not, sir?
General Wedemeyer. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Will you continue, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel (continues reading) :
The parallel with Yugoslavia has been drawn before but is becoming more and
more apt. It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity, the use of the Communist
forces, and the mobilization of the population in the rapidly growing occupied
areas by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone, as it was to seek
784 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the solution of these problems through Mikhailovitch and King Peter's govern-
ment in London, ignoring Tito.
Mr. Morris. Would you comment on that, General?
General Wedemeyer. I think events that have transpired since we
supported Tito have proved us wrong. I think the real patriot over
in Yugoslavia, Mikhailovitch, we let down. Personally I think we
should have supported him. The same would be true in China. With
all his faults, and he does have faults, I think Chiang Kai-shek was
the proper leader to support at the time we did. I do not know of an-
other leader today whom we might support and obtain best results in
China from other than Chiang Kai-shek. To me today he epitomizes
leadership there.
Mr. Morris. Is there anything more there, Mr. Mandel?
Mr. Mandel (continues reading) :
Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot
hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second, we
cannot hope to solve China's problems (which are now our problems) without
consideration of the opposition forces — Communist, provincial, and liberal.
We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This is
an old trick of Chiang's.
Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that, General ?
General Wedemeyer. It sounds exactly like somebody was writing
about the attitude of Stalin when we were worried. Stalin was
pressurizing the Allies in World War II to establish a second front.
It was always the implicit threat there "If you don't establish a
second front, we will make a separate peace with Germany."
I think the same philosophy behind the situation in Russia applied
out in China, and this chap points out we should not support Chiang
Kai-shek because he is a reactionary. So was Stalin, the worst kind,
yet we supported him.
Mr. Morris. Will you continue, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel (continues reading) :
Public announcement that the President's representative had made a visit
to the Communist capital at Yenan would have signticance that no Chinese
would miss — least of all the generalissimo. The effect would be great even
if it were only a demonstration with no real consultation. But it should be
more than a mere demonstration ; we must, for instance, plan an eventual use of
the Communist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomiiitang terms.
Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that. General Wedemeyer?
General Wedemeyer. I think that would be just like foreign repre-
sentatives coming over here and visiting Bob Taft and ignoring
President Truman, The only difference is Senator Bob Taft would
not have an armed force to support his political Republican Party.
The Chairman. You do not think that would disturb Mr. Truman,
do you ?
General Wedemeyer. I did not mean to imply any disparagement
of any name I mention.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this document pre-
paratory to its being put in the record ?
Mr. Mandel. This document, listed as No. 40, was taken from the
transcript of the proceedings of the Loyalty Security Board meeting
in the case of John S. Service as a reprinting of a State Department
employee loyalty investigation.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, as such may that be introduced in the
record and marked with the next consecutive exhibit number ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 785
The Chairman. It is to be understood and the record will show
that this is the exhibit from which Mr. Mandel has been reading that
the excerpts were commented on b}^ the witness; it that correct?
Mr. Morris. That is right.
The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 247" and is
as follows:)
ExHiniT No. 247
United States Army Observer Section,
APO 879, October 10, 19U.
Report No. 40
Secret
Subject: The need for greater realism in our relations with Cliiang Kai-shek.
To :' General Stilwell, Commanding General, USAF-CBI.
1. You have allowed me, as a political officer attached to your staff, to
express myself freely in the past regarding the situation in China as I have
seen it. Although in Yenan I am only a distant observer of recent develop-
ments in Chungking and Washington, I trust that you will permit the con-
tinued frankness which I have assumed in the attached memorandum regarding
the stronger policy which I think it is now time for us to adopt toward Chiang
Kai-shek and the Central Government.
2. It is obvious, of course, that you cannot act independently along the lines
suggested. The situation in China and the measures necessary to meet it
have both military importance and far-reaching political significance; the two
aspects cannot be separated. Because of this interrelation, and because of
the high level on which action in China must be taken, there must be agree-
ment and mutual support between our political and military branches. But
this will be ineffective without clear decision and forceful implementation by
the President.
3. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted, as usual, to the
American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters USAF-CBI, for the
information of Mr. Davies.
(Signed) J. S.
(Typed) John S. Service.
Enclosure : Memorandum, as stated.
[First endorsement]
United States Army Observer Section,
APO 879, October 16, 19U-
To: Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding United States Army Forces, China,
Burma, and India, APO 879.
Approved :
David D. Barrett,
Colonel, GSC.
MEMORANDUM
Our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continue on the basis of the
unrealistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause.
It is time, for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China,
that we take a more realistic line.
The Kuomintang government is in crisis. Recent defeats have exposed its
military ineffectiveness and will hasten the approaching economic disaster.
Passive inability to meet these crises in a constructive way, stubborn unwilling-
ness to submerge selllsh power seeking in democratic unity, and tlie statements
of Chiang himself to the People's Political Council and on October 10, 1944,
are sufficient evidence of the bankruptcy of Kuomintang leadership.
With the glaring exposure of the Kuomintang's failure, dissatisfaction within
China is growing rapidly. The prestige of the party was never lower, and
Chiang is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader.
In the present circumstances, the Kuomintang is dependent on American
support for survival. But tve are in no icaij dependent on the Kuomintang.
We do not need it for military reasons. It has lost the southern air bases
and cannot hold any section of the sea coast. Without drastic reforms — which
786 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
must have a political base — its armies cannot fight the Japanese effectively
no matter how many arms we give them. But it will not permit those reforms
because its war against Japan is secondary to its desire to maintain its own
undemocratic power.
On the other hand, neither the Kuomintang nor any other Chinese regime,
because of the sentiment of the people, can refuse American forces the use of
Chinese territory against the Japanese. And the Kuomintang attitude prevents
the utilization of other forces, such as the Communist or provincial troops, who
should be more useful than the Kuomintang's demoralized armies.
We need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition. The party and Chiang
will stick to us because our victory is certain and is their only hope for con-
tinued power. But our support of the Kuomintang will not stop its normally
traitorous relations with the enemy and will only encourage it to continue
sowing the seeds of future civil war by plotting with the present puppets for
eventual consolidation of the occupied territories against the Communist-led
forces of popular resistance.
We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang government. All the other
groups in China want to defend themselves and fight Japan. Any new gov-
ernment under any other than the present reactionary control will be more
cooperative and better able to mobilize the country.
Actually, by continued and exclusive support of the Kuomintang, we tend
to prevent the reforms and democratic reorganization of the Government which
are essential for the revitalization of China's war effort. Encouraged by our
support, the Kuomintang will continue in its present course, progressively
losing the confidence of the people and becoming more and more impotent.
Ignored by us, and excluded from the Government and joint prosecution of
the war, the Communists and other groups will be forced to guard their own
interests by more direct opposition.
We need not support the Kuomintang for international political reasons. The
day when it was expedient to inflate Chiang's status to one of the Big Four is
past, because with the obvious certainty of defeat, Japan's Pan-Asia propaganda
loses its effectiveness. We cannot hope that China under the present Kuomin-
tang can be an effective balance to Soviet Russia, Japan, or the British Empire in
the Far East.
On the contraiT, artificial inflation of Chiang's status only adds to his unrea-
sonableness. The example of a democratic, nonimperialistic China will be much
better counterpropaganda in Asia than the present regime, which, even in books
like China's Destiny, hypnotizes itself with ideas of consolidating minority
nations (such as Tibet and Mongolia), recovering lost territories (such as the
southern peninsula), and protecting the rights and at the same time nationalities
of its numerous emigrants (to such areas as Thailand, Malaya, and the East
Indies). Finally, the perpetuation in pow«r of the present Kuomintang can only
mean a weak and disunited China — a sure cause of international involvements
in the Far East. The key to stability must be a strong, unified China. This
can be accomplished only on a democratic foundation.
We need not support Chiang in the heUcf that he represents pro- American or
democratic China. All the people and all other political groups of importance
in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the
country, now and after the war.
In fact, Chiang has lost the confidence and respect of most of the American-
educated, democratically minded liberals and intellectuals. The Chen brothers,
military, and secret police cliques which control the party and are Chiang's main
supports are the most Chauvinist elements in the country. The present party
ideology, as shown in Chiang's own books China's Destiny and Chinese Economic
Theor.v, is fundamentally antiforeign and antidemocratic, both politically and
economically.
Finally, we need feel no ties of gratitude to Chiang. The men he has kept
around him have proved selfish and corrupt, incapable, and obstructive,
Chiang's own dealings with us have been an opportunist combination of extrava-
gant demands and unfilled promises, wheedling and bargaining, bluff, and black-
mail. Chiang did not resist Japan until forced by his own people. He has
fought only passively— not daring to mobilize his own people. He has sought
to have us' save him — so that he can continue his conquest of his own country.
In the process, he has worked us for all we were worth.
We seem to forget that Chiang is an oriental; that his background and vision
are limited ; that his position is built on the skill as an extremely adroit politi-
cal manipulator and a stubborn, shrewd bargainer; that he mistakes kindness
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 787
and flattery for weakness ; and that he listens to his own instrument of force
rather than reason.
Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot
hope to deal successfully with Chiang without 'being hard-toilfd. Second, we
cannot hope to solve China's prohlems [which are now our problems] without
consideration of the opposition forces — Communist, provincial, and liberal.
The parallel with Yugoslavia has been drawn before but is becoming more and
more apt. It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity, the use of the Communist
forces, and the mobilization of the population in the rapidly growing occupied
areas by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone, as it was to seek
the solution of these problems through Mikhailovitch and King Peter's govern-
ment in Lonon, ignoring Tito.
We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This
is an old trick of Chiang's.
There may be a collapse of the Kuomintang government, but it will not be
the collapse of China's resistance. There may be a period of some confusion
but the eventual gains of the Kuomintang's collapse will more than make up
for this. The crisis itself makes reform more urgent — and at the same time
increases the weight of our influence. The crisis is the time to push—^wt to
relax.
We should not let Chiang divert us from the important questions by wasting
time in futile discussions as to who is to be American commander. This is an
obvious subterfuge.
There is only one man qualified by experience for the job. And the fact is
that no one who knows anything about China and is concerned over American
rather than Chiang's interests will satisfy Chiang.
We should end the hollow pretense that China is unified and that we can talk
only to Chiang. This piits the trump card in Chiang's hands.
Public announcement that the President's representative had made a visit
to the Communist capital at Yenan would have significance that no Chinese would
miss — -least of all the generalissimo. The effect would be great even if it were
only a demonstration with no real consultation. But it should be more than
a mere demonstration ; we must, for instance, plan on eventual use of the Com-
munist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomintang terms.
Finally if these steps do not succeed, we should stop veiling our negotiations
with China in complete secrecy. This shields Chiang and is the voluntary
abandonment of our strongest weapon.
Chinese public opinion would swing violently against Chiang if he were shown
obstructive and noncooperative with the United States. We should not be
misled by the relatively very few Kuomintang die-hards; they are not the peo-
ple. The Kuomintang government could not withstand public belief that the
United States was considering withdrawal of military support or recognition
of the Kuomintang as the leader of Chinese resistance.
More than ever, we hold all the aces in Chiang's poker game. It is time we
start playing them.
(Signed) J. S.
(Typed) John S. Service.
October 10, 1944.
Mr. Morris. I think it would be appropriate at this time if we
showed a connection between Mr. Service and the Institute of Pacific
Relations.
Mr, Mandel, will you bring something forth on that score, please?
Mr. Mandel. From the same loyalty board meeting transcript of
proceedings, the date being May 27, 1950, I read the following testi-
mony :
Question. Under what circumstances did you give that otf-the-record talk at
the IPR?
This was a question directed to Mr. Service.
Answer. During the period of consultation at my return in 1944 I was much
sought after because I was the first man to get back to Washington after having
visited in the Chinese Communist areas since 1939. In addition to all these
interrogations by the different agencies, a number of newspapermen were sent
to me by the press section of the Department. I was asked to go up to New
788 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
York to talk to Mr. Luce. I got approval. I talked to Mr. Hopkins, Mr. White,
and various other people. And the IPR asked
The Chaiuman. Will you just explain IPR?
Answer. The Institute of Pacific Relations. May we refer to it as the IPR?
The Chairman. Afterward, yes.
Answer. The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe
was then Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for
me to come over and give an informal off-the-record talk to some of their people
in the Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's
telling me that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it
would be all right with me.
Question. In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the
IPR?
Answer. That is right.
Question. I notice that in your statement .vou subscribed at that time to a
number of magazines dealing with China, one of which was the Far Eastern
Survey. What is the character of that?
Answer. The Far Eastern Survey is a biweekly publication put out by the
American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations containing articles written
by a very large number of people on sub.1ects related to the Far East generally.
Question. And Pacific Affairs?
Answer. Pacific Alfairs is a quarterly published by the International Council
of the International Secretariat, I believe. Perhaps — I'm not sure of the exact
wording of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Question. You were undoubtedly aware from the press of the charges that
the Institute of Pacific Relations was seriously infiltrated by Communists. Do
you have any knowledge as to how long that situation has existed, when the
IFR first began to be influenced in its publications by Communist thinking?
Answer. No ; I do not. Outside of being a subscriber to some of its maga-
zines, I have had no interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I have never ■
attended its i)eriodic conferences or participated in its affairs in any way. Cer-
tainly it was always thought of in the days referred to here as a most respectable
type of organization. I have heard from reading the press that there were
some Communists who did occupy positions of some influence in it at one period,
but I can't tell you with any definiteness or from personal knowledge when that
was or how influential those people were.
*******
Question. I also notice in your statement that at that time you subscribed
to the magazine Araerasia. How could you describe that magazine?
Answer. I subscribed to it just after it was established, I think.
****•••
Trawscript of Proceedings — Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case
OF John S. Service
Date : Tuesday, ]\Tay 30, 1950, 10 a. m. to 12 : 30 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State.
*******
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to offer as an exhibit at this time Document 327,
which is a receipt signed by the assistant treasurer of the American Institute of
Pacific Relations for membership dues for John S. Service in the IPR for the
year ending February 1951 in the amount of $15.
Mr. Morris. That will be introduced into the record, Mr. Chair-
man.
The Chairman. I did not fret it clear. This document represents
interrogation and answer by whom?
Mr. Mandel. The Loyalty Security Board in the case of John S.
Service, the Loyalty Security Board of the State Department.
The Chairman. With John S. Service answering?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record.
mSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 789
(The document referred to and read in its entirety by Mr. Mandel
was marked "Exhibit No. 248" and filed for the committee's informa-
tion. )
Mr. Morris. That bears on the precise connection that John S. Serv-
ice had with the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The Chairman. You may proceed.
Mr. Morris. I now come to the report of January 23, 1943.
Senator Ferguson. Could I inquire whether that was sworn testi-
mony?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
This document is marked No. 103 and is taken from the same pro-
ceeding in the case of John S. Service before the State Department
Loyalty Security Board.
Mr. Morris. This is the report of January 23, 1943 ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Is this a report by Mr. John S. Service ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes.
Mr. Morris, General, may I call your attention to the report of
January 23, 1943? I think that should be the second one in that
group of papers before you.
General Wedeimeyer. I have it.
Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with that particular report of
John S. Service?
General Wedemeyer. I have read it over, yes.
!Mr. ISIoRRis. It was not made at a time you were theater com-
mander?
General Wedemeyer. No, sir ; several months prior to my becoming
commander.
Mr. Morris. It did come to your attention after you became theater
commander?
General Wedemeyer. There was a copy in the headquarters of the
China theater.
Mr. INIoRRis. You recognize it is a report made by John S. Service ?
General Wedemeyer. Frankly, I couldn't say under oath that I
could say that.
Mr. Morris. You do remember reading it ?
General Wedemp^yer. I remember reading all these memoranda in
the headquarters submitted by the political advisers.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the fourth
paragraph on that page?
The Chairman. Wliat is the instrument?
Mr. Morris. This has been identified by Mr, Mandel as a John
Service report that was made part of the record of the loyalty pro-
ceedings of the State Department in the case of John S. Service.
Mr. Mandel, please read part of the second paragraph, not the
fourth paragraph, beginning with the third sentence.
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
In Kuomintang-controlled Cbina the conntering of commnnism is a growing pre-
occupation of propaganda, of both military and civilian political indoctrination,
and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only a rigorous
suppression of anything coming under the ever-widening definition of "commu-
nism" but there appears to be a movement away from even the outward fonns of
790 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether civil war-
can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until after a vic-
tory over Japan.
Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that, General?
General Wedemeyer. Frankly, I do not know what to comment.
I clon't want to repeat over and over again and take the Senators'
time. I have tried to make it clear that the Nationalist Government
with which I dealt was improving steadily, cooperated with me to
the best of its ability, and, on the other hand, I received no cooperation
from the Communists. I didn't consider them a government, of
course, but there wasn't much cooperation requested. The little I
asked them to do was not done, namely, conducting these military
operations coordinated with my over-all operations.
I really do not know what thoughts I could give.
Mr. Morris. Is there anything in that particular report, in the
entire report, you would care to comment on ?
General Wedemeyer. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce this in the record and
have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit ?
The Chairman. Very well. It will be inserted and properly
identified.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 249" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 249
January 23, 1943.
Subject : Kuomintang-Commuuist Situation.
An outstanding impression gained during the past 18 months spent in Chung-
king and in travel through southwest and northwest China is that the most care-
ful study should be given to the internal political situation in China, particularly
the growing rift between the Kuomintang and the Communists.
The united front is now definitely a thing of the past and it is impossible to
find any optimism regarding the possibility of its resurrection as long as present
tendencies continue and the present leadership of the Kuomintang, both civil
and military, remains in power. Far from improving, the situation is deter-
iorating. In Kuomintang-controlled China the countering of communism is a
growing preoccupation of propaganda, -of both military and civilian iwlitical
indoctrination, and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only
a rigorous suppression of anything coming under the ever widening definition
of "communism" but there appears to be a movement away from even the out-
ward forms of democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether
civil war can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until after
a victory over Japan.
The dangers and implications of this disunity are obvious and far reaching.
Militarily, the present situation is a great hindrance to any effective war effort
by China. Its deterioration into civil war would be disastrous. The situation
therefore has direct relationship to our own efforts to defeat Japan. At the
present time a large and comparatively well-trained and equipped portion of
the Kuomintang army is diverted from active combat against the Japanese to
blockade the Communists. In the north (Kansu and Shensi) the lines are well
established by multiple lines of block houses and those large forces remain in
a condition of armed readiness. Further south (Hupeh, Anhwei, North Kiangsu)
the lines are less clearly demarcated and sporadic hostilities, which have gone
on for over 2 years and in which the Kuomintang forces appear to take the
initiative, continue.
On the other side, the Communist army is starved of all supplies and forced
in turn to immobilize most of its strength to guard against what it considers
the Kuomintang threat. It was admitted by both parties that there was extreme
tension in Kuomintang-Communist relations in the spring of 1942. The Com-
munists believe that it was only the Japanese invasion of Yunnan that saved
them from attack at that time. The Communists and their friends claim, fur-
thermore, that the Kuomintang is devoting its energies to the strengthening of
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 791
its control over those parts of China accessible to it rather than to fighting Japan.
This strengthening of the position of (he Knomintang will of course assist it in re-
establishing its control over areas which will then be opened to it. A logical
part of such a policy would be the taking over, as soon as an opportunity is found,
of the Communist base area in Kansu-Shensi. Success in this move would weaken
the Communists and make easier the eventual recapture by the Kuomintang of
the Communist guerrilla zones. To support this thesis the Communists point
to the campaign in the more extreme Kuomintang publications for the immediate
abolition of the border area. Another factor sometimes suggested as tending to
provoke an early Kuomintang attack on the Communists is the desirability,
from the Kuomintang point of view, of disposing of them before China finds
itself an active ally of Kussia against Japan.
The possible positive military value of the Communist army to our war effort
should not be ignored. These forces control the territory through which access
may be had to Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and Japanese North China bases.
The strategic importance of their position would be enhanced by the entry of
Kussia into the war against Japan. This importance is largely potential but
fairly recent reports of continued bitter fighting in Shan.si indicate that the
Communists are still enough of a force to provoke periodic Japanese mopping up
campaigns. Reflection of this is found in the intensive Japanese anti-Commu-
nist propaganda campaign in North China in the summer of 1941, although the
fact must not be overlooked that Japanese propaganda has emphasized the
anti-Communist angle to appeal to whatever collaborationist elements there may
be in occupied China and to the more conservative sections of the Kuomintang.
This activity in Shausi and the difiiculties of the Japanese there contrast with
the inactivity on most of the other Kuomintang-Japanese fronts.
Aside from the immediate war aspects, the political implications of the situa-
tion are also serious. Assuming that open hostilities are for the time being
averted, the eventual defeat and \Vithdrawal of the Japanese will leave the
Kuomintang still confronted with the Communists solidly entrenched in most
of North China (East Kansu, North Shensi, Shansi, South Chahar, Hopei, Shan-
tung, North Kiangsu, and North Anhwei). In addition the Communists will be
in position to move into the vacuum created by the Japanese withdrawal from
Suiyuan, Jehol, and Manchuria, in all of which areas there is already some
Communist activity. In the rest of China they will have the sympathy of
elements among the liberals, intellectuals, and students. These elements are of
uncertain size but of considerable influence in China, and the Kuomintang's fear
of their power, and the power of whytever underground organization the Commu-
nists have succeeded in maintaining in the Kuomintang area, is indicated by the
size and activity of its various secret police organs.
But possibly the greatest potential strength of the Communists, and one reason
why military action against them will not be entirely effective at the present time,
is their control of the rural areas of North China in the rear of the Japanese.
Here the Kuomintang cannot reach them and the Communists have apparently
been able to carry out some degree of popular mobilization. I am in possession
of a secret Koumintang publication describing the Communist control of Hopei.
It discusses measures of combating the Communists (by such means, for instance,
as the blockade now being enforced) and concludes that if the Communists fail to
cooperate (i. e. submit to complete Kuomintang domination) they must be
exterminated. I hope to make a translation of this pamphlet which would
appear to have significance as an official Kuomintang indication of the policy it
will pursue in these areas. It seems I'easouable to question, as some thoughtful
Chinese do, whether the people of these guerrilla zones, after several years of
political education and what must be assumed to be at least partial sovietization,
will accept peacefully the imposition of Kuomintang control activated by such
a spirit and implemented ljy military force and the political repression, and
secret police and gendarmerie power, which are already important adjuncts of
party control and which are being steadily strengthened and expanded.
Non-Communist Chinese of my acquaintance (as, for instance, the nephew of
the well-known late editor of the Ta Kung Fao) consider the likelihood of civil
war the greatest problem facing China. They point out that the Communists
are far stronger now than they were when they stood off Kuomintang armies
for 10 years in central China and that they will be much stronger yet if it proves
that they have succeeded in winning the support of the population in the guer-
rilla zone. They point to numerous recent instances of successful Communist
infiltration into and indoctrination of opposing Chinese armies (such as those
of Yen Hsi-shan) and wonder whether this will not cause a prolongation of the
792 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
struggle and perhaps make a victory for the Kiiomintang, or for either side^
impossible. There is undoubtedly a strong revulsion in the mind of the average,
nonparty Chinese to the idea of renewed civil war and the Kuomintang may
indeed have difficulty with the loyalty and eflfectiveness of its conscript troops.
Belief in tlie certainty of eventual civil war leads these same Chinese to ques-
tion whether the United States has given sufficient realistic consideration to the
future in Cliina of democracy. The question is raised whether it is to China's
advantage, or to America's own interests, for the United States to give the
Kuomintang Government large quantities of military supplies which, judging
from past experience, are not likely to be used effectively against Japan but will
be available for civil war to enforce unity in the country by military force.
These Chinese also speculate on the position of the American troops which may
be in China (in support of the Kuomintang army) if there should be a civil
war ; and wonder what will be the attitude of llussia, especially if it has become
by that time a partner in the victory over Japan.
But ignoring these problematical implications, thei'e can be no denial that
civil war in China, or even the continuation after the defeat of Japan of the
present deadlock, will greatly impede the return of peaceful conditions. This
blocking of the orderly large-scale rehabilitation of China will in itself seriously
and adversely affect American interests. Even if a conflict is averted, the
continuance or, as is probable in such an event, the worsening of the already
serious economic strains within the country may result in economic collapse.
If there is a civil war the likelihood of such an economic collapse is of course
greater.
There is also the possibility that economic difficulties may make the war-weary,
overconscripted and overtaxed farmers fertile ground for Communist propaganda
and thus bring about a revolution going beyond the moderate democracy which
the Chinese Communists now claim to be seeking. Such a Communist govern-
ment would probably not be democratic in the American sense. And it is
probable, even if the United States did not incur the enmity of the Communists
for alleged material or diplomatic support of the Kuomintang, that this Commu-
nist government would be more inclined toward friendship and cooperation with
Russia than with Great Britain and Arnerica.
For these reasons it would therefore appear to be in the interest of the United
States to make efforts to prevent a deterioration of the internal political situation
in China and, if possible, to bring about an improvement.
The Communists themselves ( Chou-En-lai and Lin Piao in a conversation with
John Carter Vincent and the undersigned aboiit November 20, 1942) consider that
foreign influence (obviously American) witli the Kuomintang is the only force
that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful
foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs no matter how tactfully
made. But they believe that the reflection of a better-informed foreign opinion,
official and public, would have some effect on the more far-sighted elements of
leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the Generalissimo.
The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be
the enjpliasizing in our dealings with the Chanese (government, and in our prop-
aganda to China, of the political nature of the world conflict ; democracy against
fascism. This would include constant reiteration of the American hope of seeing
the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomin-
tang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China.
Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army
as a participant in the war against facisin. The United States might intervene
to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support he given
by the central government to the eighteenth group army. The Communists hope
this nn"ght include a specification that the Communist armies receive a propor-
tionate share of American supplies sent to China.
Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang
would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I have
not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves. But there is no doubt that
they would welcome such action.
Tills visit would have the great additional advantage of providing us with
comprehensive and reliable information regarding the Communist side of the sit-
uation. For instance we might be able to have better answers to some of the fol-
lowing pertinent questions : How faithfully have the Communists carried out
their united front promises? What is the form of their local government? How
Commnnistic is it? Does it show any democratic character or possibilities? Has
it won any support of the people? How does it compare witli conditions of govern-
ment in Kuomintang China? How does the Communist treatment of the people iu
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 793
such matters as taxation, grain requisition, military service and forced labor
compare with that in the Kuomintang territory? What is tlie military and econ-
omic strength of the Communists and what is their probable value to the Allied
cause? IIow have they dealt with problems such as intlatiou, price control,
development of economic resoui'ces for carrying on the war, and trading with the
enemy? Have the people in the guerrilla area been mobilized and aroused to the
degree necessary to support real guerrilla warfare?
Without such knowledge, it is difficult to appraise conlllcting reports and reach
a considered judgment. Due to the Kuomintang blockade, information regarding
conditions in the Communist area is at present not available. Such information
as we do have is several years out of date, and has limitations as to scope and
probable reliability. Carlson was primarily a military man and had a limited
knowledge of the Chinese language. Most of the journalists who have been able
to visit the Communist area appear to have a bias favorable to the Communists.
They also suffered from language limitations and were unable to remain in
the area for an extended period.
I suggest that the American representatives best suited to visit the Communist
area are Foreign Service officers of the China language service. One or two men
might be sent. They should combine moderately long-term residence at Yenan or
its vicinity with fairly extensive travel in the guerrilla area. It is important
that they not be required to base a report on a brief visit iluring which they would
be under the influence of official guides, but that they should have a sufficient time
to become familiar with conditions and make personal day-to-day observations.
There is mail and telegraphic communicatiim between Yenan and Chungking,
and similar communication between various parts of the Conimuuist area. The
officers would therefore not be out of touch with the Embassy and could, if It is
thought desirable, make periodic reports.
]Mr. Morris. General, may I call your attention to the report of
April 7, 1944, that is before you?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Manclel, will you read pertinent excerpts from
that?
The Chairman. Before we go into that, what is this instrument,
where does it stem from and what is the foundation for it?
Mr. IVIandel. The date is April 7, 1944 [reading] :
Subject: Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service forwarded
to Department as enclosure No. 1 of dispatch No. 24G1, April 21, 1944, under title
"Situation in Sinkiang; Its lielatiou to American Policy vis-a-vis China and
the Soviet Union."
This was also introduced in the Loyalty Board proceedings before
the State Department in the case of John S. Service.
Chiang's persisting in. an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies
(or lack of them) are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal
dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical
desire to destroy unity among the United JS'ations is serious.
Mr. Morris. What paragraph is that?
Mr. Mandel. The second paragraph. Further :
Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does not already) that American
aims run counter to hers, .and that she must therefore protect herself by any
means available ; in other words, the extension of her direct power or influence.
Mr. Morris. General, can you comment on that ?
General Wedemeyer. This statement was made at a time when there
were a lot of people in our country who were making similar state-
ments. Today they are on the band wagon of opposing communism.
Quite a few Americans were making statements along that line. In
fact, when I came back after the war, I found it rather dangerous, and
I could only talk to a very few people, found it very dangerous to
talk realistically about the implications of communism in this coun-
try and in the world in general. I am very glad that Chiang Kai-shek
794 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
even at that time epitomized opposition to communism and thank God
for General MacArthur out in Japan for the same reason when others
were playing footsie with communism, many others. I think Chiang
showed a shrewdness, a political shrewdness, in continuing his op-
position.
As far as cooperation was concerned, the Soviet Communists did
not persist in the China theater. The contribution they made in the
war against Japan was negligible. The American people ought to
understand that clearly.
Senator Ferguson. Might I ask in relation to this : Is this not an
indication that this was a warning at least to America that she had
better see what Russia wanted in Asia and go along with Russia's
desires rather than w'hat was well for America or the world? That
is, when he says "We should make every effort to learn what the
Russian aims in Asia are," and the previous sentence that was read
to you about Russia having her way. Is that right ?
General Wedemeter. It could be interpreted that way. I think
that is a sound interpretation of the statement.
JNIr. Morris. General, may I refer you to a report now of Mr. John
P. Davies, one of the four political advisers?
The Chairman. Has this last one been inserted in the record ?
Mr. Morris. No, sir. That may be introduced in the record, having
been identified.
The Chairman. It may.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 250" and
is as follows :)
Exhibit No. 250
April 7, 1944.
Subject: Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service, for-
warded to Department as enclosure No. 1 of dispatch No. 2461, April
21, 1944, under title "Situation in Sinkiang ; Its Relation to American Policy
Vis-a-Vis China and the Soviet Union."
We must be concerned with Russian plans and policies in Asia because they
are bound to affect our own plans in the same area. But our relations with Riis-
' sia in Asia are at present only a subordinate part of our political and military re-
lations with Russia in Europe in the over-all United Nations war effort and
postwar settlement. We should make every effort to learn what the Russian
aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a
careful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of
the Chinese Communists. But in determining our policy toward Russia in
Asia we should avoid being swayed by China. The initiative must be kept firmly
in our hands. To do otherwise will be to let the tail wag the dog.
As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we
are faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship. Chiang's persisting in
an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when liis policies (or lack of them) are
accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be
characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity
among the United Nations is serious. But it would also appear that Chiang
unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia by in-
ternal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will
render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia. By so
doing, Chiang may be digging his own grave ; not only north China and Man-
churia but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven
into the arms of the Soviets.
Neither now nor in the immediately foreseeable future does the United States
want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia ; nor does it want to see
ilussia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China.
The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give,
in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary Government of
China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 795
military prosecution of the war against Japan. To give diplomatic or other
support beyond this limit will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal
anti-Russian policy. It will convince the Chinese Communists — who probably
hold the key to control, not only of north China but of Inner Mongolia and
Manchuria as well — that we are on the other side and that their only hope
for survival lies with Russia. Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does
not already) that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must there-
fore protect herself by any means available: in other words, the extension of
her direct power or influence.
It is important, therefore, that the United States have the following aims in
its dealings with China :
1. Avoid becoming involved in any way in Sino-Soviet relations ; avoid all
appearance of unqualified diplomatic support of China, especially vis-a-vis
Russia ; and limit American aid to China to direct prosecution of the war
against Japan.
This may involve soft-pedaling of grandiose promises of postwar aid and eco-
nomic rehabilitation, unless they are predicated on satisfactory reforms within
China.
2. Show a sympathetic interest in the Communists and liberal groups in
China. Try to fit the Communists into the war against Japan.
In so doing, we may promote Chinese unity and galvanize the lagging Chinese
war effort. The liberals, generally speaking, already consider that their hope
lies in America. The Communists, from what little we know of them, also
are friendly toward Ajnerica, believe that democracy must be the next step in
China, and take the view that economic collaboration with the United States
is the only hope for speedy postwar rehabilitation and development. It is vital
that we do not lose this good will and influence.
3. Use our tremendous and as yet unexploited influence with the Kuomintang
promote internal Chinese unity on the only possible and lasting foundation of pro-
gressive reform.
There is no reason for us to fear using our influence. The Kuomintang knows
that it is dependent on us ; it cannot turn toward a Japan approaching annihila-
tion ; it is inconceivable that it will turn toward communistic Russia ; and Great
Britain is not in a position to be of help. American interest in the Chinese Com-
munists will be a potent force in persuading Kuomintang China to set its house
in order.
The Communists would undoubtedly play an important part in a genuinely
unified China — one not unified by the Kuomintang's present policy in practice of
military force and threat. But it is most probable that such a democratic and
unified China would naturally gravitate toward the United States, and that the
United States, by virtue of sympathy, position, and economic resources, would
enjoy a greater influence in China than any other foreign power.
Mr. Morris. Do you have the Davies report ? That is dated June
24, 1943.
General Wedemeyer. Yes.
Mr. Morris. May I refer to the second extract made on that page,
General, November 7, 1944 — Davies [reading] :
The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the Yangtze
that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least north China.
They may also continue to hold not only those parts of the Yangtze Valley which
they now dominate but also new areas in central and south China. The Com-
munists have fallen heir to these new areas by a process which has been oper-
ating for 7 years, whereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal lines of
communication to the Japanese and the countryside to the Communists.
The Communists have survived 10 years of civil war and 7 years of Japanese
offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than
the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe
blockade imposed by Chiang.
They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has
been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square
kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to
about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately 90 million.
And they will continue to grow.
(22848 — 52— pt. 3-
796 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and funda-
mental. It is mass support, mass participation. The Communist governments
and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to
have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because
the governments and armies are genuinely of the people.
I wonder if you would comment on that extract, General ?
General Wedemeyer. As of that date, of that period, I think the
writer is incorrect in the military capabilities of the Communists, and
the statement there, the correctness of which I question namely, they
had withstood the heavy attacks of the Japanese is not correct for the
period I commanded the theater. I do not believe it was correct prior
to my assuming command, because I read the history of the operations
that had taken place from the beginning of the war, 1937. At no time
were large numbers of Communist forces involved with Japanese
forces, and at no time did the Chinese Communist military forces
make a real contribution to the over-all China war effort. Most of
their operations were guerrilla in nature. They were designed to
capture blockhouses established by the Japanese and to capture small
quantities of arms and equipment.
He goes on to say the reason for the success that he alludes to of the
Chinese Communists is simple and fundamental. He says it is mass
support, mass participation. I would change that and then go along
with the statement [reading] :
It is Soviet support and police participation, secret-police participation and
propaganda participation.
Those are the things that took over China.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say he was wrong when he said that
*'they have this support because the govermnents and armies are gen-
uinely of the people ?" Were the Chinese people Communists at heart,
or were they dominated by the Soviet Union ?
General Wedemeyer. In my judgment — and this man is an expert
and I am not on China; he has lived most of his life there and he
speaks the language — but in my humble judgment the Chinese people
per se are not communistically inijlined. They are individualistic.
The family is the integral unit. We often accuse them of nepotism
because they have these strong family ties. If one enjoys economic
success, he is duty-bound to take care of the other members of his
family.
I would go back to this. Senator : The Chinese people don't under-
stand political philosophies. I mean the bulk of them do not. There
is just a thin veneer of educated people in China who understand
what we are talking about. When anyone talks about any leader,
any war lord, any political party having the support of the Chinese
people, you can see how nebulous that is.
Mr. Morris. Generel, I draw your attention to the same document
on the second page.
Mr. Mandel, will you read that extract, please?
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
The generalissimo realizes that, if he accedes to the Communist terms for a
coalition government, they will sooner or later disposses him and his kuo-
mintang of power. He will therefore not, unless driven to an extremity, form a
genuine coalition government. He will seek to retain his present government,
passively wait out the war and conserve his strength, knowing that the Com-
munist issue must eventually be joined.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 797
It further says :
The Communists, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement
with the generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. They recognize
that Chiang's positon is crumbling ; that they may before long receive substantial
Russian support, and that if they have patience they will succeed to authority
in at least north China.
Mr. Morris. General, do you believe, if the generalissimo had ac-
ceded to the Communist terms for a coalition government, that they
would sooner or later dispossess him and his Kuomintang of power?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir ; I do. The Communists at that time
had very little power. The generalissimo had most of the power.
The Communists were determined to have all the power, and the gen-
eralissimo was just as determined to retain all the power. It just
makes sense to me. That is the way the situation maintained out there.
Any other solution I do not accept. I do not think it is sound.
Mr. Morris. With respect to the second paragraph there, you agree
with Mr, Davies when he said that the Communists had no intention
of reaching an agreement with the generalissimo short of a genuine
coalition government?
General Wedemeyer. I think the Communists had the idea of a
coalition government just a step toward acquisition of all power.
They would violate any agreement they made just as they have in
other areas of the world. When the time came they would seize all
the power and there would be no represenation on the part of the
Kuomintang. The Kuomintang would be liquidated.
Senator Ferguson. General, if this advice of Mr. Davies of De-
cember 9, 1944, was taken, how could we hope to sustain a democratic
government in China by the use of philosophy of General Marshall's
mission to form a coalition ?
General Wedemeyer. We couldn't, sir. I never did believe that a
coalition with the Communists was possible. You can coalesce po-
litical parties at times over the years. The Republicans and Demo-
crats have gotten together in a bipartisan approach to international
problems. Personally I do not agree with that. It is the American
way to make a man defend what he proposes to do. I think we should
always question the other man's judgment; do it in a respectful but
intelligent way, and continuously. I think that is the whole philoso-
phy behind democracy.
Now, you will get no such philosophy or get no such modus oper-
andi in operations with the Communists. All you have to do is read
the Communist Manifesto and Karl Marx's Das Kapital and you will
have it laid out for you just as Hitler so obligingly told us what he
was going to do and we ignored his warnings.
Senator Ferguson. How could you get a clearer statement than an
indication of Davies as to what the Communists were. They were
dominated by Russia and "if they have patience they will succeed to
authority in at least north China." He limited it to the north of
China, but he indicated that they would get the support to take over
China. Is that not true ?
General Wedemeyer. That is true.
Senator Ferguson. If you were to back the Communists, it was to
back the idea that Russia would be the dominant power of China.
General Wedemeyer. That is true.
798 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I have told you earlier, sir, I neglected to give the attention that
I should have when I was commanding that theater — give attention
to these reports. As an alibi, I was involved in military operations
and busy as the dickens. Later, in analyzing these reports and going
back over many things that had happened in tliis, the psychological
or diplomatic field, I realized I had been remiss in my duties as a
theater commander in not analyzing them more carefully. I did not
take the advice. I adhered to the path of trying to contain the J apa-
nese and supporting the Nationalist Government in my personal rela-
tions with the Chinese military and civilians.
Senator Ferguson. You did not follow this advice, in other words ?
General Wedemeyer. No. I was fortunate in having a very loyal
American out there as a diplomatic representative, Patrick J. Hurley.
I admired him a great deal and felt he represented American policies
realistically, courageously and continuously. He was the American
Ambassador.
Mr. Morris. General, may I draw your attention to the next extract
we have on this page ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Under date of November 15, 1944, Mr. Mandel, and
will you read that for us, please ?
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek. To do so at this juncture
would be to lose more than we could gain. We must for the time being con-
tinue recognition of Chiang's Government.
But we must be realistic. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically
bankrupt regime. And, if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we
must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists
rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians. Furthermore,
we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-
shek Government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying
regime and severely restricted in working out military and political coopera-
tion with the Chinese Communists.
A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory
place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us. It provides our great-
assurance of a strong, united, democratic, independent and friendly China — our
basic strategic aim in Asia and the Pacific. If Chiang and the Communists reach
a mutually satisfactory agreement, there will have been achieved from our
point of view the most desirable possible solution. If Chiang and the Com-
munists are irreconcilable, then we shall have to decide which faction we are
going to support.
In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in
mind these basic considerations : Power in China is on the verge of shifting from
Chiang to the Communists.
If the Russians enter North China and Manchuria, we obviously cannot hope
to win the Communists entirely over to us, but we can through control of
supplies and postwar aid expect to exert considerable influence in the direction
of Chinese nationalism and independence from Soviet control.
Mr. Morris. Would you comment on that excerpt, General Wede-
meyer ?
General Wedemeyer. Well, I think prior comments on other ex-
cerpts cover that, sir, namely, that a coalition government meant a
Communist government, insofar as I am concerned. It would not be
such a thing as a coalition government, the Communists would have all
control.
^ Mr. Morris. Did you think that the Chinese Communist organiza-
tion was a complete auxiliary and part of the international Com-
munist organization ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 799
General Wedemeyer. Definitely. I felt they were operating under
the aegis of the Kremlin, and most of the leaders had been trained in
the U. S. S. R., over the years, over a period of 20 years. And it is
that hard core of fanatic loyal leadership that the Communists have
generated in the various areas of the world that has enabled these
well-organized minorities to take over unsuspecting intimidated
masses. And particularly, where the masses are illiterate, unem-
ployed, improvident, as they are in China and in India ; those areas
are particularly vulnerable to the Marxian philosophies and methods.
Mr. Morris. And is there not implicit in this statement, General
Wedemeyer, an assertion that the Chinese Communists were inde-
pendent of Moscow ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Is that not obvious. General?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. In which you do not believe?
General Wedemeyer. Definitely, Senator. I think that all of these
satellites are oriented toward the Kremlin. Now, the Soviet leaders
wisely adjust and change the application of their political and eco-
nomic ideas to conform more or less to the customs, the organization,
and to the traditions of the particular area where they are applying
these ideas. They make adjustments. But the basic idea is the de-
struction of free enterprise, the enslavement of mind and body and
destruction of any spiritual force in this world. Those are the basic
objectives of communism, and they are making progress toward ac-
complishing those objectives.
Mr. Morris. May I call your attention to the first full paragraph on
page 3 in that statement. It begins [reading] :
In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in
mind these basic considerations : Power in China is on the verge of shifting from
Chiang to tlie Communists.
Do you not interpret that, General Wedemeyer, as a recommenda-
tion that we should support the Chinese Communist faction ?
General Wedemeyer. That is one interpretation, yes.
Mr. Morris. What is your interpretation. General Wedemeyer?
General Wedemeyer. My interpretation is that this chap felt that
the Communists in China were getting increasing power. I do not
go quite so far as to suggest just from that statement that this Foreign
Service officer wants us to feel that we should support the Communists.
I think there is always danger in reading into a statement
Mr. Morris. We do not intend to do that.
General Wedemeyer. I know you don't, and I cannot do it.
The Chairman. You would say the language was an inducement
toward that conclusion, though ; would you not 5
General Wedemeyer. Yes; it inclines in that direction. In fair-
ness to the writer, however, I think he is the best witness on that.
Senator Ferguson. It could be taken as a recommendation that if
you wanted to be on the power side you take his views ; is that correct ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce all of these
excerpts into the record, but Mr. Mandel has not yet told us from what
sources he has put these together, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. This document that we have in hand here on which
General Wedemeyer has been testifying has not been offered for the
record ?
800 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. That is right. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us what these
are ?
Mr. Mandel. These are taken from a publication called United
States Relations With China, a Department of State publication, Far
Eastern Series, released August 1949.
The Chairman. Released by whom and by what authority?
Mr. Mandel. By the State Department. That is popularly known
as the white paper.
The Chairman. That is the paper I have in my mind.
Mr. Morris. Those are extracts from that publication. Senator.
Before introducing that into the record, I think Mr. Sourwine would
like to ask a few questions of General Wedemeyer on that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. General, referring to the excerpt headed November
15, 1944, which has been previously discussed, the second paragraph
starts out with the sentence, "But we must be realistic." Would it be
fair, therefore, to judge the rest of this excerpt on the basis of whether
it is realistic ?
General Wedemeyer. I thinl? it would, yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, the third sentence is the one referred to by
Mr. Morris obliquely when he asked you if you shared the apparent
feeling of this writer that the Chinese Communists were free agents,
were independent, and that is the sentence which reads :
And if the Russians are going to enter tlie Pacific war, we must make a deter-
mined elfort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow
them to go by default wholly to the Russians.
That necessarily implies, does it not, that the Chinese Communists,
at the time of this writing, were not tied up with the Russians?
General Wedemeyer. Yes ; that is implicit in that statement, but I
do not agree with it.
Mr. Sourwine. It is also implicit in that statement, is it not, that
we could "capture" politically the Chinese Communists?
General Wedemeyer. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you agree with that statement ?
General Wedemeyer. I don't agree with it, but that is implicit in
the statement as you read it to me, yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. In your opinion, is either of those implications
realistic ?
General Wedemeyer. Definitely not. In my judgment, in my
humble judgment, definitely not.
I want to say one thing there to you, sir : In my relations with the
Communists they were not emotional, they were not unobjective. They
had illness up in that area and it was remote, and at great cost to my
limited war effort I sent 15 tons of medical supplies to help Mao Tse-
tung and Chou En-lai, with the permission of the Generalissimo.
I want you to understand that my attitude toward them was just as
humanitarian as the record of our great country over many years.
Now, therefore, when I make statements they are not emotional
replies, sir, they are just in the interest of the country; not in my
own personal interest or not in the interest of the Communists or the
Kuomintang.
I want to make a statement to you, because I have emphasized that
I do not agree with the implications there. I accept the statements,
that the statements are implicit in the way you interpret them, I accept
that, but I do not agree with them.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 801
Mr. SouRWiNE. General, I am attempting here to be quite coldly-
logical about this passage and not emotional at all, and I appreciate
your answer.
General Wedemeyer. I am not saying you were suggesting emotion.
I do not want emotionalism to enter into it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The next sentence reads :
Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the
Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily
decaying regime and severely restricted in working out military and political
cooperation with the Chinese Communists.
That phrase "are committed to a steadily decaying regime" can only
be interpreted as a charge that the Chiang Kai-shek government was
steadily decaying, is that not correct?
General Wedemeyer. You mean that the government was decaying?
Is that what you are asking me, if it is correct ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is implicit in this language ?
General Wedemeyer. It is implicit in that language, but again
Mr. SouRwiNE. It was not true, was it ?
General Wedemeyer. That would require quite a lot of develop-
ment. I do not know whether the Senators want me to develop that,
Mr. Sourwine, or not, but I would be happy to do it. In other words,
I am not going to answer yes or no and establish a very important point
that will militate against my entire testimony here.
Senator Ferguson. You think that would take an explanation ?
General Wedemeyer. It would take an explanation, Senator Fergu-
son, in my judgment, of about 10 minutes, indicating the development
that brought about the steadily deteriorating situation in China, eco-
.nomic, psychological, and military.
The Chairman. Would the committee care to hear it?
Senator Ferguson. I think because of the question it would be of
interest on this record.
The Chairman. You may proceed, then. General.
General Wedemeyer. Do you want to hear it, Mr. Sourwine ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
General Wedemeyer. You all are familiar with the fact that Chiang
Kai-shek took over the Chinese Nationalist Government upon the death
of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. At that time there were Soviet Russian advisers
in the area and they had agreed that there would be no political prop-
agandizing, but they would assist the new Chinese Republic in evolv-
ing a stable economy and building up their military forces.
In typical Communist fashion they violated their agreement with
reference to the dissemination of Communist political propaganda
and just brought about the conflict that ended up with the Communists
being pushed back clear up in Yunan, in a remote western province
of China.
The period 1927 to 1937 was often alluded to by Americans, British-
ers, and other foreigners in the area who had lived there many years
as the golden decade. From 1927 to 1937, during that period, com-
munications were being improved, the economy was being better
stabilized, and schools were being built to extend advantages of edu-
cation, and many improvements, in other words, were being instituted.
Now, you all know that there are many dialects in China, but basic-
ally there are three areas and people living in those three areas,
802 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
respectively, cannot understand each other. They all read and write
the same hieroglyphics, the same characters.
Chiang Kai-shek also was striving to bring about an alphabet that
■would be universally understood to simplify the education that he
envisaged for his people.
Now, the military jingoists of Japan, recognizing the develop-
ments which would bring about a nationalization, a political conscious-
ness in China, a unity, were concerned, and they had ideas of a co-
prosperity sphere in Asia under their domination. So many observers
with whom I talked in the Far East who had lived there many years,
they refer to this golden decade — mind you now, under Chiang Kai-
shek's regime and approximately the same leaders whom we have
today, and we read in the press considerable criticism about them,
they had that period where they were improving conditions in China
and many people feel that the thing that precipitated the war in
1937 on the part of the Japanese was the fact that a strongly unified
China would make it more difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to
take over in that area. So that precipitated the attack in 1937.
Now, for 8 years China fought the Japanese. The Japanese were
a modern military nation. In the first year or so of the war we
suffered many humiliating reverses at the hands of the Japanese in
the battles that we fought with them on the sea and in the air and
on the ground, as did the British. Gradually we evolved forces that
enabled us to defeat the Japanese militarily.
But the Chinese did not have competent or well-organized military
forces, and they did not fight well — they fought well with what they
had — ^but by our standards it was not a great contribution. And I
have never in any testimony stated that the contribution made by the-
Chinese in the war was overwhelming, but it was important to us in
that it did contain large numbers of Japanese that might have been
employed at crucial places and critical times aginst our forces as they
advanced up north against the Japanese Archipelgo.
But during the war, and immediately subsequent to VJ-day, prop-
aganda increased in that area, propaganda that denounced you and
me, the Americans, and distorted our objectives in that area, called us
imperialists, Yankee imperialists, and indicated our determination
to take over the Far East, to dominate the Far East. These programs
emanated from Yunnan, the Chinese Communist headquarters, and
frequently were reaffirmed in articles appearing in Pravda and other
Communist-inspired newspapers and radio releases.
It was perfectly obvious to those Americans who were out there with
me in 1945 at the close of the war that this propaganda campaign was
being intensified against us to cause the Chinese people to suspect our
motives and to turn against us.
Now, in considering any problem in China, I think all of that
period, the development in that period, must be thought about objec-
tively. And I also think about those things in relation to the state-
ments that I read here by experts on the area. This is just a soldier's
view, a practical view that I personally experienced and concluded.
These are conclusions that I drew as a result of serving out there just
a few years.
That is the background I wanted to give you.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Thank you. General. I have just two or three more
questions about this particular section of the report, this November
15, 1944, item.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 803
General Wedmeyer. All right, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. In the same sentence which elicited the answer you
have just given us is a phrase, and I had better read the whole sen-
tence and underline the phrase vocally [reading] :
Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of
the Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a
steadily decaying regime —
and here is the phase I want to underline —
and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with
the Chinese Communists.
Does that not carry with it, implicit in it, the thought that the work-
ing out of military and political cooperation with the Chinese Com-
munists was one of our objectives that it was important to us?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, it does.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that true ?
General Wedemeyer. Have you been here all morning?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes, sir, and I heard your previous testimony, but I
am attempting to get the answer to this.
General Wedemeyer. I will be glad again to say it. The contribu-
tion made by the Communists was very limited militarily, and eco-
nomic assistance would be nil.
Now, if the theater commander had been directed to assist the Chi-
nese Communists hj giving them equipment and advisers it would
have been a very difficult logistical job for me to get it way up there by
air. I had no other way of getting it up there. Just sending 15 tons
of medical supplies, I indicated to you, impinged upon my little war
effort in the southeastern part of China.
Mr. Sourwine. But that difficulty was not caused by the fact that
we were supporting the Chiang Kai-shek government, was it ? That
logistic difficulty you speak of was a logistic problem.
General Wedemeyer. Yes, it was, because I could not put my planes
in operation in logistical support in southeast China and concurrently
up to the north. So, in a way, it did militate against supporting the
Communists. If I had been directed to support the Communists in
lieu of the Nationalists, I would have carried out my orders, and I
would have gotten supplies up there, but at much greater difficulty,
because of the distance.
Now, may I explain to you, it may not be apparent to you right
away, but intratheater distribution, within the theater, was a real
problem, because I had to bring the fuel to operate the planes over
the hump. But when we captured Bhamo and Mytchinya I had a
staging area so my planes could hop over the short hop and unload
and go back without refueling in my theater, so I kept the gasoline
they brought. Once I started to distribute in China it was a real
problem because I was burning up gasoline at long distances.
Mr. SoTJRwiNE. What I was attempting to get at is whether there
was some outstanding advantage to us to be gained through military
and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists, which we
were losing at that time. In your opinion was there such an advantage f
General Wedemeyer. No, I don't think there was an outstanding
advantage to be gained.
Mr. Sourwine. That is the point.
General Wedemeyer. No.
804 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. There was another item in which your own opinion
is at variance with the opinion implicit in this statement ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The final comment I want to ask you for, sir, is on
this, and this says [reading] :
A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory"
place is the solution of this impass6 most desirable to us. It provides our g^reatest
assurance of a strong united, democratic, independent, and friendly China.
And in view of the statements already made by Mr. Davies, in one
of these reports and in other testimony here with regard to what would
have happened in the event there had been a coalition government, I
would like to ask you, sir, Would a coalition Chinese Government in
which the Communists found a satisfactory place have provided us
with assurance of either a democratic or an independent or a friendly
China?
General Wedemeyer. No. For many reasons, in my judgment, it
would not have provided a cooperative, friendly China. I indicated
earlier, sir, that in my judgment the Chinese Communists were deter-
mined to take over all the power.
Mr. SouRWTNE. Yes, sir.
General Wedeiheyer. And that they were working under the aegis
of the Kremlin power whose avowed purpose is to destroy your
country and mine. And it is just inconsistent ; we are being naive if
we consider for a moment that we could generate a friendly spirit
among the Chinese as long as the Communists are influencing them
with their sinister propaganda. We just cannot do it. And they are
most vulnerable to that propaganda because they are illiterate and
they are capable of intimidations that the Communists so skillfully
handle.
Mr. SouRWTNE. Does it not then become apparent. General, that not
only is that passage not realistic, but that in the space of a dozen
lines it has advanced a half dozen propositions, all of which are un-
sound and untenable ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. For example, one other point that
you could develop is the Chinese are not ready for a democratio
government. Democracy, as I understand it, is predicated upon an
informed electorate. So that as long as you have 80 percent of the
population illiterate it is impractical to have a true democracy there
There are a lot of things that are just inconsistent, in my judgment.
^ Mr. SouRwiNE. That is as far as I wanted to develop that point,
sir.
Mr. Morris. That document therefore may be introduced into the
record, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 251" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 251
[From the Department of State publication, Far Eastern Series, released August 1949]
United States Relations With China
memoranda by foreign service officers in china, 1943-45
June 24, 19J^S {Davies)
Chinese Communist policy appears to have followed the Comintern line. In
its initial expression the i)olicy adhered to the program of world revolution.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 805
With the Comintern's abandonment of this program, the Chinese Communists
embraced in 1935, in compliance with Moscow directives, the policy of the united
front.
The new line, so far as it applied to Asia, was in all probability prompted by
the Kremlin's realistic appraisal of the Soviet Union's position in the Far East
Russia was threatened by Japan. The Japanese Army had with its Manchurian
adventure apparently decided upon a policy of continental expansion. Con-
fronted by a strong Russian Army in eastern Siberia, the Japanese seemed to be
intent upon outflanking the Russians through China. China could not be ex-
pected to offer strong resistance to Japanese expansion so long as it was torn
by internal dissension. It was therefore evident that China should become
unified and actively resist Japanese pressure westward.
As the Chinese Communists moved away from world revolution to nationalism
they also moved in the direction of more moderate internal political and economic
policy. Whether these other moves were in compliance with Comintern dictates
is less material than that they were historically and evolutionarily sound.
The trend toward nationalism is believed to be strongest among the troops
and guerrillas who have been fighting the national enemy. Although we have
no accurate information on the subject, it is suspected that the political leaders
of the party retain their pro-Russian orientation and that they are, notwith-
standing the dissolution of the Comintern, likely to be susceptible to Moscow
direction. This probable schism within the party may prove at some later date
to be of major importance (p. 565).
November 7, 194i (Davies)
The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the
Yangtze that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least north
China. They may also continue to hold not only those parts of the Yangtze Valley
which they now dominate but also new areas in central and south China. The
Commxinists have fallen heir to these new areas by a process, which has been
operating for 7 years, whereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal
lines of communication to the Japanese and the countryside to the Communists.
The Communists have survived 10 years of civil war and 7 years of Japanese
offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than
the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe
blockade imposed by Chiang.
They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has
been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square
kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to
about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately 90 million.
And they will continue to grow.
The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and funda-
mental. It is a mass support, mass participation. The Communist governments
and ai'mies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to
have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because
the governments and armies are genuinely of the people (pp. 566-567).
January 4, i945 (Davies)
The current situation in China must afford the Kremlin a certain sardonic
satisfaction.
The Russians see the anti-Soviet government of Chiang Kai-shek decaying
militarily, politically, and economically. They observe the Chinese Communists
consolidating in north China, expanding southward in the wake of Chiang's
military debacles and now preparing for the formal establishment of a separatist
administration.
It is equally evident to the Russians that the Chinese Communists will not in
the meantime be idle. The Communists have amply demonstrated a capacity
for independent, dynamic growth. However Marshal S'talin may describe the
Chinese Communists to his American visitors, he can scarcely be unaware of the
fact that the Communists are a considerably more stalwart and self-sufficient
force than any European underground or partisan movement (p. 567).
June 24, 19JfS (Davies)
Basis for conflict : The Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek recognize that the
CJommunists, with the popular support which they enjoy and their reputation for
administrative reform and honesty, represent a challenge to the Central Govern-
ment and its spoils system. The Generalissimo cannot admit the seemingly
innocent demands of the Communists that their party be legalized and democratic
806 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
processes be put into practice. To do so would probably mean the abdication of
the Kuomintang and the provincial satraps.
The Communists, on the other hand, dare not accept the Central Government's
invitation that they disband their armies and be absorbed in the national body
politic. To do so would be to invite extinction.
This impasse will probably be resolved, American and other foreign observers
in Chungking agree, by an attempt by the Central Government to liquidate the
Communists. This action may be expected to precipitate a civil war from which
one of the two contending factions will emerge dominant. * * *
Chiang Kai-sliek and his Kuomintang lieutenants fully realize the risks of an
attack on the Communists. This may explain the reported statements of high
officials in Chungking that they must prepare not only for the coming civil war
but also for the coming war with Russia. Chiang and his Central Government
recognize that they cannot defeat the Communists and the Soviet Union without
foreign aid. Such aid would naturally be sought from the United States and
possibly Great Britain.
* * * We may anticipate that Chiang Kai-shek will exert everv effort and
resort to every stratagem to involve us in active support of the Central Govern-
ment. We will probably be told that if fresh American aid is not forthcoming,
all of China and eventually all of Asia will be swept by communism. It will be
difficult for us to resist such appeals, especially in view of our moral commitments
to continued assistance to China during the postwar period.
It is therefore not inconceivable that, should Chiang attempt to liquidate the
Communists, we would find ourselves entangled not only in a civil war in China
but also drawn into conflict with the Soviet Union (p. 571).
Deceniher 9, 1944 (Davies)
* * * The Generalissimo realizes that if he accedes to the Communist terms
for a coalition government, they will sooner or later dispossess him and his
Kuomintang of power. He will therefore not, unless driven to an extremity,
form a genuine coalition government. He will seek to retain his present govern-
ment, passively wait out the war and conserve his strength, knowing that the
Communist issue must eventually be joined.
The Communist, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement with
the Generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. They recognize that
Chiang's position is crumbling, that they may before long receive a substantial
Russian support and that if they have patience they will succeed to authority in
at least north China * * * (p. 572).
November 15, 1944 (Davies)
We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek. To do so at this juncture would
be to lose more than we could gain. We must for the time being continue recog-
nition of Chiang's government.
But we must be realistic. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically
bankrupt regime. And, if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we
must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists
rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians. Furthermore,
we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-
shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying
regime and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation
with the Chinese Communists.
A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory
place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us. It provides our
greatest assurance of a strong, united, democratic, independent, and friendly
China — our basic strategic aim in Asia and the Pacific. If Chiang and the Com-
munists reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, there will have been achieved
from our point of view the most desirable possible solution. If Chiang and the
Communists are irreconcilable, then we shall have to decide which faction we
are going to support.
In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in mind
these basic considerations : Power in China is on the verge of shifting fron}
Chiang to the Communists.
If the Russians enter North China and Manchuria, we obviously cannot hope to
win the Communists entirely over to us, but we can through control of supplies
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 807
and postwar aid expect to exert considerable influence in the direction of Chinese
nationalism and independence from Soviet control (p. 574).
December 12, 194^t {Davies)
The negotiations looking to an agreement between the Generalissimo and the
Chinese Communists have failed. It is not impossible, however, that one or the
other side may in the near future revive the negotiations with a new proposal.
So long as the deadlock exists, or new negotiations drag on, it is reasonable to
assume that the Generalissimo will continue to refuse us permission to exploit
militarily the Chinese Communist position extending into the geographical center
of Japan's inner zone. With the war against Japan proving so costly to us, we
can ill afford to continue denying ourselves positive assistance and strategically
valuable positions.
It is time that we unequivecally told Chiang Kai-shek that we will work with
and, within our discretion, supply whatever Chinese forces we believe can contri-
bute most to the war again Japan. We should tell him that we will not work with
or supply any Chinese unit, whether General Government, Provincial or Commu-
nist, which shows any inclination toward precipitating civil conflict. We should
tell him that we propose to keep him as head of the recognized government, in-
formed of what supplies we give to the various Chinese forces.
It is time that we make it clear to Chiang Kai-shek that we expect the Chinese
to settle their own political differences ; that we refuse to become further involved
in and party to Chinese domestic political disputes. We greatly hope and desire
that China will emerge from this war unified, democratic, independent and strong.
We feel that this goal is to be achieved most expeditiously and with the least
possible expenditure of Chinese and American blood and treasure if the United
States bends its efforts in China primarily toward working with and assisting
whatever elements can contribute most to the speedy defeat of Japan (p. 574).
Mr. Morris. We have some other reports here that I would like to
get your advice on as to what we should do with them, Mr. Chairman.
There are four reports here, and I believe they are all reports by Mr.
Service, are they not, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Will you take those into the record, Senator ? They are
amplifications of the same theme that we have been developing. Do
you think we should go into them in detail ?
The Chairman. No. But I want to lay the foundation for them.
The foundation is the same as those that we have already inserted in the
record ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us what they are ?
Mr. Mandel. They deal with the theme developed by Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us where they are from.
Mr. Mandel. They are all from the transcript of the testimony be-
fore the State Department Loyalty Security Board in the case of John
S. Service.
Senator Ferguson. Have they all been published in the white paper ?
Mr. Mandel. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that they become
at least part of this official record.
The Chairman. I do not see any reason, if they are taken from an
official record made in the State Department, that they should not be
admissible.
Senator Ferguson. And they should become part of this record.
Senator Jenner. Yes.
The Chairman. They will be admitted.
808 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 252, 253,
254, and 255," and are as follows:)
Exhibit No. 252
[From the Department of State publication, Far Eastern Series, released August 1949]
United States Relations With China
memoranda by foreign service officers in china, 1943-45
October 9, 1944 (Service)
Reports of two American officers, several correspondents and twenty-odd for-
eign travelers regarding conditions in the areas of North China under Commu-
nist control are in striking agreement. This unanimity, based on actual ob-
servation, is significant. It forces us to accept certain facts, and to draw from
those facts an important conclusion.
The Japanese are being actively opposed — in spite of the constant warfare
and cruel retaliation this imposes on the population. This opposition is gain-
ing in strength. The Japanese can temporarily crush it in a limited area by the
concentration of overwhelming force. But it is impossible for them to do this
simultaneously over the huge territory the Communists now influence.
This opposition is possible and successful because it is total guerrilla war-
fare aggressively waged by a totally mobilized population. In this total mobil-
ization the regular forces of the Communists, though leaders and organizers,
have become subordinate to the vastly more numerous forces of the people
themselves. They exist because the people permit, support, and wholeheartedly
fight with them. There is complete solidarity of army and people.
This total mobilization is based upon and has been made possible by what
amounts to an economic, political, and social revolution. This revolution has
been moderate and democratic. It has improved the economic condition of the
peasants by rent and interest reduction, tax reform and good government. It
has given them democratic self-government, political consciousness and a sense
of their rights. It has freed them from feudalistic bonds and given them self-
respect, self-reliance and a strong feeling of cooperative group interest. The
common people, for the first time, have been given something to fight for.
The Japanese are being fought now not merely because they are foreign in-
vaders but because they deny this revolution. The people vpill continue to
fight any government which limits or deprives them of these newly won gains
(p. 566).
June 20, 1944 (Service)
B. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it
has been for the past 10 years.
China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army
and the Government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes
of growing political unrest. The Generalissimo is losing the support of a
China which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unex-
pected strength during the first 2 years of the war with Japan. Internal weak-
nesses are becoming accentuated and there is taking place a reversal of the
process of unification.
1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is a general feeling
of hopelessness.
2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away
from the larger cities. Government mandates and measures of control cannot
be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the Government
to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy.
3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demor-
alized from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness.
4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily
from infiation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not
only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress; the weight of years
of political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and
leadership they once had.
5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection, and other
arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is
ever-increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest
may increase in scale and find political motivation.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 809
6. The provincial groups are making common cause with one another and
with other dissident groups, and are actively consolidating their position.
Their continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central
Government is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor.
7. Unrest within the Kuomintang armies is increasing, as shown in one imi)or-
tant instance by the "young generals conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher
plane, the war zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence
and are thus creating a new warlordism.
8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows
no signs of being closed, but grows more critical with the passage of time : the
inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted.
9. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its
selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable to
revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a growing
ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissensions and
cliquism within the party, which grows more rather than less acute, the leader-
ship is turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers cliques.
10. The Generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a.
hardening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his
unfortunate attempts to be sage as well as leader — shown, for instance, by
China's Destiny and his book on economics — have forfeited the respect of many
intellectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of
his dictatorship is becoming outspoken.
In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang
is ceasing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese society, the role
in which it made its greatest contribution to modern China.
C. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle
by its own initiative: on the contrary, its policies ai'e precipitating the crisis.
Some war-weariness in China m.ust be expected. But the policies of the
Kuomintang under the impact of hyperinflation and in the presence of obvious
signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This
truth is emphasized by the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with the
situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the Central Executive
Committee.
1. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to
perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations. The result is
the enthronement of reaction.
The Kuomintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the
country for democratic reform. The writings of the Generalissimo and the
party press show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitu-
tionalism remains an empty promise for which the only preparation is a half-
hearted attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local
self-government based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese
utilization in Manchuria and other areas under their control.
Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the consti-
tution and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the
dictation of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental
conditions of freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups.
Even the educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic
character to the existing but impotent Peoples Political Council are ignored.
The Kuomintang shows no intention of relaxing the authoritarian controls
on which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the para-
phernalia of a police state — the multiple and omnipresent secret police or-
ganizations, the gendarmerie, and so forth — it continues to strengthen them
as its last resort for internal security.
2. On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective
steps to check inflation which woiild injure the landlord-capitalist class.
It is directly responsible for the increase of ofiicial corruption which is one
of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situa-
tion. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding, and specu-
lation— all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the party or
with intimate political connections.
It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures
of wartime control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have
intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy, as for
instance, ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulation.
810 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft pro-
duction to run down, as they of course must when it is more profitable for
speculators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal
productive process.
It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate
the manufacture and trade of luxury goods, many of which come from areas
under Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely
paid for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy.
It fails to malie an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and in-
crease revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of
landlords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to hog down
in corruption and inefiiciency, to the point that possibly not more than one-
third of revenues collected reach the Government. It continues to spend huge
government funds on an idle and useless party bureaucracy.
At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even at-
tempting palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of
gold and foreign currency.
It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China such as
the growing concentration of land holdings, extortionate rents and ruinous in-
terest rates, and the impact of inflation.
D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots
in the composition and nature of the party.
In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has
lost its power of leadership ; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against
Japan itself nor to cooperate whole-heartedly with the American Army in
China ; and why it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country.
The answer to all these question is to be found in the present composition
and nature of the party. Politically, a classical and definitive American de-
scription becomes ever more true ; the Kuomintang is a congerie of conservative
political cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power
against all outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Eco-
nomically, the Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural-gentry-land-
lords and militarists, the higher ranks of the Government bureaucracy, and
merchant bankers having intimate connections with the Government bureau-
crats. This base has actually contracted during the war. The Kuomintang
no longer commands, as it once did, the unequivocal support of China's indus-
trialists, who as a group have been much weakened economically, and hence
politically, by the Japanese seizure of the coastal cities.
The relations of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions pro-
pounded above is clear.
The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is
no longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience
of the war is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the
party's selfish shortcomings.
It cannot fight an effective war because this is impossible without greater
reliance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national
energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present
conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the party and greater
political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as
the genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude; the threat of
foreign invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only
real reform can regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy, though
basic to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomintang's
present leaders, imperil the foundations of the party's power because it would
mean that the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely guarded
monopoly. Rather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in its present
state of passive inertia. Thus are they sacrificing China's national interests to
their own selfish ends.
For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give whole-hearted coop-
eration to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily
requii-es the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable to
carry out or make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears the large scale,
widespread and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort will
expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a liberalizing
Influence (pp. 567-570).
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 811
October 9, 19 H {Service)
Just as the "Japanese Army cannot crush these militant iieople now, so also
will Kuomintang force fail in the future. With their new arms and organization,
knowledge of their own strength, and determination to keep what they have been
fighting for, these people — now some 90 million and certain to be many more
before the Kuomintang can reach them — will resist oppression. They are not
Communists. They do not want separation or independence. But at present
they regard the Kuomintang, from their own experience, as oppressors ; and the
Communists as their leaders and benefactors.
With this great popular base, the Communists likewise cannot be eliminated.
Kuomintang attempts to do so by force must mean a complete denial of democracy.
This will strengthen the ties of the Communists with the people; a Communist
victory will be inevitable. * * *
From the basic fact that the Communists have built up popular support of a
magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, we must draw
the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share in
China's future * * * i suggest the future conclusion that unless the Kuomin-
tang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and other-
wise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it
yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will be the domi-
nant force in China within a comparatively few years (p. 572-573).
February 14, 1945 (Ludden and Service)
American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the
defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of
American lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations
should be subordinate.
The attainment of this objective demands the eifective mobilization of China
in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of
a supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic re-
sources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan's inner zone
of defense. Denied the eltective use of these resources the attainmnt of our
primary objective will be unecessarily delayed.
There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang Government
the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in
power. China's military failure is due in large part to internal political disunity
and the Kuomintang's desire to conserve such military force as it has for utiliza-
tion in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the Generalis-
simo to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary, has not
been abandoned. In the present situation in China, where power or self-preserva-
tion depend upon the possession of military force, neither the Kuomintang nor
opposition groups are willing to expend their military resources against the Jap-
anese through fear that it will then vis-^-vis other groups.
The aim of American policy as indicated clearly by official statements in the
United States is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable
preliminary to China's effective military mobilization. The execution of our
policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim. On
the contrary, it has retarded its effect because our statements and actions in
China have convinced the Kuomintang Government that we will continue to
support it and it alone. The Kuomintang Government believes that it will
receive an increasing flow of American military and related supplies which, if
past experience is any guide, it will commit against the enemy only with great
reluctance, if at all.
We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand
the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable in-
fluence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by
this time that the effort to solve the Kuomintang-Communist differences by
diplomatic means has failed ; * * *.
At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which
existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support
for Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows :
"The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and
factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and
22848— 52— pt. 3^
812 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological
preferences for one side or the other."
A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to
China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military
aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise.
It would serve notice, however, of our preparation to malie use of all availaole
means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a firm
rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China
would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make conces-
sions of power and permit united-front coalition. The present opposition
groups, no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would
be won wholeheartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time,
a united ally (pp. 575-576).
Exhibit No, 253
Yenan, May 1, 1945.
Congress of Communist Party Meets
Yenan, May 1. — The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party was held in Yenan in the latter part of April. This is one of the most
important events in the history of modern China.
"The task of this Congress is to rally people throughout China on the eve of
the counteroffensive to save the nation from the crisis which is the consequence
of the erroneous policy of the Kuomintang Government, and so thoroughly to
defeat and annihilate the Japanese aggressors and set up an independent, free,
democratic, unified, strong and prosperous new China.
"There are 752 delegates representing 1,210,000 members of the Chinese Com-
munist Party. Of these 544 are delegates and 208 are probationary delegates.
"Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Li Shao-Chi, Chou En-lai, Jen Pi-shih, Lin Po-hu,
Pen Tah-huai, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, Ho Lung, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Kao
Kang, Lo Fu, and Peng Chen were elected to the presidium of the congress. Jen
Pi-shih was elected secretary and Li Fu-chen assistant secretary of the congress.
"agenda items
"There were four items on the agenda : The political report by Comrade Chu
Teh, the report on redrafting of the party statutes by Comrade Li Shao-chi, and
the election of members of the central committee of the Chinese Communist
Party.
"Since its foundation in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party held six national
congresses. These congresses were held in July 1921, May 1922, June 1923,
January 1925, April 1927, and July 1928. Because of the long period of war
and struggle, 17 years have elapsed before the present seventh congress could
be convened.
"At the convention of the present congress, the power of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party, unity and solidarity within the party, and the party's prestige among
the people of China are higher than at any period in the past.
"total strength
"At present the Chinese Communist Party not only has over 1,200,000 mem-
bers but also has under its leadership the Eighth Route, New Fourth, and other
anti-Japanese regular armies, numbering 110,000 strong, over 2,200,000 People's
Volunteer Corps, and 19 liberated areas distributed over 19 provinces in Man-
churia, north, central, and south China, with a total population of 95,500,000.
"Because the war of resistance in the liberated areas is rapidly developing,
these figures are steadily increasing. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party
and liberated areas under its leadership have really become the center of gravity
of the Chinese people in the anti-Japanese "national salvation movement" and
struggle for liberation. The present congress will undoubtely have an extremely
important influence on the future development of the war of resistance and
internal politics of China." (Yenan, in English Morse to North America, May
1, 1945, 9:30 a. m. e. w. t.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 813
"Coalition Government Needed," Sats Mao
"Tenan, May 1. — On the 'coalition government' was the title of the political
report given by Chairman Mao Tze-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist
Party, to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.
"Mao Tze-tung pointed out that the 'unification of all parties and groups and
nonparty representatives, to form a provisional democratic coalition government
so as to carry out democratic reform to overcome the present crisis, mobilize and
unify the national forces of the vrar or resistance to effectively collaborate with
the Allies in fighting and defeating the Japanese aggressor, and to secure the
thorough liberation of the Chinese, are the basic demands of the Chinese people
at present.'
"national assemblt
"China needs a coalition government, said Mao Tze-tung, not only during the
war but also after the war. 'After the victory of the war of resistance, the
National Assembly, based on a broad, democratic foundation, should be called
to form a regular democratic government of a similar coalition nature embracing
more broadly all parties and groups and nonparty representatives. This gov-
ernment will lead the liberated people of the entire nation to build up an inde-
I)endent, free, unified, prosperous, and strong new country. After China has had a
democratic elective system, the Government should be a coalition working on the
basis of a commonly recognized new democratic program, no matter whether the
Communist Party is the majority or minority party in the National Assembly.'
"immediate formation
"Mao Tze-tung repeatedly urged the necessity of immediate formation of a
coalition government. One party, dictatorship, dictatorship of the antipopula-
tion group within the Kuomintang, said Mao Tze-tung, is not only 'a fundamental
obstacle to the mobilization and unification of the strength of the Chinese people
in the war of resistance, it is also the (colossal) embryo of the civil war.' "
MAO reveals postwar PLAN FOR CHINA
The following is Yenan's continuation in English Morse of the political report
given by Chairman Mao Tze-tung to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Com-
munist Party held in Tenan, the first part of which was reported under the
heading "Coalition Government Needed, Says Mao."
"In his report, Mao Tze-tung brought forward a program for the defeat of the
Japanese aggressors and the establishment of a new China. This program is
divided into two sections — namely, general and specific — and furnishes the
answers to many important wartime and postwar problems. Concerning the
thorough annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and forbidding a halfway
compromise, Mao Tze-tung called the people's attention to the secret under-
standings and dealings between the pro-Japanese elements in the Kuomintang
government and the Japanese seci-et emissaries.
"no compromise
"He said: 'The Chinese people should demand that the Kuomintang govern-
ment must thoroughly annihilate the Japanese aggressors and forbid any com-
promise. At the same time the Chinese people should expand the Eighth Route
and New Fourth Armies and other People's Armies. Moreover, wherever the
enemy has penetrated, the Chinese people should universally and voluntarily
develop anti-Japanese armed forces ready to cooperate directly with our allies
in the fighting.'
"To reactionary elements who want to steal the sacred right of armed resis-
tance to the Japanese aggressors from them, "The Chinese people should in self-
defense resolutely deal a counterblow after remonstrances have proved futile."
people's freedom
"With regard to the people's freedom, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that in their
struggle for freedom at the present the first and main effort of the Chinese people
is directed against the Japanese aggressor. But the Kuomintang government
814 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
has deprived the people of their freedom and bound them hand and foot, render-
ing them unable to oppose the Japanese aggressors.
"Mao said that 'The people in China's liberated areas have gained their free-
dom, and the people in other areas are able to and should gain such freedom.
The more the Chinese people have gained, the greater is the organized democratic
force, and then there is the possibility of a coalition government.'
"With regard to the unification of the people, Mao pointed out that 'divided
China must be changed into unified China.' But what Chinese people want is
not 'absolutist unification by dictators' but the 'democratic unification by the
people. The movement of the Chinese people striving for freedom, democracy,
and a coalition government is actually a movement for unification.'
"With regard to the People's Armies, Mao pointed out that without any army
which stands on the side of the people a coalition government cannot be formed.
The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are wholeheartedly on the side of the
people. Mao also pointed out that many Kuomintang troops which frequently
suffered [words missing] oppress the people and discriminate against other
troops should be reformed. Mao Tze-tung declared : 'As soon as the new demo-
cratic coalition government and the united high command is formed in China,
troops in the Chinese liberated areas will at once be handed over to them. But
all Kuomintang troops must also be handed over to them at the same time.
"private capitalism
"Mao Tze-tung declared that the Chinese Communist Party in the entire period
[words missing]. The new democracy approves the development of private
capitalism and ownership of private property, but this must follow the theory
propounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen; namely, to carry out the principle of 'tillers
own their land' and to guarantee that private capitalism 'cannot control the life
of the people in the country.'
"With regard to the land problem, Mao pointed out that in the liberated areas
the reduction of rent and interest has been carried out so that the landlords and
peasants jointly take part in the war of resistance.
"Mao also declared : 'If there is no particular hindrance, we shall continue to
carry out this policy after the war. First of all, the reduction of rent and in-
terest will be carried out throughout the country and then [words missing].
Then appropriate means will be found to arrive systematically at the [words
missing] "tillers own their land." ' [Next paragraph garbled in transmis-
sion— Ed.]
"On the one hand 'workers' interest will be 'protected', while on the other
band 'guaranties are given to [words missing] profits from proper commercial
[enterprise — Ed.].' He declared that in this new democratic state 'facilities
will certainly be [words missing] widespread [development — Ed.] of a private
capitalistic economy' apart from the economy of state-owned business and co-
operatives.
"Mao Tze-tung welcomes foreign investments in China. He said that the
industrialization of China 'will [afford — Ed.] a very great amount of foreign
Investments.'
"culture and education
"'With regard to culture and education, Mao Tze-tung pointed out [words
missing] respecting the intelligentsia who serve the people and have made [words
missing]. He also pointed out the various tasks such as the liquidation of illit-
eracy, and the popularization of public hygiene. He further pointed out that the
ancient Chinese and foreign culture should be 'absorbed critically.'
"Concerning the national minorities problem, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that
'national minorities should be helped [asterisks supplied by Tenan — Eld.] to at-
tain liberation and development, politically, economically, and culturally. Their
language, literature, customs, habits, and religious faith should be respected.'
"With regard to the problem of religion, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that 'accord-
ing to the principle of freedom of belief, China's liberated areas will allow evey
school of religion to exist. Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, Buddhists,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 815
and other religious beliefs, provided they obey the Government laws and decrees,
will be protected by the Government.'
"Mao Tze-tung in his report dwelt in detail on 'diplomatic problems' [words
missing] principle of the Chinese Communist Party in diplomatic policy, de-
clared Mao Tze-tung, 'is the establishment and consolidation of the diplomatic
relations with other countries, the solution of mutually related wartime and
postwar problems, such as the cooperation in fighting, peace conference, com-
mercial intercourse, investments, [words missing] of thorough extermination of
the Japanese aggressors, upholding of world peace [words missing] for equal
and independent status of tiie nation [words missing] interests and friendship of
nations and peoples.'
"international conferences
"Also the Atlantic Charter and resolutions was [words missing] Moscow,
Cairo, Tehran, and Crimea international conferences, Mao Tze-tung said, that the
Chinese Communist Party [words missing] the Crimea Conference on this ques-
tion. The Chinese Communist Party 'welcomes the San Francisco United Na-
tions Conference and has sent its representative to join the Chinese delegation in
order to express the will of the Chinese people.'
"Mao Tze-tung opined that the Crimea line accords [words missing] with the
policy held by the Chinese Communist Party in the settlement of the Chinese
and oriental question. He is of the opinion that a policy similar to that of [words
missing] be adopted in the Orient and Cliina."
4-POINT PROGRAM
"He said that '(1) The Japanese aggressors must be ultimately defeated and
the Japanese Fascist military and the causes producing them thoroughly extermi-
nated. There should be on halfway compromise: (2) [words missing] the ves-
tige of fascism in China must be exterminated without allowing the least trace to
remain; (3) domestic peace must be established in China and civil war not al-
lowed to recur; (4) the Kuomintang dictatorship [words missing] must be abol-
ished [words missing.] After its abolition it should at first be supplanted by
a provisional democratic coalition government fully supported by the whole na-
tion. [Words missing] territories having been recovered, the i-egular coalition
government executing the popular will should be set up through free and unre-
stricted elections."
SOVIET UNION
"Speaking of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, '[We are of the opinion —
Ed.] that the Kuomintang Government must stop its attitude of enmity toward
the Soviet Union and swiftly improve [Sino — Ed.] Soviet diplomatic relations.'
'On behalf of the Chinese people, Mao Tze-tung expressed [words missing] which
has always been rendered to China by the Soviet Government and people in
China's war [words missing] liberated and expressed welcome of Marshal Sta-
lin's speech [words missing] and recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese
neutrality pact by the Soviet Union.'
"Mao Tze-tung added : 'We believe that without the participation of the
Soviet Union it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the
Pacific question.' "
. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
"Regarding Sino-Anglo and Sino-American diplomatic relations, Mao Tze-tung
said : 'The great efforts made by the Great Powers, American and Great Brit-
ain, especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggres-
sors and the sympathy and aid rendered by their governments and peoples to
China, deserve our thanks. [Words missing] will or Chinese people and thereby
injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people. If any foreign government
helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese
people, a gross mistake will have been committed.'
"Speaking of the abrogation of the unequal treaties with China [words
missing], Mao Tze-tung said that the Chinese people welcome [words missing]
Chinese people on a footing of equality. But he pointed out, China 'definitely
cannot rely on an [words missing] equality [words missing] being given by the
good will of foreign governments and peoples. [Words missing] and actual
footing of equality must in the main rely oji the efforts of the Chinese people
816 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to build up politically, economically, and culturally a new democratic country^
which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous, and strong. China
assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality according to the policy
of the Kuomintang government at present in force?"
FAE EASTERN COUNTRIES
"Mao Tze-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard to
the countries in the Far East: After the [words missing] unconditional sur-
render of the Japanese aggressors, all democratic [words missing] of the Japa-
nese people should be aided to establish a democratic regime of the Japanese
people. Without such a democratic regime of the Japanese people, thorough ex-
termination of the Japanese [words missing] would not be possible to guarantee
peace in the Pacific [asterisks supplied by Yenan — Ed.] 'The decision of the
Cairo Conference to grant independence to Korea is correct, and the Chinese
people should so help the Korean people to attain liberation [words missing].*
With regard to Thailand, she 'should be dealt with according to the measures of
dealing with a Fascist turncoat'." (Yenan, in English Morse to North America,
May 2, 1^5.)
Exhibit No. 254
Junes 1944.
The Situation in China and Suggestions Rexjarding Ameeioan Pomct
/. The situation in China is rapidly becominff critical
A. The Japanese strategy in China, which has been as much political as mili-
tary, has so far been eminently successful.
Japan has had the choice of two alternatives.
1. It could beat China to its knees. But this would have required large-scale
military operations and a large and continuing army occupation. And there
was the danger that it might have driven the Kuomintang to carry out a real
mobilization of the people, thus making possible effective resistance and perhaps
rendering the Japanese task as long and costly as it has been in north China.
2. Or Japan could maintain just enough pressure on China to cause slow
strangulation. Based on the astute use of puppets, the understanding of the
continuing struggle for power within China (including the Kuomintang-Com-
munist conflict), and the knowledge that Chiang expects to have the war won
for him outside of China by his allies, this policy had the advantage that as long
as the Kuomintang leaders saw a chance for survival they would not take the
steps necessary to energize an effective war. It would thus remove any active
or immediate threat to Japan's flank, and permit consolidation and gradual exten-
sion of the important Japanese-held bases in China. Finally, it would permit
the accomplishment of these aims at a relatively small cost.
Japan chose the second alternative, accepting the gamble that the Kuomintang
would behave exactly as it has. Like many other Japanese gambles, it has so
far proved to have been nicely calculated. China is dying a lingering death by
slow strangulation. China does not now constitute any threat to Japan. And
China cannot, if the present situation continues, successfully resist a determined
Japanese drive to seize our offensive bases in east China.
B. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it
has been for the past 10 years.
China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army and
the Government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes of
growing political unrest. The Generalissimo is losing the support of a China
which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unexpected
strength during the first 2 years of the war with Japan. Internal weaknesses
are becoming accentuated, and there is taking place a reversal of the process of
unification.
1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is general feeling of
hopelessness.
2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away
from the larger cities, and Government mandates and measures of control cannot
be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the Government
to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy.
3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demoral-
ized from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 817
4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily
from inflation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not
only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress ; the vs^eight of years of
political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and
leadership they once had.
5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection, and other
arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is ever
increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest may in-
crease in scale and find political motivation.
6. The Provincial groups, are making common cause with one another and
with other dissident groups ,and are actively consolidating their positions. Their
continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central Govern-
ment is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor.
7. Unrest within the Kuomintang Armies is increasing, as shown in one impor-
tant instance by the "young generals' conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher
plane the war-zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence
and are thus creating a "new warlordism."
8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows
no signs of being closed but grows more critical with the passage of time ; the
inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted.
9. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its
selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable
to revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a
growing ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissension and
cliquism within the party, which grow more rather than less acute, the leadership
is turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers' clique.
10. llie Generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a hard-
ening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his un-
fortunate attempts to be "sage" as well as leader — shown, for instance, by
"China's Destiny" and his book on economics — have forfeited the respect of many
intellectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of his
dictatorship is becoming more outspoken.
These symptoms of deterioration and internal stress have been increased
by the defeat in Honan and will be further accelerated if, as seems likely, the
Japanese succeed in partially or wholly depriving the Central Government of
east China south of the Yangtze.
In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang is
ceasing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese security, the role
in which it made its greatest contribution to modern China.
C. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle
by its own initiatives : on the contrary, its policies are precipitating the crisis.
Some war-weariness in China must be expected. But the policies of the
Kuomintang under the impact of hyperinflation and to the presence of obvious
signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This
truth is emphasized by the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with
the situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the central execu-
tive committee.
1. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to per-
petuate their own power overrides all other considerations.
The result is the enthronement of reaction.
The Kuomintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the
country for democratic reform. The writings of the Generalissimo and the
party press show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitu-
tionalism remains an empty promise for which the only "preparation" is a half-
hearted attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local
self-government based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese
utilization in Manchuria and other areas under their control.
Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the Constitution
and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the dictation
of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental conditions of
freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups. Even the
educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic character
to the existing but important People's Political Council are ignored.
On the contrary, the trend is still in the other direction. Through such means
as compulsory political training for Government posts, emphasis on the political
nature of the army, through control, and increasing identification of the party
and Government, the Kuomintang intensifies its drive for "Ein Volk, ein Reich,
818 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ein Fiihrer," even though such a policy in China is inevitably doomed to failure.
The Kuomintang shows no intention of relaxing the autoritarian controls on
which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the para-
phernalia of a police state — the multiple and omnipresent secret-police organi-
zations, the gendarmerie, and so forth — it continues to strengthen them as its
last resort for internal security. (For the reenforcement of the most impor-
tant of these German-inspired and Gestapo-like organizations we must, unfortu-
nately, bear some responsibility.)
Obsessed by the growing and potential threat of the Communists, who it fears
may attract the popular support its own nature makes impossible, the Kuomin-
tang, despite the pretext — to meet foreign and Chinese criticism — of conducting
negotiations with the Communists, continues to adhere to policies and plans
which can only result in civil war. In so doing, it shows itself blind to the
facts: that its internal political and military situation is so weak that success-
without outside assistance is most problematic, that such a civil war would
hasten the process of distintegration and the spread of chaos ; that it would
prevent the prosecution of any effective war against Japan ; and that the only
parties to benefit would be Japan immediately and Russia eventually. Prepara-
tions for this civil war include an alliance with the present Chinese puppets
■which augur ill for future unity and democracy,
2. On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective
steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class.
It is directly responsible for the increase of official corruption, which is one
of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situa-
tion. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding, and speculation,
all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the party or with inti-
mate political connections.
It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures of
■wartime control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have
intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy, as, for
instance, ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulations.
It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft pro-
duction to run down, as they, of course, must when it is more profitable for
speculators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal
productive process.
It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate the
manufacture and trade in luxury goods, many of which come from areas under
Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely paid
for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy.
It fails to make an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and
increases revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of
landlords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to bog down
in corruption and ineflacieney to the point that possibly not more than one-third
of revenues collected reach the Government. It continues to spend huge Gov-
ernment funds on an idle and useless party bureaucracy.
At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even attempt-
ing palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of gold and
foreign currency.
It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China, such as the
growing concentration of landholdings, extortionate rents, and ruinous interest
rates, and the impact of inflation.
3. On the external front the Kuomintang is showing itself inept and selfishly
short-sighted by progresive estrangement of its allies.
By persistence in tactics of bargaining, bluff, and blackmail, most inappro-
priate to its circumstances, and its continuing failure to deal openly and frankly,
and to extend whole-hearted cooperation, which its own interests demand, the
Kuomintang is alienating China's most important ally, the United States. It
has already alienated its other major jwtential ally, Soviet Russia, toward which
its attitude is as irrational and short-sighted as it is toward the Communists.
The latest example of this is the irresponsible circulation of the report that
Soviet Russia and Japan have signed a secret military agreement permitting
Japanese troop withdrawals from Manchuria.
It is allowing this situation to develop at a time when its survival is de-
pendent as never before upon foreign support. But the Kuomintang is en-
dangering not only itself by its rash foreign policy : There are indications that it
is anxious to create friction between the United States and Great Britain and
Russia. When speedy victory, and any victory at all, demands maximizing of
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 819
agreements and the minimizing of frictions, such maneuvers amount to sabotage
of the war effort of the United Nations.
4. On the military front the Kuomintang appears to have decided to let
America win the war and to have withdrawn for all practical purposes from
active participation.
Its most important present contribution is to allow us, at our own and
fantastic cost, to build and use air bases in China.
It delayed, perhaps too long for success, to allow forces designated for the
purpose and trained and equipped by us to take the offensive in west Yunnan,
even though needed to support the American-Chinese campaign in north Burma,
the purpose of which is to open a life line into China and facilitate the eventual
landing on the China coast. It agreed to this action only after long months of
obstruction.
It fails to make effective use of American equipment given to it, as it also failed
with earlier Russian supplies. Equipment brought into China has often not been
transported to the fighting fronts. In other cases it has been known to have
been hoarded or diverted to nonmilitary purpose. China has displayed a dog in
the manger attitude in regard to equipment consigned to China and deteriorat-
ing in India for lack of transportation. It has concealed and refused to make
available to our forces hoards of supplies such as gasoline known to exist in
China, even when the emergency was great and China's own interest directly
served.
It has consistently refused to consolidate and efficiently administer transiwrta-
tion. In the past this resulted in great losses of supplies in the Japanese capture
of Burma and west Yunnan ; now it is crippling Chinese internal transportation
on which military activity must depend.
It has allowed military cooperation to be tied up with irrelevant financial
demands which can only be described as a form of blackmail. It has made these
excessive demands in spite of the fact that American expenditures in China
(against which there are almost no balancing Chinese payments) continually add
to the large Chinese nest egg of foreign exchange, which cannot be used in China
at present and thus constitutes in effect a "kitty" being hoarded for postwar use
It has failed to implement military requisitioning laws to assist us in obtain-
ing supplies in China and has left us at the mercy of conscienceless profiteers,
some of whom have been known to have oflicial connections. It has permitted
the imposition on us of fantastic prices, made more so by a wholly unrealistic
exchange rate, for articles in some cases originally supplied to China through
American credits. It seemingly has ignored the fact that the more supplies that
can be obtained in China, the greater the tonnage from India that can be devoted
to other essential military items.
It remains uncooperative and at times obstructive in American efforts to col-
lect vital intelligence regarding the enemy in China. This attitude is exem-
plified by the disapi)ointing fruits of promised cooi)eration by Chinese espionage
organizations (toward which we have expended great effort and large sums) ;
by the continued obstruction, in the face of agreement, to visits by American
observers to the actual fighting fronts, and by the steadfast refusal to permit any
contact with the Communist areas. It apparently remains oblivious to the
urgent military need, both in China and in other related theaters, for this in-
telligence regarding our common enemy, and it seemingly cares little for the fact
that exclusion from Communist-controlled territory hampers our long-range
bombing of Japan and may cost needless loss of American lives.
In its own war effort a pernicious and corrupt conscription system which
works to insure the selection and retention of the unfit, since the ablest and the
strongest can either evade conscription, buy their way out, or desert. It starves
and maltreats most of its troops to the degree that their military effectiveness is
greatly impaired and military service is regarded in the minds of the people
as a sentence of death. At the same time it refuses to follow the suggestion that
the army should be reduced to the size that could be adequately fed, medically
cared for, trained and armed. It bases this refusal on mercenary political con-
siderations— the concentration on the continuing struggle for power in China,
and the ultimate measurement of power in terms of armies.
For the same reason it refuses to mobilize its soldiers and people for the only
kind of war which China is in a position to wage effectively — a i)eople's guerrilla
war. Perhaps our entry into the war has simplified the problems of the Kuomin-
tang. As afraid of the forces within the country, its own people, as it is of the
Japanese, it now seeks to avoid conflict with the Japanese in order to concentrate
on the perpetuation of its own power.
820 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The condition to which it has permitted its armies to deteriorate is shown
most recently by the defeat in Honan, which is due not only to lack of heavy
armament but also to poor morale and miserable condition of the soldiers,
absence of support by the people, who have been consistently mistreated, lack
of leadership, and prevalent corruption among the ofBcers through such prac-
tices as trade with the occupied areas.
If we accept the obvious indications that the present Kuomintang leadership
does not want to tight the Japanese any more than it can help, we must go further
and recognize that it may even seek to prevent China from becoming the battle-
ground for large-scale campaigns against the Japanese land forces. This helps to
explain the Kuomintang's continued dealings with the Japanese and pupi)ets.
Thus the Kuomintang may hope to avert determined Japanese attack, maintain
its own position and power, save the east China homes of practically all of its
oflBcials, and preserve its old economic-industrial base in the coastal cities.
If this analysis is valid it reveals on the part of the Kuomintang leadership,
which means the generalissimo, a cynical disregard of the added cost of the
inevitable prolongation of the war in American lives and resources.
D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in
the composition and nature of the party.
In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has lost
its power of leadership; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against
Japan itself nor to cooperate wholeheartedly with the American Army in China,
and why it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country.
The answer to all these questions is to be found in the present composition and
nature of the party. Politically, a classical and definitive American description
becomes ever more true : the Kuomintang is a congerie of conservative political
cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power against all
outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Economically, the
Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural gentry landlords, the militar-
ists, the higher ranks of the Government bureaucracy and merchant bankers
having intimate connections with the bureaucrats. This base has actually con-
tracted during the war. The Kuomintang no longer commands, as it once did,
the unequivocal support of China's industrialists, who as a group have been much
weakened economically, and hence politically, by the Japanese seizure of the
coastal cities.
The relation of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions propounded
above is clear.
The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is
no longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience
of the war, is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the
party's selfish shortcomings.
It cannot fight an effective war becaiTse this is impossible without greater re-
liance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national
energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present
conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the party and greater
political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as the
genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude ; the threat of foreign
invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only real reform
can now regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy, though basic
to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomintang's present
leaders, imperil the foundations of the party's power because it would mean that
the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely guarded monopoly.
Bather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in its present state of
passive inertia. They are thus sacrificing China's national interests to their
own selfish ends.
For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give wholehearted co-
operation to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily
requires the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable, to
carry out or to make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears that large-
scale, widespread, and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort
will expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a
liberalizing influence.
The Kuomintang cannot unify the country because it derives its support from
the economically most conservative groups, who wish the retention of China's
economically and socially backward agrarian society. These groups are in-
capable of bringing about China's industrialization, although they pay this
objective elaborate lip service. They are also committed to the maintenance of
an order which by its very nature fosters particularism and resists modern
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 821
centralization. Countless examples can be given to show the line-up of the party
with the groups that oppose modernization and industrialization — such as con-
nections with Szechwan warlords and militarists. The Kuomintang sees no
objection to maintaining the economic interests of some of its component groups
in occupied China or in preserving trade with occupied China, the criterion of
which is not the national interest but its profitability to the engaging groups.
This explains why free China's imports from occupied China consist largely of
luxuries, against exports of food and strategic raw materials. It is therefore
not surprising that there are many links, both political and economic, between
the Kuomintang and the puppet regime.
E. The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain of failure ; if that
failure results in a collapse of China, it will have consequences disastrous both
to our immediate military plans and our long-term interests in the Far Bast.
The foregoing analysis has shown that the Kuomintang, under its present
leadership, has neither the ability nor desire to undertake a program which
could energize the war and check the process of internal disintegration. Its
preoccupation with the maintenance and consolidation of its power must result,
to the contrary, in acceleration rather than retardation of the rate of this disin-
tegration. Unless it widens its base and changes its character, it must be
expected to continue its present policies. It will not of its own volition take
steps to bring about this broadening and reform. The opposite will be the case :
Precisely because it has lost popular support, it is redoubling its efiorts to
maintain and monopolize control.
The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain to fail because they run
counter to strong forces within the country and are forcing China into ruin.
Since these policies are not favorable to us, nor of assistance in the prosecution
of an effective war by China, their failure would not of itself be disastrous to
American interests. For many reasons mentioned above, we mignt welcome the
fall of the Kuomintang if it could immediately be followed by a progressive
government able to unify the country and help us fight Japan.
But the danger is that the present drifting and deterioration under the
Kuomintang may end in a collapse. The result would be the creation in China
of a vacuum. This would eliminate any possibility in the near future of utilizing
China's potential military strength. Because the Japanese and their puppets
might be able to occupy this vacuum, at much less cost than by a major military
campaign, it might also become impossible for us to exploit China's flank posi-
tion and to continue operating from Chinese bases. The war would thus be
prolonged and made more difl5cult.
Such a collapse would also initiate a period of internal chaos in China, which
would deter the emergence of a strong and stable government, an indispensable
precondition for stability and order in the Far East.
China, which might be a minor asset to us now, would become a major
liability.
F. There are, however, active and constructive forces in China opposed to the
present trends of the Kuomintang leadership which, if given a chance, might
avert the threatened collapse.
These groups, all increasingly dissatisfied with the Government and the party
responsible for it, include the patriotic younger army oflScers ; the small mer-
chants ; large sections of the lower ranks of the Government bureaucracy ; most
of the foreign-returned students ; the intelligentsia, including professors, stu-
dents, and the professional classes ; the liberal elements of the Kuomintang, who
make up a sizable minority under the leadership of such men as Sun Fo ; the
minor parties and groups, some of which like the National Salvationists enjoy
great prestige ; the Chinese Communist Party ; and the inarticulate but increas-
ingly restless rural population.
The collective numbers and influence of these groups could be tremendous.
A Kuomintang oflScial recently admitted that resentment against the present
Kuomintang Government is so widespread that if there were free, universal
elections 80 percent of the votes might be cast against it. But most of these
groups are nebulous and unorganized, feeling — like the farmers — perhaps only
a blind dislike of conditions as they are. They represent different classes and
varying political beliefs, where they have any at all. They are tending, how-
ever, to draw together in the consciousness of their common interest in the
change of the status quo. This awakening and fusion is, of course, opposed by
the Kuomintang with every means at its disposal.
The danger, as conditions grow worse, is that some of these groups may act
independently and blindly. The effect may be to make confusion worse. Such
might be the case in a military putsch, a possibility that cannot be disregarded.
822 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The result might be something analogous to the Sian incident of 1936. But the
greater delicacy and precariousness of the present situation would lend itself
more easily to exploitation by the most reactionary elements of the Kuomintang,
the Japanese, or the puppets. Another possibility is the outbreak, on a much
larger scale than heretofore, of unorganized and disruptive farmers revolts.
A disturbing phenomenon is the apparent attempt now being made by some of
the minority parties to effect a marriage of convenience with the provincial
warlords, among the most reactionary and unscrupulous figures in Chinese poli-
tics and hardly crusaders for a new democracy.
The hopeful sign is that all of these groups are agreed that the basic problem
in China today is political reform toward democracy. This point requires
emphasis. It is only through political reform that the restoration of the will
to fight, the unification of the country, the elimination of provincial warlordism,
the solution of the Communist problem, the institution of economic policies
which can avoid collapse, and the emergence of a government actually sup-
ported by the people can be achieved. Democratic reform is the crux of all
important Chinese problems, military, economic, and political.
It is clear beyond doubt that China's hope for internal peace and effective
unity — certainly in the immediate future (which for the sake of the war must
be our prior consideration) and probably in the long term as well — lies neither
with the present Kuomintang nor with the Communists, but in a democratic
combination of the liberal elements within the country, including these within
the Kuomintang, and the probably large sections of the Communists who would
be willing, by their own statements and past actions, to collaborate in the
resurrection of a united front.
Given the known interest and attitudes of the Chinese people, we can be sure
that measures to accomplish the solution of these problems will be undertaken
in earnest by a broadly based government. Such a government — and only such
a government — will galvanize China out of its military inertia by restoring na-
tional morale through such means as the reduction of the evils of conscription
and stopping the maltreatment and starvation of the troops. Such a govern-
ment— and only such a government — will automatically end the paralyzing in-
ternal dissention and political unrest. Such a government — and only such a
government — will undertake the economic measures necessary to increase pro-
duction, establish effective price controls, mobilize national resources, and end
corruption, hoarding, speculation, and profiteering.
It is, of course, unrealistic to assume that such a broadly based democratic
government can be established at one stroke, or that it can immediately achieve
the accomplishment of these broad objectives. But progress will be made as,
only as, the government moves toward democracy.
II. In the light of this developing crisis ichat should be the American attitude
toicard China f
It is impossible to predict exactly how far the present disintegration in China
can continue without spectacular change in the internal situation and drastic
effect on the war against Japan. But we must face the question whether we
can afford passively to stand by and allow the process to continue to an almost
certainly disastrous collapse, or whether we wish to do what we legitimately
and practically can to arrest it. We need to formulate a realistic policy toward
China.
A. The Kuomintang and Chiang are acutely conscious of their dei)endence on
us and will be forced to appeal for our support.
We must realize that when the process of disintegration gets out of hand
it will be to us that the Kuomintang will turn for financial, political, and military
salvation. The awareness of this dependence is the obvious and correct explana-
tion of the Kuomintang's hypersensitivity to American opinion and criticism.
The Kuomintang — and particularly the Generalissimo — know that we are the
only disinterested, yet powerful, ally to whom China can turn.
The appeal will be made to us on many grounds besides the obvious, well-
worn but still effective one of pure sentiment. They have said in the past
and will say in the future that they could long ago have made peace with Japan
on what are falsely stated would have been favorable terms. They have claimed
and will claim again that their resistance and refusal to compromise with Japan
saved Russia, Great Britain, and ourselves, ignoring the truth that our own
refusal to compromise with Japan to China's disadvantage brought on Pearl
Harbor and our involvement before we were ready. They have complained and
will continue to complain that they have received less support in the form of
materials than any other major ally, forgetting that they have done less fighting.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 823
have not used the materials given, and vs^ould not have had the ability to use
what they asked for. Finally, they have tried and will continue to try to lay
the blame on us for their difficulties, distorting the effect of American Army
expenditures in China and ignoring the fact that these expenditures are only
a minor factor in the whole sorry picture of the mismanagement of the Chinese
economy.
But however far-fetched these appeals, our flat refusal of them might have
several embarrassing effects.
1. We would probably see China enter a period of internal chaos. Our war
effort in this theater would be disrupted, instability in the Far East prolonged,
and possible Russian intervention attracted.
2. We would be blamed by large sections of both Chinese and American public
opinion for "abandoning" China after having been responsible for its collapse.
(In a measure we would have brought such blame upon ourselves because we
have tended to allow ourselves to become identified not merely with China but
also with the Kuomintang and its policies. Henceforth, it may be the better
part of valor to avoid too close identification with the Kuomintang.)
3. By an apparent abandonment of China in its hour of need, we would lose
international prestige, especially in the Far East.
On the other hand, if we conae to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own
terms we would be buttressing, but only temporarily, a decadent regime which
by its existing composition and program is incapable of solving China's problems.
Both China and ourselves would be gaining only a brief respite from the ultimate
day of reckoning. It is clear, therefore, that it is to our advantage to avoid a
situation arising in which we would be presented with a Hobson's choice between
two such unpalatable alternatives.
B. The Kuomintang's dependence can give us great influence.
Circumstances are rapidly developing so that the Generalissimo will have to
ask for the continuance and increase of our support. Weak as he is, he is in
no position — and the weaker he becomes the less he will be able — to turn down or
render nugatory any coordinated and positive policy we may adopt toward
China. The cards are all in our favor. Our influence, intelligently used, can be
tremendous.
C. There are three general alternatives open to us.
1. We may give up China as hopeless and wash our hands of it althogether.
2. We may continue to give support to the Generalissimo, when and as he
asks for it.
3. We may formulate a coordinated and positive policy toward China and take
the necessary steps for its implementation.
D. Our choice between these alternatives must be determined by our objectives
in China,
The United States, if it so desired and if it had a coherent policy, could play
an important and perhaps decisive role in —
1. Stimulating China to an active part in the war in the Far East, thus hasten-
ing the defeat of Japan.
2. Staving off economic collapse in China and bringing about basic political
and economic reforms, thus enabling China to carry on the war and enhance
the chances of its orderly postwar recovery.
3. Enabling China to emerge from the war as a major and stabilizing factor in
postwar east Asia.
4. Winning a permanent and valuable ally in the progressive, independent, and
democratic China.
E. We should adopt the third alternative — a coordinated and positive policy.
This is clear from an examination of the background of the present situation
in China and the proper objectives of our policy there.
The first alternative must be rejected on immediate military grounds, but also
for obvious long-range considerations. It would deprive us of valuable air bases
and position on Japan's flank. Its adoption would prolong the war. We cannot
afford to wash our hands of China.
The results of the second alternative — which, insofar as we have a China
policy, has been the one we have been and are pursuing — speak for themselves.
The substantial financial assistance we have given China has been frittered
away with neglibible, if any effect in slowing inflation and retarding economic
collapse. The military help we have given has certainly not been used to increase
China's war effort against Japan. Our political support has been used for
the Kuomintang's own selfish purposes and to bolster its short-sighted and ruin-
ous policies.
The third, therefore, is the only real alternative left to us. Granted the re-
jection of the first alternative, there is no longer a question of helping and advis-
824 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Ing China. China itself must request this help and advice. The only question is
whether we give this help within a framework which malies sense, or whether
we continue to give it in our present disjointed and absent-minded manner. lu
the past it has sometimes seemed that our right hand did not know what the
left was doing. To continue without a coherent and coordinated policy will be
dissipating our effort without either China or ourselves deriving any appreciable
benefit. It can only continue to create new problems, in addition to these already
troubling us, without any compensating advantages beyond those of indolent
short-termed expediency. But most important is the possibility that this hap-
hazard giving, this serving of short-term expediency, may not be enough to save
the situation ; even with it, China may continue toward collapse.
F. This positive policy should be political.
The problem confronting us is whether we are to continue as in the past ta
ignore politcal considerations of direct military significance or whether we are
to take a leaf out of the Japanese book and invoke even stronger existing political
forces in China to achieve our military and long-term political objective.
We must seek to contribute toward the reversal of the present movement
toward collapse and to the rousing of China from its military inactivity. This
can be brought about only by an accelerated movement toward democratic polit-
ical reform within China. Our part must be that of a catalytic agent in this
process of China's democratization. It can be carried out by the careful exer-
tion of our influence, which has so far not been consciously and systematically
used.
///. TJie implementation of this political policy, though difficult in some respects^
is practical and can &e carried out by many means
A. Diplomatic finesse will be required in the execution of this policy in such
a way as not to offend the strong current of genuine nationalism (as disting-
uished from the chauvinism of the Kuomintang) which characterizes almost
all sections of the Chinese people. There must be a sensitivity to the situation
In China and the political changes there so that there can be an appropriate
and immediate stiffening or softening of the measures which we undertake.
This tact and sensitivity wHl be required not only of the top policy-directing
agency but of all other agencies actually implementing that policy and concerned
in direct relations with China.
There must be effective coordination of the policies and actions of all American
Government agencies concerned in these dealings with China.
The present lack of effective cooperation between the various Government
agencies — State, War, and some of the newer autonomous organizations — de-
tracts from the efficient functioning of each, and weakens American influence,
when it is most needed.
It must be recognized — and it will be even more the case under the iwlicy
proposed — that all our dealings with all our activities in China have political
implication. Coordination is absolutely essential for the achievement of unity
of policy and synchronization of action. It's attainment will require intelligent
and forceful direction both in Washington and in Chunking,
The logical person to coordinate activities in Chunking is obviously, because
of the broad issues involved, the Ambassador. Similarly the corresponding
person in Wahington might be the Chief of the China Section of the State Depart-
ment who would watch the whole field for the President or a responsible Cabinet
member. Positive action, of course, would depend on constant and close con-
sultation, both in Washington and in the field, between the representatives of
the State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments and the other agencies operat-
ing in China.
C. Since all measures open to us should not be applied simultaneously, there
should be careful selection and timing.
Some measures will be simple and immediately useful. Others should be
deferred until primary steps have been taken. Still others will be more force-
ful or dii'ect and their use will depend on the Kuomintang's recalcitrance to
change its ways. We must avoid overplaying or underplaying our hand.
D. Specific measures which might be adopted in the carrying out of this posi-
tive policy include the following :
1. Negative: (a) Stop our present mollycoddling of China by: Resti'icting
lend-lease, cutting down training of Chinese military cadets, discontinuing train-
ing of the Chinese Army, taking a firmer stand in the financial negotiations,
or stopping the shipment of gold. Any or all of these restrictive measures can
be reversed as the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang become moi-e cooperative
in carrying on military operations, using equipment and training supplied, being
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 825
reasonable on financial questions, or allowing ns freedom in such military require-
ments as establishing contact with the Communist areas.
(6) Stop building up the Generalissimo's and the Kuomintang's prestige in-
ternationally and in the United States. Such "face" serves only to bolster the
regime internally and to harden it in its present policies. Our inclusion of
China as one of the Big Four served a useful purpose in the early stage of the
war and as a counter to Japanese racial propaganda but has now lost its justi-
fication.
We make fools of ourselves by such actions as the attention given to the
meaningless utterances of Chu Hsueh-fen as a spokesman of Chinese labor and
the prominence accorded to China in the International Labor Office Conference.
Our tendency toward overlavish praise is regarded by the Chinese as a sign
of either stupdity or weakness.
Abandonment of glib generalities for hard-headed realism in our attitude
toward China will be quickly understood, without the resentment that would
probably be felt against the British. We can make it clear that praise will be
given when praise is due.
(c) Stop making unconditional and grandiose promises of help along such
lines as UNNRA, postwar economic aid, and political support. We can make it
clear without having to be vei*y explicit that we stand ready to help China when
China shows itself deserving. This ties into the more positive phase of pub-
licity and propaganda to the effect, for instance, that American postwar eco-
nomic aid will not be extended to build up monopolistic enterprise or support the
landlord-gentry class but in the interests of a democratic people.
(d) Discontinue our present active collaboration with Chinese secret police
organizations, which support the forces of reaction and stand for the opposite
of our American democratic aims and ideals. This collaboration, which results
in the effective strengthening of a Gestapo-like organization, is becoming in-
creasingly known in China. It confuses and disillusions Chinese liberals, who
look to us as their hope, and it weakens our position with the Kuomintang leaders
in pressing for democratic reform.
2. Positive: (o) High Government officials in conversation with Chinese lead-
ers in Washington and in China can make known our interest in democracy and
unity in China and our dissatisfaction with present Kuomintang military, finan-
cial, and other policies. Such suggestions will bear great weight if they come
from the President and advantage can be taken of opportunities such as the
visits of the Vice President Wallace to China and H. H. Kung to the United
States. A progressive stage can be questions or statements by Members of
Congress regarding affairs in China.
(&) We should take up the repeated, but usually insincere requests of the
Kuomintang for advice. If advisers are asked for, we should see that they are
provided, that good men are selected, and that they get all possible aid and
support from us. While the Kuomintang will be reluctant to accept the advice
we may give, its mere reiteration will have some effect.
(c) We should seek to extend our influence on Chinese opinion by every prac-
tical means available.
The Office of War Information should go beyond its present function of report-
ing American war news to pointing up the values of democracy as a permanent
political system and as an aid in the waging of war against totalitarianism. We
should attempt to increase the dissemination in China, by radio or other more
direct means, of constructive American criticism. This should include recogni-
tion and implied encouragement to liberal and progressive forces within China.
Care should be taken to keep this criticism on a helpful, constructive, and objec-
tive plane and to avoid derogatory attacks which may injure Chinese nation-
alistic sensitivities. To do this work, there may have to be some expansion of
the OWI in China and of our propaganda directed toward this country.
A second line is the active expansion of our cultural relations program. The
present diversion, b.v Koumintang wishes, to technical subjects should be recti-
fied and greater emphasis laid on social sciences, cultural, and practical political
subjects such as American Government administration. We should increase our
aid and support to intellectuals in China by the many means already explored,
such as aid to research in China, translation of articles, and opportunity for
study or lecturing in the United States.
Other, more indirect lines, are the expansion of our American Foreign Service
representation in China to new localities (since each office is in some measure a
center of American influence and contact with Chinese lilierals and returned
students from the United States) and the careful indoctrination of the American
826 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Army personnel in China to create, by example and their attitude toward Chi-
oese, favorable impressions of America and the things that America stands for.
Where contact between American and Chinese military personnel has been
close, as in Burma, the result has apparently been a democratizing influence.
(d) We should assist the education of public opinion in the United States
toward a realistic but constructively sympathetic attitude toward China. The
most obvious means would be making background information available, in an
unofficial way, to responsible political commentators, writers, and research
workers. Without action on our part their writings will become known to Chi-
nese Government circles and from them to other politically minded groups. We
should, however, coordinate this with the activity described in the section above
to promote dissemination in China.
(e) We should maintain friendly relations with the liberal elements in the
Kuomintang, the minor parties, and the Communists. This can, and should for
its maximum effect, be done in an open, aboveboard manner. The recognition
which it implies will be quickly understood by the Chinese.
Further steps in this direction could be publicity to liberals, such as distin-
guished intellectuals. When possible they may be included in consideration for
special honors or awards, given recognition by being asked to participate in in-
ternational commissions or other bodies, and invited to travel or lecture in the
United States. A very effective action of this type would be an invitation to
Madam Sun Yat-sen from the White House.
We should select men of known liberal view to represent us in OWI, cultural
relations, and other lines of work in China.
(/) We should continue to show an interest in the Chinese Communists.
This includes contact with the Communist representatives in Chungking, pub-
licity on the blockade and the situation between the two parties, and continued
pressure for the dispatch of observers to north China. At the same time we
should stress the importance of north China militarily for intelligence regarding
Japanese battle order, Japanese air strength, weather reporting, bombing data,
and damage assessment, and air crew evacuation and rescue work. We should
consider the eventual advance of active operations against the Japanese to north
China and the question of assistance to or cooperation with Communist and
guerrilla forces. If our reasonable requests based on urgent military grounds
do not receive a favorable response, we should send our military observers any-
way.
(g) We should consider the training and equipping of provincial and other
armies in China in cases where we can be satisfied that they will fight the Jap-
anese.
ih) We should continue to press, and if necessary insist, on getting American
observers to the actual fighting fronts. We should urge, and when possible
assist, the improvement of the condition of the Chinese soldier, especially his
treatment, clothing, feeding, and medical care.
(i) We should publicize statements by responsible Government ofiicials indi-
cating our interest in Chinese unity and our attitvide toward such questions as
the use of American lend-lease supplies by the Kuomintang in a civil war. It is
interesting for instance, that Under Secretary Welles' letter to Browder regard-
ing American interest in Chinese unity was considered so important by the Kuo-
mintang that publication in China was prohibited.
This program is, of course, far from complete. Other measures will occur to
the policy agency and will suggest themselves as the situation in China develops.
E. Most of these measures can be applied progressively.
This is true, for instance, of the various negative actions suggested, and of the
conversations, statements, and other lines of endeavor to influence public opinion
in China. A planned activity of encouragement and attention to liberals, minor
party leaders, and the Communists can advance.
F. The program suggested contains little that is not already being done in an
uncoordinated and only partially effective manner.
What is needed chiefly is an integration, systematic motivation and planned
expension of activities in which we are already, perhaps in some cases uncon-
sciously, engaged. We do, for instance, try to maintain contact with liberal
groups ; we have expressed the desire to send observers to the Communist area ;
we have a weak cultural relations program; and the OWI has made some at-
tempts to propagandize American democratic ideals.
G. The program constitutes only very modified and indirect intervention in
Chinese affairs.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 827
It must be admitted that some of the measures pi'oposed would involve taking
more than normal interest in the affairs of another sovereign nation. But they
do not go so far as to infringe on Chinese sovei'eignty. If we choose to make
lend-lease conditional ou a better war effort by China, it is also China's freedom
to refuse to accept it on these conditions. We do not go nearly as far as im-
perialistic countries have often done in the past. We obviously do not, for
instance, suggest active assistance or subsidizing of rival parties to the Kuomin-
tang, as the Russians did in the case of the Communists.
Furthermore, the Chinese Government would find it difficult to object. The
Chinese have abused their freedom to propagandize in the United States by the
statements and writing of such men as Lin Yu-tang. They have also, and through
Lin Yu-tang, who carries an official passport as a representative of the Chinese
Government, engaged in "cultural relations" work. They have freely criticized
American policies and American leaders. And they have attempted to dabble
in American politics, througli Madame Chiang, Luce, Willkie, and Republican
Congressmen. They have had, and will continue to have, freedom to try to influ-
ence public opinion in the United States in the same way that we will try to do
it in China.
Exhibit No. 255
MiLiTART Weakness of Our Fab Eastern Policy
February 14, 1945.
To the Commandinff General, USAF:
American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the
defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of Ameri-
can lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations should be
subordinate.
The attainment of this objective demands the effective mobilization of China
in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of
a supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic
resources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan's inner
zone of defense. Denied the effective use of these resources, the attainment of
our primary objective will be unnecessarily delayed.
There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang government
the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in
power. China's military failure is due in large part to internal political disunity
and the Kuomintang's desire to conserve such military force as it has for utiliza-
tion in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the generalissimo
to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary, has not been
abandoned. In the present situation in China, where power or self-preservation
depend upon the possession of military force, neither the Kuomintang nor opposi-
tion groups are willing to expend their military resourses against the Japanese
through fear that it will weaken them vis-tl-vis other groups. A recent instance
is the lack of resistance to the Japanese capture of the southern section of the
Hankow-Canton Railway. Equally, the Kuomintang is jealously intent on pre-
venting the strengthening of other groups: Witness the blockade of the
Communists.
The aim of American policy, as indicated clearly by official statements in the
United States, is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable
preliminary to China's effective military mobilization. The execution of our
policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim. On
the contrary, it has retarded its achievement. It has had this undesired and
undesirable effect because our statements and actions in China have convinced
the Kuomintang government that we will continue to support it, and it alone.
The Kuomintang government believes that it will receive an increasing flow of
American military and related supplies which, if past experience is any guide,
it will commit against the enemy only with great reluctance, if at all.
We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand
the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable in-
fluence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by this
time that the effort to solve the Kuomintang-Communist differences by diplo-
matic means has failed ; we should not be deceived by any face-saving formula re-
22848 — 52— pt. 3-
828 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
suiting from the discussions because neither side is willing to bear the onus of
failure. We should also realize that no goverament can survive in China with-
out American support.
There are in China important elements interested in governmental reform by
which unity and active prosecution of the war may result. Aside from the
Chinese Communists, however, all of these elements are cowed by a widespread
secret police system and lack any firm rallying point. They will remain help-
less to do anything constructive as long as statements of our policy indicate that
we are champions of the status quo.
At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which
existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support
for Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows :
"The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and
factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and
thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological prefer-
ences for one side or the other."
A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to
China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military
aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise. It
would serve notice, however, of our preparation to malie use of all available
means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a firm
rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China
would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make conces-
sions of power and permit united front coalition. The present opposition groups,
no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would be won
wholeheartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time, a
united ally.
Whether we like it or not, by our very presence here we have become a force
in the internal politics of China and that force should be used to accomplish our
primary mission. In spite of hero-worshipping publicity in the United States,
Chiang Kai-shek is not China and by our present narrow policy of outspokenly
supporting his dog-in-the-manger attitude we are needlessly cutting ourselves
oft' from millions of useful allies ; many of whom are already organized and in
position to engage the enemy. These allies, let it be clear, are not confined to
Communist-controlled areas of China, but are to be found everywhere in the coun-
try. The Communist movement is merely the most prominent manifestation of a
condition which is potentially present throughout Chiha. Other important
groups favor the same program as that espoused by the so-called Communist-
agrarian reform, civil rights, the establishment of democratic institutions — but
the Communists are the only group at present having the organization and
strength openly to foster such revolutionary ideas.
Our objective is clear, but in China we have been jockeyed into a position from
which we have only one approach to the objective. Support of the generalissimo
is desirable insofar as there is concrete evidence that he is willing and able to
marshal the full strength of China against Japan. Support of the generalissimo
is but one means to an end ; it is not an end in itself, but by present statements
of policy we show a tendency to confuse the means with the end. There should
be an immediate adjustment of our position in order that flexibility of approach
to our primary objective may be restored.
Mr. Morris. Would you testify that to the best of your recollection
the reports of these four political officers were uniformly derogatory
of the Chinese Nationalist Government ?
General Wedemeter. I could state that the reports oral and writ-
ten of three, Mr. Service, Mr. Davies, and Mr. Ludden, were very
commendatory in references to the Commiuiists, and frequently de-
rogatory in references to the Nationalist Government.
Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, can you recall that any friction
or disagreement was openly expressed between yourself and General
Hurley on the one hand and these political advisers on the other?
You have testified that generally you were in support of General
Hurley's position.
General Wedemeyer. Well, my position out there was I was just
a military man and I looked up to the Ambassador as the senior rep-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 829
resentative of my country in that area. And when I first reported to
take over the command I paid my respects to Ambassador Gaus. He
was the Ambassador to China at that time. And shortly thereafter, a
month or so hater, he resigned, and Mr. Patrick J. Hurley became the
Ambassador. And I evolved a system of working together, and, as I
stated, I recognized him as a senior, a civilian, and I deferred to his
ideas in the political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural fields. In
the military field I felt that I was responsible and he did too.
Senator Ferguson. General, when you were assigned to China on
this mission, was it to carry out a new policy ?
General Wedemeyer. No, sir, 1 received no instructions about a
new policy.
Senator Ferguson. You were assigned to carry out a mission which
in your opinion was the mission previous to your assignment ?
General Wedemeyer. To support the Nationalist Government of
China and to actually, to put it bluntly, kill as many Japanese as
possible.
Senator Ferguson. To help them in the Japanese cause.
General Wedemeyer. To assist them or to cooperate with them in
their military operations against the Japanese, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you understood that that was a carrying
on of a policy that had been there ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But you found in the files of the foreign officers
a different philosophy ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But you kept to the assignment that you felt
that you had and carried that out as nearly as you could ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that was the policy at least of Hurley who
came there as the Ambassador of the United States ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is all I have.
Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, there was a question, I think, on
the record : Did you recall any expressions of disagreement between
any of these Foreign Service officers and yourself and General Hurley ?
General Wedemeyer. Well, I did not have any disagreement with
them.
Mr. Morris. Did you hear of any ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir ; I did.
Mr. Morris. Would you tell us about it. General Wedemeyer ?
General Wedemeyer. Well, Ambassador Hurley moved over to my
house during the winter of 1944-45 because the Japs used to bomb us
there and a big boulder had rolled into the Ambassador's house, so
he moved into my house for a few weeks while his house was being
renovated. And he, in the evening discussions in my home, sug-
gested that these four political advisers that I had be placed under
him. That seemed logical to me. I looked to the Ambassador for my
intructions in political matters, diplomatic matters, and I told him
I would agree to that.
So we were ordered home in February of 1945 by President Koose-
velt. And when we got back to this country, to the Capital, Mr.
Hurley requested that those four men be returned to him and to
operate in the Embassy, and said that General Wedemeyer had no
830 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
objection; which was correct. That was done. Mr. Stimson, as
Secretary of War, had requested those four political advisers for his
friend General Stilwell when General Stilwell assumed command
out there some years earlier.
So, Mr. Stimson was interested in my view, and I had lunch with
him and expressed agreement that they should be put back over under
the Embassy. I did not express disapproval or concern about these
men. I had none. They had been loyal to me. I did not agree with
their reports. I found them to be very bright, keen, and they cer-
tainly knew most of the Chinese leaders. But, as I indicated, I did
not analj^ze their reports nearly as carefully as I should have, and
talk to them about it, because I was so busily involved with military
duties. They were put over under the Ambassador.
Wlien we got back, we were only home about a week, and we
flew back to Uhina, and Mr. Hurley then had some difficulties with
these men. He felt, as he expressed it, that they were undermining
his efforts to bring about a stability in the China area. He finally
had one of them transferred. And some had already left, I think.
Mr. Service had come back, and Mr. Emmerson and Ludden and
Davies still were there. And finally Davies was transferred to Mos-
cow, and he came over to say good-by to me. At that time Hurley
was still living with me, and they had quite a heated argument in
my home.
Senator Ferguson. Would you tell us what the argument was about ?
General Wedemeyer. Of course, one does not remember all of the
details.
Senator Ferguson. I realize that. Just give us the substance.
General Wedemeyer. This has not occurred to me in the years inter-
vening. But Hurley stated to Mr. Davies that he, Davies, had not
supported Mr. Hurley and had made reports that contravened Amer-
ican policy as he. Hurley, understood it, and that he was going to ask
the State Department to relieve Mr. Davies ; that is, to discharge him.
Senator Ferguson. Do you mean discharge him entirely from the
service ?
General Wedemeyer. Discharge him entirely from the Foreign
Service. Mr. Hurley made that statement.
And Mr. Davies protested very strongly and became highly emo-
tional, as did the Ambassador, and there were exchanges. I do not
recall, really, in fairness to either one of them, what was said.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you can give the substance of it.
General Wedemei^er. The substance was that Mr. Davies felt that
he had been loyal, and Mr. Hurley that he had not been loyal to him,
Hurley, and finally Mr. Hurley agreed not to request his discharge
but definitely that he should be transferred and go to Moscow to see at
first hand the operation of some of these ideas that Mr. Davies had
been espousing.
Senator Ferguson. So, it was Mr. Hurley's idea that he would not
ask for his discharge from the service ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But he recommended that Davies be sent to
Moscow to experience things that he had been advocating in China ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. That is my recollection of the con-
versation that took place in my house in about February or March
or April, right around in there.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 831
Senator FEROusoisr. Of course, you felt, when their advice was not
in line with wliat you thought your mission was, that you, being a
military man and assigned there to do a certain mission, did not have
any personal feeling against them ?
General Wedemeyer. Oh, yes; I did, Senator, but I was too busy
with -the military job. But if I had known — those men were under
me, and if I ever have anybody, civilian or military, under me, and
he is doing anything that I interpret as disloyal, I will go after him.
Senator Ferguson. Did you interpret these things as being dis-
loyal 'i
General Wedemeyer. I did not, sir, because I did not analyze them
as I should have carefully.
Senator Ferguson. I will put it to j^ou now : What is your opinion
now after you read these rejDorts in the light of all the circumstances?
Were they disloval to the Government and the policy that we had
there?
General Wedemeyer. I cannot answer that question, sir ; honestly I
cannot answer it. But I can say this : If I had followed their advice,
communism would have run rampant over China much more rapidly
than it did. And I would not have carried out my directive or my
instructions as I understood them.
Senator Ferguson. I think that is an answer to my question.
General Wedemeyer. I would hesitate to call any man categorically
disloyal, sir, unless I had the proof.
Senator Ferguson. I understand your answer.
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, when General Marshall went to
China, did you ever see his directive that he took with him?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; I did.
Mr. Morris. Do you know who prepared that directive ?
General Wedemeyer. No, sir; I don't. I think that General Hull
and General Lincoln and General Marshall himself had something to
to with it.
Subsequently I saw a carbon copy of that directive in the Pentagon,
and it had the initials J. C. V. in the lower left-hand corner, as I
recall it.
Senator Ferguson. Whose initials could they be?
General Wedemeyer. Well, the head of the Far Eastern Division
was John Carter Vincent at that time.
Mr. Morris. You say you saw the initials J. C. V. on the draft of the
directive ?
General Wedemeyer. I have seen them on a carbon copy of that
directive, sir. Whether it was the final directive, I don't know. I
mean, I did not compare the phraseology exactly.
Senator Ferguson. General, I wonder whether you have an opinion
as to why it is so difficult for committees to actually ascertain who
did prepare this directive. Why should there be any argument about
who prepared this or any secrecy about who prepared it ? Why should
it not be an open book?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. Senator Ferguson, I can understand
why we should protect sources of information in the FBI. I can
understand that where the FBI at times does not want you to have
access, or anyone to have access, to their files.
Senator Ferguson. To their source.
832 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS !
General WedeMeyer. Yes, sir. You will destroy a source.
Senator Ferguson. I understand that.
General Wedemeyer. Or jeopardize a source. But I do not under-
stand at all why the repersentatives of the American people do not
have more information concerning national and international develop-
ments.
Senator Ferguson. As to who prepared a document.
General Wedemeyer. I think that who prepared a document cer-
tainly should be available to you representatives of the American
peoples.
I could not understand, for example, why Wedemeyer's name was
mentioned so frequently in the MacArthur hearings, associated with
a telegram, and yet we could not find out who in the State Department
had direct contact with the same matter. And I do not know to this
day, and I tried to find out. Yet my name was bandied about freely.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, it was not a secret on your part?
General Wedemeyer. And my permission was not requested either.
If I had some compunction about it, I certainly was not given the op-
portunity to express it, but I did not care.
Senator Ferguson. When it comes to a State Department official,
then it becomes a deep, dark secret ?
General Whjemyer. I could not say that as a generality, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It did in that case.
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It is certainly true as to who prepared the docu-
ment of the Marshall situation ; is it not ?
General Wedemeyer. I don't know, sir. I did not know that you
people had made the request to get this information, sir. I did not
know that.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that at
this time we have not made such a request for that document.
Senator Ferguson. That is true, Mr. Chairman. I now suggest
and ask that the Chair and the committee obtain this information as
to who actually did, and let us havelt on the record so that it will not
be in dispute.
The Chairman. You mean we will try to obtain it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, that is all the committee can do. It can
do its best.
The Chairman. The committee will proceed through its chairman
at once to try to secure the information by every means that we know
of. I wish to say, however, that the Chair has had some difficulty in
times past.
Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that.
The Chairman. The witness on the stand now. General Wedemeyer,
rendered a very valuable report that would have been of great interest
to the people of this country, and the chairman, then chairman of
another committee of the Senate, attempted by subpoena to get that
report, and the subpena was denied, or the document was denied to the
subpena officer. So, we may have some trouble here again, but we will
try.
Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, do you recall the recommenda-
tions made in the directive that General Marshall took with him to
China?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 833
General Wedemeyer. Well, I could give you substantially what was
in it. It required General Marshall, as a special envoy of the Presi-
dent, to go to China and to broaden the base of the Government, to
bring about a coalition of the various political parties there and to
create stability in that area.
Mr. Morris. And you say that was the substance of the directive?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Now, General Wedemeyer, were you in China when
General Marshall first arrived on his mission ?
General Wedemeyer. You mean on this mission? Yes, sir; I met
him at the airport.
Mr. Morris. Were you the ranking American military commander
in the field at that time ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Were you consulted on military matters by General
Marshall in the execution of his mission ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I gave General Marshall a resume
of the situation that maintained in China at the end of the war and
indicated my intention, which was hardly necessary to do, but that
every resource in the China theater was at his disposal to help him out.
Mr. Morris. Did General Marshall make an effort to bring about a
coalition between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Com-
munist government ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; I think he made a very continued
and studied effort to bring about a coalition of the political factions,
and also to do away with the military forces of any particular political
party, and to amalgamate them with the political forces, and they
would be tlie army or the military force of the political entity that
he ended up with. Obviously, it would be impossible to carry on a
political entity if Republicans had an army and Democrats had an
army in our own country.
Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, do you have any knowledge that
General Marshall imposed an embargo on the Chines Nationalist
Government at that time ?
General Wedemeyer. The term "embargo," in the connotation of
that term, I do not know whether it had application to what I know
about it.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us just what you know ?
General Wedemeyer. There was, as I recall it, $500,000,000 appro-
priated by the Congress to help China. I do not know whether the
help was military or economic or both, but I know that General Mar-
shall was authorized by the President to determine the assistance,
economic and military, that would be given to China. This, of course,
was to assist him in bringing about this coalition that he was ordered
to accomplish.
Mr. Morris. And do you know that this money was withheld from
the Chinese Government ?
General Wedemeyer. Well, sir, when I returned, I was put in com-
mand of the Second Army over here with headquarters in Baltimore.
But I did receive calls from Chinese friends here telling me that they
were desperate for ammunition and for maintenance parts for their
vehicles, American vehicles that they had secured during the war, and
they urged me to do what I could. I was in no official status and could
834 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
do nothing about it, but it would indicate that there were retardations
or stoppages of the flow of supplies to China. That was my only
contact with that situation.
Mr. Morris. I have no further questions to ask General Wedemeyer
on this score.
Senator Ferguson. I have a question.
You did answer some questions to the United States News ; is that
correct ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And I am asking you in relation to the answers
to questions on how our policy was influenced. Do you recall those
answers ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I think Mr. David Lawrence asked
me if in my judgment there were influences
The Chairman. I think the questions and answers might be
submitted.
Senator Ferguson. I just wanted to know whether or not there
was any change that you wanted to make in those answers or whether
that is your opinion.
General Wedemeyer. No, sir ; that is my considered opinion.
Senator Ferguson. That is your considered opinion ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we
insert this.
General Wedemeyer. I would like to emphasize there. Senator
Ferguson, that in referring to that I know of my own personal ex-
perience that there are thousands of loyal Americans in Government
service.
Senator Ferguson. You say that in here.
General Wedemeyer. And I want it emphasized here, sir, because
I do not want in any way to reflect against the many of my own com-
rades in military service, or against many fine people in the Gov-
ernment service in general.
Senator Ferguson. But that does not detract from these answers
in here?
General Wedemeyer. Not one iota, sir. I believe those statements
to be correct.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that
this excerpt of an interview of General Wedemeyer appearing in the
September 14, 1951, issue of United States News and World Report
be inserted in the record. That is, only that portion of it beginning
with How Policy Was Influenced and down to Basic Mistakes of the
United States.
The Chairman. I believe that is proper. It may be inserted in
the record.
(The information referred to is as follows :)
How Policy Was Influenced
Question. What do you mean by "sinister influences"?
Answer. Communist influences which had their genesis in tlie Kremlin, but
which were implemented by representatives in tliis country, both by Soviet
representatives and, unfortunately, by some of our own misguided citizens.
Question. Inside the Government?
Answer. Undoubtedly to a limited extent. I do not want to reflect against
the thousands of loyal Americans in Government service who have been stead
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 835
fast in their devotion to duty and to the principles of democracy. They are
in the vast majority.
Question. I suppose you include the State Department?
Answer. Yes. I mean in many departments.
Question. Do you thinlc there are communistic influences in the military
departments?
Answer. I never came into direct contact with a man in uniform in any of
the services of whom I could say categorically that he was a Communist or
had Communist connections.
Question. But were there suspicions as to that voiced from time to time in
the Far East?
Answer. Yes. Take the newspaper that we published and disseminated
widelv in the China theater during and subsequent to the war. It was called
The China Lantern. There were editorials that appeared in that paper from
time to time that were inimical to the best interests of our country. The men
on the staff of that paper were in the military service.
Question. Going back to this matter of the influences on our policy, isn't it
possible that some of these influences were those that swallowed the com-
munistic line and believed it to be the better line of the two?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I accept that explanation. But as far back as 1933, when
we recognized Soviet Russia, I perceived in my small way the real implications
of communism. I had read Das Kapital and had studied and followed as much
as I could the developments in Soviet Russia. During the 2 years, 1936 to 1938,
that I was in Germany as a student at the German War College, the Nazis con-
tributed considerably — not intentionally — to my education pertaining to Soviet
objectives. It was not all propaganda that the Nazis put out about the Soviets.
I warned both civil and military leaders with whom I was associated in America
about the implications of what I called "indiscriminate assistance to the Soviet
Russians."
From 1940 through most of 1943, I was connected with strategic planning
in the then War Department and had an opportunity to express views. There
were a number of American officers who realized the real implications of what
I term "indiscriminate assistance" to a nation whose objectives or aims were
just as dangerous to America, if not more so, than were those of Hitler and his
henchmen.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever express disagreement with General
Marshall on the advisability of forming a coalition government in
China?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. When General Marshall first came
out and showed me his directive I told him I did not believe it was
possible of accomplishment. I testified to that effect before in the
MacArthur hearings, and that is in coincidence with the view I ex-
pressed earlier today several* times, namely, you cannot coalesce Com-
munists with people who desire individual freedom. It just is not
going to work. People who have a spiritual belief, people who respect
the dignity of the individual, they are just antithetical to the views
or philosophies of Marxism.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this
time.
The Chairman. Senator Jenner?
Senator Jenner. I have no questions.
Senator Fekguson. You would say then that the old proverb of say-
ing you cannot mix oil and water would apply to trying to mix these
two philosophies, and that you would have domination by the Com-
munists?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I am always afraid of cliches, you
know, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But at least you think the Communist philos-
ophy would dominate?
General Wedemeyer. Definitely, yes, sir. They will dominate if
they are permitted to.
836 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. That is, if you try to compromise with them.
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. I have no further questions at this particular time of
General Wedemeyer.
The Chairman. Do you have any questions, Senator Jenner?
Senator Jenner. No.
The Chairman. General, we wish to express our sincere gratitude
for your presence here and for your splendid testimony and coopera-
tion generally.
General Wedemeyer. I would like to make just one statement, sir.
I have been following the work of this committee, and I commend both
the Democratic and Republican members for what I believe to be an
objective investigation in the interest of the country. Don't pay any
attention, please, to the smear campaigns that are being instituted by
those very same forces that you are investigating. I wish you success.
The Chairman. Gentlemen of the committee, the chairman of this
committee has received a letter dated September 15, 1951, on the letter-
head 450 Eiverside Drive, New York 27, N. Y., purporting to be
signed by Corliss Lamont and bearing his signature. The letter starts
out by saying (reading) :
I wish to protest again to you and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Internal Security, of which you are chairman —
and so forth. I will not detain the committee to read the letter.
Senator Jenner. I received a copy, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The members of the committee, I think, have re-
ceived copies.
The letter from Mr, Lamont will be inserted in the record with the
permission of the committee.
(The letter referred to is as follows :)
New York 27, N. Y., September 15, 1951.
The Honorable Pat McCarran,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington^ D. C.
My Dear Senator McCarran : I wish to protest again to you and the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, of which you are chairman, against
the repeated actions of that subcommittee in attemipting to smear me as a Com-
munist and to associate me with the alleged betrayal of American foreign policy
in the Far East. Your subcommitee has dragged me into this picture as part of
a shabby endeavor to discredit the American Institute of Pacific Relations and
to establish it as a subversive organization.
The Subcommittee on Internal Security has tried to give the totally false im-
pression that I am a far-eastern expert and have been a prime mover in the
affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations. But in fact I have never been par-
ticularly interested in the Far East and have only a few years been a member
of the institute, and a very inactive one at that.
However, my late father, Thon-jas W. Lamont, of J. P. Morgan & Co., did have
considerable knowledge of the Far East and visited both Japan and China. For
more than 20 years he participated actively in the work of the Institute of Pacific
Relationti and contributed generously to it. From 1925 until the time of his
death in 1948 he made to that organization 14 donations amounting to $14,700.
On the other hand, I did not start contributing to the institute until 1946.
From that year until the present I made six donations totaling $800, or about
one-eighteenth of the total of my father's gifts. Yet your subcommittee and its
investigators have never once mentioned my Republican father's long and deep
interest in the institute. Instead, this subcommittee has stressed my own slight
and brief association with the institute, obviously as part of its effort to paint
that excellent organization as red by concealing the fact that leading bankers
and conservatives have been among its chief backers.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 837
At its hearing on August 22, 1951, your subcommittee read into its records
the crudest sort of dishonesty about me. Your counsel submitted on that occa-
sion a memorandum headed, "C. L. from E. C. C," and then suggested that it
had been written to Corliss Lamont from E. C. Carter, former secretary general
of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Testimony continued for some time on this
assumption ; and nobody was given an opportunity to refute it and to show that
the memo was from Mr. Carter to Clayton Lane, at one tinoe an oflSicer of the
institute.
The memorandum itself was perfectly innocent. And this episode well illus-
trates the method of your subcommittee in striving to mislead public opinion.
Evidently some members of this subcommittee would be glad to see me hung for
the nonexistent crimes of sonieone else whose initials happen to be the same
as mine.
On August 2, 1951, a self-confessed ex-spy, Mrs. Hede Massing, testified before
your subcommittee that I was a Communist. I wrote your subcommittee August
12 disproving this charge and saying in part: "For the one-thousandth time I
completely and categorically deny that I am or ever have been a Communist.
My numerous disagreements on fundamental points with Communist and Soviet
docti-ines, such as those regarding philosophy, civil liberties, the Tito controversy,
and the aggression of the North Koreans in 1950, show clearly that I rely on my
own independent thinking and follow nobody's line. I am a radical American
dissenter carrying on as best I can the dissenting tradition of my ancestors who
came over on the Mayflower."
I requested your subcommittee to enter the above statement into its oflacial
records. But I did not even receive an acknowledgement of my letter.
From its record, Mr. Senator, it seems to me that your subcommittee is con-
stantly encouraging the violation of the Ninth Commandment, "Thou shalt not
bear false witness against thy neighbor." It is turning representative govern-
ment into government by misrepresentation. It is causing the American people
to lose faith in their democratic institutions and is thereby doing more to under-
mine the political system of the United States than all the Communists who have
ever existed in this country.
Other congressional investigating committees, of both House and Senate, have
behaved just as scandalously. The procedures of such committees ought to be
revised by law in order to guarantee defendant witnesses, organizations, and
other victims their legitimate rights and a fair hearing. The new rules should
apply whether bankers or teachers, labor leaders or Communists, liberals or
independents, Republicans or Democrats are being investigated.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me earnestly request that in the interests
of the truth you enter this letter in the official records of the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Internal Security as my refutation of the untrue accusations
made against me at its hearings.
Very truly yours,
Corliss Lamont.
The Chairman. In connection with Mr. Lament's letter the chair-
man desires to insert in the record at this time the reply of the chair-
man of this committee dated September 19, 1951, addressed to Mr.
Corliss Lamont and signed by the chairman of this committee. Those
letters will be inserted in the record so as to become a part of the
record of this hearing.
(The letter referred to is as follows :)
Septembeb 19, 1951.
Mr. Corliss Lamont,
New Yorlc 27, tf. Y.
Deiab Mr. Lamont: I have your letter of September 15, 1951, which I notice
you have released to the press.
I take note of the fact which you impart in your letter that your father,
Thomas W. Lamont, contributed $14,700 to the Institute of Pacific Relations
during the period 1925-48 and that he took an active interest in the institute
and in the Far East. I also note that you point out that your own six donations
to the institute totaled only $800 by contrast.
I would like to jwint out, however, that you are wrong in your statement
that this committee has never once mentioned your father's name in its hear-
838 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ings. In fact, the only substantial testimony involving either you or your
father concerned an episode which took place in 1945. As you must know, if
you read the record, this episode involved an effort made by Mr. Owen Latti-
more and Mr. E. C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations to induce your
father, Thomas W. Lamont, through you, to sign a draft prepared by Mr.
Lattimore in answer to an article that appeared in the Reader's Digest by J. B.
Powell and Max Eastman. Testimony showed that Mr. Lattimore prepared
a draft of an answer after consultation with Mr. T. A. Bisson and made arrange-
ments to have it published in the name of some prominent American. According
to testimony, they selected your father, Thomas W. Lamont, as a person who
might sign the article. Arrangements for the carrying out of this plan, according
to testimony and documents introduced into the record, were made through
you. When your father declined to have his name signed to the article, this
committee took especial care to bring out his refusal to do so.
It is also to be noted that the committee and the staff questioned Mr. Carter
at length on the unusual language used in the letter from Mr. Carter to Mr.
Lattimore who were admittedly good friends. The letter of June 19, 1945, reads
in part :
"Dear Owen : Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday.
Late last evening I went up to the One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Street and saw
the son. I discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and prob-
ably will be gone all summer. I explained the general situation to the son
and said that I would like his advice as to who would be the best single person
or group of three or four to sign such a letter. He made some academic sug-
gestions and then finally suggested the possibility of his father. He thought
it would better for me to approach him than for him to do so, though he said
the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and doesn't usually
like to take on extra burdens during his holiday. He also confirmed what I
suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. I am, however, prepared
in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him with as strong and tactful a letter as
I can write on the off-chance that he might be will to do something. * * *
"Edward C. Carter."
I believe if you will read or, if you have already done so, reread that testimony
you will find that the committee was simply trying to bring out the facts, and
the incidence of your name and your father's name was dictated by the under-
lying circumstances and by nothing else.
With respect to the second point you make in your letter, therein you accuse
the committee of dishonesty to you. The record you refer to is as follows :
"Mr. Mandel : I have here a footnote dated November 5, 1948, taken from the
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 'CL from ECC. 'CL' may be Corliss
Lamont, and 'ECO' may be E. C. Carter." '
Two letters "OL from ECC" were introduced into the record at this point and
there was no significance whatever attached to the identity of the "CL."
As you must know, it was the habit of the lu'^titute of Pacific Relations to refer
to individuals in the various memoranda by their initials only. The assumption
that it may have been Corliss Lamont was without significance and represented
a mere guess on the part of the research director as to the addressee therein.
Certainly there was no invidious connotation drawn from this conchisiun. How-
ever, inasmuch as you point out that the "CL" is Clayton Lane and not Corliss
Lamont, your statement of this fact will be cross-indexed to that testimony.
As for the fact that you have been identified before this committee as a Com-
munist, I call attention to the fact that this committee has made no findings nor
drawn any conclusions from the sworn testimony before it.
As you request, your letter is being put into the official record.
Sincerely,
Pat McCakran, Chairman.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Michigan has
received a letter from Henry A. WalLace, and I do not know whether
other members of the committee have also received it, but I would ask
that that be inserted in the record also. I will turn it over to the
committee.
1 See p. 574, pt. 2.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 839^
The Chairman. As regards the letter to which Senator Ferguson
refers, that letter and the reply will be inserted also.
(The letters referred to are as follows :)
Septembek 13, 1951.
Hon. Henry A. Wallace,
South Salem, N. Y.
My Dear Henry : Upon my return from Turkey, I found your letter of August
20 which had been previously acknowledged by my secretary.
If you would permit me to do so, I shall be very glad to place your letter in the
official record of the committee.
With kindest personal regards, I am.
Yours sincerely.
South Salem, N. Y., August 25, 1951.
Hon. Homer Ferguson,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. €.
Dear Senator Ferguson : In a UP report of August 22 you are quoted as say-
ing that much of the Budenz testimony was hearsay. Therefore I am moved to
call your attention to the Budenz testimony on August 23 before the Senate
Internal Security Committee to the effect that I was under the influence of
Communists (Lattimore and Vincent, according to Budenz) on my trip to China
in 1944.
For your information I may say that Lattimore was sent along on the trip
not as a member of my personal staff but as a representative of OWI at the
instance of Elmer Davis and Roosevelt. He was an expert on the nomadic
tribes and occasionally was helpful as an interpreter but he had nothing whatever
to do with my report to President Roosevelt or with my communication to
President Roosevelt on June 28, 1944.
The person who had by far the greatest influence on me was a Republican,
Ambassador to China, Hon. Clarence E. Gauss. You may remember that in the
fall of 1945 Senator Hart, of Connecticut, was urging him for the Republican
place on the Export-Import Bank. It was at instance of Gauss that I re-
ported to Roosevelt that in spite of Chiang's weaknesses as a leader that at the
moment we had no alternative to the support of Chiang.
It was at Chiang's instance that I sent a message from Kunming to Roosevelt
on June 28, 1944. suggesting the name of General Wedemeyer as liaison between
Roosevelt and Chiang. While Vincent did not inspire this suggestion he was
cognizant of what was in my cable and did not in any way object.
On December 15, 1945, the Honorable Patrick Hurley, recently resigned as
Ambassador to China, told me in the presence of Herbert Brownell that he never
had any quarrel with me with regard to the Chinese situation.
I thought you ought to have these facts in view of the Budenz testimony.
With cordial regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Henry A. Wallace.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have a letter from Mr. Carter ad-
dressed to me which I think should go in the record. It is very short.
Mr. Mandel, will you read that very briefly ?
Mr. Mandel. It is a letter from Edward C. Carter dated September
6, 1951 [reading] :
Dear Mr. Morris : In my testimony some weeks ago I believe that I stated
that Miss Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley was a cousin of Christopher Chancellor, the
present head of Reuters. My wife tells me that this is inaccurate. It seems
that when the clhancellor children were young they went to stay for long
periods in Yorkshire at the Cholomeley's home. It was because of this intimate
relationship under the same roof that I made the mistake of thinking they were
cousins.
I believe that the mistake is quite unimportant, but I want to correct it.
840 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr._ Morris. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we allow that letter
to go into the record as a correction of Mr. Carter's own testimony.
The Chairman. It may be inserted.
(The letter referred to is as follows :)
New York Citt, September 6, 1951.
Mr. Robert Morris,
Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D. 0.
Dear Me. Morris : In my testimony some weeks ago I believe that I stated that
Miss Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley was a cousin of Christopher Chancellor, the
present head of Reuters. My wife tells me that this is inaccurate. It seems
that when the Chancellor children were young they went to stay for long periods
in Yorkshire at the Cholmeley's home. It was because of this intimate rela-
tionship under the same roof that I made the mistake of thinking they were
cousins.
I believe that the mistake is quite unimportant but I want to correct it.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.*
Senator Ferguson. When it is printed in the record, if it is possible,
could this not be put in at that place so that it will correct the record
without too much trouble ? Has it already been printed ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Would it be satisfactory if that were cross-indexed
back to it ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; so that at least it would be clear that the
correction was made.
The Chairman. Is there anything further, Mr. Morris?
Mr. Morris. There is one other letter that the War Department has
asked us to put into our record. It concerns the testimony of General
Willoughby. It is not very important, but I think inasmuch as the
Army has requested that it should go in, we could put it into the
record.
The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record.
Mr. Morris. That letter is dated August 15, 1951, from Miles Reber,
major general, GSC.
The Chairman. Very well.
(The letter referred to is as f ollow§_:)
Department of the Army,
Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison,
Washington, D. C, August 15, 1951.
Hon. Pat MoCakran,
Chairman, Suhcommittee on Internal Security,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.
Dear Senator McCarran : In connection with the recent testimony of General
Willoughby before your committee pertaining to his official report on the Sorge
case, it is respectfully requested that the following facts in connection with his
report be included in the record of the hearings of your committee.
Copies of all consecutive reports and exhibits pertaining to the Sorge case
received by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, from
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, FECOM, were distributed to the FBI, CIA,
and State Department between the dates of March 9, 1949, and November 22,
1950. No reports or exhibits to the Sorge case have been received since Novem-
ber 22, 1950.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Army, may I suggest that this letter be made
a part of the record of hearings in this case. Your cooperation in such action
will be very much appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
MrLES Reber,
Major General, OSC,
Chief of Legislative Liaison.
> See p. 51, pt. 1.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 841
Mr. Morris. Tomorrow, Senator McCarran, we have General
Fortier who is theater intelligence commander in the Far East Com-
mand. He will be our witness tomorrow. That will be at 10 o'clock
or 9 o'clock, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. I think it can be 10 o'clock. It is very difficult to
convene at 9 o'clock. I think we will be able to meet at 10 o'clock.
I have discussed it with the leader and I think it will be all right to
proceed.
Mr. Morris. General Fortier is under subpena to appear here at
9 o'clock. May I inform him that he may come in at 10?
The Chairman. Yes.
The committee is recessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Wliereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the committee recessed to be recon-
vened at 10 a. m. Thursday, September 20, 1951.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1951
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. G.
The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424,
Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, Jenner, and
Watkins.
Also present: Senator McCarthy.
J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee
counsel ; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Morris ?
Mr. "Morris. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Please stand and be sworn, General.
You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give
before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
General Fortier. I do.
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. L. JOSEPH FORTIER, UNITED STATES
ARMY (RETIRED), McLEAN, VA.
Mr. Morris. General Fortier, will you give your full name and
address to the reporter, please?
General Fortier. Louis Joseph Fortier, brigadier general, United
States Army, retired. Spring Hill Eoacl, McLean, Va.
Mr. Morris. What is your present military status?
General Fortier. United States Army, retired.
Mr. Morris. What was your last military assignment, General ?
General Fortier. Director of Theater Intelligence Division of the
Far East Command.
Mr. Morris. Wlien did you relinquish that command ?
General Fortier. I sailed from Japan in October, the middle of
October 1950. I was the Director of Theater Intelligence Division
until some time in September 1950.
Mr. Morris. Will you describe briefly the nature of your assign-
ment, General Fortier, at that time ?
General Fortier. From around the 1st day of February 1949 until
September 1950 I was in charge of the Theater Intelligence Division
under G-2, Far East Command, GHQ, Tol^yo.
22848— 52— pt. 3 10 843
844 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr, Morris. Will you describe for us generally the functions that
you had to perform in that post ?
General Fortier. As Director of this Division, my job was that of
observing, studying the capabilities of any external threat to the Far
East Command. In other words, I was concerned with any potential
outside enemy that might threaten the security of the Far East Com-
mand.
Mr. Morris. As such, General, did you take recognition of the de-
velopment of Red China ?
• General Fortier. Besides observing the capabilities of the Soviets
in that area, probably my greatest interest was that of watching the
development in China.
Mr. Morris. Had you been interested in communism in China as a
professional matter, General Fortier?
General Fortier. I had been in and out of Intelligence for the last
14 years and, as a matter of fact, ever since 1921-23 when I took a
master of science degree in political science, in which I specalized
on the problems arising from the Versailles Treaty, I have been closely
observing the development of Soviet Russia and communism in general.
Mr. Morris. So it is your testimony that while you held this posi-
tion you were concerned with the development and the consolidation
of communism on the mainland of China ?
General Fortier. Yes, sir ; I was.
Senator Ferguson. Would that not be right in line with your duties
if you were to look into the questions that might be a threat to your
command ? Communism in China could be a threat to the command
in Tokyo, could it not?
General Fortier. Yes, sir.
May I explain this? That whereas I had the division that was
charged with the external security, in other words, a threat from
outside, there was another division of G-2 which was charged with the
internal security. My primary interest was watching the development
in China and seeing the advance of communism and Mao Tse-tung's
forces in China.
Mr. Morris. General, did you ever have occasion to brief important
leaders of the United States Government as an adviser to Japan ?
General Fortier. It was what we call in the service a standard
operating procedure that whenever any distinguished representative
of the United States Government came to Tokyo, he was given a brief-
ing as to the situation as we saw it and in turn we endeavored to obtain
from him his views, or the Washington view if he came from Wash-
ington.
Mr. Morris. That was standard operating procedure?
General Fortier. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Do you recall a visit that Ambassador at Large Philip
C. Jessup made to Japan in late 1949 or early 1950?
General Fortier. Yes, I do.
Mr. Morris. Will you relate the circumstances to this committee,
please ?
General Fortier. As I recall it, Mr. Jessup came to Japan, to Tokyo,
in the early days of January 1950. It was just about the time that
we had gotten word that Britain had recognized Communist China.
We gave Mr. Jessup the normal briefing that was given to visiting
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 845
people from Washington. And it so happened, the instance that
Mr. Morris is referring to, that during one of the intermissions, I
found myself alone with Mr. Jessup
The Chairman. Found yourself where?
General Fortier. Standing next to him in the conference room, and
I put the following question to him. I said : "Wlien will we recognize
Communist China?"
Senator Ferguson. You knew at that time he was connected with
the State Department of the United States Government?
General Fortier. Yes, sir. He was there as an ambassador with
that rank.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Why did you put the question that way, in the
affirmative, General?
General Fortier. I had been very much concerned about Britain
recognizing Communist China.
Senator Ferguson. Had he been briefed on that question? Was
that mentioned in the briefing ?
General Fortier. I don't recall that it was. We had a set briefing
that involved our views on Asia as a whole ; that is, on the periphery
of the Far East Command. That briefing was usually given by
General Willoughby who was G-2.
Senator Ferguson. Y^ou usually had around the table more than
Oeneral Willoughby and yourself, did you not ?
General Fortier. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is, as I recall, your briefing form.
General Fortier. All the key staJff officers of GHQ Far East Com-
mand were present at this time.
Senator Ferguson. You do not know whether that question was
raised in the briefing ?
General Fortier. I don't think it was, as a matter of fact.
Senator Eastland. What did Mr. Jessup tell you ?
General Fortier. Mr. Jessup said, "Well, in about 2 or 3 weeks."
Mr. Morris. Was it as a categorical statement ?
General Fortier. It is a little bit difficult for me to remember his
exact words as to whether it was a categorical statement or not, but
I do remember that I picked up the statement and I argued with Mr.
Jessup and told him that I thought it would be a grave error if we
recognized Communist China.
Senator Eastland. Why did you think it would be a grave error?
General Fortier. I thought it would be a grave error for the fol-
lowing reason : that as far as I knew never in its history had China
been consolidated under one particular regime or one head. China
had always had these regional groups and throughout the history of
China there had been an attempt made to consolidate it, but never
with success.
Having followed the development in China, in Communist China,
and seeing Mao Tse-tung's army overrun the key areas, and feeling
that Mao Tse-tung was being aided and abetted by the Russians, I felt
that Mao Tse-tung had a very fine chance of consolidating that coun-
try for once under a regime that would be inimical to us and against
the best interests of the United States.
Senator Eastland. If we recognized them ?
846 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
General Fortier. Yes ; if we recognized the country and gave them
that moral and political support that would be received bj^ them should
we grant recognition.
Senator Fergusox. What did Jessup say about that ?
General Fortier. Mr. Jessup said, 'AVel'l, we must face facts." I am
not putting in quotes and end quotes now. I am giving you my recol-
lection on this. He said, "We must face facts. After all, Mao Tse-
tung's armies have overrun the vast portion, in fact the key areas of
China. They are in the process of reestablishing law and order and
the mere fact that we should recognize them does not mean we approve
either of the character of their government or of the nature of it. In
arriving at a decision as to recognition or nonrecognition, the criteria
should be whether the government that has come in has established
sovereignty, has control of the majority of the country, and is in the
process of reestablishing law and order."
Senator Eastland. Had they consolidated China at that time ?
General Fortip:r. In my opinion, no.
Senator Eastland. Had they consolidated their position in China
when you left Japan ?
General Fortier. In my opinion, no.
Senator Eastland. Have they consolidated China today?
General Fortier. In my opinion, no.
Senator Eastland. You think recognition by this country would
do much to consolidate communism in China ?
General Fortier. I certainly do.
Senator Ferguson. You told Jessup that ?
General Fortier. I told him substantially that.
About that time, someone else came in. Here was this conference
room and the conversation was interrupted and never came to a final
conclusion.
Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you we had an agreement with
Great Britain that after recognition by Britain that we would recog-
nize China ?
General Fortier. No, sir. ^
Senator Ferguson. Did he mention anything about the fact of
Britain's recognition?
General Fortier. Ho did not, sir.
Senator Eastland. Eight there, as a general in intelligence and
from your sources of information and your feel of the atmosphere
and general knowledge, did you not think that there had been an
understanding betA^■een this country and Great Britain that Great
Britain's recognition of Communist China would be followed by our
recognition ?
General Fortier. That is a rather difficult question to answer. I
prefer to give you the atmosphere.
Senator Eastland. Was that not your judgment. General, and is
not that the reason you asked Mr. Jessup the question you did ?
General Fortier. Well, some time in October or November 1949, I
had become so much concerned with the fact that Britain might
recognize Communist China that I had made a study for my own
satisfaction of the situation as faced by the British in Hong Kong
in 1941, in December, when the Japanese invaded Hong Kong, and the
situation as existed in 1949, late 1949.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 847
I studied it from a political, economic, military, and psycliological
point of view, I drafted mainly for my own information and that of
my immediate entourage, a study in which I concluded that while it
would be a great error should Britain recognize Connnunist China, I
feared very much they would and that possibly the economic factor
would be the determining one because there was no question but that
there had been a terrific increase in trade through Hong Kong be-
tween 1948 and 1949.
To answer Senator Eastland's question, I have no information,
direct evidence, on which to base any deal between the United States
and Britain. On the other hand, I feared, you might say, that the
United States would follow a recognition by Britain, and if I remem-
ber correctly, either Britain had just recognized Communist China,
at the time I spoke to Mr. Jessup, or I had obtained some information,
that they would do so shortly. I believe that is what prompted my
questioning of Mr. Jessup, the fact that a day or two before there had
been some sort of an official announcement that Britain had recog-
nized Communist China.
Senator Eastland. You were worried about Formosa, too?
General Fortier. I was worried we might follow suit.
Senator Ferguson. Did you get his pereonal opinion, or was he
speaking, that the Government was going to do this ?
General Fortier. No, sir. This was a man to man conversation
between Jessup and me.
Senator Ferguson. But it was his personal idea that it should be
recognized ?
General Fortier. Senator, the entire conversation ■
Senator Ferguson. Because you were giving him your personal
argument and he was giving his.
General Fortier. I feel he was.
The Chairman. That is the way it impressed you at the time?
General Fortier. Yes. The whole conversation did not last more
than 2 or 3 minutes, as you can well understand. We were having this
conference and about every 50 minutes there would be a 10-minute
intermission. It was in one of them I tackled him on that subject.
Senator Eastland. Were you afraid of the loss of Formosa, too?
General Fortier. I was very much concerned with that.
Senator Eastland. Wliy were you concerned with that?
General Fortier. Because I shared the view that Formosa is a
key area — I do not like to use the word "vital" because the word has
been overworked, but that Formosa lies between the Philippines and
Japan and if it fell in enemy hands it would be a very serious threat
to either country.
Senator Eastland. Would it not put Japan in a nutcracker be-
tween the islands we have given Russia on the north and those islands
south of Japan ?
General Fortier. Yes, sir.
Senator Eastland. Were there many airfields on Formosa ?
General Fortier. Yes, sir ; there are.
Senator Eastland. Did the Far East Command have trouble with
the State Department in getting in Formosa, or did the United States'
State Department attempt to keep generals in the Far East Com-
mand away from Formosa?
848 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
General Fortier. Well, tlie correct answer to that is I know of no
important official of GHQ who was ever barred admittance to
Formosa.
Senator Eastland. Did you not have to resort to subterfuges to
get in?
General Fortier. I think the Senator is referring to the fact that
there was at times a tendency to scrutinize the group from GHQ that
had requested admission to Formosa, and I will say, Senator, that it
was based largely, at least from the information we obtained, on the
lack of hotel reservations and facilities there.
Senator Eastland. Did you not think that was a subterfuge,
General ?
General Fortier. In my particular case, when I went to Formosa,
every one in GHQ knew, of course, of my particular job, that of Di-
rector of Theater Intelligence Division, and the United States Gov-
ernment had its set-up in Formosa, including military, air, and naval
attaches. At least, theoretically, any information that we desired
concerning Formosa could have been obtained through those sources.
Senator Eastland. Did you not have to resort to subterfuge to get
in Formosa ? I want you to answer that question.
General Fortier. I don't know whether I had to or not, but I did.
Senator Eastland. What was that subterfuge ?
Senator Ferguson. Why do you hesitate on this ?
General Fortier. Because, if I seem to hesitate it may have been
in this particular instance being referred to that it was overplayed.
I have no reason to believe that had I applied formally for admission
to Formosa that that would not have been granted me. I think it
would, but on a particular occasion, I had heard certain reports about
the defense capabilities of Formosa that bothered me. I wanted to
get over there and get there in a hurry, because it was a time when
actually it was a critical period. It was late May, early June, of 1950.
Senator Ferguson. Wliy did you have to ask the State Department ?
Senator Eastland. Please go ahead and answer the question.
General Fortier. So, in order to get there and get there in a hurry,
an arrangement was made whereby I was invited as a guest of a very
high-ranking official in Formosa.
Senator Eastland. Who was that official ?
General Fortier. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
Senator Eastland. Is it true that you sent word you were coming
to the State Department representative and got in a plane and left
before he had time to answer ?
General Fortier. That is correct, sir.
Senator Eastland. Was it not general knowledge that the Far East
command was not welcomed down at Formosa by the American State
Department ?
General Fortier. Well, it was my impression that we were none too
welcome, at least those of us in the intelligence field.
Senator Eastland. Did you ever hear of a General Merritt who was
being sent subrosa by the State Department to organize an anti-Chiang
faction in Formosa ?
General Fortier. No, sir.
The Chairman. You made a statement a little while ago. General,
that when you attempted to go to Formosa you seemed to be "scruti-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 84^
nized." Why do you use the word "scrutinize" ? Your going to For-
mosa was scrutinized. By whom and how ?
General Fortier. Did I use that word ?
The Chairman. Yes.
General Fortier. I believe I don't recall in a particular thing, but
I said those officers who were involved in the intelligence field, their
request for admission into Formosa would have been more closely
scrutinized by the American representation in Formosa than would
others. After all, let's be fair about this thing. The United States
Government had. a consul general, had United States Military, Air
and Naval attaches in Formosa. Certainly, theoretically, we had
appropriate United States representation in the place. If I was not
satisfied with their views and reports and I desired my own estimate,.
V7hy, you might attribute that to my own idiosyncrasy, that I preferred
my own evaluation to that which I was receiving.
Senator Ferguson. But, General, you don't claim that the military
and attaches at an embassy are Intelligence officers, do you, in the sense
of the word you were ?
General Fortier. No, sir; they are not.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore, you had to obtain information out
of Formosa. Why did you have to ask the State Department for
permission to go to Formosa ?
General Fortier. Sir, one has to obtain a visa from the State De-
partment or through the State Department channels to visit any
foreign country. Formosa was not under the aegis of the Far East
Command.
Senator Ferguson. Is it true that civilians who went to Japan, for
instance, connected with the United States Government and not con-
nected with the State Department, had difficulty going to Formosa?
General Fortier. Sir, that I would not know. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that?
General Fortier. That is the first I ever heard of that.
Senator Ferguson. Did you get a visa from the State Department?
General Fortier. I got one from the State Department representa-
tive. General MacArthur's chief political adviser, Mr. Seabald, was
my channel of getting into any country. Through him, we could
contact these various missions that were in Tokyo. For example,
when I went to Hong Kong or Indochina, or to Korea, that was proc-
essed through the State Department representative in Tokyo.
Senator Eastland. That State Department representative in Tokyo
told you how to get into Formosa, did he not ?
General Fortier. He aided and abetted me.
Senator Eastland. That was through subterfuge, to send a mes-
sage to Formosa you were coming and get in your plane and go before
they had time to answer. Is that true ?
General Fortier. That is the way I got in there; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I might tell you. General, that I had a similar
experience to get. into Formosa aft^ I was in the air in the plane.
We had to obtain permission to go in instead of getting clearance
from the State Department.
Is that not what you did ? You got in the plane and got permission
to land?
850 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
General Fortier. I had anticipated that I would have trouble
getting in.
The Chairman. Trouble from what source ? From our authorities
or from whom ?
General Fortier. Through Mr. Robert Strong, who was our con-
sul general there.
The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out the relevancy
of this testimony to our Institute of Pacific Kelations inquiry.
Our records are replete with the association of Mr. Jessup to the
Institute of Pacific Relations. So Mr. Mandel has compiled a list of
the important positions that Mr. Jessup held in the Institute of Pacific
Relations. I would like those introduced in the record at this time.
The Chairman. He has compiled them from what source?
Mr. Morris. Will you describe your compilation ?
Mr. Mandel. According to Problems of the Pacific, 1933, Proceed-
ings of the Fifth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held
August 14 to 26, 1933, one of the conference members was Philip Jes-
sup.
The Chairman. That is a publication of the Institute of Pacific
Relations?
Mr. Mandel. The Institute of Pacific Relations.
Then, according to Problems of the Pacific, dated 1939, Proceedings
of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at
Virginia Beach, November 18 to December 2, 1939, page 273, one of the
international officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations was Philip
C. Jessup, who was also chairman of the Pacific Council.
Then, according to the Annual Report of the American Council
of the IPR, 1938, page 58, Philip C. Jessup was vice chairman and a
member of the board of trustees.
Then in the volume called War and Peace in the Pacific, A Prelimi-
nary Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Re-
lations held at Mont Tremblant, December 4 to December 14, 1942,
page 159, Philip C. Jessup is listed as a conference member and as
chairman of the Pacific Council.
Again in a volume called Security in the Pacific, A Preliminary
Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations
held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to January 17, 1945, page 157,
Philip C. Jessup is listed as a conference member ; and, finally, we have
a telegram addressed to Edward C. Carter from "Fred"
Senator Eastland. Do you know who that Fred is ?
Mr. Mandel. It may be Field.
Senator Eastland. What is the date of that ?
Mr. Mandel. November 23, and the year is not given.
It says : "Approve nominations suggest Jessup for research chair-
man."
Mr. Morris. There is no other Fred on the staff of the Institute of
Pacific Relations other than Fred Field ?
Mr. Mandel. None that I know of.
Senator Eastland. Have you any idea what year that is?
Mr. Mandel. We can check it and establish the year from other
correspondence.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 851
Mr. Morris. When yon do verif}^ that, which we are not prepared to
do now, verify the position that Mr. Jessnp did hold as research
chairman, you will be able to relate it to that telegram.
Mr. MANDEii. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I had another question of the
witness. I wanted to ask whether or not it was a fact, to your knowl-
edge, that in the Far East in the various embasssies there were rumors
about the insecurity of the defense and the fact that Formosa was
just ready for an overthrow of the Nationalist Government? That
was back around the time you were talking about.
General Fortier. There was considerable rumor and misgiving
about the state of defense of Formosa in general.
To be very honest with you, that is the reason I was anxious to go
down there.
Senator Ferguson. To go down and see and get the facts?
General Fortier. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know on October 26, I think that is
the date, the United States Government sent a message to the Nation-
alist Government at Formosa that we would not give them any more
military aid, and that was 1949 ?
General Fortier. No, sir; I do not know that. I had heard they
were not receiving any military aid, but I did not know of any message
such as you spoke of.
Senator Ferguson. You did not know that such a message was
sent ?
General Fortier. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. To the Nationalist Government ?
General Fortier. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How long did you stay in Formosa ?
General Fortier. As I recall, I stayed there 3 days.
Senator Ferguson.. I assume you talked to General Sun ?
General Fortier. I did, at long length.
Senator Ferguson. You had no trouble getting hotel space?
General Fortier. I did not live in a hotel.
Senator Ferguson. You lived in the palace ?
General Fortier. No ; but I lived in a cottage, a very comfortable-
cottage in the mountains.
Senator Ferguson. Near Chiang Kai-shek's place?
General Fortier. Yes ; where the generalissimo lived.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not know they had plenty of space for
visitors in Taipei ?
General Fortier. The facts are not quite that way. Senator. In
late August 1950, I was the deputy chief of the Far East Command's
survey group that made a complete, exhaustive study of Formosa.
This was after the Korean war had broken out. This was in August
1950.
We sent a rather sizable group of officers and enlisted men to For-
mosa, to Taipei, to conduct the survey. We had, as I recall, something
between 40 and 50 officers. We had considerable difficulty in find-
ing
Senator Ferguson. But I am talking about the number of people
you had in mind going down just to get information.
852 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
General Fortier. Hotel accommodations
Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about the hotels; I am talk-
ing about the place that the former resident commissioner of Japan
used as a guest house for visiting people.
General Fortier. Sir, I am inclined to agree that hotel accom-
modations in Formosa were extremely limited, that one or two in-
dividuals might not have been taken care of would not stand too
close scrutiny. But if there were a group of 10 or 12 people ■
Senator Ferguson. If you tried to send a large mission over
there; but that was not your purpose, was it? It was to get some
man in there to get accurate information for you ?
General Fortier. The problem was to get just a few to obtain
information.
Senator Eastland. The problem was for you to get in?
General Fortier. I got in, sir.
Senator Eastland. General, it is just to get your full background
in the record, but were you ever stationed in Yugoslavia?
General Fortier. Yes, sir. I was military attache to Yugoslavia
from the latter part of May 1939 until I wrote my own orders to
get out of there after the Germans had overrun the country.
Senator Eastland. Did you have anything to do with setting up
the coup that overthrew the regency ?
General Fortier. Not that I had anything to do with it, but I was
a very intimate friend of Gen. Bor Mirkovic, who was the deputy
chief of aviation. He was the one who planned and implemented
and executed the coup d'etat on the 26th of March 1941. One of his
lieutenants was Mikhailovich. I knew him quite intimately.
Senator Eastland. Did you know Tito ?
General Fortier. I did not know Tito.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think now it would be a grave mistake
to recognize Red China ?
General Fortier. I do.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think now as you did in the past that
it would consolidate them and give'prestige and aid to them in their
communism and their efforts as Communists?
General Fortier. I do.
Senator Ferguson. Do you feel very strongly about that?
General Fortier. I have felt right along there were two things
that might happen that would consolidate Communist China. One
would be for Chiang Kai-shek to make a deal with Mao Tsetung
and lend his support to Mao Tse-tung.
The other would be for us to recognize them. In so doing, then
they would have the moral and the economic force that would be
needed to consolidate the country.
Senator Eastland. Would an armistice in Korea help consolidate
the Communist regime in China ?
General Fortier. I doubt that seriously.
Senator Watkins. May I inquire when it was that you had this
conversation with Ambassador Jessup ?
General Fortier. Sir, it was in the early winter of 1949-50. If I
recall correctly, it was in early January of 1950. The date can be
fixed hj^ studying Mr. Jessup's itinerary when he made that Far East
survey in the winter of 1949-50. I have not any access to any records
to determine the exact date on which I spoke to him.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 853
Senator Watkins. It was at least before the outbreak of the Korean
police action ?
General Fortier, Yes, sir. It was several months before the out-
break of the Korean war.
Senator Watkins. I notice you refer to that as a "war." I said a
police action.
General Fortier. Well, a police action. I am sure it is a war to
the man in there fighting.
Senator Watkins. I quite agree with you.
This might be a bit far afield, but somewhere along the line, Mr.
Chairman, it seems to me we ought to make some inquiry into what
caused the United States to get out of Korea when we had our forces
there, to get out when they moved back into Japan.
Do you know the situation with respect to what prompted us to
get out of Korea at that time ? I mean when we withdrew our forces.
General Fortier. I would not have been too well informed on that.
I may have seen the papers, in fact I probably did see the papers, in
connection with it ; but as I recall it, it was some United Nations agree-
ment that by a certain date the United States would remove its forces
from Korea. I went to Korea in April of 1949 and at that time we had
a reinforced regiment there plus a number of instructors. By the
30th of June 1949, we had removed all troops from the area and had
nothing but military advisers in a group.
Senator Watkins. Do you know whether or not it was the recom-
mendation of the Army that caused us to get out of Korea ?
General Fortier. I wouldn't know, sir. You can probably obtain
that from National Defense.
Senator Watkins. Would you inform the committee now without
violating any classified information just what the situation was in
Korea at the time we got out ?
General Fortier. From what point of view, sir ?
Senator Watkins. From the point of view of whether it was a wise
or unwise move.
General Fortier. In my opinion, it was a wise move for us to move
out at that particular stage in the game. After all, a reinforced regi-
ment is purely a token force. We would have been neither fish nor
fowl with a reinforced regiment.
Senator Watkins. Do you believe that the North Koreans or the
Chinese would have attacked the United States forces even if they
were only a token force ?
General Fortier. That, I do not. I do not believe they would have
attacked us.
The Chairman. They were not making sporadic drives across the
line before we moved out, or were they ?
General Fortier. Throughout the entire period there were border
incidents.
Senator Watkins. There were no actual attacks on American
troops, however? All of the attacks occurred later on after the
American troops had been withdrawn ?
General Fortier. There had been border incidents with the South
Koreans even when we were there.
Senator Ferguson. Almost weekly ?
General Fortier. Not against our forces.
854 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Watkins. That was part of your investigation, to investi-
gate any possible threat to the United States from North Korea, from
China, and that particular section ?
General Fortier. When I went over there, it was to get the feel of
the country, to study the capabilities, get information direct from the
people on the ground as to what might be the North Korean capabili-
ties. I did the same thing by traveling, for example, to the Kowloon-
Hong Kong front. I went to Saigon and Hanoi and spent a week in
Tonkin. I was a house guest there of the French deputy commanding
general.
I studied the location of his advance posts and talked with his staff
about the situation internally and externally in Indochina. We did
not feel too secure about the whole situation there in the spring of
1950.
Senator Watkins. What are you referring to now, just Korea?
General Fortier. No, sir. This map that we had was showing more
and more red. We were getting this encroachment on our command.
Here were these four Japanese islands and Okinawa. The Beds were
driving south. At first our attention had been drawn to the north
around Hokkaido, but as it swept down, don't you see, here was our
southern flank becoming more and more exposed. We had the respon-
sibility for the Philippines, too.
So, naturally, anyone who is in the intelligence profession, and
particularly one who had that special responsibility that I had, would
concern himself with what was going on and where were the build-
ups, what were the capabilities, where might they strike if they did
strike.
Senator Eastland. Did you expect war to break out on one of those
four fronts in 1950?
General Fortier. To answer your question directly, sir, I was very,,
very much concerned. I was afraid. I had enough of an intuition
that something was going to break out in the Far East that the record
will show that I was constantly on the move traveling, trying to find
out where it might break out.
Senator Eastland. Did Intelligence know where the Chinese
divisions were concentrated?
General Fortier. Yes, sir. We had very good information on where
all these threats were, exactly how they were distributed. But I
would like to say right here that to know what a potential enemy is
capable of doing and to determine what he intended to do on the
spur of the moment or at the last minute, those are two entirely
different things.
The Chairman. Who was our potential enemy at that time that
you were apprehensive?
General Fortier. I was mostly apprehensive — well, of course, the
Soviets never left my mind, and Mao Tse-tung and his forces.
The Chairman. It was in this atmosphere that you have described
here that you discussed with Mr. Jessup as to when we might recog-
nize Red China?
General Foriter. Yes; it was. From nround September 1940 until
June 1950, to use the vernacular, I was "sweating it out" in the Far
East Command.
Senator Jenner. When you talked to Jessup. he made his tour and
inspection of Korea at that time?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 855
General Fortier. I think he was on his way out.
Senator Jenner. What did lie say in regard to Korea?
General Fortier. I did not discuss Korea with him.
Senator Jenner. Have you seen any statements he made to the
American public upon his return to America about the situation in
Korea being awfulb' peaceful over there and everything lovely?
General Fortier. No, sir; I did not.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions, Senators?
Senator Watkins. I would like to know if he can give us that
information as to what the real situation in Korea was as far as the
Army knew it just prior to the outbreak of this police action in Korea.
General Fortier. We were quite well informed about the disposi-
tion of the North Korean forces, their strength, their armament. We
knew their capabilities. We did not know on the morning of the
26th day of June 1050 at 4 : 30 a, m., or whatever time it was, they
were going to jump off.
Senator Watkins. Did you know in a general way an attack from
that section was impending?
General Fortier. Not any more so than any of these others ; not any
more so than it would have been against Formosa or Indochina.
Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, the indications were pretty
.strong there was likely to be an attack on Formosa, were they not ?
General Fortier. Yes, sir.
Senator Watkins. And also Indochina ?
General Fortier. Yes.
Senator Watkins. If it were put in the same category, it would be
in the realm of a probable attack coming from that point ?
General Fortier. Yes.
Senator Watkins. That was your business to find out ?
General Fortier. It was my business to find out.
Senator Waticins. Did you evaluate the North Koreans as a danger
to your security?
General Fortier. Yes, we did ; not as much so as the Chinese Com-
imunists.
Senator Watkins. What I would like to know: Were you really
caught flat-footed hj the North Korean attack on South Korea ?
General Fortier. We were not surprised, but we were amazed.
Xet's put it that way.
To answer your question, I think the greatest surprise was what
liappened 2 days later when we got word we would intervene in that
action.
Senator Watkins, You were surprised at that?
General Fortier. Yes.
Senator Watkins. Why were you surprised at that?
General Fortier. I don't know why. I am just telling you.
Senator Watkins You say you were surprised. There must have
'been some reason for it.
General Fortier. In the first place, we had no responsibility in the
Far East Command for Korea at all, as you probably well know.
Mr. Morris. You ]iad no authority whatever to send troops in there
:at the time?
General Fortier. No.
Senator Jenner. Was it not a determined fact among the high
•command that Korea was militarily untenable?
856 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
General Fortier. I didn't share that view.
Senator Jenner. Was that not the view ?
General Fortier. I don't know of any official expression that ever
came from the Far East Command to that effect, but I think that it
has been shown that South Korea is tenable and those of us who were '
there in the days of the latter part of June, July, and August learned
what America can do with very few resources with every one playing
as one team and as one coordinated unit.
Senator Eastland. How many American divisions would you think
it would take to bring the Korean war to a speedy conclusion ?
General Fortier. We have had in the military service a rule of
thumb in determining the number of divisions to hold its own against
a potential enemy, and that has been usually a division for every ten
miles of front. Korea happens to be a peninsula. If I recall cor-
rectly, it is about 150 miles wide. With the superiority of naval
forces we have guarding either flank, with the Air Force that we have,
if we had a total of 12 to 15 divisions in there, I do not think there
would be any question about the liquidation of the Korean conflict
successfully.
Senator Eastland. We could go to the Yalu River ?
General Fortier. You are asking me to pit my knowledge of mili-
tary strategy — in other words, you are shifting my role, sir. I have
been playing in the role of an intelligence officer. Now I am to become
the commander in chief.
The Chairman. Mr. Morris, you may proceed with your questions.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we had commenced to show the associa-
tion between Mr. Jessup about whom we have had testimony today,
and the Institute of Pacific Relations. We had set forth, to a partial
extent, Mr. Jessup's association with the IPR.
I would like to put in in detail, Mr. Chairman, some of the roles
that he did have in some of the more important conferences of the
Institute of Pacific Relations. For instance, the IPR holds a triennial
conference which is one of the features of that organization, one of
the principal means of expression.
I would like to show he had an important role certainly during the
two conferences that were held during the war, the one at Mont Trem-
blant in 1942 and then again in the Hot Springs convention in 1945.
Mr. Mandel, will you put in the record Mr. Jessup's association
with those two conferences?
The Chairman. From what are you reading, please?
Mr. Mandel. This was formerly entered into the record as exhibit
No. 110 on August 14, 1951. It is a letter dated June 15, 1942, from
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed : "E. C. C. from
W. W. L :". The memorandum reads as follows :
In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions
for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe
we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice — say that of
Currle, Barnes, and Jessup — on elimination. This list runs too much in the
regular groove as regards nongovernment people. So far as Washington is
concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key
positions.
Then a list of names follows.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that reintroduced in the
record and one of the points is to show that the leaders of the Institute
of Pacific Relations, E. C. C. and W. W. L., were consulting at this
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 857
time Currie, Barnes, and Jessup for the makeup of the representation
to that particular conference. As such, I would like it in the record.
The Chairman. For that purpose it will be inserted again,
(The document referred to previously marked "Exhibit No. 110;'
was reintroduced and is as follows:)
Exhibit No. 110
June 15, 194?:.
E. C. C. from W. W. L.
In response to your request I have hastily jotted clown a number of suggestions
for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I belie-vo
we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice — say that of
Currie, Barnes, and Jessup — on elimination. This list runs too much in the
regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is
concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key
positions.
GOVERNMENT
Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska.
Bean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare.
Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare.
Riefler, Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare.
Shoemaker, James H., Board of Economic Warfare.
Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare.
AVallace, H. A., Vice President, Board of Economic Warfare.
Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget.
Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information.
Bunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information.
Fahs, C. B., Coordinator of Information.
Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information.
Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture.
Ropes, E. C, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade.
Berle, A. A., Department of State.
Davies, Joseph, Department of State. ■
Grady, Henry, Department of State.
Hiss, Alger, Department of State.
Hornbeck, S. K., Department of State.
Sayre, Francis B., Department of State.
Stinebower, L. D., Department of State.
Vince, Jacob, Department of the Treasury.
White, H. D., Department of the Treasury.
Gulick, Luther H., National Resources Planning Board.
Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration.
Nathan, Robert, War Production Board.
Currie, Lauchlin, White House
Lubin, I., White House
OTHEES
Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross
Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council
Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point
Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News
Clapper, Raymond, Washington columnist
Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register & Tribune
Dennett, Tyler, historian
Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corp.
Emeny, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland
Field, Frederick V., New York
Herod, W. R., International General Electric
Jessup, Prof. Philip C, Columbia University
Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission
Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corp.
Luce, Heni-y, Time, Inc.
Molyneaux, Peter, Texas Weekly
Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute
Schwellenhach, Judge Lewis B., United States District Court, Spokane, Wash.
(ex-Senator)
858 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Sproiil, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York
Sweetlaml, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief
Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives
Wilkie, Wendell, attorney
Willits, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation
Wilson, C. E., General Electric
Yarnell, Admiral H. E., United States Navy, retired
The Chairman, Did you have something else ?
Mr. Mandel. Then we have former exhibit No. 104 from the open
hearings of August 14, 1951,
It is a letter from the IPE files dated November 30, 1942. Memo-
randum to Mr, Carter, copy for Mr. Jessup, Mont Tremblant, It reads
as follows :
In response to your request for designations of American Council members of
Mont Tremblant committees, I am putting down the following suggestions.
These should be reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup
so that they are merely tentative for the present.
The Pacific Council — Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be in
the chair so presumably another American should represent the Council. I
believe Kizer is the best choice.
Program committee — Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as
alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and 1
understand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would
be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later. * * *"
That is a partial excerpt from the exhibit,
Mr. Morris, Mr, Chairman, I notice that this exhibit and the pre-
vious one have already been introduced in the record at previous
hearings.
I believe Mr, Mandel gave the previous hearing dates.
The Chairjman, Very well,
Mr. Mandel, This is former exhibit No, 132, used in open hearings
on August 16, 1951, It comes from the files of the IPE, and is on the
letterhead of the Columbia University, addressed to Mr, Raymond
Dennett, secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
from Philip C. Jessup, and I read portions of this exhibit :
In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in
mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we have ever
made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the American
delegation. The Pacific Council provides a secretariat for the conference and
some of our people have been taken by the Pacific Council for that purpose.
Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know.
Mr, Morris. This is Mr, Jessup writing ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes.
The following are people whom I would include : Benjamin Kizer, Brayton
Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Morison, Mansfield Freeman or
J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Hari'y White,
Rupert Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Moffat, Robert
J. Watt, Len DeCaux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Virginius
Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, Josepli Barnes,
Frederick V, Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Adam Comstock Notestein.
Further :
In reply to yours of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to
him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine.
There is a pencil note at the bottom which says : "Frank Coe of FEA
also good."
Mr. Morris. I would like to point out in that list of names are names
.of 10 people identified before the committee as being members of the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 859
Communist organization. I think it would be proper to make that
comment as that exhibit number 132 was introduced in the open
hearings of August 16, 1951.
The Chairman. I think this should go in the record at this point,
notwithstanding the fact that the excerpts are already in.
Mr. Morris. May it be incorporated in its entirety ?
The Chairman. Yes.
(Exhibit No. 132 is as follows :)
Exhibit No. 132
Mr. Raymond Dennett,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York 22, N. Y.
Deae Ray : In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what
you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we
have ever made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the
American delegation. The Pacific council provides a secretariat for the con-
ference and some of our people have been taken by the Pacific council for that
purpose. Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know.
The following are people whom I would include: Benjamin Kizer, Brayton
Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Mori son, Mansfield Freeman or
J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Harry
White, Ruperl Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Mo'tfat,
Robert J. Watt, Len DeCaux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Vir-
ginius Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmanu, Sunnier Welles, Joseph
Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Ada Comstock
Notestein.
In reply to your of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to
him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine.
I definl tely would exclude Hunter on the ground that we have too much of the
Kizer group ; I would exclude Captain Pence because he is now out of the Occu-
pied Areas Section. If either of them were available I would suggest Commodore
Vanderbilt or Commodore Stassen.
I suppose we may need to invite General McCoy for organizational purposes.
I do not know anything about General Bissell. Yarnell should certainly come
as a vice chairman and not as a member of the American delegation. Apropos
your statement below "Military," on page II, I would get away from the idea of
California naming a delegate.
Personally I would exclude Swing and would add to your press people Way-
mack, of Des Moines.
I would be careful that we do not get too stodgy a delegation but keep a bal-
ance. I think the above list is fairly good. Another Government man who
woidd be new to us but very helpful because of his interest in native peoples and
Pacific island government is John Collier, head of the Indian service and a fine
person. Let me know what you hear from the others and we will see how things
add up.
Sincerely yours,
Phiop C. Jessup.
Frank Coe, of FEA, also good. [Penciled note.]
General Fortier. I would like to have it quite clear that the Far
East Command was not caught short on an external enemy. In other
words, our function in General MacArthur's headquarters was to take
care of the security, both external and internal, of the Far East
Command. No attack came on Japan, no attack came on Okinawa
that we had not foreseen or anticipated. In other words, we had no
responsibility in the Far East Command or for the intelligence be-
tAveen South and North Korea. There was a State Department repre-
sentation there in South Korea and likewise there was a mission func-
tioning under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in South Korea. It was not
the MacArthur mission by any means.
22848^52— pt. 3 11
860 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Watkins. The reason I asked the question about that was
because it had been reported that the Far East Command had been
caught napping.
The Chairman. May I say, and I think Senator Ferguson will con-
firm what I am about to say, that before the Appropriations Com-
mittee many months ago there was presented to us evidence that the
Intelligence Department had full knowledge of what was going on and
that they knew that munitions were being delivered from Kussian
boats into North Korea and that was also brought to the attention of
the State Department and to the attention of the White House. That is
testified before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate.
Senator Ferguson. And the withdrawal of civilians away from
the line.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Watkins. I merely wanted to give you an^opportunity to
explain that situation if you were caught napping or if you had any
responsibility so that we would know about it.
Mr. Morris. Let the record show that Korea was not General For-
tier's command. I hope that is understood.
General Fortier. It was never my command. Korea was not under
General MacArthur's command.
Senator Ferguson. You did need some intelligence in order to do
your own work out of both Formosa and Korea ?
General Fortier. And we got considerable intelligence from these
otlier sources, occasionally to confirm on the ground that which was
confirmed in cables and dispatches, which I think is a very reasonable
reaction.
Mr. Morris. In reply to your question about the 10 people who have
been identified as part of tlie Communist organization on that last
list recommended by Mr. Jessup, I will point out that we have had
testimony that Benjamin Kizer was a member of the Communist
Party, testimony that Lauchlin Currie was associated with an espi-
onage ring and gave vital military secrets to the Russian espionage
system, the military secret being, iifone case, the fact that the United
States had broken the Soviet code.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire whether Currie is in the United
States'?
Mr. Morris. My information is he is in Colombia.
John Carter Vincent has been identified as a member; Harry Dexter
White as a member of an espionage ring ; Owen Lattimore as a mem-
ber of the Communist organization; Len DeCaux as a member of the
Communist Party ; Alger Hiss as a member of the Commuinst Party ;
Joseph Barnes as a member of the Communist Party; Frederick V.
Field as a member of the Communist Party, and Frank Coe as a
member of the Communist Party.
We have had other evidence on some of the other people there, but
none of it that would warrant any such conclusion as we can make
about those 10.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Morris, have you any evidence that any
salary or money is being paid to Mr. Lauchlin Currie furnished by the
taxpayers of the United States Government?
Mr. Morris. I cannot answer that question, but that is one of the
things we are inquiring about.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 861
Senator Ferguson. I ask now that we get that information as to
whether- or not taxpayers' money is being paid to Mr. Currie.
The Chairman. Whether he is on any payroll of the United States
Government.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; or getting money that the taxpayers are
furnishing.
Senator Watkins. Directly or indirectly.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Morris. I read a newspaper clipping last night. It would take
me just 3 minutes to find it. It describee! his resignation from th&
World Bank and accepting the position with Colombia, and there was
a related story about that.
Mr. Chairman, if you think it is appropriate, we could put in more
associations of Mr. Jessup with the institute in the record at this time.
]\Ir. Mandel is prepared to do so. For instance, his activity in the IPR
bearing on the American Peace Mobilization. I wonder if you want
that in the record now ?
Senator Ferguson. Why do you not insert that ?
The Chairman. Please go on with your laying a foundation for
each insertion.
Mr. Mandel. I read exhibit 14 from the open hearing of July 28,
1951, being a telegram from Frederick V. Field, from Chicago, elated
September 1, 1940, to Philip C. Jessup, as follows :
I have been attending a peace congress of some 6,000 representatives from
all parts of the country, labor, farm, and middle-class organization. This is a
genuine peace movement through the interpretation of democracy. These people
and our program represent what I have for long profoundly believed in. They
are asking me to become the executive of {\, continuing organization, and I feel
a deep conviction that I must accept. As the people I should be working for will
meet to elect officers tomorrow. I must, despite obvious personal preference to
postpone decision pending consultation with you and others, and as the executive
must be presented to them, make an immediate affirmative decision. This show
has been and will be smeared by the newspapers. I anticipate losing the respect
of many present friends. These developments I regard as inevitable if we do
the job in tliis country that was not done in France, etc. In view the inevitable
criticism and misunderstanding, and because of my continued deep interest in
the IPR welfare, I feel that I must, by this telegram, affirm my immediate resig-
nation from all the IPR responsibilities that its officers wish to accent. Finally
I must urgently hope for both personal and professional associations that you
will reserve your own judgment until I can talk with you.
The Chairman. From whom was that and to whom, again, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is from Frederick V. Field to Philip C. Jessup,
dated September 1, 1940. He is referring to his acceptance of a posi-
tion with the American Peace Mobilization which was organized at
that time.
May I read at this point the statement of Attorney General Francis
Biddle in reference to the gathering that Mr. Field was to be made
an official of? He declares in regard to the American Peace Mobili-
zation :
It was formed in Decemlier of 1940 under the auspices of the Communist
Party and the Young Communist League as a front organization designed to
mold American opinion against participation in the war against Germany.
The second communication is a part of exhibit 14, introduced in
open hearings on July 26, 1951. It purports to be minutes of a meet-
ing of the executive committee of the American Council of the Insti-
862 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
tute of Pacific Relations and it was taken from the files of the insti-
tute. Present, among others, was Philip C. Jessup, chairman, and
Edward C. Carter. I read an excerpt :
The chairman read a long telegram which he had received from Mr. Frederick
V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in which Mr. Field indicated that he had
been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to
strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had a
deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility because
the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was necessary
to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending
consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated criticism and mis-
understanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of the Institute of
Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the afiirmation of his immediate resignation
from all IFR responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently
talked at length with Mr. Field who explained in detail the reasons that had
led him to accept tlie new position. Mr. Parker voiced the feelings of all present
when he inquired whetlier Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded
to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that
he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances it was moved
that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation
with great regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of
the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during 11 years of
service with the American Council. The hope was to be expressed that when his
new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leader-
ship in the work of the American Council.
That is an excerpt from the exhibit.
Mr. Morris. That has already been introduced in evidence.
Mr. Mandel. Next is a letter memorandum from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 20, 1940, headed
"WLH from ECC." I read this memorandum for the record:
For your private information I enclose a copy of a telegram which Field sent
to Jessup on August 31 or September 1. Field telephoned me late on the afternoon
of August 30 from Chicago saying that great pressure was being put on him to
become secretary of the American Peace Mobilization. I told him that institu-
tionally I hoped he could postpone a decision, but that if personally he decided
it was his national duty to take the Chicago job, I would do everything I could
to back him up. From Ellsworth early the next morning I sent him a wire
urging him to postpone a decision for another week. I thought it was of the
utmost importance that he should first consult Edith, Jessup, and his colleagues
of the New York office.
The immediacy of the program, the pressure of the 20,000 attending the
Chicago convention, and the very short time that was left before the Conscription
Act would be voted in Congress made him feel, however, that he must make an
immediate and affirmative decision. He took a thousand people from Chicago
to Washington where they bombarded Congressmen for several days and I
think Fred believes that the conscription bill got 100 less votes in Congress than
it otherwise would. He is now working night and day with a large staff and
thousands of backers throughout the country, to get the conscription bill repealed
or nullified.
He expects at any moment he may go to prison but desires to work full steam
ahead until the moment of arrest in a gigantic Nation-wide effort to launch a
movement which will preserve our democratic institutions so that if we do
have to go to war we will have something worth fighting for. He does not wish
to have the United States imitate France.
For a considerable time he lived on benzedrine instead of sleep and feels,
I think, that he is in exactly the same position as a man who is suddenly drafted
to throw everything else over and join in the work of the national defense council
or join the ranks. He was here for 2 days this week and has agreed next week
to go into the whole question of the handbook. It is on his conscience, though
I cannot make out whether it is on his conscience as much as it is on yours and
mine.
I shall use your letter in my talk with him, so I don't know that there is any
point in your writing him yet. I have asked Miss Greene to prepare for Fred,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 863
you, and me a very careful analysis of just how much progress has been made
in quantity and quality and a detailed slietch of what still remains to be done.
When we have this we will have to make a cost accounting of what would be
required to finish the job. I am wondering whether I would be justified in
telling Fred that he ought to consider giving whatever money is necessary to
enable us to employ a staff to finish the book. Though I think he imagines he
can give a little time to it each week, I personally do not think there is a ghost
of a chance of his being able to give enough time to bring the book to a speedy
conclusion.
Can you give me an estimate of what the project has cost us thus tax, or
should I get this from Miss Austern?
I heard Fred speak to an audience of 2,000 in the Manhattan Center a couple
of nights ago. There must have been 5 minutes sustained cheering when he
stood up before he could begin his speech. He has long wanted to be a part of a
great mass movement. Now he is at the head of one. I think the Pacific will
be a marginal interest from 1 to 5 years. Some day it may come back as the
focus of his life, but there is no point in putting on any pressure at the present
time.
If you have anything to add to your letter of September 18 on this matter,
please send it to me by air mail.
The Chairman. By whom is that?
Mr. Mandel. That is headed "WLH from ECC." There is no
signature.
The Chairman. Do you know who WLH is ?
Mr. Morris. It is the practice, Mr. Chairman, of the institute to
refer to their staff members by initials only. "WLH" is generally
W. L. Holland, and "ECC" is generally E. C. Carter. That is almost
without exception true.
Mr. Mandel. I might quote from Attorney General Francis Biddle,
who describes the organization.
The Chairman. Wliat organization?
Mr. Mandel. The American Peace Mobilization.
The most conspicuous activity of the American Peace Mobilization was the
picketing of the White House which began in April 1941 in protest against lend-
lease and the entire national defense program. On the afternoon of June 21,
1941, Frederick V. Field, national secretary, suddenly called off the picket line
around the White House.
Here is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Public Rela-
tions headed "Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations" and com-
ing from the Columbia University, signed Phil. The signature cor-
responds to the signature of Philip C. Jessup on other letterheads in
the file.
I read this letter, to Mr. Edward C. Carter :
October 29, 1940.
Dear Ned : I don't really think we can use Fred's statement as is, much as
I would be glad to help him with his cause. How about a combination of the
two, something like this :
"Frederick V. Field, who has been on the staff of the American Council since
1928, has resigned in order to become executive secretary of the American Peace
Mobilization. The American Peace Mobilization is a mass organization of pro-
gressive trade-unions, farm, church, youth, Negro and fraternal groups dedi-
cated to preserving the interests of the United States through the strengthening
of American democracy and through nonparticipation in the war between Eng-
land and the fascist powers. Mr. Field had a deep conviction that he was
obligated to accept this new responsibility and felt that in view of the acceptance
of his new position, it was not possible for him to continue his official connection
with the IPR. The executive committee, being forced to the conclusion that
Mr. Field's decision was final, felt compelled to accept Mr. Field's resignation
with great regret. It expressed its appreciation of the distinguished service
that Mr. Field had rendered during his 11 years of service to the American Coun-
864 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
cil and expressed the hope that when his new task was completed, it would be
possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the IPR."
Perhaps we could add to that the expression of appreciation which came from
the staff.
How does that strike you?
The paragraphs in regard to Lasker seem to me excellent.
Sincerely yours,
Phil.
Mr. Morris. Wliile we are reading these exhibits, Mr. Chairman,
I might point out it is no longer necessary for General Fortier to be
here.
The Chairman. Very well.
Thank you, General, for your presence.
Mr. Morris. Thank you. General.
May that letter of October 29, 1940, be introduced?
The Chairman. It will be.
(The document referred to and read in its entirety by Mr. Mandel
was marked "Exhibit No. 256," and filed for the record.)
Mr. Morris. We have Mr. Joseph Kornfeder available, Mr. Chair-
man, and he is prepared to testify today. The general nature of his
testimony is to show that the Chinese Communist Party has been
in the past a full-fledged member of the Communist Internationale, he
having been in Moscow to make personal observations on this fact.
The Chairman. I would like to hear that testimony, but I would
like to have other members of the committee present also. I am in-
clined to believe we will have to defer on account of the vote being
taken.
Mr. Morris. Until some time later today ?
The Chairman. I suggest we convene at 2 : 30.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder is from Detroit and he is not easily
summonable.
The Chairman. Mr. Kornfeder, please be here at 2 : 30.
(Whereupon, at 11 : 30 a. m., the hearing recessed until 2 : 30 p. m.,
this same day.)
afternoon session
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Has the wit-
ness been sworn ?
Mr. Morris. No, sir.
The Chairman. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you
are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee of the
Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Kornfeder. I do.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH ZACK KORNFEDER, DETROIT, MICH.
The Chairman. You may proceed.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this hearing, one of
the purposes of this hearing, is that we would like the record to
show something of the nature of the Chinese Communist organization.
It has been said on many occasions that Chinese Communists are
not real Cominunists. An example of this can be found in a pamplilet
which represents a cooperative project of the Institute of Pacific
Relations and the Webster Publishing Co. It is called China Yes-
terday and Today, by Eleanor Lattimore.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 865
On page 108 of that pamphlet, we read the expression :
When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they
stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the word
^'Communist." They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and,
unlike the Russians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise
in the areas under their control.
Because their chief interest at the moment is in improving the economic con-
ditions of the Chinese farmer and in increasing the number of people capable
of taking part in political Ufe, they are often described as a peasant party.
Then it goes on on that page, that is page 108 and page 109. Taking
this, Mr. Chairman, as typical of such an attitude of the Chinese Com-
munists, I think it is necessary that we have a witness here who can
testify, first-hand, about the nature of the Chinese Communist organi-
zation.
For that reason, we have asked Mr. Kornf eder to be here.
The Chairman. All right, you may proceed.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, would you give your name and address
to the reporter, please?
Mr. Kornfeder. My name is Joseph Zack Kornfeder, 3210 Book
Tower, Detroit, Mich.
The Chairman. How do you spell your name ?
Mr. Kornfeder. K-o-r-n-f-e-d-e-r.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, when did you join the Communist
Party ?
Mr. Kornfeder. I joined the Communist Party at the time of its
formation in 1919.
Mr. Morris. And how long did you remain a member of the Com-
munist Party?
Mr. Kornfeder. I remained a member until October 1934.
Mr. Morris. Could you tell us what the highest position you achieved
in the Communist Party was, Mr. Kornfeder?
Mr. Kornfeder. I was a member of the district committee of the
Communist Party, New York district, a member of the central execu-
tive connnittee of the Communist Party, now known as the national
committee, for several terms.
While in Moscow, I was a member of the Anglo-American secre-
tariat of the Communist International at the Communist International
headquarters, and later a representative of the Communist Interna-
tional in South America.
Mr. Morris. Were you a Comintern delegate to North and South
America ?
Mr. Kornfeder. I was a Comintern delegate to South America.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, did you have any training in Moscow?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes; I took a 3-year course in the Lenin School.
The Lenin School is a college to train leaders for the various Com-
munist Parties in the various methods of political warfare.
Mr. Morris. What years were you so trained, Mr. Kornfeder ?
Mr. Kornfeder. I was in Moscow from the latter part of 1927 until
April or May 1930.
Mr. Morris. And what was your next assignment after your train-
ing period ?
Mr. Kornfeder, After that, I went as a representative of the Com-
munist International to South America.
Mr. Morris. Would you describe your relationship under those
circumstances to the Communist Party of South America ?
866 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, as representative of the Communist Inter-
national in the Communist Parties of Columbia and Venezuela, I
was in charge of these parties, that is, I was their political director
about the same way Gerhardt Eisler was of the Communist Party of
the United States, while he was here.
Mr. Morris. That is, in other words, Mr. Kornf eder, you were not a
member of the Communist Party of South America, but you were
their superior and their boss ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is right, yes.
Mr. Morris. Is that really what your position was?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is correct.
Mr. Morris. And when you say that you were then the counterpart
of Gerhardt Eisler in the United States, do you mean that Gerhardt
Eisler was the Comintern man that was sent here to run the Commu-
nist Party of the United States ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Kornfeder, while you were in Moscow did
you have any opportunity to observe the workings of the Chinese
Communist Party ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes, definitely so.
Mr. Morris. Would you tell us whatever you can in connection
with that question, Mr. Kornfeder ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Well, in 1927, there developed a big crisis inside of
the Chinese Communist Party
The reason for the crisis was that the Chinese Communist Party
who, until then, had been a part of the Kuomintang, had been ex-
pelled from the Kuomintang by Chiang Kai-shek and his associates,
and that created a crisis inside of the Chinese Communist Party.
The subject of that crisis and the question as to what was wrong
in the policy. Communist policies, in China then became an item of
discussion in all of the higher committees of the Communist Inter-
national.
I attended the discussions. The result of these discussions was
that the leading committees of tire Chinese Communist Party were
purged, reorganized, and those that Moscow disapproved of were ex-
pelled from the Communist Party as Trotskyites.
I also had an opportunity to become familiar with the Chinese
Communist politics by attending the various meetings of the Commu-
nist International leading committees.
Mr. Morris. Now, before you get on to that, Mr. Kornfeder, in what
capacity did you attend these other discussions that you have testified
about?
Mr. Kornfeder. I was a member of the Anglo-American secretariat
of the Communist International. That was a subcommittee in charge
of the Communist Party's English-speaking countries.
The Communist Party of the United States always played a large
role in the affairs of the Communist Party of China. So, because of
that, I was interested to stay informed on affairs in China.
Mr. Morris. You say, Mr. Kornfeder, that the American Com-
munist Party was very active in the affairs of the Chinese Communist
Party in China ?
Mr. Kornfeder. That is right.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 867
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Kornfeder, why were the American Com-
munists employed in connection with the Chinese Communist activi-
ties? What is the reason for that?
Mr. Kornfeder. Well, the reason, as I get it from attending these
discussion, is that America wielded a large influence in China all the
time.
Mr. Morris. Wielded a large influence?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes. And the Comintern wanted to avail itself
of that influence even if it was just in the form of representation from
the United States, whether they had been Communist or Communist-
controlled unions that claimed to represent a big following in the
United States, or any other form.
It seemed to hav.e an effect of building up the morale of the Chinese
Communists to have Communist representation on the leading com-
mittees in the Chinese labor movement.
The Chairman. You say Communist representation, or do you
mean American representation?
Mr. Kornfeder. That is right, American Communist representa-
tion.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Kornfeder, while you were in Moscow at
these various Comintern meetings, did you encounter Chinese Com-
munists there?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes, definitely so.
The Chinese Communist Party was represented on all the leading
committees in the Communist International. They were on the execu-
tive committee of the Communist International, they were on the
agitation and propaganda commission of the Communist Inter-
national, on the organization commission of the Communist Inter-
national, and there was a special secretariat of the Communist Inter-
national which preoccupied itself entirely with the problems of China,
Japan, Malaya, Indochina, and so on, the so-called far eastern sec-
retariat of the Communist International.
Mr. Morris. Now could you tell us, Mr. Kornfeder, the evidence as
you experienced it which indicated to you that the Chinese Com-
munists were an integral part of the Comintern organization ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Well, in the first place, there was a tremendous
college, the largest college to train leaders in the arts of political
warfare, the so-called Far Eastern University, formerly also known
as the Snn Yat-sen University.
The Chairman. And that is located where?
Mr. Kornfeder. Located in Moscow.
That university had a capacity to train 2,000 organizers and agi-
tators a year.
At the time I was there, the number of Chinese Communists being
trained there was 1,200.
Mr. Morris. Would that be 1,200 a year, Mr. Kornfeder ?
Mr. Kornfeder. 1,200 a year; yes.
This training system started in 1926 and, as far as I know — Vt^ell,, it
certainly was there while I was in Moscow, and as far as I Imow from
others that were there subsequently, it continued throughout the years.
The Chairman. How long were you there ?
Mr. Kornfeder. I was there until 1930,
868 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. From when ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. From 1927.
The Chairman. Attending that university ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. I attended anotlier one, the Lenin School, which was
a college to train leaders for the more advanced countries, like the
United States, Germany, England, France, and so on.
But the Eastern University trained Communist leaders for China,
Japan, Korea, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, India, and so on, the so-
called colonial countries.
Mr. Morris. And it is your testimony, then, that the Chinese Com-
munist leaders were being trained in Moscow ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Definitely so.
Mr. Morris. Was the discipline exerted by the Comintern organiza-
tion on the Chinese Communist Party as strong as the discipline exer-
cised in other Communist parties throughout the world ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. It certainly was, even stronger because they had a
civil-war situation.
Mr. Morris. Would you explain that, Mr. Kornfeder?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, in a strange situation like existed inside of
China, the Communist Party under such conditions maintained a
discipline that is even more severe than in countries where conditions
are relatively stable.
This manifested itself in the control that Moscow headquarters had
on the personnel of the Chinese Communist Party. There was not a
single official of any consequence that could be elected by the Chinese
Communist Party without previous consent of the Communist Inter-
national, whether it be a secretary of the party, whether he be a head
of, let us say, trade-union activities commission, or organization com-
mission, or of the guerrilla army that they were already then forming.
All of these leading personnel were all decided first in Moscow before
they could be put into position.
The same procedure was true, by and large, with all of the other
Communist parties.
The Chinese Communist Party was an integral part of the world
Communist Party, which is monolithic, and there is no difference
between the control of Moscow over that party as compared with
other parties, except that discipline was even more severe because of
the more severe internal situation in China.
The Chairman. How did these students, as you termed them as
such, maintain themselves in this University of Moscow ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, the university, its teaching staff, and oper-
ating personnel, and all the trainees, all the expenses of that were paid
by the Soviet Government and, coming there, that is the transjDorta-
tion costs, were also furnished from the same source.
If they had relatives back home, which they had to maintain, then
a subsidy was allowed for that purpose.
There were all together about four colleges like that in Moscow.
They were all at the expense of the Soviet Government.
The Chairman. The students then, so-called, were maintained with
their tuition, their living, their housing, their clothing, everything
was furnished to them by the Soviet Government?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. JSIr. Kornfeder, have you ever met Stalin, personally ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes, sir.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 869
Mr. Morris. Could you tell us whether or not he took an active
interest in the affairs of the Chinese Communist organization?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Stalin was in charge of the affairs of the Chinese
Communist Party by decision of the political bureau of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union since 1926,
All matters of policy, whether relating to the line to be adopted or to
organization strategy, were decided in the final sense by Stalin himself.
I am not the only one that says that. At the celebration for Stalin's
seventieth birthday which took place, I believe, 2 years ago, Beria,
the head of the political police, known as the MVD, in a laudatory
speech on Stalin, which appeared in some of the papers, also said
that the successes in China are due to the brilliant leadership of our
great leader, Joseph Stalin, who has been guiding the affairs of the
Communist Party of China ever since 1926.
Mr. JNIoRRis. And you know that to be a fact, that statement of
Beria, you know that to be a statement of fact from your own personal
experience ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is right. I knew it long before he made the
speech.
Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Kornfeder, did you attend the Sixth World
Congress of the Communist International ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes ; I attended the Sixth World Congress of the
Communist International in Moscow.
Mr. Morris. When was that held ?
Mr. Kornfeder. The summer of 1928.
Mr. Morris. Did anything take place at that congress bearing on
the importance of the Chinese Connnunist Party in its future role
in world affairs ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes. The situation in China, from a Communist
point of view, was one of the very principal topics of discussion and
decision at the congress. I have here, and if I may I could quote it.
Mr. Morris. What is it that you have there?
Mr. Kornfeder. I have here the Theses on the Revolutionary Move-
ment in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, which was adopted at that
congress, and all the principal parts of which w^ere written by Joseph
Stalin himself.
Mr. Morris. From what are you reading, Mr. Kornfeder? From
what publication?
Mr. Kornfeder. I would like to read from a copy of this, decisions,
that appeared in the International Press Correspondence, which was
a weekly news service of the Communist International, a thesis on
the colonial question.
Mr. Morris. What is the date of the publication you are reading
from, Mr. Kornfeder?
Mr. Kornfeder. December 12, 1928.
Mr. Morris. And you attended this congress ?
Mr. Kornfeder. 1 attended the congress, and I know this is the
resolution, the thesis that was adopted there.
Now, the decision at that congress revolved largely on the subject,
that is, in reference to China, whether to orientate the activities
of the Communists in China on the peasantry.
There is the accepted Marxian theory and the theory of Lenin, the
founder of the Soviet state, that the Communists should orientate
870 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
themselves on the factory workers and by forming labor unions there
and so on and so forth, entrench themselves.
That was the accepted theory up until about the time of this con-
gress, also for colonial countries.
Now, at the sixth congress, by the initiative of Stalin, the base of
Communist politics in this type of country was fundamentally
changed. From there on, the Communists were to base themselves on
the peasants.
Now, the peasant, to make an illustration, would be something like
a very poor sharecropper down in the South, not a farmer as we under-
stand it. A farmer would be a relatively rich man. The peasant is
something like the poorest type of sharecropper down in the South,
except that in China their conditions are even worse.
Now, the Communists were to base themselves upon this strata, and
conquer the countryside first, and then, after forming guerrilla armies
in the countryside, conquer the cities.
Those of you gentlemen who may have followed the course of events
must have noticed that that is the thing that took place in China, first
the countryside was conquered and then the cities, instead of the tra-
ditional Marxian method of first conquering the cities and then con-
quering the rest of the country.
Now, the change in that direction, which required the Communists
to change their organization methods, their agitation methods, to
concentrate on what we call agrarian reform, and out of which some
intellectuals here in this country got the impression that the Com-
munists in China are agrarians — of course, that was entirely false. It
was just the change of operational tactics on the part of Moscow.
Now, to show you here, I will quote this change. I will quote a part
of this resolution on page 1665.
Along with the national-emancipatory struggle, the agrarian revolution con-
stitutes the axes of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the chief colonial
countries.
The chief colonial country was, of course, in Asia, China. It is the
peasantry that, from here, becomes the center of operation.
Another part which was already then introduced in the strategy of
the Communists in this type of country is to exploit nationalism.
You see, prior to this, the Communists operated, well, under their
own flag. All the propaganda was outright Communist and so on and
so forth.
After this Congress, more and more, • they shifted to the use of
nationalism, to operate behind nationalist movements, to infiltrate
nationalist movements, to use their flag and operate under it, and so on.
There is a part here which introduces that change of tactics. It is
on the same page.
It is very important, in accordance with the concrete circumstances, to investi-
gate very carefully the special influence of the national factor, which to a con-
siderable degree determines the special character of the colonial revolution, and
to take it into account in the tactics of the Communist Party concerned.
The Chairman. How would that apply in the United States ? Have
you an illustration of it ? Can you give us an illustration of it ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, in the United States they apply this thesis
only to the Negroes. They consider the Negroes as colonials who are
being exploited and oppressed by American imperialism, and who
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 871
should have an independent Kepublic based on the Negro Belt in the
South.
That is the only part of this thesis that would apply to the United
States, because the United States is an industrially advanced country
where conditions are different.
You see, their strategy adjusts itself in its method of operation to
the type of country in which the Communists operate.
In this country this would also be translated to the Communists
hiding behind the skirts of the liberals.
The Chairman. Hiding behind what?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Operating behind the skirts of the liberals. That
is, using the liberals as a front or pretending to be liberals.
They could not use nationalism in the sense that it is in China be-
cause, well, we are an independent Nation and the leading Nation.
But in their internal operations, they would make an assimilation
of this tactic by not operating under their own flag, operating as lib-
erals or so-called progressives, and so on.
Mr. Morris. That concludes your comments on that world congress,
Mr. Kornfeder, does it?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes.
I would suggest that it may be of use to introduce this part into the
record, which is entitled "Comnmnist Strategy and Tactics in China^
India, and Similar Colonial Countries."
Of course, the Communist methods since that was adopted have gone
through considerable changes, have become smoother. But the basic
principles are still in here and are being used even today.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we have that introduced
into the record for the purposes described by Mr. Kornfeder.
That is an official publication of the Communist International, and
therein is a thesis on the revolutionary movement in the colonies and
semicolonies. We have had testimony from Mr. Kornfeder on that
score.
The Chairman. And this is under date of December 12, 1928, vol-
ume 8, No. 88.
Mr. Morris. That is an official publication of the Communist Inter-
national ?
Mr. Kornfeder. That is right.
The Chairman. That part referred to by the witness may be in-
serted in the record, commencing on page 1665, under the caption
"On Communist strategy and tactics in China, India, and similar
colonial countries," extending down to the middle of page 1670, just
before "The immediate tasks of the Communists."
It will be inserted in the record.
(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 257" and is as
follows:)
[From International Press Correspondence, December 12, 1928]
III. On Communist Strategy and Tactics in China, India, and Similar
Colonial Cotcjntries
16. As in all colonies and semicolonies, so also in China and India the develop-
ment of productive forces and the socialization of labor stands at a comparatively-
low level. This circumstance, together with the fact of foreign domination and
also the presence of powerful relics of feudalism and precapitalist relations,
determines the character of the immediate stage of the revolution in these coun-
872 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
tries. In the revolutionary movement of these countries we have to deal with
the bourgeois democratic revolution, i. e. of the stage signifying the preparation
of the prerequisites for proletarian dictatorship and socialist revolution. Corre-
sponding to this, the following kinds of tasks can be pointed out, which may be
considered as general basic tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the
colonies and semicolonies :
(a) A shifting in the relationship of forces in favor of the proletariat;
emancipation of the country from the yoke of imperialism (nationalization of
foreign concessions, railways, banks, etc.) and the establishment of the national
tmity of the country where this has not yet been attained ; overthrow of the
power of the exploiting classes at the back of which imperialism stands ; organ-
ization of Soviets of workers and peasants and organization of the Red Army;
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry ; consolidation
of the hegemony of the proletariat.
(&) The carrying through of the agrarian revolution; emancipation of the
peasants from all precapitalist and colonial conditions of exploitation and bond-
age ; nationalization of the land ; radical measures for alleviating the position
of the peasantry with the object of establishing the closest possible economic
and political union between the town and village.
(c) In correspondence with the further development of industry, transport,
etc., and with the accompanying growth of the proletariat, the widespread de-
velopment of trade union organizations of the working class, strengthening of
the Communist Party and its conquest of a firm leading position among the toil-
ing masses ; the achievement of the 8-hour working day.
(d) Establishment of equal rights for nationalities and of sex equality (equal
rights for women) ; separation of the church from the state and the abolition of
caste distinctions ; political edvication and raising of the general cultural level
of the masses in town and country, etc.
How far the bourgeois-democratic revolution will be able in practice to realize
all its basic tasks, and how far it will be the case that part of these tasks will be
carried into effect only by the Socialist revolution, will depend on the course of
the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and its successes or
defeats in the struggle against the imperialists, feudal lords and the bourgeoisie.
In particular, the emancipation of the colony from the imperialist yoke is facil-
itated by the development of the Socialist revolution in the capitalist world and
can only be completely guaranteed by the victory of the proletariat in the leading
capitalist countries.
The transition of the revolution to the Socialist phase demands the presence
of certain minimum prerequisites, as, for example, a certain definite level of
development in the country of industry, of trade union organizations of the
proletariat and a strong Communist Party, The most important is precisely the
development of a strong Communist Party with a big mass influence, which would
be in the highest degree a slow and difficult process were it not accelerated by
the bourgeois-democratic revolution which already grows and develops as a result
of the objective conditions in these countries.
17. The bourgeois-democratic revolution in the colonies is distinguished from
the bourgeois-democratic revolution in an independent country chiefly in that
it is organically bound up with the national emancipatory struggle against im-
perialist domination. The national factor exerts considerable influence on the
revolutionary process in all colonies, as well as in those semicolonies where
imperialist enslavement already appears in its naked form, leading to tlie revolt
of the mass of the people. On the one hand, national oppression hastens the
ripening of the revolutionary crises, intensifies the dissatisfaction of the masses
of workers and peasants, facilitates their mobilization and endows the revolu-
tionary mass revolts with the elemental force and character of a genuine popular
]-evolution. On the other hand, the national factor is able to infiuence not
only the movement of the working class and peasantry but also the attitude
of all the remaining classes, modifying its form during the process of revolution.
Above all, the poor urban petty bourgeoisie together with the petty bourgeoise
intelligentsia is during the first period, to a very considerable extent, brought
under the influence of the active revolutionary forces ; secondly, the position
of the colonial bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic revolution is still for the
most part an ambiguous one and its vacillations in accordance with the course
of the revolution are even more considerable than in the bourgeoisie of an inde-
pendent country (e. g., the Russian bourgoisie in 1905-17) .
It is very important, in accordance with the concrete circumstances, to investi-
gate very carefully the special influence of the national factor, which to a con-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 873
siderable degree determines the special character of the colonial revolution, and
to take it into account in the tactics of the Communist Party concerned.
Along with the national emancipatory struggle, the agrarian revolution con-
stitutes the axis of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the chief colonial coun-
tries. Consequently, Communists must follow with the greatest attention the
development of the agrarian crisis and the intensification of class contradictions
in the village ; they must from the very beginning give a consciously revolutionary
direction to the dissatisfaction of the workers and to the incipient peasant move-
ment, directing it against imperialist exploitation and bondage as also against
the yoke of the various precapitalist (feudal and semifeudal) relationships as a
result of which peasant economy is suffering, declining, and perishing. The
incredible backwardness of agriculture, the prevalence of oppressive rent rela-
tions, and the oppression of trading-usury capital represent the greatest hind-
rance to the development of productive forces in village economy in the colonies
and stand in monstrous contradiction with the highly organized forms of ex-
change between the village agricultural production of the colonies and the world
market created by monopoly imperialism.
IS. The national bourgeoisie in these colonial countries does not adopt
a uniform attitude in relation to imperialism. A part of this bourgeoisie,
more especially the trading bourgeoisie, directly serves the interests of im-
perialist capital (the so-called compradore bourgeoisie). In general, it more
or less consistently defends the antinational imperialist point of view directed
against the whole nationalist movement, in common with the feudal allies of
imperialism and the more highly paid native officials. The remaining portions
of the native bourgeoisie, especially the portion reflecting the interests of native
industry, support the national movement and represent a special vacillating
compromising tendency which may be designated as national reformism (or,
in the terminology of the theses of the Second Congress of the Communist Inter-
national, a bourgeois-democratic tendency).
This intermediate position of the national bourgeoisie between the revolu-
tionary and imperialist camps is no longer to be observed, it is true, in China after
1925 ; there the greater part of the national bourgeoisie from the beginning,
owing to the special situation, took the leadership in the national-emancipatory
war; later on it passed over finally into the camp of counterrevolution. In
India and Egypt, we still observe, for the time being, the typical bourgeois-
nationalist movement — an opportunistic movement, subject to great vacilla-
tions, balacing between imperialism and revolution.
The independence of the country in relation to imperialism, being to the
advantage of the whole colonial people, corresponds also to the interests of the
national bourgeoisie, but is in irreconcilable contradiction to the whole nature of
the imperialist system. Various native capitalists, it is true, are by their im-
mediate interests to a great Extent bound by numerous threads to imperialist
capital. Imperialism is able directly to bridge a considerable portion of them
(it may be even a greater portion than heretofore) and to create a definite Com-
pradore position, a position of intermediary trader, subexploiter or overseer
over the enslaved population. But the position of slave owner, of monopolist
supreme exploiter, imiierialism reserves for itself alone. Independent rule, a
future of "free" independent capitalist development, hegemony over an "independ-
ent" people — this imperialism will never voluntarily yield to the national bour-
geoisie. In this respect, the contradiction of interests between the national
bourgeoisie of the colonial country and imperialism is objectively of a radical
character. In this respect, imperialism demands capitulation on the part of
the national bourgeoisie.
The native bourgeoisie, as the weaker side, again and again capitulates to im-
perialism. Its capitulation, however, is not final as long as the danger of class
revolution on the part of the masses has not become immediate, acute and men-
acing. In order, on the other hand, to avoid this danger, and, on the other hand,
to strength its position in relation to imperialism, bourgeois nationalism in
these colonies strives to obtain the support of the petty bourgeoisie, of the
peasantry and in part also of the working class. Since, in relation to the work-
ing class it has little prospect of success (as soon as tbe working class in these
countries has at all begun to avv-ake politically), it becomes the more important
for it to obtain support from the peasantry.
But just here is the weakest point of the colonial bourgeoisie. The unbear-
able exploitation of the colonial peasantry can only be put an end to by the way
of the agrarian revolution. The bourgeoisie of China, India, and Egypt is by its
immediate interests so closely bound up with landlordism, with usury capital
874 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
and with the exploitation of the peasant masses in general, that it takes its stand
not only against the agrarian revolution but also against every decisive agrarian
reform. It is afraid, and not without foundation, that even the more open
formulation of the agrarian question will stimulate and accelerate the growth
of the process of revolutionary fermentation in the peasant masses. Thus,
the reformist bourgeoisie hardly dare to decide to approach practically this
basic urgent question.
Instead, it attempts by means of empty nationalist phrases and gestures to
keep the petty bourgeois masses under its influence and to compel imperialism
to grant certain concessions. But the imperialists draw the reins ever tighter,
for the national bourgeoisie is incapable of offering any serious resistance. Ac-
cordingly, the national bourgeoisie in every conflict with imperialism attempt,
on the one hand, to make a great show of their nationalist "firmness" of prin-
ciple, and on the other hand, they sow illusions as to the possibility of a peace-
ful compromise with imperialism. Through both the one and the other, the
masses inevitably become disillusioned and in this way they gradually outlive
their reformist illusions.
19. An incorrect estimation of the basic national-reformist tendency of the
national bourgeoisie in these colonial countries gives rise to the possibility of
serious errors in the strategy and tactics of the Communist Parties concerned. In
particular, two kinds of mistakes are possible :
(a) A nonunderstanding of the difference between the national reformist and
national-revolutionary tendency can lead to a "khvostist" policy in relation to the
bourgeoisie, to an insufiiciently accurate political and organizational delimitation
of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie, and to the blurring of the chief revolu-
tionary slogans (especially the slogans of the agrarian revolution) , etc. This was
the fundamental mistake into which the Communist Party of China fell in
1925-27. •
ib) An underestimation of the special significance which the bourgeois na-
tional-reformist, as distinct from the feudal-imperialist camp, possess owing to
its mass influence on the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, peasantry and even a
portion of the working class, may lead, at least in the first stages of the move-
ment, to a sectarian policy and to the isolation of the Communists from the
toiling masses.
In both these cases, insufficient attention is given to the realization of precisely
those tasks which the Second Congress of the Communist International had al-
ready characterized as the basic tasks of the Communist Parties in the colonial
countries, i. e. the tasks of struggle against the bourgeois-democratic movement
inside the nation itself. Without this struggle, without the liberation of the
toiling masses from the influence of the bourgeoisie and of national-reformism,
the basic strategical aim of the Communist movement in the bourgeois-demo-
cratic revolution — the hegemony of the proletariat — cannot be achieved. With-
out the hegemony of the proletariat, an organic part of which is the leading role
of the Communist Party, the bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be carried
through to an end, not to speak of the socialist revolution.
20. The petty bourgeoisie in the colonial and semieolonial countries plays a
very important role. It consists of various strata, which in different periods of
the national-revolutionary movement play very diverse roles.
The artisan, who is hit by the competition of foreign imported goods, is hos-
tilely disposed toward imperialism. At the same time, he is interested in the
unlimited exploitation of his journeymen and apprentices, and accordingly, he
is hostilely disposed toward the class-conscious labor movement. At the same
time, also, he usually suffers himself from the exploitation of trading and usury
capital. The exceedingly ambiguous and hopeless position of this stratum of the
petty bourgeoisie determines its vacillations, and it frequently falls under the
influence of Utopian reactionaries.
The small tradei" — both in town and village — is connected with village exploi-
tation through usury and trade, and he clings to the old forms of exploitation in
preference to the prospects of an expansion of the internal market. These
strata, however, are not homogeneous. These sections of the trading bourgeoisie
which in one form or another are connected with the Compradores occupy a
different position from tho.se sections the activity of which is limited mainly to
the internal market.
The petty bourgeois intelligentsia, the students, and such like, are very fre-
quently the most determined representatives, not only of the specific interests
of the petty bourgeoisie, but also of the general objective interests of the entire
national bourgeoisie, and, in the fii'st period of the national movement, they
often come out as the spokesmen of the nationalist struggle. Their role at the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 875
head of the movement is comparatively important. In general, thpy cannot act
as representatives of peasant interests, for the very social strata from which
they come are connected with landlordism. Tlie upsurge of the revolutionary
wave may drive them into the labor movement, bringing with them their petty
bourgeois ideology of vacillation and indecision. Only a few of them in the
course of the struggle are able to break with their own class and rise to an
understanding of tlie tasks of the class struggle of the proletariat, and to become
active defenders of the interests of the latter. It frequently happens that the
petty bourgeois intellectuals give to their ideology a socialist or even Communist
color. In the struggle against imperialism they have played, and in such coun-
tries as India and Egypt they even now, still partially play a revolutionary role.
The mass movement may draw them after it, i>ut it may also push them into the
camp of extreme reaction or at least, cause the spread of Utopian reactionary
tendencies in their ranks.
Alongside of these strata, there are to be found in the colonial towns con-
siderable sections of urban poor, the position of which objectively drives them to
the support of revolution — artisans who do not exploit the labor of others, street
traders, unemployed intellectuals, ruined peasants seeking work, etc. Further,
the colonial town, as also the village, has a populous section of "coolies", semi-
proletarians who have not passed through the school of factory production and
who live by casual labor.
The peasantry, along with the proletariat and in the character of its ally,
represents a driving force of the revolution. The immense many-millioned
peasant mass constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population even in
the most developed colonies (in some colonies it is 90 percent of the population).
The many millions of starving tenant-cultivators, petty peasants oppressed by
want and groaning under all kinds of precapitalist and capitalist forms of ex-
ploitation, a considerable portion of them deprived of the possibility of cultiva-
tion even on the lands that they rent, thrown out from the process of production
and slowly dying from famine and disease, village agricultural laborers, all
these are the allies of the proletariat in the village. The peasantry can only
achieve its emaucipation under the leadership of the proletariat, but the prole-
tariat can only lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution to victory in union with
the peasantry.
The process of class differentiation of the peasantry in the colonies and semi-
colonies which possess important relics of feudalism and of precapitalist rela-
tionships, proceeds at a comparatively slow rate. Nevertheless, market relation-
ships in these countries have developed to such a degree that tiie peasantry
already no longer represent a homogeneous mass, as far as their class relations
are concerned. In the villages of China and India, in particular in certain parts
of these countries, it is already possible to find exploiting elements derived from
the peasantry, who exploit the peasants and village laborers through usury,
trade, employment of hired labor, the sale or letting out of land on rent, the
loaning of cattle or agricultural implements, etc., etc.
In general, it is possible that, in the first period of the struggle of the peasantry
against the landlords, the proletariat may be able to carry with it the entire
peasantry. But in the further development of the struggle some of the upper
strata of the peasantry may pass into the camp of counter-revolution. The
proletariat can achieve its leading role in relation to the peasantry only under
the conditions of unflinching struggle for its partial demands, for complete carry-
ing through of the agrarian revolution, and only if it will lead the struggle of the
wide masses of the peasantry for a revolutionary solution of the agrarian
question.
21. The working class in the colonies and semicolonies has characteristic
featvires which play an important role in the building up of an independent
working class movement and proletarian class ideology in these countries. The
predominant part of the colonial proletariat is derived from the pauperized
village, with which the worker remains in connection even when engaged in
production. In the majority of colonies (with the exception of some large factory
towns such as Shanghai, Bombay, Calcutta, etc.), we find, as a general rule,
only a first generation of proletariat engaged in large-scale production. Another
portion is made up of the ruined artisans who are being driven out of the decay-
ing handicrafts, which are widely spread even in the most advanced colonies.
The ruined artisan, a petty owner, carries, with him into the working class a
guild tendency and ideology which serves as a basis for the penetration of
national-reformist influence into the labor movement of the colonies.
22,S48 — .52 — pt. .3 12
876 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The great fluctuation in the composition of the proletariat (frequent renewal
of the labor force iu the factories owing to workers returning to the villages and
the inflow of new masses of poverty-stricken peasants into production) ; the
considerable percentage of women and children ; the numerous different lan-
guages ; illiteracy ; the wide distribution of religious and caste prejudices — all
make diflScult the work of systematic agitation and propaganda and retard the
growth of class consciousness among the workers. Nevertheless, the merciless
exploitation, practiced in the most oppressive forms by native and foreign capital,
and the entire absence of political rights for the workers, create the objective
pre-conditions on the basis of which the labor movement in the colonies is
rapidly overcoming all obstacles and every year draws greater and greater masses
of the working class into the struggle against the native exploiters and the
imperialists.
The first period of the growth of the labor movement in the colonial and semi-
colonial countries (approximately 1919-1923) is organically bound up with the
general growth of the national-revolutionary movement which followed the world
war, and' which was characterized by the subordination of the class interests of
the working class to the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle headed by the
native bourgeoisie. Insofar as the labor strikes and other demonstrations bore
an organizational character, they were usually organized by petty bourgeois in-
tellectuals who restricted the demands of the workers to questions of the
national struggle. The most important characteristic of the second period of
rapid growth of the labor movement in the colonies, on the other hand, the period
which began after the Fifth Congress of the Communist International, was the
emergence of the working class of the colonies into the political arena as an
independent class force directly opposing itself to the national bourgeoisie, and
entering upon a struggle with the latter in defense of its own immediate class
interests and for hegemony in the national revolution as a whole. The history of
the last few years has clearly confirmed this characteristic of the new stage of
the colonial revolution, first of all in the example of the great Chinese revolution,
and subsequently in the insurrection in Indonesia. There is every ground to
believe that in India the working class is liberating itself from the influence of
the nationalist and social-reformist leaders and is being converted into an inde-
pendent political factor in the struggle against the British imperialists and the
, native bourgeoisie.
22. In order correctly to determine the immediate tasks of the revolutionary
movement, it is important as a starting point to take into consideration the degree
of maturity attained by the movement in the separate colonial countries. The
revolutionary movement in China is distinguished from the present movement in
India by a series of essential features, characterizing the different degrees of
maturity of the movement in the two countries. The previous experience of the
Chinese revolution must, undoubtedly, be utilized in the revolutionary movement
in India and other analogous colonial countries. But it would be a completely
mistaken application of the Chinese experience if, at the present time in India,
Egypt, etc., we were to formulate the inunediate tasks, slogans and tactical meth-
ods in exactly the same form as took place in China, for example in the Wuhan
period, or in the form in which it is necessary to formulate them there at the
present time.
The tendency to skip over the inevitable difficulties and special tasks of the
present stage of the revolutionary movement in 'India, Egypt, etc., can only be
harmful. It is necessary to carry through much work in the building up and
consolidation of the Communist Party and trade-union organizations of the
proletariat, in the revolutionization of the trade-unions, in the development of
economic and political mass demonstrations and in the winning over of the
masses and their liberation from the influence of the national-reformist bour-
geoisie, before it is possible to advance in these countries with definite prospects
of success to the realization of such tasks as those which were fully carried out in
China during the Wuhan period as the immediate tasks of the struggle of the
working class and peasantry.
The interests of the struggle for the class rule of the national bourgeoisie
compel the most important bourgeois parties in India and Egypt (Swarajists,
Wafdists) still to demonstrate their opposition to the ruling imiTierialist-t'eudal
bloc. Although this opposition has not a revolutionary but a reformist and class
collaborationist character, this by no means signifies that it has not a special
significance. The national bourgeoisie has not the significance of a force in
the struggle against imperialism. Nevertheless, this bourgeois-reformist opposi-
tion has its real special significance for the development of the revolutionary
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 877
•movement— and this both in a negative as well as in a positive sense — insofar
as it possesses any mass influence at all.
Its chief feature is that it exerts a braking retarding influence on the develop-
ment of the revolutionary movement, insofar as it is successful in drawing the
toiling masses in its wake and holding them back from the revolutionary
struggle. On the other hand, however, the demonstrations of the bourgeois
opposition against the ruling imperialist-feudal bloc, even if they do not have
any deei^ foundation, can exert a certain accelerating influence on the process
of the iwlitical awakening of the wide masses of toilers; the concrete open
conflicts of the national-reformist bourgeoisie with imperialism, although of
little significance in themselves, may, under certain conditions ; indirectly serve
as the cause of the unleashing of even greater revolutionary mass actions.
It is true' the reformist bourgeoisie itself endeavours not to allow of any such
effect of its oppositional activities, and in one way or another seeks to prevent
it in advance. But, wherever the objective conditions exist for a far-reaching
political crisis, there the activities of the national-reformist opposition, even
their insignificant conflicts with imperialism which are least of all connected
with the real hearth of the revolution, can become of serious importance.
The Communists must learn how to utilize each and every conflict, to develop
such conflicts and to broaden their significance, to connect them with the agitation
for revolutionary slogans, to spread the news of these conflicts among the wide
masses, to arouse these masses to independent, open manifestations in sui^port
of their own demands, etc.
23. The correct tactics in the struggle against such parties as the Swarajists
and Wafdists during this stage consist in the successful exposure of their real
national-reformist character. These parties have already more than once betrayed
the national-emancipatory struggle, but they have not yet finally passed over
to the counter-revolutionary camp in the manner of the Kuomintang. There is
no doubt that they will do this later on, but at the present time they are so
particularly dangerous precisely because their real physiognomy has not yet
been exposed in the eyes of the wide masses of toilers. For this exposure there
is still needed a very large amount of Communist educational work and a very
great deal of new political experience on the part of the masses themselves.
If the Communists do not already succeed in this stage in shaking the faith of
the toiling masses in the bourgeois national-reformist leadership of the national
movement, then this leadership in the coming upsurge of the revolutionary
wave will represent an enormous danger for the revolution.
Consequently, it is necessary, by means of correct Communist tactics, adapted
to the conditions of the present stage, to help the toiling masses in India. Egypt,
Indonesia and such colonies to emancipate themselves from the influence of the
bourgeois parties. This is not to be achieved by any noisy phrases, however,
radical they may sound superficially, about the absence of any distinction be-
tween the oppositional national-reformists (Swarajists, Wafdists, etc.) and the
British imperialists or their feudal counter-revolutionary allies. The national
reformist leaders would easily be able to make use of such an exaggeration in
order to incite the masses against the Communists. The masses see the chief
immediate enemy of national emancipation in the form of the imperialist feudal
bloc, which in itself is correct at this stage of the movement in India, Egypt, and
Indonesia (as far as one side of the matter is concerned) .
In the struggle against this ruling counter-revolutionary force,- the Indian,
Egyptian, and Indonesian Communists must proceed in advance of all, they must
fight more determinedly, more consistently and more resolutely than any petty
bourgeois section or national-revoluntary group. Of course, this fight must not
be waged for the organizing of any kind of putsch or premature attempt at a
rising on the part of the small revolutionai-y minority, but for. the purpose of
organizing the widest possible strata of the masses of toilers in demonstrations
and other manifestations so that in this way the active participation of these
masses can be guaranteed for a victorious uprising at a further stage of the
revolutionary struggle.
At the same time, it is no less important mercilessly to expose before the toil-
ing masses the national-reformist character of the Swarajist, Wafdist and other
nationalist parties, and in particular of their leaders. It is necessary to expose
their half-heartedness and vacillation in the national struggle, their bargainings
and attempts to reach a compromise with British imperialism, their previous
capitulations and counter-revolutionary advances, their reactionary resistance to
the class demands of the proletariat and peasantry, their empty nationalist-
phraseology, their dissemination of harmful illusions about the peaceful decolon-
878 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ization of the country and their sabotage in relation to the application of revolu-
tionary methods in the national-emancipatory struggle.
It is necessary to reject the formation of any l<ind of bloc between the Com-
munist Party and the national-reformist opposition ; this does not exclude the
formation of temporary agreements and the coordinating of separate activities
in connection with definite antiimperialist demonstrations, provided that the
demonstrations of the bourgeois opposition can be utilized for the development
of the mass movement, and provided that these agreements do not in any way
limit the freedom of the Communist Parties in the matter of agitatimi among
the masses and among the organizations of the latter. Of course, in this work
the Communists must linow how at the same time to carry on the most relentless
ideological and political struggle against bourgeois nationalism and against the
slightest signs of its influence inside the labor movement. In such cases, the
Communist Party must take particular care not only to maintain its complete
political independence and to make quite clear its own character, but also, on
the basis of facts, to open the eyes of the masses of toilers who are under the
influence of the bourgeois opposition, so that they will perceive all the hope-
lessness of this opposition and the danger of the bourgeois democratic illusions
that it disseminates.
24. An incorrect estimation of the chief tendency of the parties of the big
national bourgeoisie gives rise to the danger of an incorrect estimation of the
character and role of the petty bourgeois parties. The development of these
parties, as a general rule, follows a course from the national-revoluntionary to
the national-reformist position. Even such movements as Sun Yat-senism in
China, Gandhism in India, Sarekat Islam in Indonesia, were originally radical
petty bourgeois ideological movements which, however, as a result of their
service to the big bourgeoisie became converted into a bourgeois nationalist-
reformist movement. After this, in India, Egypt, and Indonesia, there was
again founded a radical wing from among the different petty bourgeois groups
(e. g. the Republican Party, Watanists, Sarekat Rayat), which stand for a more
or less consistent national-revolutionary point of view. In such a country as
India, the rise is possible of some new analogous radical petty bourgeois parties
and groups.
But tlie fact must not be lost sight of that these parties, essentially con-
sidered, are connected with the national bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeois in-
telligentsia at the head of the parties puts forward national-revolutionary de-
mands but at the same time appears more or less conscious as the representative
of the capitalist development of their country. Some of these elements can
become the followers of various kinds of reactionary Utopias, but when con-
fronted with feudalism and imperialism, they, in distinction from the parties
of the big national bourgeoisie, appear at the outset not as reformists but as more
or less revoluntionary representatives ot the anti-imperialist interests of the
colonial bourgeoisie. This is the case, at least, so long as the development
of the revolutionary process in the country does not put on the order of the day
in a definite and sharp form the fundamental internal questions of the bourgeois-
democratic revolution, particularly the question of the realization of the agi-arian
revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. When this
happens, then it usually denotes the end of the revolutionary character of the
petty bourgeois parties. As soon as the revolution has placed the class interests
of the proletariat and the peasantry in critical contradiction not only to the
rule of the feudal-imperialist bloc, but also to the class rule of the bourgeoisie,
the petty bourgeois groups usually go back to the position of the national-re-
formist parties.
It is absolutely essential that the Communist Parties in these countries should
from the very beginning demarcate themselves in the most clear-cut fashion, both
politically and organizationally, from all the petty bourgeois groups and parties.
In so far as the needs of the revolutionary struggle demand it, a temporary co-
operation is permissible, and in certain circumstances even a temporary unTon
between the Communist Party and the national revolutionary movement, pro-
vided that the latter is a genuine revolutionary movement, tliat it genuinely
struggles against the ruling power and tliat its representatives do not put ob-
stacles in the way of the Communists educating and organizing in a revolutionary
sense the peasants and broad masses of the exploited. In every such coopera-
tion, however, it is essential to take the most careful precautions in order that
this cooperation does not degenerate into a fusion of the Communist movement
with the bourgeois-revolutionary movement.
The Communist movement in all circumstances, most unconditionally pre-
serve the independence of the proletarian movement and its own independence in
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 879
agitation, in organization and in demonstrations. To criticize tlie half-hearted
ness and vacillation of the petty bourgeois groups, to anticipate their vacilla-
tions, to be prepared for them and at the same time to utilize to the full all the
revolutionary possibilities of these strata, to carry on a consistent struggle
against petty bourgeois influence over the proletariat, employ all means to
liberate the wide masses of the peasantry from the influence of the petty bour-
geois parties and to win from them the hegemony over the peasantry — these are
the tasks of the Communist Parties.
25. How rapidly the revolutionary movement in India, Egypt, etc., will reach
such a high degree of maturity as it has already reached in China, depends to an
essential extent on how quickly there arises there a big revolutionary wave.
In the event of its postponement for a considerable time, the political and organ-
izational ripening of the driving forces of the revolution can only proceed by way
of a gradual and relatively slow process of development. If, however, the com-
ing powerful revolutionary wave rises earlier, then the movement may quickly
be able to attain a much higher stage of maturity.
Under exceptionally favorable circumstances, it is not even excluded that the
revolution there may be able in one single mightly wave to achieve the conquest
of power by the proletariat and peasantry. It is also possible that the process
of the development of the revolution from one stage to another more mature stage
will be interrupted for a more or less prolonged period of time, in particular if
the coming wave of revolutionary' upheaval reaches a relatively small height
and is not of great duration. Consequently, it is necessary in every case to sub-
ject the concrete situation to the most detailed analysis.
The following factors are of decisive significance for the immediate growing
over of the revolution from one stage to another higher stage: (1) The degree
of development of the revolutionary proletarian leadership of the movement, i. e.
of the Conuuunist Party of the given country (the numerical strength of the
Party, its independent character, consciousness and fighting readiness, as well
as its authority and connection with the masses and its influence on the trade
union and peasant movement) ; (2) the degree of organization and the revolu-
tionary experience of the working class, as well as, to a certain extent, of the
l>easantry. Tlie revolutionary experience of the masses signifies experience of
struggle : in the first place, liberation from the influence over them of the bour-
geois and petty bourgeois parties.
Since these prerequisites for the first big mass outburst of the revolution,
even in the best circumstances, are present only to an insufficient degree, an un-
usually deep revolutionary crisis and an unusually high and persistent revolu-
tionary wave are required for it to be possible for the bourgeois-democratic
revolution with the aid of this one wave of upheaval to lead to the complete vic-
tory of the proletariat and peasantry. Such a possibility is most easily pre-
sented, for example, when the ruling imperialism is temporarily distracted by
a long-continued war outside the frontiers of the colonial country concerned.
26. Living, concrete, historical dialetics, such as were demonstrated by the
now completed first period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China, will
give to the Communists, especially those working in the colonial countries, a
valuable experience which it is necessary to study carefully in order to draw
the correct conclusions, especially from the mistakes committed in the course
of Communist work in the colonies.
The rise of the revolutionary wave in China was unusually prolonged (over 2
years), since it was connected with a protracted internal war. Inasmuch as the
Northern Expedition was not conducted directly against the great imperialist
powers and inasmuch as the latter, owing to competition between them, were
partially passive during the first period, while the bourgeois leadership of the
national movement had already for some years held Canton in its hands — a
definite, though limited, territory — as well as a centralized power backed up by
the army, and so forth, it is understandable that in this exceptional case a great
part of the bourgeoisie in the beginning looked upon the national emancipatory
war as its own particular affair. The Kuomintang, in which it pi-acticnlly played
a leading role, in the course of a short time came to be at the head of the national
revolutionary movement, a circumstance which in the course of further events
represented an extremely great danger for the revolution.
On the other hand, among the peculiarities of the situation in China nuist be
numbered the fact that the proletariat there was stronger in relation to its bour-
geoisie than the proletariat of other countries. It is true that it was weakly
organized, but during the upsurge of the revolutionary wave the growth of labor
organization proceeded at a very rapid rate.
880 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Communist Party also rose in a short time from a small group to a party:
with 60,000 members (and presently even more) and possessing a wide influence
among the workers. Naturally, in these conditions many petty bourgeois ele-
ments also entered the party. The party was lacking in revolutionary expe-
rience and, even more, in traditions of Bolshevism. In the beginning, the upper
hand in its leadership was taken by wavering elements, which were still only to
a very small degree liberated from petty bourgeois opportunist tendencies which
inadequately understood the independent tasks and role of the Communist Party
and which came out against any decisive development of the agrarian revolution.
The entry of the Communists for a certain period into the leading party of the
national revolution, the Kuomintang, in itself corresponded to the requirements
of the struggle and of the situation, and was also in the interests of the indis-
pensable Communist work among the fairly wide masses of toilers who followed
this party. In addition, at the beginning, tlie Communist Party of China received
in the territory under the rule of the Kuomintang Government the possibility of
independent agitation among the masses of workers and peasants and among the
soldiers of the national army and their organizations. At that time the party
possessed greater possibilities than it actually made use of.
At that time the party did not sufficiently clearly explain to the masses its
proletarian class position in distinction from Sun Yat-senism and other petty
bourgeois tendencies. In the ranks of the Kuomintang, the Communists did not
conduct any independent policy, leaving out'of account that in any such inevi-
table bloc the Communists must adopt an unconditionally critical attitude toward
the bourgeois elements and always come out as independent force. The Com-
munists failed to expose the vacillations of the national-bourgeoisie and of
bourgeois-democratic nationalism, just at the time when this exposure ought to
have constituted one of the most important tasks of the Communist Party. The
inevitable disruption of the Kuomintang drew nearer and nearer as the national
army advanced, but the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party undertook
nothing or almost nothing in order to prepare the party in case of a breach, and
in order to guarantee its independent position and to unite the revolutionary
workers and peasants in an independent lighting bloc which would oppose itself
to the leadersliip of the Kuomintang.
Thus, the bourgeois-counter-revolutionary coup of Chiang Kai-shek found the
revolutionary proletariat completely unprepared and threw its ranks into con-
fusion. Further, the leadership of the Communist Party even at that time
badly understood the process of the development of the revolution from one
stage to another and did not carry through the correct changes in the line of
the party made necessary by this coup. Inasmuch as the left wing of the petty
bourgeois leaders of the Kuomintang during the course of a certain time still
went together with the Communist Party, there took place a territorial separa-
tion; there arose the separate governments of Nanking and Wuhan. But the
Communist Party did not occupy a leading position even in Wuhan.
Very quickly, in the Wuhan territory there commenced a second period, char-
acterized, among other things, on the one hand, by the presence of elements of an
incipient, still indefinite dual power (the seizure by peasant unions of a number
of ruling functions in the villages, and the extension of the functions of the trade
unions, determined by the endeavour of the masses to reach a "plebeian" inde-
pendent solution of the questions of power), and, on the other hand, by the
absence of sufficiently mature conditions for the organization of Soviets as organs
of revolt against the Wuhan government, insofar as the latter still carried on a
revolutionary struggle against the Nanking government which represented the
treachery of the bourgeosie to the revolution.
Tlie Communist Party at that time directly hindered the independent actions of
the revolutionary masses, it did not facilitate their task of gathering and or-
ganizing forces, it did not assist in breaking down the influence of the leaders of
the Left Kuomintang and their position in the country and in the army, instead
of utilizing its participation in the Government for these purposes, it, on the
contrary, screened the whole activity of this Government (individual petty
bourgeois leading members of the party went so far that they even participated
in the disarming of the workers' pickets in Wuhan and in sanctioning the
punitive expedition to Changsha!).
At the bottom of this opportunist policy lay the hope of avoiding a rupture with
the petty bourgeois leaders of the Wuhan governments. But, as a matter of
fact, this rupture could only be put off for a short space of time. When tlie mass
risings acquired a threatening character, the leaders of the Wuhan Kuomintang
also began to reach out toward unity with their allies on the other side of the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 881
barricades. The revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants still con-
tinued to exert all its forces in order to achieve victory.
The Communist Party of China now also corrected its line, elected a new lead
ership and took its place at the head of the revolution. But the revolutionary
wave had already ebbed. The heroic mass struggles under the slogan of Soviets
could only achieve a few temporary successes. Only in individual localities did
the uprising of the agrarian revolution begin sufticiently early, in the remainder
the many millions of the ijeasants' rearguard were delayed in their advance.
Instead of the former gross errors of opportunist leadership, there were now
revealed on the contrary, in various places extremely harmful putschist mistakes.
The preparations for risings also did not take place without great defects on the
part of tlie Communists. The heavy defeats once more threw back the revolu-
tion, which in the south had already entered into the second stage of develop-
ment, to the starting point of this stage.
27. Thanks to the fact that the Chinese national bourgeoisie obtained power,
the composition of the former bloc of the imperialists and militarists was partly
altered and the new ruling bloc now represents the immediate chief enemy of the
revolution. In order to overthrow it, it is necessary to win over the decisive
masses of the proletariat and peasantry to the side of the revolution. This con-
stitutes the most important task of the Chinese Communist Party for the im-
mediate future. The Chinese workers have already acquired an enormous
experience. The further strengtliening and revolutionization of the trade union
movement and the further strengthening of the Communist Party is essential.
A certain portion of the Chinese peasantry has already outlived bourgeois dem-
ocratic illusions and shown considerable activity in the revolutionary struggle,
but this is only an insignificant minority of the huge peasant population of China.
It is very probable that some petty bourgeois groups will take up the position
of national reformism (inside or outside the Kuomintang), in order by a certain
display of bourgeois-democratic opposition to conquer influence over the toiling
masses (to these petty bourgeois reformists belong also Tang Ting-san and the
Social Democratic trade-union, leaders). Under no circumstances must the
significance of these attempts be underestimated. The isolation of these groups
and their exposure before the masses by means of correct Communist tactics
constitutes an absolutely essential precondition for the Communist Party to be
able to take a really leading position in the moment of the coming new rise of the
revolutionary wave in China.
Already at the present time, the party must everywhere propagate among
the masses the idea of Soviets, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat
and peasantry, and the inevitability of the coming revolutionary mass armed
uprising. It must already now emphasize in its agitation the necessity of over-
throw of the ruling bloc and the mobilization of the masses for revolutionary
demonstrations. Carefully studying the objective conditions of the revolution
as they continue to mature, utilizing every possibility for the mobilization of
the masses, it must consistently and undeviatingly follow the line of seizure of
state power, organization of Soviets as organs of the insurrection, expropriation
of the landlords and big property-owners, expulsion of the foreign imperialists
and the confiscation of their property.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, after you finished your assignment
in South America, that is, you were Comintern delegate to South
America, what was your next assignment?
Mr. Kornfeder. Well, my next assignment was I was put in charge
of the Communist Party's labor union activities in the New York
area.
Mr. Morris. In other words, you were assigned from South America
back to New York ?
Mr. Kornfeder. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Wliat year was that?
Mr. Kornfeder. That was about the end of 1931.
Mr. Morris. Would you tell us what you did when you reported
for your duties, you new duties ?
The Chairman. I think before you get into that, I have a question
I would like to ask you. When you left South America, did you re-
turn to Russia ?
882 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. KoRNFEDER. No, I returned to the United States,
The Chairman. Tell me, what was the date of your departure from
Moscow to go to South America ?
Mr. Kornfeder. I departed from Moscow, I believe, in April 1930.
It may have been the early part of May.
Mr. Morris. So you were in South America a little more than a
year?
Mr. Kornfeder. I was in South America about 17 months.
The Chairman. Where were you in South America ?
Mr. Kornfeder. I was first in Colombia, stationed in the capital of
Colombia, Bogota, and then I was in Venezuela, in the capital, Caracas.
The Chairman. Specifically, what was your mission down there?
Was it to organize?
Mr. Kornfeder. Well, the strategic objective was to get at the oil
fields of Venezuela and Colombia. But since there were no com-
petent Communist Parties in existence, the job was, first, to organize
Communist Parties with which to do it, and after organizing native
Communist Parties, and organizing a labor federation, then to con-
centrate on the organization of the oil fields.
The Chairman. Through the labor population, is that right ?
Mr. Kornfeder. That is right.
The Chairman. How far along did you get with it while you were
there ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Well, I succeeded to reorganize a very loose, in-
efficient, socialistic political party in Colombia, and make out of it a
Communist Party, and organized also a committee for the formation
of a labor federation, which had the affiliation of the existing local
unions that then were operating in Colombia.
I also succeeded to organize organizing committees amongst the
Colombian peasants and plantation hands — that is, the plantation
workers, the coffee plantations, and some groups, two small organizing
groups, in the oil areas and in the banana region.
Mr. Morris. Was the purpose olthis work of the Communist or-
ganization to cut off raw materials from the United States in the event
of an emergency with that country ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Well, the whole strategic purpose of activities in
this type of country is to isolate the hinterland from the advanced
countries, and does deprive the advanced countries from raw mate-
rials and markets for their goods. That is the broad strategic purpose.
In the specific case of Venezuela and Colombia, the general purpose
was similar, but the specific purpose was that, in the event of a war,
a war between the United States and Russia, which was, of course,
anticipated in Moscow all the time — because the United States was
considered the ultimate fortress of capitalism — they wanted to be in a
position during a strategic moment to tie up the oil fields. That was
the immediate strategic objective of organizing Venezuela and
Colombia.
Mr. Morris. A few years ago, Mr. Kornfeder, there was a Com-
munist demonstration in Bogota. Do you know whether or not any
of the people engaged in that uprising were people you organized when
you were in South America?
Mr. Kornfeder, Yes. All the leaders whose names appeared in
the news dispatches from there were, at the time I was there, members
of the central committee of the Communist Party that I had organized.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 883
Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, we are just getting a little bit from our
principal subject here.
Will you describe the activities, or rather describe your visit back
to the United States in 1941 ? What was the first thing you did when
you got to the United States ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Well, the first thing I had to do was to find a place
where to live, and since I didn't have one, I camped in Earl Browder's
apartment for 6 weeks.
Mr. Morris. Who else was there during that period of 6 weeks?
Mr. Kornfeder. Well, almost all the then leaders of the party off
and on used to come to that apartment for discussions, tactical and
organizational and strategic problems.
The Chairman. That was in the city of New York?
Mr. Kornfeder, That was in the city of New York.
And among them was one that I imagine you would be interested
in, Harrison George.
Harrison George was then taking the place of Earl Browder in the
Pan-Pacific Union secretariat.
The subsidiary body of the Red international labor unions, which
w^as seeking to infiltrate the labor movement in China and Japan, and
other countries in the Far East, had received a new project. The
project was that this secretariat that he was then heading was to move
from China to San Francisco because, in China at that time, the sit-
uation had become difficult for the Communists, and they were moving
the headquarters of the Communist International that was operating
secretly in Shanghai or Hankow, moving them to the United States.
There is one special episode I think I should mention before this
committee.
From then on, the Communist Party of the United States began
to concentrate on the district in California, which had been neglected
until then. A great many of the agitators, writers, organizers, were
from there on assigned to develop the party organization in Cali-
fornia, especially in 'Frisco, Los Angeles, and so on.
The Chairman. Now you say from there on. From about what
date would that be?
Mr. Kornfeder. From 1932 on.
Now, among the problems that Harrison George raised was the
problem under what auspices to do a great deal of this work, not only
in the United States but in the countries at which these activities were
especially aimed, that is, China, Indochina, Indonesia, India, and so
on.
It is in this connection that I first took notice of the organization
known as the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The subject came up because there was needed an organization that
could function as a front for the operations in that area, a respectable
enough front that is not suspect.
Earl Browder, as I recall it, said that the Institute of Pacific Re-
lations could be made an instrument for that purpose, that the party
had already important contacts in there at that time.
Mr. Morris. And was that in your line of activity in the Communist
movement, to work on such a project, Mr. Kornfeder?
Mr. Kornfeder. No, that was not in my line of actviity.
Mr. Morris. And you learned that just because of the fact that you
happened to be staying at Earl Browder's house at that time ?
884 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is right.
Mr. Morris. And then you continued on and worked in the Com-
munist Party until how long ?
Mr. KoRXFEDER. I Continued in charge of their labor union and
unemployment activities in the New York area and later on in Ohio,
until 1934.
Mr. Morris. And then did you break with the Communist Party
in 1934?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornf eder, as a matter of interest, how long did it
take you to completely dissassociate yourself from the Communist
Party?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, to disassociate myself completely, not only
from their organization but from their theories and ideology, I would
say it took me until 1937, about 3 years.
I first rejected, of course, Stalin's methods and then I questioned
Lenin's theories, but still held on to the principal concepts of Marxism,
and then I sweated through that subject as to whether Marx was right
or not.
Politically, I thought he was wrong 2 years after, but as to whether,
on his economics, he was wrong, it took me another year.
So it took me about 3 years to completely disassociate myself from
the philosophy, theory, et cetera, of that movement.
The Chairman. How did you initiate the break?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, the break occurred on a difference on current
policy, which, at that time, involved the question as to whether the
Communist Party should work through the craft unions of the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor and dissolve the independent nonaffiliated
unions that it controlled, or whether it should form a new organization
of the type, as later on, as the CIO became.
I was in favor of the type of organization like the CIO which, at
that time, was contrary to the line dictated from Moscow.
Senator Ferguson. Were you a Marxist before you were a Com-
munist ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That is why it took some time to break your
ties with Marxism?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Do you see now really any difference between
Marxism and communism ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Not in the objectives, but there is a big difference
in methods.
Senator Ferguson. In the methods ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. But do you not think that in the end they have
to be one and the same if they are going to be successful ?
Mr. KoRNFEDx-iiR. In the end, if they get control, in order to stay in
control they will have to use more and more Communist methods
themselves.
Senator Ferguson. They will have to use force to keep their con-
Iro], will they not?
Mr. Kornfeder. That is right.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 885
Senator Ferguson. And is that not really their policy, was that not
the Marxist policy ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. That was Marxist policy ; yes.
You see, the disputation between the Socialists and the Communists
is, to a considerable extent, on the interpretation of what Marx meant.
But they both consider Marx as their ideological prophet.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, after you broke with the Communist
organization, and you say that break took you about 3 years, still you
were not orientated to the point of view that you would have testified
before a Senate committee at that time, would you, Mr. Kornfeder?
Mr. Kornfeder. Definitely not. I would not have appeared before
any official body of the Government, whether judicial, legislative, or
any other. It requires the complete break and the realization that
this thing is a menace.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you not mean that it requires more than a com-
plete break, Mr. Kornfeder, that in addition to the complete break
there must also come this realization you speak of, the menace of com-
munism ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes, definitely so. Yes.
I came to look upon communism as a modern form of reaction in
the sense that it seeks to reimpose the domination of the state in an
absolutist form, a thing that humanity has struggled against for
centuries.
So once that picture dawns upon your mind, well, then you are
finished with the whole thing.
Senator Ferguson. But it is sold to you in the package that it is
something new ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes; that it is something new, that through its
methods you are going to achieve great innovations that are good for
the humanity as a whole, and especially for the underdog; and
especially, if you are one of the underdogs, it is very appealing.
Senator Ferguson. It does not show you the side that you become the
slave of the state ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Definitely not.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, it criticizes the economic royal-
ists and it advocates the political royalists, does it not ?
Mr. Kornfeder. It criticizes the monopolies of capitalism and im-
poses a supermonopoly of the state.
Senator Ferguson. Of statism ?
Mr. Kornfeder. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. So it would be well for us to see how we can get
rid of the monopolies of the economic royalists and not impose upon
ourselves a political monoply ?
Mr. Kornfeder, Something even worse.
Senator Ferguson. Something even worse?
Mr. Kornfeder. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I get back to this pamphlet again ?
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. I would like to have the following passage, two or
three passages, read into the record, and then I will ask Mr. Kornfeder
a few questions on it.
886 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This is from page 107, from a pamphlet called China Yesterday and
Today, by Eleanor Lattimore, edited by Marguerite Ann Stewart, a
cooperative project between the American Council, Institute of Pacific
Relations, and Webster Publishing Co.
Until early 1946, however, the Kuomintang refused to recognize other parties
as legal political bodies. Friction has been especially bitter between the Gov-
ernment and the Communists. Soon after the war with Japan ended, armed con-
flicts occurred between them which, if allowed to become an all-out civil war,
could -easily have destroyed all that China had gained during her war against
Japan.
For the Communists are by no means the small minority party they were when
they were driven from the south by Chiang's troops. They are now second
to the Kuomintang in size and influence, and control an area inhabited by about
100,000,000 people.
When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they
stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the
word Communist.
And the word "Communist" is italicized.
They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Rus-
sians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas
under their control.
Senator Ferguson. Would you read that again ?
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir.
They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Rus-
sians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas
under their control.
Because their chief interest at the moment is in improving the economic con-
ditions of the Chinese farmer and in increasing the number of people capable
of taking part in political life, they are often described as a peasant party.
They have established a system of popular elections in the regions under their
control ; they favor extending the vote to the people of the rest of the country ;
and they have long declared that they would support a democratic republic in
which not only they themselves but all other Chinese political parties would
be represented.
At the time this is being written —
and the date is 1946 —
negotiations are being carried on between the Chinese Government and the
Communists which, it is hoped, will result in a more democratic government.
For not until China achieves a government in which the Chinese people are ade-
quately represented and which brings about agricultural reforms designed to
give her farmers enough to live on will the underlying causes of communism be
removed.
Mr. Kornfeder, I ask you if you will comment upon those passages
that I have just read. I offer this book for your scrutiny.
Mr. Kornfeder. Well, I think I already covered one angle of this,
namely, that the Chinese Communists are just a peasant party.
The change of strategy from basing upon the factory workers to
the Chinese peasants was important, decisive, tactical change.
Mr. Morris. Was it decided, Mr. Kornfeder, at that Sixth World
Congi-ess that you attended, that the Chinese Communists would be
represented as a peasant party ?
Mr. Kornfeder. No; it wasn't decided. They don't accept the
peasant party, they only accept affiliations of Communist parties.
The change was to orientate the strategy on the peasants. The peas-
ant can be made ideologically a Communist just like a factory worker.
A Communist is not necessarily made in the economic category, he
is made through ideology. So the calculation of Stalin worked out,
that you can work, which was one of his major contributions to Com-
i
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 887
muiiist strategy, by the way, tlie change of orientation in the colonial
€oantries from the workers which, in the colonial countries, are only a
few. There is not much industry. But the peasants which are the
big, downtrodden mass, and the Chinese Communist Party became a
Communist Party, recruited mainly from peasants who had become
Communists. But it was a Communist Party in every sense.
Senator Ferguson. When you say Communist Party, you mean
international, under the domination of the Kremlin?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Under the complete domination of the Kremlin;
yes.
Now, as to private propertj^ Well, you see, this is a very skillful
piece of sugar-coating the Communist position, very cleverly writ-
ten. You could imply this, and you could imply another thing.
But it is a part of Communist strategy when they seize a country
not to expropriate the peasants and the small shopkeepers right
away. They cannot do it. But they nationalize the land.
Here it says that nationalization is taking place. Well, national-
ization means that the Government takes title to all the land, whether
it enforces that title right away or not in a matter of tactics, of opera-
tion.
In Russia, the land was nationalized immediately after seizure of
the power by the Bolsheviks, but the nationalization wasn't really
enforced until years later when they had consolidated themselves
and collectivized the farms, had supercollectivized them, and so on
and so forth.
So you can say, half-truths, that they are going to maintain private
property. But for how long?
Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that the facts today, that China
today, and I am talking about the mainland, has disproved that
statement ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, they nationalized the land. They have
not yet taken the land off the peasants. They have taken the land
from the larger landowners and distributed it among the peasants
in order to get the support of the peasants and their cooperation
until they entrench themselves.
Then, after they have entrenched themselves, they will do in
China, carry out, the same Bolshevik program as in Russia. They
will make state farms, and they will make supercollectives which are
dominated, controlled, and managed by the state.
But in the first stage, in a colonial country, that would be a suicidal
method, if the Communists would attempt to force collectivization
immediately. They first have to have complete control of the Gov-
ernment apparatus, a well-organized political police, a well func-
tioning Communist Party, and all the committees, before they can
attempt to create a war with the peasants because when they begin
to take the land away from the peasants, and the so-called collectives,
the peasants will resist.
They resisted in Russia and they certainly will resist in China.
So this is a very misleading, skillful piece of selling the Com-
munist program with the pretense that it isn't Communist. But
it is.
The Chairman. Now you are referring to the article in the book
handed to 3'ou by Mr. Morris ?
Mr. KoRNFEDER. Yes.
888 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. And that is "China Today',' is that it ?
Mr. Morris. No ; this is a publication of the Institute of Pacific Re-
lations and the Webster Publishing Co., by Eleanor Lattimore, pub-
lished in 1946, and it is entitled "China Yesterday and Today."
In other words, Mr. Kornfeder, you do not agree with Mrs. Latti-
more when she says here :
When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they
stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the
word "Communist."
Mr. Kornfeder. That is right. I disagree with it in every sense.
Mr. Morris. And you know that the Chinese Communists, from
your own experience, is a member of the Comintern organization ?
Mr. Kornfeder. They are not only Communists, they are among
the most intransigent, they are among tlie best Communists.
They really believe and they are thoroughly indoctrinated, like
semi-illiterate persons. When they absorb a doctrine, they really are
all-out for it. The Chinese Communists are that type.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, before putting this into the record, I
would like to make the observation that the photograph appearing on
page 108, from which we have made these extracts, has been supplied
by courtesy of the China Aid Council, and I would like the record to
show that two witnesses have identified the China Aid Council as a
Communist-controlled organization.
Senator Ferguson. Could you say what the photograph is?
Mr. MoRRrs. It is the photograph tliat appears on page 108. It says
"Courtesy China Aid Council," and the caption is "Communist stu-
dents of China's northwest studying in front of the loess cave which
is their classroom."
May that go into the record. Senator? The text does not have to
go in because I have read it.
The Chairman. I cannot put the picture into the record. The rest
will go into the record.
(The document referred to was mg^rked "Exhibit No. 258" and filed,
for the record.)
Mr. Morris. I think that is all we have of Mr. Kornfeder.
The Chairman. Are there any questions. Senator?
Senator Ferguson. No, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have some more exhibits. I think
we will take a few minutes to put them into the record, if you have
the time.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, this last exhibit that went in,
this pamphlet, is there any description in the record as to who Eleanor
Lattimore is?
Mr. Morris. Eleanor Lattimore is the wife of Owen Lattimore, and
is the Eleanor Lattimore who has held c^ce in, and who has worked
for, the Institute of Pacific Relations.
There would seem to be absolutely no doubt that she is the wife of
Owen Lattimore.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 880
The Chairman. I'liat is in the record from before ?
Mr. Morris. She has testified in executive session before this com-
mittee.
Mr. Mandei,. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, dated March 31, 1938, addressed to Philip C. Jessup
from Edward C. Carter. It reads as folloAvs :
Dear Jessup : Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at
the Century Club at 7 : 15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20, to listen to a
hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constan-
tine Oumansky, the able, two-listed counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Wash-
ington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen
of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of
my guests care to put.
If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting
evening.
Sincerely yours,
Edwakd C. Carter.
The Chairman. To whom is that addressed ?
Mv. ]\Iandel. To Prof. Philip C. Jessup from Edward C. Carter.
We have a letter, also from the files, from Birchfield, Norfolk, Conn.,
dated April 2, 1938, addressed to Mr. Carter, from Philip C. Jessup,
reading as follows :
Dear Mr. Carter: I accept eagerly and gratefully for Wednesday the 20th.
Many thanks.
Sincerely yours,
Philip C. Jessttp.
Senator Ferguson. May I have the letter ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I offer that, and ask that that be intro-
duced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.
Mr, Mandei, will you kindly identify that as having been taken
from the institute's files?
Mr. Mandel. Yes; I do.
The Chairman. Taken from where?
Mr. Mandel. The files of the Institute of Pacific Kelations.
The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record, and properly
identified.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 259" and
are as follows:)
Exhibit No. 259
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, March 31, 1938.
Prof. Philip C. Jessltp,
Norfolk, Conn.
Deab Jessup : Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at
the Century Club at 7 : 15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20, to listen to a
100-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantino
Oumansky, the able, two-fisted counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington,
to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my
friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests
care to put?
If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting
evening.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
890 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
BmCHFIELD,
Norfolk, Conn., April 2, 1938.
Deak Mr. Caeteb: I accept eagerly and gratefully for Wednesday, the 20th.
Many thanks.
Sincerely yours,
Philip 0. Jbssup.
Senator Ferguson-. Could you identify the Moscow trials ?
Mr. Mandel. The Moscow trials were in 1937, and were popularly
known as the purge trials, and created a tremendous furor throughout
the world because noted Soviet leaders were brought to trial, and they
confessed to having tried to overthrow the Soviet Government. Many
of them were liquidated or disappeared. They aroused indignation
throughout the world and especially in the United States.
The Chairman. All right, you may proceed.
Mr. Mandel. I refer now to a document which is from the files of
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 12, 1943, addressed
to Hon. John H. Kerr, chairman. Special Subcommittee on Committee
on Appropriations, and it is signecl by Edward C. Carter.
Now, the reference in this letter that I want to read is this :
I have known Mr. Bisson personally for more than 10 years. He was a member
of the American delegation to the IPR conference at Yosemite National Park in
1936. Tlie late Hon. Newton D. Baker was chairman of that delegation.
As a member of the research stafC of the Foreign Policy Association, I have fol-
lowed Mr. Bisson's scholarly writing on the Far East very closely. He has con-
sistently maintained a high standard of objectivity. Indeed, his work is of such
a high order that in 1938 the institute asked him to write a book on American
policy in the Far East. Dr. Philip C. Jessup of Columbia University was
chairman of the institute at that time and this assignment was given to Mr.
Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval.
Mr. Morris. Mr, Chairman, I would like to point out that Mr. Bisson
has been identified before this committee as a member of the Commun-
ist organization.
May I offer this into evidence, Mr. Chairman, for whatever pro-
bative value there may be in that one reference ?
The Chairman. As I understandjt, this is a document taken from
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. And, Mr, Chairman, the Hon. John H. Kerr was the
chairman of a special subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria-
tions, of the House of Representatives, and apparently the question
of Mr. Bisson's loyalty had come up and letters of recommendation
were sent in from various people, according to our scrutiny of the
files,
The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 260" and is
as follows :)
Exhibit No. 260
129 East Fifty-second Street,
Neiv York City, April 12, 1943.
Regarding T. A. Bisson.
Hon. John H. Kerr,
Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives , Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir : I have known Mr. Bisson personally for more than 10 years. He
was a member of the American delegation to the IPR conference at Yosemite
National Park in 1936. The late Hon. Newton D. Baker was chairman of that
delegation.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 891
As a member of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association, I have
followed Mr. Bisson's scholarly writing on the Far East very closely. He has
consistently maintained a high standard of objectivity. Indeed, his work is of
such a high order that in 1938 the institute asked him to write a book on
American policy in the Far East. Dr. Philip C. Jessup, of Columbia University,
was chairman of the institute at that time and this assignment was given to
Mr. Bissou with Dr. Jessup's full approval. Under separate cover I am sending
you a copy of that book in order that you may familiarize yourself with the
quality of his writing. This book has received high praise from a great many
outstanding American experts on the Far East. It has consequently had a wide
sale and is a standard reference book in a great many public and university
libraries.
Mr. Bisson is 100 'percent American. He was alert to the Japanese menace
long before the general public became aware of the implications to the peace
of America of Japanese aggression and in many of his writings he faithfully
stated the issues that the United States must face vis-^-vis Japanese military
expansion.
If you wish further information, please let me know.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Mr. IMandel. I have here a letter from the tiles of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, dated February 16, 1940, addressed to Mr. Motylev,
Pacific Institute, 20 liazin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
Dear Motylev : You will, I think, be interested in the enclosed clipping from
the New York Herald Tribune of February 1.5, 1940, giving the views of Dr.
Philip C. Jessup with reference to the City of Flint at Murmansk.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
And I have here the clipping, a copy of the clipping, from the New
York Herald Tribune of February 15, 1910, and I read the last para-
graph of the article referred to as follows :
Dr. Jessup paid tribute to naval officers, who were, he said, the firmest STip-
porters of international law at present. He declared that the Soviet Union had
committed no violation of international law in holding the freighter City of
Flint at Murmansk. The action of the British naval patrol, however, in forcing
the Mormacsnn to enter a belligerent port he described as contrary to the
neutrality laws of the United States and to accepted principles of international
law.
May I point out that this occurred during the period of the Stalin-
Hitler pact ?
Mr. MoREis. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record and be
marked as the next consecutive exhibit? That is the letter from the
institute's files, Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev, as well as the clipping
from the New York Herald Tribune that Mr. Mandel read.
The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 261" and are
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 261
129 East 52d Street,
New York City,
Fehniary 16, 19J,0.
Dr. V. E. Motylev,
PacifiG Institute, 20 Rasin Street,
Moscoio, U. S. S. R.
Dear Motylev : You will, I think, be interested in the enclosed clipping from
the New York Herald Tril)une of February Ift. 1940, giving the views of Dr. Philip
C. Jessup with reference to the City of Flint at Murmansk.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Cartkk.
(22848— 52— pt. 3 13
892 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
[From tlie New York Herald Tribune, February 15, 1940]
United States Neutrality Dogma Called Mild-Mannered — Jessup, of
Columbia, Finds Change in International Law
The assertion of neutrality rights by the United States was called mild-man-
nered yesterday by Prof. Philip C. Jessup, of the Columbia University Law
School, at a luncheon of the school's alunmi association at the Lawyer's Club,
115 Broadway. He said the British blockade was not a blockade in any technical
sense but a measure of reprisal against Germany for its submarine warfare.
Under earlier concepts of international law, Dr. Jessup explained, the burden
of proof was on the captor of a merchant vessel in wartime. Under the present
procedure of British prize courts, he said, this burden of proof had been shifted
to the complainant, making it almost impossible for the neutral owner of a
vessel to prove what would be the eventual destination of his cargo.
Dr. Jessup paid tribute to naval officers, who were, he said, the firmest sup-
porters of international law at present. He declared that the Soviet Union had
committed no violation of international law in holding the freighter City of
Flint at Murmansk. The action of the British naval patrol, however, in forcing
the Mormacsun to enter a belligerent port, he described as contrary to the neu-
trality laws of the United States and to accepted principles of international law.
Mr. Mandel. In connection with the last item, may I refer to the
New York Times of October 29, 1939, which carries a statement as
follows, under the headline "United States accuses Soviet in Flint
confusion. Formal charge is made that Russia treats American en-
voy with contempt."
The first paragraph :
With the freighter City of Flint evidently having left Murmansk carrying
her American crew on board under a German prize detail, and with Laurence
A. Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador to Russia, having been unable to
communicate with Capt. Joseph A. Gainard of the ship, the State Department
tonight charged the Soviet Government with "withholding adequate coopera-
tion."
The article goes into greater detail.
Senator P'erguson. May I inquire, then, is it a fact that Mr. Jessup
was taking a stand contrary to the stand taken by the United States
of America through its State Department ?
Mr. Mandel. Correct.
Senator Ferguson. That is, in that article?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And then this stand, which was opposing the
stand of the United States of America, was being sent by Mr. Carter
to a Russian Communist in Russia?
Mr. Mandel. To a Russian official.
Senator Ferguson. And a Communist in Russia ?
Mr. Morris. Whether he is a member of the Communist Party, we
cannot say, Senator. But Dr. Motylev, who is the representative of
the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whether he
is a member of the Russian Communist Party, we cannot say.
Senator Ferguson. And this letter says "I think it will be inter-
esting." You will be interested in this stand, in other words, of Dr.
Jessup against the stand of the United States Government; is that
correct ?
Mr. Mandel. Correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I had a little difficulty at first getting the sig-
nificance when you put it in at first. Until you read the last, I won-
dered whether I was right in my conclusions.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 893
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that Mr. Mandel make a
photostat of this article from which he read, and have that intro-
duced into the record.
Senator Ferguson. I think it should be, to make tliis perfectly
clear as to what this is.
The Chairman. That may be done. See that it gets into the record
at the proper sequence.
(The information referred to is as follows :)
[From the New York Times, October 29, 1939]
United States Accuses So^aET in "Flint" Confusion — Formal Charge Is Made
That Russia Treats American Envoy With Contempt
(By Bertram D. Hulen)
Washington, October 128. — With the freighter City of Flint evidently having
left Murmansk carrying her American crew on board under a German prize
detail and with Laurence A. Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador to Rus-
sia, having been unable to communicate with Capt. Joseph A. Gainard of the
ship, the State Department tonight charged the Soviet Government with "with-
holding adequate cooperation."
The charge, made in a formal statement, reflected the intense irritation felt
in Washington over the cavalier fashion in which the diplomatic representative
of this Government in Moscow has been treated by the Soviet authorities. OflS-
cials expressed unconcealed anger over the failure to ascertain any definite facts
officially regarding the vessel.
State Department officials discussed the situation from every angle during
the day. It was learned that staff conferences, headed by Secretary Cordell
Hull, were held behind closed doors twice during the day. Officials, however,
preserved an unusual reticence and nothing more than the formal statement
was made public.
HIGH officials CONFER
Conferring with Mr. Hull were top-flight officials of his Department, including
R. Walton Moore, counselor ; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State ;
and Green H. Hackworth, lesal adviser of the Department.
It is generally believed that the City of Flint sailed, possibly 2 or 3 days
ago, to run the British blockade and reach a German port in the Baltic before
institution of prize court proceedings by the Nazi authorities.
According to press reports, the United States Embassy in Moscow was con-
vinced tonight that she had sailed. This word had not been communicated to
the State Department by the Embassy, but it was regarded as a reasonable
assumption.
Previous reports from Moscow and from Berlin, first that the City of Flint
had sailed, then that she had not, were considered an obvious effort to confuse
the situation in order to minimize, if possible, the risks the ship must take in
eluding British blockaders.
But it was apparent from the State Department's statement tonight that
if she does run the blockade German claims to her permanent possession will be
resisted in the expected legal proceedings.
The statement, factual in its contents and reciting the circumstances that
have surrounded the City of Flint since her seizure, clearly implied that the
Russian Government had disregarded the requirements of international law.
It implied also that neither Russia in her dealings with Ambassador Stein-
hardt nor Germany in her conversations with Alexander C. Kirk, the United
States Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, had been frank, if indeed honest.
It emphasized that Mr. Steinhardt throu^Jiout had been denied access to the
primary source of information, the vessel herself.
So far, Mr. Stcinhnrdt has lieen unsuccessful in persuading the Soviet regime
to conform to the customary diplomatic procedure, even although this be of
the most formal character. In short, official Washington considers that he has
been treated with nothing less than contempt.
894 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The State Department statement was considered as forming a basis for resist-
ance to any claim for permanent possession of tlie vessel tliat Germany might
advance in prize court proceedings.
VIEVPS NOT VOICED IN NOTE
The statement could be considered a protest, although outside formal diplo-
matic channels. While some thought may have been given to voicing these
views in a note, that course has not yet been adopted, at least so far as was
revealed tonight.
An emphatic form of protest could be registered by ordering Mr. Steinhardt
home for consultation, but no consideration is said to have been given to that
course as yet.
Today's statement pointed out that, judging from press reports from German
sources, the German authorities were not without information, although Mr.
Steinhardt was having extraordinary difHculty in obtaining the facts and was
given no facility for personally verifying them.
A short time b?fore the statement was issued, the Ambassador reported to
the State Department that again he had been unable to make telephone contact
with Captain Gainard.
Officials here were satisfied that the vessel had left Murmansk and was seek-
ing to reach a German harbor. Obviously, it was pointed out, Russia would not
give this information if she were deliberately siding with Germany. If really
neutral, she might feel that to announce departure of the ship would be to in-
form Great Britain and for that reason be an unneutral act.
That Germany would bend every effort to conceal the departure of the vessel
"was considered only natural, so reports on this score from Berlin today were
discounted.
IMr. Kirk reported from Berlin to the State Department that in reply to an
inquiry at the Ministry of Marine this afternoon he was told that the American
crew was on board the City of Flint at Murmansk. After a further inquiry late
this afternoon at the Foreign Office, Sir. Kirk was informed that, according to
the latest reports, the vessel and crew were still in the Arctic port. It was also
said that if, after the completion of repairs, the ship were taken to another port,
the American crew would presumably be kept on board to operate the vessel.
Mr. Kirk also reported that, according to information he had received from
the American consul general in Hamburg, the prize commissioner has received
no news of the vessel.
The rebuffs received at the hands of Russia were resented here no less because
the Foreign Office was following its customai'y course of putting off and humiliat-
ing an Ambassador and his Government^ It is a well-understood technique of
the Soviet regime.
An Ambassador will seek official information, only to be refused an appoint-
ment at the Foreign Office or be told that there is no information available.
Later the substance of what he has sought will appear in press reports, and
when he again calls at the Foreign Office this will be given him. In this and
other ways the Moscow Government follows a calculated policy of insolence
toward the envoy.
Diplomats of long experience in revolutionary Russia know the pattern well
and are not surprised, thoiigh their resentment reaches the boiling point. To
them it reflects Bolshevist philosophy of treating governments with contempt
in making announcements first through Soviet press channels on the theory
that in this way they are dealing directly with the people of a country, not with
their representatives.
But the White House and the State Department are not concerned with the
philosophy that might explain the treatment accorded the United States Govern-
ment in this case. They are deeply resentful over the whole episode.
United States Statement on "Flint"
Washington, Oftober 2S. — Following' is the text of the statement issued by the
State Department tonight on the case of the steamer Citij of Flint :
"The Citii of Flint was captured by a German cruiser at an estimated distance
of some 1,250 miles from New York, with a mixed cargo destined for British
ports. The date of capture is understood to have been October 9.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 895
"The Citii of Flint was taken into the harbor of Tromsoe on Or-tober 21, with
a German crew and flying the German flag. After remaining 2 hours to talce
water, it was ordered by the Norwegian Government to depart, which it did.
The Citi/ of Flint was taken into the harbor of Murmansk on tlie evening of
October 23.
"On October 25 the American chargt^ d'affaires cabled from Berlin that the
Foreign Oflice, at its press conference, said that the City of Flint was captured
by a German vessel and contraband was found on board, destined for England.
The Foreign Oflice then added that it was found, however, that the sliip was
unsea worthy in that it did not have navigation charts adequate for bringing
the ship into a German port.
"When the vessel entered the harbor of Murmansk, according to an announce-
ment presmuably from the Soviet Government through the Tass news agency,
'the naval forces at the port of Murmansk have temporarily held the vessel
and interned the German crew.'
"On October 2.5 the American charge d'affaires at Berlin cabled that the Ger-
man Foreign OflSce, referring to the seizure of the City of Flint, said that 'the
German authorities were communicating with the Soviet authorities in the
matter.'
"On the same day [October 25] the Tass Agency reported that 'the German
crew of tlie cargo steamer City of Flint has been released from internment by
the maritime authorities of Murmansk in view of the fact, as has been estab-
lished, that the vessel was brought into port for repair of her machinery. The
vessel is meanwhile remainiig in Murmansk for verification of the exact compo-
sition of her cargo.'
•'On October 26 the American charge d'affaires cabled from Berlin quoting a
memorandum received that morning from the Foreign Office relative to the City
of Flint and its crew, which, among other things, stated that a 'prize crew placed
on board [the City of Flintl has brought the steamer to the harbor of Mur-
mansk because of sea damage.'
"When transmitting the memorandum an official of the Foreign Office stated
informally to the charge d'affaires that the Foreign Office had no details as to
the damage which necessitated taking the ship to Murmansk, but he maintained,
in response to an inquiry, that the term 'damage' would cover the case of a
ship lacking charts with which to navigate the waters through which she had to
proceed.
"For some reason as yet unexplained the German crew was interned in spite
of the fact that according to German authorities they were without charts and
liad put into Murmansk because they could not proceed to a German poi't without
charts. Later, they were released, seemingly under a plea that their entry into
Murmansk was required for necessary repairs to defective machinery.
"A prize crew may take a captured ship into a neutral port without internment
only in case of stress of weather, want of fuel and provisions, or necessity of
repairs. In all other cases, the neutral is obligated to intern the prize crew and
restore the vessel to her former crew.
"The conclusion from the foregoing facts and circumstances indicates that
when the City of Flint entered the harbor at Murmansk, any plea relating to the
chart requirements if advanced must have been ignored since the German crew
was interned. A second and entirely different reason for entering Murmansk,
namely, defective machinery which called for immediate repairs, was not ad-
vanced until later.
"A subsequent cable from the American charge d'affaires at Berlin, also dated
October 26, quoted a statement of the Foreign Office at its noon press conference
to the effect that the fact that the Russians have freed the German crew indicates
that the Soviet authorities have confirmed the view of the prize crew that the
City of Flint was unseaworthy and it was therefore permissible to take the ship
into a neutral harbor.
"Testimony of the American crew as to the full facts pertaining to the taking
of the City of Flint into Murmansk is not yet available.
"It seems manifest that even if it is assumed that the German crew was pro-
ceeding legally prior to the entry of the City of Flint into the harbor of Murmansk,
the known facts and circumstances support the contention of the American Gov-
ernment that the crew did not at the time of entry offer any reasonable or justi-
fiable grounds such as are prescribed by international law for taking the vessel
into this port, and that, therefore, it was the clear duty of the Soviet Government
896 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to turn the City of Flint over to the American crew. This has been the major
contention of the American Government.
"In view of tlie foregoing facts and circumstances, each person can judge for
himself the question as to how much light is shed on this entire transaction by
the action of the Soviet Government in withholding adequate cooperation with
the American Government with respect to assembling and disclosing to the Amer-
ican Embassy in Moscow the essential facts pertaining to the landing, the where-
abouts, and welfare of the American crew ; by the facts that it was first alleged
by the German authorities that the need for charts was the ground for bringing
the vessel into port ; and by the fact that later this ground seems to have been
abandoned and a new ground or theory relating to defective machinery was
set up."
Ml'. Morris. Mr. Cliairman, we are preparing more exhibits along
the lines that we are presenting today, and I ask that they be presented
at some other time.
The Chairman. Very well. Is there anything further today ?
Senator Ferguson. I hope, Mr. Chairman, if they are along this
same line, that they may all be put into the record as soon as possible
because I understand there will be another hearing of another com-
mittee where Mr. Jessup's name will be up for confirmation by the
Senate.
I think it is only fair to Mr. Jessup and to the Senators that any-
thing that this committee has in relation to these exhibits should go
into the record.
The Chair]max. I may say. Senator Ferguson, that today I have, as
chairman of this committee, addressed a letter to the chairman of the
subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
advising him that I am having a transcript of the proceedings of this
committee bearing on Mr. Jessup prepared for that committee's pe-
rusal and use.
Senator Ferguson. I think that is proper because we should not
have a hearing where one matter is brought up and then not refer that
to another committee that is going to pass upon Mr. Jessup.
The Chairman. The entire files of this committee will be made
available to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Mr. Morris. Senator Ferguson, may I point out some of the diffi-
culties ?
There is one point that arose this morning on whether or not Fred
Field is the one who recommended Mr. Jessup for a particular office.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Carter is here. Why do we not clear this up
and ask Mr. Carter if the Fred who signed that telegram is Fred
Field?
Mr. Carter, can you give us information on this?
The Chairman. Come forward, Mr. Carter, if you care to.
TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC
RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Do you have the telegram ?
The Chairman. You were here this morning when that wire was
read ?
Mr. Carter. Yes ; I was in the back row.
Senator Ferguson. Would you look at this wire?
Mr. Carter. I would be delighted.
Mr. Morris. One of the difficulties here. Senator, is that we have an
estimated 300,000 letters here, and then we have all the files of the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 897
institute. It takes a long time to track anything down, as Mr. Carter
can appreciate.
Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that, and that is wliy I knew Mr.
■Carter was here, and he might clear this up.
Mr. Carter. Well, the internal evidence, which is very slender,
would seem to indicate that this was Frederick V. Field.
In what year was this, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. The year is not given.
Mr. Carter. That is rather important.
Mr. IMoRRis. Can you remember such a recommendation that Field
made?
Senator Ferguson. It is a recommendation at a certain convention
■or committee meeting that might bring it back to your mind. I think
the place of the meeting is shown on the next page.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the record will show that Mr. Carter
has been sworn.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Carter, when did Jessup serve as research chair-
man? Do you recall that?
Mr. Carter. I think it is here in the document you just gave to me.
Senator Ferguson. The meeting is given, Mr. Carter, on the sheet
.attached to the telegram.
Mr. Carter. I wouldn't want to be too sure, but, frankly, I am
mixed up as to whether Mr. Field was speaking of Mr. Jessup, I am
■confused on two points: One, whether it refers to the Mount Trem-
blant conference in 1942, or the Hot Springs conference in 1945.
It says, "approve him as research chairman." For the life of me,
on the spur of the moment, I can't remember whether it was Mount
Tremblant, 1942, or Hot Springs, 1945, where Jessup was proposed as
research chairman and so served.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. But was he proposed by Fred Field at
•either one of those? Did you have another Fred in either 1942 or
1945?
The Chairman. That is, on your staff.
Mr. Carter. I think we only had one Fred.
Senator Ferguson. That was Fred Field?
Mr. Carter. From the text of this short telegram, Fred doesn't
3iominate him ; someone else has nominated him.
Senator Ferguson. But he approves him?
Mr. Carter. But he aj^proves him.
Senator Ferguson. And that would be Fred Field ?
Mr. Carter. That would be Fred Field.
Mr. Morris. That is not quite right, is it, Mr. Carter ? It says here,
approve the nominations and suggest Jessup for research chairman."
In other words, the suggestion is coming from Field, if it is Field,
ihat Jessup be research chairman ?
Mr. Carter. Yes. But just on the one telegram, without refreshing
myself on all of the operations — this was a complicated international
■organization, Avith a dozen countries and committees within each
country, trying to get agreement between the British and the French
and the Australians, and so on.
Mr. Morris. This Winsted, Conn., November 23 would not give you
a clue, would it? The Hot Springs convention was in the summer,
was it not?
■((
898 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Carter. No ; it was along, I think, in January.
Mr. Morris. Hot Springs?
Mr, Carter? Winsted is far away from Hot Springs.
Mr. Morris. But someone may have lived there in 1942 and not
in 1945. That does not mean anything to you?
Mr. Carter. No.
Senator Ferguson. I think he identified it earlier. Fred Field is
the only one they have. Therefore it is apparent that it is Fred Field.
Mr. Carter. I could call up Mr. Holland, who has the remains of
the files there, and his memory might be better than mine.
The Chairman. Is that all for today?
Mr. Morris. That is all, Mr. Chairinan.
The Chairman. The committee will be called any time you want
it called.
Mr. Morris. We have a witness for next Tuesday.
The Chairman. In the meantime, if you have any additional files
or records bearing upon matters that should go before the Committee
on Foreign lielations, would you so advise the committee?
We will stand in recess until the call of the Chair.
(Whereupon, at 4:10 p. m., Thursday, September 20, 1951, the
hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1951
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Adminstration
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. G .
The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator Pat
■ McCarran (chairman) presiding.
Present : Senators ISlcCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, and Jenner.
Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; liobert
Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of
research.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order, please.
Mr, Morris, have you anything to proceed with ?
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of re-
quests made by this committee of the various branches of the Executive
Departmeiit that are in a state of either we have been turned down on
our requests, or else we have gotten a generally unsatisfactory answer.
I would like that the record show some of the difficulties we have
encountered in this respect.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. Today, Mr. Chairman, we are going to take testimony
on a 3-day conference that Avas held by the State Department in Oc-
tober 1949. At that time Secretary of State Acheson had appointed
Philip C. Jessup to be the head of a panel of three people to advise
him on the formulation and the review of far eastern policy. Think-
ing this to be completely in line with the line of our investigation be-
cause most of the people invited were Institute of Pacific Relations
people, we requested on August 24, 1951, of Hon. Dean Acheson, Sec-
retary of State, Washington, D. C, over your signature, a request
which reads as follows :
My Dear Mr. Secretaky : The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has
had testimony in executive session concerning tlie :>-day round-table discussion
arranged by the Office of Public Affairs of the State Department for the pur-
pose of exchanging views with informed private citizens on United States for-
eign policy toward China, and which took place on October 0, 7, and 8, 1949.
It is requested that the minutes, which our testimony indicates were taken
at the time, be made available to this committee.
Mr. Chairman, I would like that request on your part to Secretary
of State Acheson on August 24, 1951, introduced in the record.
The Chairman. It will be introduced in the record.
(The document referred to and read into the record by Mr. Mandel
was marked "Exhibit No. 262" and filed for the record.) '
The Chairman. What is the answer ?
899
900 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. The answer is dated September 12, 1951, and reads:
Deab Senator McCarran : I have received your letter of August 24, 1951
(received August 27), requesting the minutes of the meeting held in the Depart-
ment on October 0, 7, and 8, 1949, concerning American policy toward China.
I regret that this reply has been delayed during the absence of many depart-
mental officers in San Francisco.
As I think you knovF, the record kept of this decision was classified con-
fidential. This was done to insure frankness on the part of the non-Government
people invited to the conference and they were specifically advised that their
remarks would not be made available outside the Department of State. To
honor the commitment made to these participants, therefore, the Department
believes that the record of this meeting should not be released, even on a
confidential basis. I am, however, enclosing a list of the people invited to this
meeting.
Sincerely yours,
Jack K. McFaix,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).
I would like that introduced.
The Chairman. That will be inserted in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 263" and
is as follows:)
Exhibit No. 263
September 12, 1951.
Hon. Pat McCarran,
CJiairman, Internal Security Suico^nmittec,
United States Senate.
Dear Senator McCarean : I have received your letter of August 24, 1951
(received August 27), requesting the minutes of the meeting held in the Depart-
ment on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, concerning American policy toward China.
I regret that this reply has been delayed during the absence of many depart-
mental officers in San Francisco.
As I think you know, the record kept of this discussion was classified con-
fidential. This was done to insure frankness on the part of the non-Govern-
ment people invited to the conference and they were specifically advised that
their remarks would not be made available outside the Department of State.
To honor the commitment made to these participants, therefore, the Department
believes that the record of this meeting should not be released, even on a con-
fidential basis. I am, however, enclosing a list of the people invited to this
meeting.
Sincerely yours,
Jack K. McFat.l,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).
List of Consultants, Conference on Problems of United States Polict in
China
Joseph W. Ballantine, the Brookings Institute, Washington, D. C.
Bernard Brodie, department of international relations, Yale University, New
Haven, Conn.
Claude A. Buss, director of studies. Army War College, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Colegrove, department of political science. Northwestern University,
Evanston, 111.
Arthur G. Coons, president. Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif.
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, N. Y.
John K. Fairbanks, committee on international and regional studies. Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass.
William R. Herod, president. International General Electric Co., New York, N. Y.
Arthur N. Holcombe, department of government, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Mass.
Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer & Graves, Spokane, Wash.
Owen Lattimore, director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations.
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 901
Ernest B. MacNaughton, chairman of the board, First National Bank, Portland,
Oreg.
George C. Marshall, president, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
J. Morden Murphy, assistant vice president. Bankers Trust Co., New York, N. Y.
Nathaniel Pelfer, department of public law and government, Columbia University,
New York, N. Y.
Harold S. Quigley, department of political science, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minn.
Edwin O. Reischauer, department of far-eastern languages, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.
William S. Roberston, president, American & Foreign Power Co., New York, N. Y.
John D. Rockefeller III, president. Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, N. Y.
Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.
Eugene Staley, executive director, World Affairs Council of Northern California,
San Francisco, Calif.
Harold Stassen, president, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
Phillips Talbot, tFniversity of Chicago, Chicago, 111.
George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
Harold M. Vinacke, department of political science, University of Cincinnati,
Cincinnati, Ohio.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, during the testimony of General Wil-
loughby testimony turned up which indicated that there are records
in the War Department which could be available to this committee and
which would aid us in our investigation. Accordingly, on August
20, 1951, a letter was sent to the President at the White House in
Washington, D. C. It reads :
Dear Mr. President : During the open public hearing of the Internal Security
Subcommittee held on August 9, 1951, Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby was questioned
concerning the loyalty of three individuals who were attached to SCAP head-
quarters in the postwar period. General Willoughby replied that he was for-
bidden by oflScial directive to testify on the contents of the files of the tliree em-
ployees involved. Each of these three persons, namely, Miriam S'. Farley, An-
drew Gi ajdanzev, and T. A. Bisson, was an active leader of the Institute of Pa-
cific Relations prior to, during, and subsequent to their assignments to Tokyo.
It is respectfully rquested that the contents of tliese files be made available
to the members of the Internal Security Subcommittee in order that they may
translate the information in such files into evidence for the subcommittee, if
the facts wai'rant such action. Naturally, if any confidential sources of in-
formation must be protected, the subcommittee will scrupulously protect iden-
tities.
Very sincerely yours,
Pat McCarran.
I would like that introduced.
The Chairsian. It will be inserted.
(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Morris was
marked "Exhibit No. 264" and filed for the record.)
Mr. MoRuis. On September 19, 1951, over the signature of Harry
Truman, President, we received a letter reading :
Dear Senator McCarran : I have your letter asking that the files of Miriam S.
Farley, Andrew Grajdanzev, and T. A. Bisson be made available to the Senate In-
ternal Security Subcommittee.
I am informed that none of these persons is now employed by the Federal
Government. However, all three were formerly employed at the headquarters
of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan. According to the
records of tlie Department of tiie Army, Miriam S. Farley was employed there
from January to May 1946; Andrew Grajdanzev was employed from January
1946 to August 1947 ; and T. A. Bisson was employed from October 1945 to May
1947.
I have asked the Secretary of the Army to make available to the subcommit-
tee the employment records of these three persons. However, for reasons which
I have set forth at length on a number of occasions, I do not feel that the in-
902 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
formation so made available to the subcommittee shoulcl include investigative
data of a confidential nature.
Sincerely yours,
Harry Truman.
T would like to have that introduced, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It may be inserted.
(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Morris was
marked "Exhibit No. 265" and filed for the record.)
Mr. Morris. On August 27, 1951, over the signature of Pat Mc-
Carran, chairman, a letter was sent to the Hon. Dean Acheson.
Senator Ferguson. JNIight I go back to this and ask what the em-
ployment records of the three persons mean to us ? It only means the
dates, does it not ?
Mr. Morris. We have received nothing. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. But it is all confidential data and the personnel
file is kept from us ?
Mr. Morris. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. The reason for discharge if they were dis-
charged, recommended for their employment, and so forth?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Will you read this, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. This is a letter dated August 27, 1951, addressed to
Hon. Dean Acheson from Pat McCarran :
Mt Dear Mr. Secretary : The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee intro-
duced into the record on.Auwst 23, 1951, two items from the Daily Worker,
copies of wliich are enclosed herewith. One is dated October 4, 1942, pages 1
and 5, and is an article by Mr. Earl Browder, general secretary of the Com-
munist Party U. S. A., on the State Department ; and the second is an article
entitled "Welles States United States Policy on China," published October 16,
1942, pages 1 and 2.
The second article is preceded by a statement that the memorandum was the
result of an interview between Mr. Earl Browder and ]Mr. Robert Minor, both
representing the Communist Party, U. S. A., Under Secretary of State, Mr.
Sumner Welles, and Mr. Lauehlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the Pres-
ident, held on October 12, 1942.
It was pointed out in the course of the hearing that in fairness to the State
Department it miglit be well to request a brief statement on this matter fi'om
the Department. In this connection, we would appreciate the following infor-
mation :
1. Was there an interview held at the State Department in which Mr. Earl
Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, INIr. Sumner Welles, and Mr. Lauehlin Currie par-
ticipated on October 12, 1942?
2. Who arranged this interview and how was it arranged?
3. Is the enclosed memorandum, as taken from the Daily W^orker of October
16, 1942, a true copy of the memorandum submitted by Mr. Sumner Welles and
Mr. Lauehlin Currie on that date?
Your kind cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.
The reply dated September 1, 1951, is signed by Jack K. McFall,
Assistant Secretary, and reads as follows :
My Dear Senator McCarran : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
August 27, 1951, addressed to Secretary Acheson requesting information con-
cerning an alleged meeting held at the State Department October 12. 1942, in
which Earl Browder, Robert Minor, Sumner Welles, and Lauehlin Currie par-
ticipated.
The Department received a similar request from a INIember of Congress some
time ago and at that time made a thorough but unsuccessful search of de-
partmental files for evidence of such a meeting. These efforts to obtain in-
formation respecting the meeting were complicated by the fact that the De-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 903
partiuent officers who reportedly participated were no longer with the De-
partment. , . ^ , J. ■ .
The Department will again examine its files with a view to obtaining in-
formation bearing on the specific questions in your letter of August 27 and
will write you further upon completion of this reexamination.
Tlie CiiAiKMAN. What is the date of that letter again?
j\rr. Mandel. The date is September 1, 1951.
Then on September 21, 1951, a telephone message came to the
office from Mr. Holland, Chinese Affairs Division of the State De-
partment, -who said that they are vv'orking on the answer to the letter
of August 27 in regard to Browder. This requires considerable re-
search^ but they waiit us to know that they are working on it. That
is not a verbatim transcript of the message.
Mr. INIoRRis. I would like those two letters to go in the record,
along with the telephon.e conversation as read by Mr. Mandel, and
given the next exhibit numbers.
The Chairman. They will be inserted.
(The documents referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel were
marked as "Exhibit Nos. 266, 267, and 288" and hied for the record.)
Mr. Mandel. This is a letter from Senator Pat McCarran dated
July 10, 1951, to the Honorable Dean Acheson :
My Dear Mr. Secretary : Perhaps it might save some time for all of us if, in
addition to my previous requests for information on loyalty cases, you sent
us a complete list of individuals dropped or permitted to resign from the State
Department since the end of 19-14 because of loyalty considerations.
Thank you for your courtesy in this matter.
The reply is dated August 2, 1951, from the Department of State,
signed Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary:
My Dear Senator McCarran : I refer to your letter of July 10, 1951, in
which you request to be supplied with a complete list of the individuals who
were dropped or permitted to resign from the State Department since the end
of 1944 because of loyalty considerations.
I regret that I am precluded from furnishing you with the information which
you requested, by reason of the President's directive of March 13, 1948 (Fed-
eral Register, March 16, 194S), with regard to the confidential status of em-
ployee loyalty records.
Mr. Morris. JNIr. Chairman, I would like those tvro letters intro-
duced and marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.
Tlie Ciiairiman. They may be inserted.
(The documents referred to and read by Mr. Mandel were marked
as "Exhibits Nos. 269 and 270" and filed for the record.)
Mr. Mandel. This is a letter dated August 31, 1951, addressed to
Hon. Dean Acheson and signed by Eva B. xVdams, administrative
assistant to Senator McCarran :
In connection with some matters now under consideration by the Senate In-
ternal Security Subcommittee, we will have occasion to refer to certain memo
randa from Foreign Service officers quoted in part on pages 5(>4 to 5157 of the
State Department's publication "Tlie United States Relations with China."
In all fairness to the Department and the individuals involved, we would like the
full documents for our use rather than the excerpts quoted. We would appre-
ciate your sending us the full memoranda from which the quotations were taken.
Thank you for your cooperation,
Sincerely yours,
Eva B. Adams.
Tliat refers to the reports of Davies. Ludden, and Service, along
with Emmerson, in the white paper. The reply is dated September
904 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
12, 1951, Department of State, signed by W. K. Scott, Acting Deputy
Under Secretary :
My Dear Senator McCarran : The receipt is acknowledged of Miss Adams'
letter of August 31, 1951, requesting the full text of certain memoranda quoted
in part in pages 564 to 576 of the Department publication "United States Rela-
tions With China."
The Department will examine its files for the documents in question and will
communirntp with you further respecting this matter.
Sincerely yours,
(For the Secretary of State).
The Chatrman. Wliat is the date of that letter ?
Mr. Mandel. September 12, 1951.
Mr. Morris. I recommend that these two letters be introduced into
the record and be marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.
The Chairman. They will be inserted.
(The documents referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandell were
marked as "Exhibits Nos. 271 and 272" and filed for the record.)
Mr. Morris. I have just one more exchange, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Has any further reply come from the State De-
partment on that last letter ?
Mr. Mandel. I am searching to find if there is any further reply.
This is a letter dated September 12, 1951, to the Hon. Dean Acheson
from Senator Pat McCarran :
My Dear Mr. Secretary : For puriwses of use by the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee, we would like to have a copy of a report sent to the State Depart-
ment by John Kenneth Emmerson, dated February 25, 1946, entitled "Political
Factors in the Present Japanese Situation," and another dated January 5, 1945,
entitled "The Japanese Communist Party."
We would like to use this material in connection with a hearing on Friday,
September 14. We shall be glad to send a messenger to the Department if you
will telephone us that this material is available.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Pat McCarran, Chadrman.
On Thursday, September 13, we received a telephone message from a
Mr. Anderson of the State Department, extension 2206, in reference to
the documents mentioned in our letter of September 12, 1951, telling
us we would hear further.
On September 14 Mr. Walter K. Scott of the State Department
called and stated that a letter "is being written us that they will not
be able to release the documents requested."
We did not receive the letter for unexplained reasons, but we got
this letter over the telephone from the State Department that they
had sent us dated September 19, 1951 :
My Dear Senator McCarran : This is in reply to your request for copies of
two reports sent to the State Department by Mr. John*Keiineth Emmerson, one
dated February 25, 1946, entitled "Political Factors in the Present Japanese
Situation," and another dated January 5, 1945, entitled "The Japanese Commu-
nist Party."
It is the view of the Department that preserving the integrity of the reporting
by departmental officers is a matter of principle of the highest importance. In
the present context, the release of these reports by individual officers would
undoubtedly have the effect of inhibiting the free and frank expression of views
by officers in the field in their reports to the Department. For that reason,
the re(iuest must be respectfully declined.
As this matter is of great importance to the Department, I should very much
appreciate an opportunity to discuss it with you at your convenience.
Sincerely,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 905
Signed by Mr. Webb, Acting Secretary,
Mr. Morris. I would like those letters to go in the record, together
with the memoranda and marked with the next consecutive exhibit
numbers.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The documents referred to and read by Mr. Mandel were marked
as "Exhibits Nos. 273, 374, and 275," and filed for the record.)
Mr. Morris. I would like the record to show that Professor Cole-
grove is here today under subpena, and we are going to aslc him to
testify about a meeting that took place 2 years ago. Mr. Chairman,
there is a transcript of this meeting, and we have requested it and it
has been denied us.
Senator Ferguson. I do not want to take time now, but I do want
to comment on some of this information that is now put in the record
about the cooperation of the executive branch, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Certainly.
Will you be sworn? You do solemnly swear that the testimony
you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. CoLEGRovE. I do.
TESTIMONY OF KENNETH COLEGHOVE, NOKTHWESTEEN
UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, ILL.
Senator Ferguson. We asked the professor to come here and he has
been waiting quite a while. I did want the record to show that I did
not want the record to stand as it was.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter,
Professor ?
Mr. Colegrove. My name is Kenneth Colegrove. My address is
Harris Hall 305, Northwestern University, Evanston, 111.
Mr. Morris. What are your present duties ?
JMr. Colegrove. I am professor of political science, Northwestern
University.
Mr. Morris. How long have you held that position ?
Mr. Colegrove. I have held that position since 1919. I have been
absent from Northwestern University on sabbaticals, traveling in
Europe and Asia, but the position has been held since 1919.
Mr. Morris. What has been your major assignment in Northwestern ?
Mr. Colegro\te. Teaching political science, particularly the field of
international law and international relations and also Asiatic politics
in government.
Mr. Morris. What 'degrees do you hold, Professor?
Mr. Colegrove. I have an A. B. degree from the State University
of Iowa, a Ph. D. from Plarvard University. Columbia University
gave me an honorary Doctor of Letters some years ago.
Mr. Morris. When was that?
Mr. Colegro\t2. That was in 1945.
Mr. Morris. Professor, what books have you written?
Mr. Colegrove. I have written one book on Militarism in Japan, in
1936 ; a book on International Control of Aviation. That was back
in 1930. I have written a book on United States Senate and W^orld
Peace, in 1944.
906 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Professor, what has been your specialty in interna-
tional affairs?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. My specialty has been international control of avia-
tion and treaty-making in the United States, and then government
and ])olitics and diplomacy of Japan. I might say that my studies on
Japan amoimt to about 20 articles which are published in the Amer-
ican Political Science Review, the American Journal of International
Law and other learned journals.
Mr. INIoRRis, Professor, when did you first join the Institute of
Pacific Relations?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I joined at an early date. I am sorry to say I didn't
refresh my memory on that, but somewhere in the middle of the thir-
ties, I think.
Mr. Morris. How long have you remained a member of the institute ?
Mr. Colegrove. I have been off and on, a member of the institute.
You joined the institute simply by paying your dues. That is all it
amounts to.
May I say I joined the institute back in the early thirties because at
that time the institute had the reputation of unbiased scientific system
of investigation and many of the books that it published and the
survey which it published were very excellent helps in teaching and
in research.
It also purported at that time to be wholly unbiased, wholly sci-
entific, and a very large number of professors and libraries subscribed
to it. I think most of the members like myself became members in
order to get the publications rather than to participate in the studies.
Senator Ferguson. The studies were done by a group that could
spend the time and the effort?
Mr. Colegro"st3. Yes,
Senator Ferguson, The books that were sent out to the student of
international affairs and teachers, you did want to be in a position to
get these as they came out?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. We referred" our students to these studies.
They were excellent studies on the Avhole. Sometimes you coidd detect
a bias but you attached that to the writer rather than to the institute
itself.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know people were writing under ficti-
tious names or aliases?
Mr. Colegrove. I didn't realize that ^yith reference to the Institute
of Pacific Relations.
Senator Ferguson. That Avas not what the teacher really wanted.
He wanted to know who the writer was, his experience, et cetera?
Mr. CoLEGRO\T.. Exactly.
Mr. Morris. Professor, were you associated with the publication
Amerasia?
Iklr. Colegrove. Yes; I was, from the first issue down to the time
when I resigned.
Mr. Morris. Was the first issue in 1937?
Mr. Colegrove. 1987. I resigned from the advisory board. I was
a member of what was called the advisory board of editors from 1937
until 1942 when T resignod fii'st and was persuaded to come back.
Then I resigned for good in 1943.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 907
Mr. jNIorris. Will you tell us the circumstances surrounding your
first beconnuf^ associated with the publication and the two resignations
you have just mentioned?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I was invited to join the editorial board by Fred-
erick Field Avho was and still is a very personable young man.
Senator Eastland. What year was that ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. That was' in 1936, the year before the first pub-
lication.
At that time the American people were not widely awake to Asia
and Asiatic problems. I was among those who felt we ought to know
more about Asia, that we ought to study Asia more in the schools
and we ought to have mor.i information with reference to Asia and
we ought to awaken a large public opinion with reference to Asia.
America knew a great deal about Europe but Asia had been very
greatly neglected. What Frederick Fiekl and what Mr. Jaff'e and
others connected with Amerasia, prof>osed to do was to publish a
monthly journal called Amerasia, America-Asia, running the two
together, which would translate into popular language the learning
regarding current affairs in Asia. To me that was a very attractive
proposition. I think most of the editors, most of the scholars who
agreed to become editors, felt that they were really doing a service
to the American people and doing a service to the schools, doing a
service to public opinion, by serving on this Amerasia.
The first numbei-s of Amerasia were excellent. Some of the very
best things we have on Asia were published in Amerasia.
The Chairman. Would jou raise your voice just a bit, Professor?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. Yes.
Some very good articles were published in Amerasia. I did not de-
tect any special line in 1937, 1938, and 1939. I knew that some of the
editorial board were attached preeminently to the American inter-
ests, looked at the national interest of the American people as first
and foremost. I knew that others were not so careful of the Ameri-
can interests and sympathized with revolutionar}- processes, some of
which are rather dangerous.
I thought at the time it was a well-balanced board. All views were
expressed there.
Mr. Morris. Professor, looking back do you think there was a line
there or do you think you just did not detect a line?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. In the first few years as I look over the old num-
bers I would say there was no line to bo easily detected. Eater on
the line appeared, especially in articles by a Chinese scholar by the
name of Chi.
Senator Ferguson. What was the line, Professor?
Mr. CoLEGRO\'E. It is very hard to say exactly what the line was.
When I use "the line," I mean a person is following the policy of
Soviet Russia.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, if you had followed the line you
would have gone to the Kremlin?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes ; the line would go back to the Kremlin.
]\Ir. Morris. You say that is right ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. That is what I meant by party line.
22848— 52— pt. 3 14
908 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Professor. I "would like to offer you an exchange of
correspondence involving you, which Mr. Mandel will certify came
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The Chairman. Do you want the witness to see them first?
ISIr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. CoLEGROVE. This is a letter from Mr. Lockwood.
Mr. Morris. There were three letters, a copy of a letter from Mr.
Lockwood to you and the second letter is one which purports to be an
original of yours.
Mr. CoLEGEOVE. I recall the correspondence.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that?
Mr. Mandel. These letters dated November 30, 1942, November
20, 1942, November 18, 1942, and November 17, 1942, were taken from
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Morris. Professor, will you tell us your recollection of this
exchange of correspondence ?
Mr. Colegrove. As I just said, I served on this advisory editorial
board from 1937 on. I was one of the few members from the West,
and I must say I never attended a meeting of the editorial board,
although I understand meetings were held about every month in New
York City. I never happened to be in New York City when such
a meeting was held.
In the bsginning it was my understanding with the board that I
would be given the right to approve all the articles on Japan that were
published in Amerasia. These articles were sent out to me in bunches.
I read them and sent back my comments. Later on I noticed that
Amerasia did publish some articles on Japan which I had not O. K.'d.
I was very busy at the time and didn't protest at this seeming neglect:
Then around 1940 a number of articles began to be published in
Amerasia by Kate Mitchell and by Mr. Mattuch and Mr. Gohol very
antagonistic to the British rule in India and also to the Dutch rule in
Indonesia.
During the war Great Britain became our ally, or we became an
ally of Great Britain and I thought this was very bad policy to publish
these articles without having articles on the other side. I protested
at this lack of impartiality and scholarship. Mr. Jaffe promised me
that I would have the riglit before any article attacking British rule
in India or Dutch rule in Indonesia
INIr. Morris. Will you please speak up ?
Mr. Colegrove. American articles were published in Amerasia at-
tacking the British rule in India and the Dutch rule in Indonesia.
That of course was following the Communist line. I didn't know that
at the time. I thought it was very unscholarly to publish articles
attacking British rule in India and Dutch rule in Indonesia without
publishing articles on the other side. Mr. Jaffe agreed with me on
this matter because I suppose he wanted to keep the old members
of the board together, and said that before any article attacking the
British in India or the Dutch in Indonesia was published, he would
allow me to secure some other writer to publish an article on the
other side.
Mr. Jaffe, I am sorry to say, in my view broke that agreement, and
in the fall of 1942 I i-esigned from the editorial board, saying this was
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 909
not following^ tlie scholarly procedure. This correspondence relates
to my resignation.
Mr. JafFe later on persuaded me to come back, with the very firm
promise that it would never happen again. I regret to say that it
did happen again and I resigned for good in April 1943.
Mr. Morris. Professor, docs ]\Ir. Lockwood concede there was a line
to Amerasia in his letter to you there?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. I am afraid he does. ]Mr. Lockwood seems to be
on both sides.
Mr. Morris. Will you read the second paragraph ?
This is his letter ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. What is the date ?
Mr. Colegro\t3. November 30, 1942.
It seems to me that as matters now stand the editors are put in an emliar-
rassing position by the fact that the material in the monthly issue is unsigned
and therefore all the editorial board seems to take responsibility for everything
that is said whether they agree with it or not and even when they haven't seen
it in advance. Jaffe recognized the validity of this olijection and promised to
think it over. We haven't had a chance to discuss it again.
In later correspondence Jaffe promised that would not be done in
the future.
Mr. INIoRRis. I ask that these four letters identified by Professor
Colegrove and by Mr. jMandel as letters from the files of the Institute
of Pacific Relations be introduced into the record and be marked with
the next consecutive exhibit numbers.
The Chairman. There seems to be something more than letters
here.
Mr. Morris. This is just our summary of the exchange. The four
letters should go in the I'ecord.
The Chairman. The letters will be inserted into the record.
(The documents referred to were marked as exhibits Nos. 276, 277,
278, and 279, and are as follows :)
Exhibit No. 279
Northwestern University,
November 17, 19Jf2.
Mr. PniiJp J. Jaffe,
Amerasia, 125 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.
Dear Mr. Jaffe : I am writing you regarding the lack of objectivity and
scholarsliip displayed in recent articles in Amerasia dealing with India.
In the October 2.5 issue of Amerasia occurs an article by Mr. Kurt II. Mattusch
under the title "The American Public and India," which is not only bitterly
anti-British but also unscholarly.
For instance, on page 403 he says that the debate on the Cripps Mission in the
House of Lords envisaged safe reservations for British interests within India.
As a matter of fact, tlie debate of July 30 was on Europeans in India and was
not on the Cripps mission. The Marquess of Crewe, whose speech is quoted, was
not an official spokesman. Mr. Mattusch completely ignores the statement of the
Duke of Devonshire, who, speaking for the Government, said : "It is really
impossible to make an offer both of complete self-government and to exact
guaranties for specified British interests."
Again, his statement aboiit taxes and the upkeep of Gibraltar, Malta, and Eden
is simply fantastic. Numerous other errors in this art'cle could be pointed out.
I wish also to refer to the number of Amerasia published in May and devoted
to India and the war. This number contained numerous misrepresentations tliat
910 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
DO scholar would tolerate. For instance, on pages 4 to 8, the onus of defeat of
the Cripps mission seems to be laid on Mr. Jinnah, who is pictured as a scheming
politician. Now, everyone with even a slight acquaintance with Indian affairs
knows that the working committee of the Indian National Congi'ess contains
politicians just as scheming and sellisli as Mr. .Jinnah. Nevertheless the com-
mentator ignores this fact.
The commentary also fails to give a proper consideration to Pakistan, to
explain tlie Moslem case, to give proper consideration to the plight of the untouch-
ables under the Hindu domination. It fails to call proper attention to the very
small percentage of Indian people, barely 10.000,000 out of 3S9,000,(X)0, who are
political-minded. A scholarly treatment of the question should point out all
these facts.
There is another consideration other than lack of scholarship in the publication
of these one-sided articles and comment. We are engaged cooperatively in a war
for the self-preservation of our institutions. Great Britain is our ally in this
war. The publication of articles which misrepresent the facts while attacking
Great Britain can do little else than impair our war effort. Loyalty to our own
country requires intellectual honesty and moderation in any criticism of our ally.
I find myself under necessity of resigning from the editorial board unless
Amerasia is willing to publish in the very near future two articles to offset the
above-mentioned anti-British articles. I would like to see this principle also
applied to the editorials.
it is a matter of deep regret to me to be compelled to write to you in this
fashion. There is nothing personal in my feelins; in this matter. But as a
teacher I cannot permit my name to be used on an editorial board of a magazine
which prin.ts such unscholarly and unfair articles without also publishing articles
on the other side.
It is probable that in any case I ought not be on the editorial board, inasmuch
as I live so far from New York City and cannot attend the periodical meetings
of the editorial board.
Please do not consider this letter as any ultimatum in this matter. T have
nothing but the most friendly feeling toward you personally and all my colleagues
on the board.
Faithfully yours,
Kenneth Colegbove,
Professor of Political Science.
Exhibit No. 278
Northwestern UNivERSiri%
^ College of Liberal Arts,
Evanston, 111, November 18, 1942.
Mr. William Lt^iCKWoon,
Secrefari/, American Committee for International Studies,
Princeton, N. J.
Dear Mr. Lockwood : I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have just
sent to Mr. Philip Jaffe, editor of Amerasia. I regret very much the necessity
of sending this letter, but I feel that I cannot remain a meml)er of the editorial
board of a magazine which publishes articles severely criticizing our ally Great
Britain unless those articles are scholarly in character and also unless the
British side, or again the Moslem side, is also expressed on the pages of the
ma' azine.
I suiijjo^e. anyway, it is time for me to withdraw from the editorial board,
inasmuch as, living in Chicago. I cannot attend the Ixiard meeetings. I hope,
of course, if the editorial board cannot arrange to publish some articles on the
other side of the Indian question, and if I find it necessary to withdraw from
the board, Amerasia will publish my letter of resignation, indicating exactly my
reason for retiring.
Hastily yours,
Kenneth Colegrove,
Profe.^sor of Political Science.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 911
Exhibit No. 277
The Institute for Advanced Study,
Princeton, N. J., November 20, 1942.
Mr. WiU-iAM W. LocKwooD,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.
Dear Bill : I am sorry we opened the enclosed letter from Kenneth Colegrove,
which is not on American committee business even though it is addressed to you
as secretary of the committee.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Ed.
(Typed ) Edward Meade Earle.
P. S. — Incidentally, I was pretty peeved about the review of Mackinder, which
I thought flippant.
Exhibit No. 276
November 30, 1942.
Prof. Kenneth Colegrove,
105 Harris Hall, Northwestern University,
Evanston, III.
Dear Professor Colegrove : I have read with interest and some sympathy
your letter to Phil Jaffe on Amerasia. I felt the same way about the treatment of
India and have said so to him and to Kate Mitchell.
It seems to be that as matters now stand the editors are put in an embarras-
sing position by the fact that the material in the monthly issue is unsigned ; and,
therefore, all the editorial board seems to take responsibility for everything
that is said, whether they agree with it or not and even when they haven't seen
it in advance. .Jafl'e recognized the validity of tliis objection and promised to
think it over. We haven't had a chance to discuss it again.
For some time I've been frankly rather puzzled as to whether to remain on the
boai'd, Ijeing torn between reluctance to sponsor the "line"' being taken and, on the
other hand, the feeling that Amerasia had a lot of useful stuff in it. Also, I
dislike making any sort of break with Jaffe and Miss Mitchell, both of whom
are close personal friends of mine.
It may be that the whole board of outsiders ought to disappear and the maga-
zine be made frankly the personal vehicle of the two people doing all the work.
They are reluctant to have that happen. The real reason I haven't withdrawn,
conlidentially, is the hope that sooner or later some kind of combination could
be made between Amerasia and the two IPR periodicals which would strengthen
their total usefulness to the public and eliminate the present duplication and
competition. From the IPR standpoint, this of course would preclude a con-
sistent and personalized editorial line, though it wouldn't by any means preclude
a forum of opinion presenting a variety of views. Personnel is getting so scarce
that there ought to be some combination in this general field of Far East peri-
odicals. The new form of Amerasia serves really to increase the duplication
and competition with Pacific Affairs and tlie Far Eastern Survey, particularly the
former.
My own ideas aren't very clear on this, and I'm writing you my puzzlement
ii\ the hope that you may have some suggestions. As a nonstalf person who has
been interested both in Amerasia and in the IPR, I would very much appreciate
having your views as to what we ought to do.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood.
Note. — I understand this is what happened : IPR people would not go along
with Jaffe's personal views as reflected in Amerasia, which had started as an
objective and substantiated paper. — Clayton Lane, January, 1950.
(Above is handwritten.)
912 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Were you invited to participate in Government serv-
ice during the war ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I was invited to be a consultant by tlie Office
of Strategic Services.
Mr. Morris. By whom ?
Mr. CoLEGRO^^. I was invited by Charles Burton Foss. I might
say as a matter of amusement here, that during the war a great many
of us old professors were invited to serve in Government agencies by
our bright young students who had gone into the Government serv-
ice and gotten into positions of some importance. Charles Burton
Foss was a former student of mine. He was inviting his old professor
to come down and help him during the war, which I did.
]\Ir. Morris. What other invitation did you have to join the Gov-
ernment service. Professor?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. During the war my consultation with the Office of
Strategic Services was my only service. Immediately after the war,
I was invited to become a consultant for General MacArthur, the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo. That was in
1946.
Mr. Morris. Did you as a matter of fact work for OSS, Professor ?
Mr. CoLEGRO^^. Yes. I served as a consultant on four or five differ-
ent occasions in Washington for the OSS. I might say that Charles
Burton Foss was first the Chief of the Japan Section of the OSS under
the Far Eastern Division. Then he succeeded Carl Eemer and was
Chief of the Far Eastern Division of OSS.
Mr. Morris. Were you ever asked to join the Office of War Infor-
mation ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I w^as offered the post of head of the Japan-
ese desk in the OWI in Japan. I was asked to take that position by
Prof. Owen Lattimore, who was serving the Office of War Informa-
tion from the San Francisco position.
Mr. Morris. Did you accept that offer. Professor ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. No ; I declined that position.
Mr. Morris. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Lattimore at
the time of your declination. Professor ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. Professor Lattimore wrote me several letters
and then asked me to meet him as he came through from Washington
to San Francisco ; asked me to meet him in Chicago. I met him.
Mr. Morris. Will you relate to us what happened during the course
of that conversation, Professor ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. That was in December 1943, and Lattimore again
offered me the post of the Japan desk in San Francisco. He seemed
a little annoyed that I didn't accept it. We had dinner together. I
was courteously awaiting until his plane took off for San Francisco;
so we continued the conversation. We discussed first the position
that Amerasia had taken with reference to the British in India, and I
objected to Amerasia's attitude and articles and said that was one of
the points why I resigned. Lattimore seemed to take great offense at
that.
Senator Ferguson. At your position ?
Mr. Coi^.ROVE. Yes, at my position ; very great offense at my argu-
ments, and I was entirely wrong regarding it. For some reason or
other, we got on the subject of the Dutch in Indonesia. Lattimore
was still more furious at my contradicting him with reference to the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 913
benefits of Dutch rule in Indonesia. I was opposed to liquidating
Dutch imperialism in Indonesia immediately after the war. Then
I mentioned something about the Chinese Communists, and this sur-
prised me a great deal to have Lattimore, whom I thought by this
time had lost some of his control, claim that he had more information
on China than I had, which was, of course, true. He went so far
as to say that Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung were real
democrats and that they were really agrarian reformers and had no
connection with Soviet Russia.
Senator Ferguson. You say Professor Lattimore said the Chinese
Communists were democrats, agrarian reformers, and had no con-
nection with Soviet Russia?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Had you taken the opposite view ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Oh, yes. I think most scholars felt the same way
at the time.
Senator Ferguson. That you were right ?
Mr. Colegrove. I felt I was right.
Senator Ferguson. Did most scholars feel
Mr. Colegrove. At that time I think most impartial scholars were
very hesitant to believe that the Chinese Communists did not have
some connection with. Soviet Russia, that Mao Tse-tung was a Marx-
ian doctrinnaire and not a mere agrarian reformer, and certainly
not a democrat in any respect.
I told Lattimore on this occasion that I felt that he was saying
something he didn't believe himself, and I was surprised to see Latti-
more back down.
Mr. INIoRRis. You say he was conversing with you in a state of
temper ?
Mr. Colegrove. I think he got very annoyed with me and didn't
exercise caution which he generally does exercise.
JMr. Morris. Did he mention whether or not he felt that the Chinese
Communists were receiving aid from Soviet Russia ?
Mr. Colegrove. He claimed they were not. In fact, he went so
far as to say there was no means of communication.
The Chairman. Was it not quite well known at that time that young
Chinese had been taken to Moscow and indoctrinated and trained?
That was a matter of pretty common knowledge ; was it not ?
Mr. Colegrove. Certainly, among persons who followed the situa-
tion in Asia, that was very well known.
The Chairman. Mao Tse-tung was one of them ?
Mr. Colegroms. Well, Mao Tse-tung had not gone to Moscow. He
was one of the few who did not. Every one of his lieutenants were
Moscow-trained. That applied especially to Chou En Lai.
Senator Ferguson. Were you not somewhat surprised at Latti-
more's stand being in the OWI, Lattimore taking the stand he did in
relation to these Communists in China?
Mr, Colegrove. I was amazed, frankly. I got the impression that
perhaps Professor Lattimore was not folloAving instructions from the
State Department that he should be following with reference to his
duties in San Francisco.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I meant.
Mv. Colegrove. About this time the official view of the United
States was that nothing disparaging should be said of the Japanese
914 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Emperor, the Tano system; nothing should be done to arouse hatred
or antagonism of the imperial household, because my understanding is
that Mr. Grew, who was the Under Secretary of State, had the opinion
that the Emperor would be of very great assistance in bringing about
the surrender of Japan when finally Japan should wisely surrender.
The militarists would never give in. So, if you could only get the
Emperor, you would save a situation.
Owen Lattimore's view from conversations was, as I recall, that the
Emperor's system was the greatest deterrent to democracy in Jai)an
and that the Emperor and his whole family should be exterminated.
Senator Eastland. You mean killed ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Killed, destroyed. Publicly he did not go that far.
He went that far privately.
Senator Ferguson. With you?
Mr. CoLEGKOVE. Yes. Publicly his proposal was that the Japanese
Emperor and his whole family should be sent over to China to be
dealt with by the Chinese. Everybody vvdio knew Asia at that time
would realize the Chinese would annihilate the Emperor and his
family or put them beyond all power of living.
Senator Ferguson. Professor, this line that Lattimore was taking,
both on the Emperor and the situation of the Chinese, was that, in your
opinion, the Soviet line ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. That has always been the Soviet line. The
Coimnunist Party in Japan ever since 1921 has opposed the Emperor.
That has been the line of the Communist Party in Japan while they
were underground. They were underground from 1923 on. Of
course, the Communist Party, line in Japan was dictated by the
Kremlin.
Senator Ferguson. But here was a man, Owen Lattimore, that was
well informed as to America's stand, or should have been, and as to
the world situation. When he was advocating to you privately these
matters, in your opinion, as you said to him once, I believe, that he
was advocating something that he ci)uld hardly believe himself but
he was still advocating it, that was the Communist line?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. 1 do not charge him
Senator Ferguson. With being a Communist?
Mr. Colegrove. No. I did not charge him with following the
Communist line. I simply told him I was sure he knew better, that
Mao Tse-tung was not a democrat and a mere agrarian reformer. I
probably did not make my statement clear here when I said 1 talked
these tilings over with Lattimore on the occasion of our visit in
December 1943.
Also I discussed with Lattimore the policy of the United States
toward the Emperor that was being followed by the State Depart-
ment, the War Department and the OWI at that time.
Senator Eastland. Why did you decline a job in San Francisco?
Mr. Colegrove. Largely personal. I did not trust Owen Lattimore.
1 did not care to be associated with him.
Senator Eastland. You thought they were following the Com-
munist line out there?
Mr. Colegrove. I can't say that I was that alert. Senator. Some
of us professors are not as alert as we should be. I could not say that
Owen Lattimore was following the Communist line. I didn't like his
attitude on Asiatic problems.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 915
Senator Eastland. You say it was a Communist line?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I say it was the Connnunist line.
Senator Eastland. You say you did not trust him. Therefore, you
did not take the job. Is that right?
Mr. Colegkove. Yes.
Senator Eastland. Why did you not trust him?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. For those reasons.
Senator Eastland. Because he was following the Communist line?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I would say in the back of my mind that
would stand out, but at that time I would not have said that Owen
Lattimore is following the Communist line.
Senator Ferguson. You have no doubt about it now ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. That was the Communist line. As you look back
over the situation and compare it with the editorials in the Daily
Worker, you can see definitely that was the Communist line.
Mr. Morris. Professor, on the 10th of July of this year while you
were examined in executive session you were shown a letter dated
July 10, 1938, by Owen Lattimore to Mr. Carter. I would like to
show this to you once again and ask you if you will make any general
connnent on the last full paragraph on the first page and the first
paragraph on the second page.
The Chairman. What is this?
Mr. Morris. This, Senator, is a letter which has been introduced
in evidence previously, a letter from Owen Lattimore to Edward C.
Carter, dated July 10. 1938, and officially made a part of our record.
The Chairman. You are drawing his attention to certain para-
graphs?
Mr. Morris. Two paragraphs.
The CiiAiR3iAN. What is your question?
Mr. Morris. I have just called attention to the fact that he was
shown that letter in executive session and asked to comment on it, I
am going to ask him if he will make any comments now.
The Chairman. I think it would be well for you to read the para-
graphs.
Mr. CoLEGROVE. One paragraph that you refer to here Professor
Lattimore says :
I think that yon are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section
of tlie inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the ab o-
Uitely essential radical aspects, but can be depended ou to do it with the right
touch.
Chi was a member of the editorial board of Amerasia and I did not
know at that time he was a Communist, but it was very evident that
he was following the Communist line.
Mr. Morris. It was evident to you. Professor, that Chi, while you
were on the board of Amerasia with him, was follovving the Com-
munist Party line?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. That came gradually into our minds, that he was
following the Communist line. At first we thought he was a bright
young Chinese scholar who had a mass of information, which he did.
He had a mass of information. We finally realized it was along the
Communist line entirely.
The Chairman. When you use the term "we" aj-e you using the
editorial "we" applying to yourself?
916 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. CoLEGRovE. I would say it included members of the committee
like Cyrus Peake and myself. I assume otlier members who were very
sympathetic toward the Kremlin knew it all the time.
The last paragraph reads :
For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me tlnit the good scoring
position for the IPR differs with d'fferent countries. For Cli'na, my liunch is
that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position — far
enough not to be covered by the same label — but enough ahead of the active
Chinese liberals to be noticeable.
That sentence, together with his whole letter, seems to me to be one
of the most intellectually dishonest academic documents that I have
ever seen. This is a complete negation of what the IPR said to pro-
fessors and teachers all over the country that it was. In its solicita-
tion for membership it had always emphasized the scholarly, scientific
viewpoint that it was presenting, amplified by the fact that it was
not trying to advocate the interest of any particular country but only
giving us the benefit of their researches and their scholarship.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, you thought it was an honest
organization and this sentence indicates to you that it was really a
fraud ?
Mr. CoLEGRO\TE. Ycs. This is fraudulent. This is one of the most
contemjDtible things I know from the whole academic world. Thou-
sands of university professors and hundreds of thousands of students
all over the country who were beginning to study Asia looked upon
this institute as an unbiased, wholly scientific institution engaged in
research, engaged in discovery of the truth and in not following any
line.
I and other scholars would have been shocked if we knew that one
official of the Institute of Pacific Relations was writing to the secre-
tary-general telling him to follow a certain line with reference to
China, Japan, with reference to Indonesia.
Senator Ferguson. Professor, to do it in such a way as to deceive
the people, not to come out and announce it was a Communist propa-
ganda agency but to deceive the people, isn't that true with that
sentence ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. It was shocking. It is almost revolting to
think that you yourself were misled by such an organization. This
will have done a very great injury to organized scholarship in the
United States. It is no wonder people are suspicious of the Rocke-
feller Foundation or of the Carnegie Corp. which gives so much
money to organizations of this sort.
Senator Ferguson. Then to realize those that had charge of it
would use it as a means of deceiving the people and use it really as a
propaganda agency or front ?
Mr. Colegrove. This shows behind the front the Institute of Pacific
Relations was nothing else than a propaganda organization support-
ing a line.
Senator Eastland. A Communist line?
Mr. Colegrove. In this case a Communist line.
Mr. Morris. Thank you. Professor.
This, Mr. Chairman, has already been introduced into the record as
exhibit No. 4 on the first day of the open hearing.
The Chairman. Let the record show exhibit No. 4 is the exhibit
in the hands of the witness at this time from which he testified.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 917
Mr. Morris. Professor Colegrove, did you attend a conference held
under the auspices of the State Department on October C, 7, and 8,
1949?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. I was invited to attend that conference. The
invitation came in a telegram signed by Dean Acheson, Secretary of
State.
Mr. Morris. What was your understanding of this conference,
Professor ?
Mr. Colegrove, My understanding had been that Professor Jessup
had been charged by the State Department with the formulation of
a new policy for China and that a committee had been set up with
Professor Jessup as chairman, President Case and Dr. Fosdick as
the two other members, and that Ambassador Jessup and the State
Department wished to receive advice from experts regarding what
the policy of the United States in China should be.
I might say the collapse of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Govern-
ment had occurred that summer.
Mr. Morris. Professor, were Messrs. Jessup, Fosdick, and Case all
three IPR men ?
Mr. Colegrove. I believe they were, but Mr. Jessup of course was
the member of the board of trustees. I believe Dr. Fosdick was also.
1 have always assumed that President Case was a member.
Mr. Morris. You testified, Professor, that this conference, to your
understanding, was called by Mr. Jessup in order to assist the Secre-
tary of State in formulating far-eastern. policy ?
Mr. Colegrove. I wouldn't like to be positive about that. I would
say that impression was that the list was prepared by Ambassador
Jessup. The invitation was over the signature of the Secretary of
State.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that the
conference we are now having testimony about is the conference, the
transcript of which was asked for by you of the State Department
and which was denied.
The Chairman. Let the record so show.
Mr. Morris. At the time of receiving a letter from the State Depart-
ment a list of consultants who did attend this conference was made
available. I would like now to show this list to Professor Colegrove
to refresh his recollection on the make-up of that particular con-
ference.
The Chairman. This is the list attached to the letter addressed to
me under date of September 12, 1951, over the signature of Jack K.
McFall, Assistant Secretary ; is that correct?
Mr. Morris. That is right.
Mr. Colegrove. May I use this ?
. Mr. Morris. Yes.
Would you just state that most of the participants of that confer-
ence were associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Colegrove. It seems to me, Mr. Morris, that most of these are
members of the IPR,_ and many of them are high-ranking officers.
The Chairman. High-ranking officers of what ?
Mr. Colegrove. Of the IPR, that is, members of the board of
trustees. I must say I was never a high-ranking officer in the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations. I was merely a member. Thousands of
918 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
people in the United States were members simply to subscribe to the
Survey and other publications.
The Chairman. Were you a member of the editorial staff ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. No; but I was a member of the advisory editorial
board of Amerasia but not of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I propose that the best way of identifj^-
ing or establishing whether or not these people were connected with
the Institute of Pacific Relations is during the course of the testimony
of the next wifness on this conference to ask Mr. Holland, presently
secretary-general, to confirm those who were associated with the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Mandel has made a compilation from
our records, but I suggest it is inadequate and that the best way of
establishing it would be to have Mr. Holland assert for our record who
the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations are.
The Chairman. He is coming on ?
Mr. Morris. No; but during the testimony of our next witness in
regard to this conference have Mr. Holland establish that fact.
The Chairman. Very well. As I understand the witness' testimony
now, he is saying that a considerable number of the names on that list
were high-ranking officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations ; is that
right?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes ; many were, not a majority, but many were.
Mr. Morris. Will you describe for us the developments of the con-
ference as they unfolded, Professor?
The Chairman. You did attend the conference, first of all ?
Mr. Coi.EGROVE. Yes, I was present during the 3 days that the con-
ference was held.
The Chairman. Where did it assemble?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. In the State Department, in the large conference
room I'ight off of the offices of the Secretary of State.
The Chairman. Who if anyone was the presiding officer ?
Mr. Colegrove. The presiding officer was Ambassador Jessup, but
Dr. Jessup was detained in Lake Success with the United Nations
affairs and was not present in the opening session.
Mr. Morris. He was present during the second and third sessions ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. Dr. Fosdick presided over the first day's
session.
Mr. Morris. What were some of the subjects discussed at that con-
ference ?
Mr. Colegrove. Mr. Morris, may I say with reference to giving
testimony on the subject of this conference in the State Department
that the State Department did say that the proceedings would be con-
fidential and would not be given to the press. The implication was
that members of the conference should not discuss this matter with
the press.
On the other hand, I take it that it is proper for any member of the
conference who is testifying before a Senate committee to speak very
frankly with reference to what was said and done in the conference.
Mr. SouRAViNE. It is not only proper, sir; you are under oath,
Mr. CoLEGROM-:. And must answer the questions.
Senator Ferguson. You were called in by the United States Gov-
ernment ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. The telegram was signed Dean Acheson.
Secretary of State.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 919
Senator Ferguson. You were acting as a Government official?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes.
Senator Fercuson. "Were you paid or not?
Mr. CoLEGROVE, Travel expenses were given and a per diem.
Senator Ferguson. You were to advise with the various members
there ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Advise with Ambassador Jessup's committee.
Senator Ferguson. It was public business; that is, the Govern-
ment was paying for it, setting it up and taxpayers" money was being
used 'for it?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes.
Mr. Morris. The obvious purpose was to formulate far eastern
policy ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. So we understood.
Senator Jenner. Were there any press releases issued from this
conference?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. Some time later, as I recollect, and I am
sorry I cannot give you the exact date, the State Department pub-
lished a list of consultants.
Senator Jenner. Did they publish any news or anything said in
the conference?
Mr. Colegrove. No. My understanding is they did not.
Mr. Morris. Was the question of Communist China discussed ?
JNIr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. The recognition of Communist China was
one of the very important questions discussed. When Ambassador
Jessup arrived he frankly said that the Department wanted the ad-
vice of these consultants on the question of recognition of Communist
China, on the question of the Japan Peace Treaty, on the question of
a Pacific pact, and on the question of giving economic aid to Commu-
nist and non-Communist countries in Asia. Those four subjects were
broadly discussed and a great many other subjects, too.
Mr. Morris. Was there a tendency of the various people during the
course of these 3 days to break clown into groups and take positions
on the subjects as they arose?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, there was that tendency. As you will notice, it
always occurs in a group of individuals. You can classify them more
or less closely into groups. If you are going to limit the groups to
thre'e. I would say that one group was very obviously pro-American in
its thinking, put America first, that is, foreign policy must serve the
national interest of the American people.
Mr. Morris. Did that group generally take a strong anti-Commu-
nist position?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. That group took a very strong anti-Communist posi-
tion. Now on the other side of this group they were not thinking so
much of America as they were thinking of other things and that group
tended to be sympathetic to Communistic China and very, very con-
siderate of the Kremlin.
Senator Eastland. Who was that group ?
Mr. CoLEGRo^^5. I would say the leader of that group, if you consider
he was a leader, was Professor Lattimore.
Senator Ferguson. Owen Lattimore?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Owen Lattimore. I would put in that group Mr.
Rosinger.
Mr. Morris. Is that Lawrence K. Rosinger?
920 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, of IPR.
Mr. Morris. I would like the record to show at this time that Law-
rence K. Rosinger has been identified by two witnesses as having been
a member of the Communist Party.
The Chairman. By two witnesses before this committee?
Mr. Morris. Before this committee.
Mr. CoLEGRovE. More or less, Professor Fairbank.
Mr. Morris. Prof. John K. Fairbank?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
To some extent E.eischauer of Harvard and Professor Peffer of
Columbia University.
Senator Eastland. As I understand. Ambassador Jessup invited
Owen Lattimore to a conference in Washington to advise and assist
in formulating United States Government's China policy and advise
with him on the Japanese Peace Treaty; is that right?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. Well, if Owen Lattimore received the very same
telegram that I received, it was signed by Dean Acheson, Secretary of
State.
Senator Eastland. You say the list was made up by Professor
Jessup ?
Mr. Colegrove. I assume that. I don't know ; that was the talk.
Mr. Morris. You do know that Professor Jessup was in charge of
this particular conference you attended ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. I think the Secretary of State would not
act very wisely if he didn't allow Ambassador Jessup to select his
own expert.
Senator Eastland. Was that in 1949 ?
Mr. Colegrove. October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.
Senator Ferguson. You mentioned the interest for America in the
first group and then you said there were others you thought were
thinking of something else than the primary interest of America and
her relations to the world. What was that other thing?
Mr. Colegrove. With reference to^this extreme group?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Colegrove. I felt that they were very sympathetic toward Chi-
nese Communists and also were extremely careful with reference to
the Kremlin.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, they were favoring, in 'your
opinion, the Communist line rather than the good interests of the
United States of America ?
Mr. Colegrove. That was my impression.
Senator Ferguson. From what was said ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
Senator Eastland. Did they advocate economic aid to Communist
China?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes, very, very strongly.
Senator Ferguson. And recognition of Communist China?
Mr. Colegrove. Immediate recognition of Communist China, and
were very much opposed to a Pacific pact.
The Chairman. You have named certain people who were present
at that meeting as belonging to that particular group that favored
Communist China and the Kremlin. Have you named all of them
that you can recall who belonged to that group?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 921
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I see one other name I should have thought of , Mr.
Benjamin H. Kizer, who is very decidedly of that group; sometimes
Eugene Staley, Professor Staley.
Senator Ferguson. Did the chairman take any side as to what
group he was with ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Ambassador Jessup gave no sign he was in favor
of one or the other. He w^as a good presiding officer. He was a good
parliamentarian. Ambassador Jessup is suave, courteous, almost
deferential. He knows how to cut off debate without offending any-
one's sensibilities. He is an excellent presiding officer.
At the same time Professor Jessup is a great scholar. I have very
great respect for his scholarship, his learning, and his books on inter-
national law particularly are very notable contributions.
In this conference Mr. Jessup did not indicate his own personal
attitude on any question whatsoever.
Mr. Morris. Professor Colegrove, as a matter of fact which group
dominated the conference ?
Mr. Colegrove. I felt that the group that was sympathetic to Red
China dominated the conference. Governor Stassen was among those
who were very much opposed to Soviet Russia. Ballantine, Joseph
W. Ballantine, was opposed. Professor Brodie was very much op-
posed. I was decidedly opposed myself. I think we could add the
name of Professor Buss as among those who took a strong anti-Com-
munist attitude. I felt that we were in the minority, I am sorry to
say.
Mr. Morris. And the people avIio did favor Communist China were
in the majority and they dominated the conference?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
Then the third group I mentioned was a group between, that was on
one side once and on the other side again, persons who were a little
unstable — well, a little undecided as to the position they wished to
follow.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may the record show at this time that
a subpena has been sent to Governor Stassen to appear before this
committee next Monday afternoon in connection with the testimony
given today by Professor Colegrove?
The Chairman. Very well. The subpena has been issued ?
Mr. Morris. It is going out today. Senator.
Mr. Colegrove. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have not had an op-
portunity to read the transcript that the State Department kept.
The Chairman. Was there a transcript ?
Mr. Colegrove. A transcript was made of everything by the State
Department. Governor Stassen was very shrewd; I believe he had
his own secretary there making a transcript. But I have had no
opportunity to review this, the proceedings, and I am speaking wholly
from my memory 2 years ago.
Senator Ferguson. You have spoken generally of opinion, so you
have not attempted to give specific statements.
Mr. Colegrove. Yes; except I would be specific on the question of
recognizing Red China. Mr. Lattimore was wholly for it. Mr.
Kizer was for it. Mr. Rosinger was for it and Mr. Staley Avas for it,
also Mr. Fairbank. I was opposed to it, Governor Stassen opposed to
it, Ballantine opposed to it, and Brodie opposed to it.
922 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Jenner. Was there anything discussed in this conference
with regard to our attitude toward Korea and Formosa?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. Owen Lattiniore, who had furnished the State
Department with a memoranda, proposed in that memoranda that
tlie United States immediately liquidate its responsibilities for Korea,
and in the conference he expressed the same view. I remember that
very distinctly.
Senator Eastland. As a loyal American, were you satisfied with
the men who were invited to that conference at the State Department
to advise Mr. Jessup on the formulation of China policy?
Mr. CoLEQROVE. Frankly, Senator, I was very much surprised.
Senator Eastland. You were disappointed, were you not?
Mr. CoLEGRovE. I was very much disappointed.
Senator Eastland. In fact, the group that had been invited was
the group largely that had betrayed the Chinese Government to the
Communists?
Mr. CoLEGRovE. That is exactly the situation.
Senator Eastland. In fact, there were no new experts but it was the
same crowd that had betrayed this country and sold China down the
river ?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. And the State Department knew their views.
Senator Eastland. Yes.
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I might add this, and I have nothing to back it up
except my impression — I thought the State Department in its brief-
ing was doing a little propaganda work on a professor such as myself.
Mr. Morris. Who did the briefing ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. There were several officers who briefed us. Nelson
Johnson of the Far Eastern Commission did a very good job of brief-
ing. I was very much disappointed in the briefing done by Cora
Du Bois, who briefed the conference upon southeast Asia. I suspect,
but I haven't much to go on, that the State Department thought it
was good for some of the experts, so-called experts, to indoctrinate us
and when it was over to approve the new policy which would be
recognition of New China.
Mr. Morris. You thought that had been the policy and they just
wanted to get somebody to back them up?
Mr. CoLEGROATc. I got that impression, I am sorry to say.
Senator Eastland. Now did you read the American white paper
on China?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, all students of Asia studied that with a great
deal of care.
Senator Eastland. Was that an honest or dishonest and false
document?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. In my opinion it was one of the most false docu-
ments ever published by any country.
Senator Eastland. It was a dishonest document?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Thoi'oughly dishonest.
Senator Eastland. Who supervised the preparation of that white
paper?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. The New York Times said that Ambassador Jessup
had been appointed by the State Department to edit that but I can
hardly believe that Phil Jessup really supervised that document. He
is a scholar, he is a learned man, and as a scholar the man must have
realized that that document is not the real story.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 923
Senator Jenner. Owen Lattimore is a scholar and learned man?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, a fine scholar, he has a fine command of certain
Asiatic lano;iiages, that is true.
Senator Eastland. What about the letter of transmittal?
Mr. CoLEGRO^^. That letter of transmittal was thoroughly dis-
honest, especially the paragraph of the letter which says that there
is nothing that the United States could have done to save Chiang
Kai-shek and again, except to reemphasize it, the United States had
left nothing undone that might have saved him and kept the Com-
munists from winning the victory.
Senator Eastland. You thought that was a lie?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. That obviously was a lie, and I must say that those
sort of statements are one thing we try to teach freshmen at North-
western University never to make, such general sweeping statements
like that, and I think by the time they have become seniors we have
taught them those are not the kind of statements to make.
Senator Eastland. Who signed that letter of transmittal ?
Mr. Colegrg^t:. That letter was under the signature, I understand,
of the Secretary of State, but obviously someone in the Department
drafted it for him.
Senator Eastland. In reality was it drafted by Professor Jessup ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE, I don't know. I hope it was not. I sincerely hope
that Phil Jessup did not draft that letter.
Senator Eastland. But the newspaper said he prepared that white
paper, did it not?
Mr. CoLEGRovE. My understanding was that he supervised the edit-
ing of the paper.
Senator Eastland. Yes, supervised the editing.
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes.
Senator Eastland. Do you remember when Mr. Alfred Kohlberg
made charges that the Institute of Pacific Relations was Com-
munist-controlled ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I was one of the members at that time that
voted in favor of Mr. Kohlberg when an attempt was made to change
the direction
Senator Eastl^vnd. All he wanted was an investigation?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Merely an investigation, an outside investigation.
Senator Eastland. Did he get that investigation ?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. No ; he did not.
Senator Eastland. It was whitewashed, was it not ?
Mr. CoLEGRovE. Very distinctly.
Senator Ferguson. He did not even get an inside investigation,
did he? " ^
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Presumably he got an inside investigation because
a letter was sent saying that his charges had been found utterly false.
Senator Eastland. You know it was a whitewash, do you not?
Mr. Colegroat:. I felt that very strongly even at the time.
Senator Eastland. Did Professor Jessup have a hand in that white-
wash ?
Mr. Colegrove. I regret to say that Jessup's name is among the
eight who signed the letter to the members informing them that the
charges were false.
22848— 52— pt. 3 15 •'■' '^'-^ *-■'
924 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Eastland, And he had a hand in whitewashing and con-
cealing Communist control of the Institute of Pacific Relations, an
organization which was offering alleged experts in foreign policy to
the American Government?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. To my great regret, his name was in the list of
eight informing the members.
Senator Eastland. Now what about Indonesia? Were you satis-
fied with Professor Jessup's stand in the United Nations on the Dutch
Government in Indonesia ?
Mr. CoLEGROA^. I might sa}'-, in answer to that, that my whole at-
titude in this matter goes back some years and I was utterly surprised
that Phil Jessup would accept the chairmanship of the board of
trustees of the IPR. He is a great international jurist; that is his
field. He had not made a reputation, had not at that time, in the Far
East. He had written no articles I know of and no books. He had
made no special study. So the appointment of Professor Jessup as
chairman of the IPR. seemed to me at the time to be very peculiar,
something extraordinary.
Senator Eastland. Yes ; but then it was extraordinary and in his
attacks on the Dutch Government and Dutch imperialism in Indonesia
he followed the Communist line ?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. Yes ; the Communist line for many years has been
the destruction of the Dutch rule in Indonesia.
Senator Eastland. Is it your judgment that he went beyond his
instructions from the State Department to follow the Communist line
in this instance?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Well, it seemed to me that the speeches that Am-
bassador Jessup made to the Security Council in December 1948 and
again in January 1949 against the Dutch Government were very unfair
and were not the speeches that a scholar should make. There was a
rumor around the State Department that Ambassador Jessup had
exceeded his instructions in pressing the Security Council to take
drastic action against the Dutch.
I recall a dinner I had with Ambassador Jessup in February of
1949 at which I said to him that rumors had been to the effect that he
had exceeded his instructions in the Indonesia affair. Phil Jessup,
however, denied that had been the case and told me that he had not
exceeded his instructions. Nevertheless the rumors persisted.
Senator Eastland. He was following the Communist line ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Well, that is the Communist line.
Senator Eastland. Now, do you know Edward C. Carter?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes ; he is a fine, old gentleman. I have always been
annoyed by Mr. Carter. He is really, let me say, not the type of man
who should have headed a research institute.
Senator Eastland. I certainly agree with you. He ought to have
been on Union Square.
Now in April of 1945 there were charges that Carter was attempting
to influence the State Department to force the Generalissimo to take
the Chinese Communists into his government ; that is true, is it not ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes; those rumors were present and began even
before that time.
Senator Eastland. Do you think the board of trustees of the in-
stitute should have called Carter to rein then ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 925
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I was very much disturbed by those rumors. I
wrote to Raymond Dennett, who was acting as secretary at that time,
and also I chose him because I knew him very well. I wrote to him
informing him that the rumors were that Edward Carter and other
IPR officers had been lobbying for the State Department to force
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to take the Communists into his gov-
ernment and even to share the Chinese govermnent on a 50-50 basis.
I said I objected very strongly to any officer of the IPE. lobbying this
way with the State Department and particularly on work that was
said to have been done by Edward Carter.
Senator Eastland. Do you not think that Professor Jessup and the
trustees of the institute should have stopped Carter ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Certainly. I got a letter back saying that Carter
wasn't doing anything like that but I can hardly believe that letter
because I think the letter informing me was
The Chairman. From whom was the letter ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Raymond Dennett, son of Tyler Dennett. Dennett
at that time was acting as secretary of the IPR.
Senator Eastland. In that instance were you not disappointed in
Professor Jessup, that he did not attempt to prevent Carter from
lobbying with the State Department to force Communists in the
generalissimo's government ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I was disappointed with the whole board of
trustees.
Senator Eastland. Jessup was one of them ?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. Jessup was one of the board of trustees at that
time. I was disappointed with all of them for not taking these
rumors and examining them and for not taking action against Carter,
who I believe unquestionably was lobbying with the State Department.
Senator Eastland. You believe unquestionr»bly he was lobbying
with the State Department?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes.
Senator Eastland. To force Chiang Kai-shek to put Communists
in the government?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes.
Senator Eastland. You said on a 50-50 basis ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, that was the rumor.
Senator Eastland. That would have meant a bloodless revolution
in China?
Mr. CoLESGROVE. Yes. Whenever the Communists move in, even
on less than a 50-50 basis, they take over the government in a very
short time. We have seen that too frequently in Europe.
Senator Ferguson. We have had great trouble discovering who in
the State Department prepared the memorandum for General Mar-
shall when he went out to accomplish that mission.
Senator Eastland. In fact. Professor Jessup had been close to this
left-wing group all along, had he not, Lattimore, Field ?
Mr. Colegrove. Unfortunately that seems to be the case.
Senator Ferguson. I want to go back to this question of the ex-
perts being briefed at the meeting in the State Department. Was that
briefing before you were asked to give your opinion ?
Mr. Colegrove. It began with a briefing by George Kennan on the
very first day and the rest of it was interspersed. I was very much
926 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
disappointed in the briefing by George Kennan. This was a confer-
ence upon the Far East and George Kennan didn't tell us anything
that we hadn't known or thought about for years and years and years.
I thought George Kennan just wasted the time of the conference.
Senator Ferguson. You got a kind of feeling that the briefing was
to give you some propaganda to take back to the people ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I felt distinctly that the briefing by Cora Du Bois
was of that kind. The briefing done on the military situation by
Colonel McCann didn't give us anything we had not already read in
the New York Times.
Senator Ferguson. Did you get an impression from this conference
on the Far East, which you said was in your estimation propaganda,
that it was the desire of the State Department to have a policy of
great leniency at least toward the Connnunists in China ?
Mr. Colegrove. The State Department didn't tip its hand in this
respect. I indicated that Ambassador Jessup
Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about his action but the lady
who briefed you.
The Chairman. Senator, I would like to have him conclude his
sentence there. It would be interesting. You said didn't tip its
hand?
Mr. Coij:grove. Didn't tip its hand, and Ambassador Jessup is a
very clever and able presiding officer. He didn't disclose his own
views, but the briefing by Cora Du Bois was a briefing very sympa-
thetic toward the Communists.
Senator Ferguson. Those were the kind of questions that were being
brought up in the meeting ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know when her briefing took place?
Mr. Colegrove. I think her briefing took place in the second session.
Senator Ferguson. When was the question discussed on the recog-
nition of China by the United States ?
Mr. Colegrove. Curiously enough t^at was discussed in every ses-
sion but particularly emphasized in what would be the second session.
Senator Ferguson. How did this lady who briefed you stand on
that question ? Did she express herself ?
Mr. Colegrove. She was talking only about southeast Asia and did
not cover other subjects.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record
at this time the only document that we have on the reports made at
this particular conference. That is a text of Lattimore's memoran-
dum which he himself released during the time of the Foreign Policy
Committee's investigation of the same subject a year ago. I think it
is appropriate if we put that in the record, Mr. Chairman.
I think we mi^ht ask Mr. Colegrove whether or not the views set
forth there coincide generally with the views that Mr. Lattimore ex-
pressed at the conference, according to his testimony.
The Chairman. Have you read this memorandum ?
Mr. Colegrove. I have read this memorandum.
The Chairman. This that has been handed to the chairman pur-
ports to be the New York Times of Tuesday, April 4, 1950. It is a
photostatic copy of certain parts of the New York Times. What is
it that you want ? How do you identify it ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 927
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel will authenticate that
photostat.
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the New York Times of April
4, 1950, pages 1 and 21, being a news release accompanying the text
of Lattimore's memorandum on the United States far-eastern policy.
It says :
Following is the text of Owen Latimore's memorandum on United States in
the Far East, drafted for a State Department advisory committee last August
and made public today by Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. That is the photostat of the New York Times of the
morning of
Mr. Mandel. April 4, 1950.
Mr. Morris. As such may it be introduced in the record?
The Chairman. It may be introduced.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 280- A"
and "Exhibit No. 280-B" and are filed as follows :)
Exhibit No. 280-A
[From the New York Times, April 4, 1950]
Lattimore Bares His Memorandum On Far East Policy — Professor Acts
After Senator Challenges State Department to Release the Document —
He Opposed Aid to Chiang But Urged Efforts to Convince Orientals They
Should Turn to United States and Not Russia
Washington, April 3. — Prof. Owen Lattimore made public today a secret
memorandum on proposed far-eastern policy that he had submitted to the State
Department last August.
He did so after Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, of Wisconsin, who
has accused the Johns Hopkins University professor of being a "top Soviet es-
pionage agent," demanded that the State Department release the document, or
"it will be my duty as a United States Senator to do so."
The State Department said, however, that Mr. Lattimore's views, together
with those of about 30 other persons, were solicited on a confidential basis, and
that it had no right to make them public.
Then a few hours later, Mr. Lattimore, who has called the spy charge "an
unmitigated lie," released the contents of his memorandum, saying :
"Senator McCarthy in typical fashion is seeking by insinuation and conceal-
ment to spread some of the poison of which he has an inexhaustible supply."
aid for CHIANG OPPOSED
In the memorandum. Professor Lattimore warned against United States sup-
port for the Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, but recommended efforts
to convince the far-eastern peoples that it was this counti'y and not the Soviet
Union to which they should turn.
Mr. Lattimore bade the State Department "avoid premature or excessive"
commitment of American resources in the Far East, and said that if there was
to be war, "it can be won only by defeating Russia — not Northern Korea, or
Viet Nam, or even China."
He said that Russia had won gains in the Far East without lessening the
strength she could "deploy toward Europe" and cautioned against any United
States assumption that Russia would become so involved in China that she
would no longer be able to "maneuver in Europe."
WOULD BAR USE OF JAPAN
'"It is not possible to make Japan a satisfactory instrument of American
policy," he said, and "South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the
interests of the United States."
"The kind of policy that failed in support of so great a figure as Chiang Kai-
shek cannot possibly succeed if it is applied to a scattering of "little Chiang
Kai-sheks' in China or elsewhere in Asia," he wrote.
928 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In his statement, Senator McCarthy said that the State Department con-
sidered tlie Lattimore report "so important and of such a confidential nature
that the American people were not entitled to know its contents." He has been
arguing that Mr. Lattimore laid down a policy line as a State Department con-
sultant that aided the Cliinese Communists and "betrayed" the Chinese Na-
tionalists.
The Senator had called a press conference for this morning at the Naval
Medical Center in nearby Bethesda, Md., where he is undergoing treatment for
a sinus condition. But after about 20 reporters arrived, they were told by
the commanding officer of the institution, Capt. R. M. Gillett, U. S. N., that Mr,
McCarthy was "under minor surgical procedure" and could not appear before
them for interviews and questions.
Some reporters had intended to ask the Senator whether he wished to repeat
off the Senate floor, and thus outside his congressional immunity from suit for
libel, the charges he had made against Professor Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore, head of the Walter Hines Page School of International Eela-
tions at Johns Ilopkins, has threatened, through his lawyers, to sue Senator
McCarthy if given an opportunity outside the area of immunity.
The Senator's statement asserted in substance that Secretary of State Dean
Acheson had not been truthful in saying last week that he believed he had never
even met Professor Lattimore.
Mr. McCarthy declared that Drew Pearson, a newspaper columnist and one
of the Secretary's "very loyal friends," had written in August 1945 that Mr.
Acheson had arranged for a meeting between the professor and President
Truman.
This meeting, Mr. McCai'thy said, was "for the purpose of weaning Truman
away from the Byrnes-Grew far-eastern policy." (He was referring to former
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and former Under Secretary Joseph C.
Gi*ew ) .
"While Lattimore was not unsuccessful in convincing Truman at that par-
ticular time," the Senator went on, "it is significant that very shortly after-
ward both Grew and Byrnes left the State Department and the Acheson-Latti-
more crowd took complete control."
The Senator coupled with this charge that Secretary Acheson had not con-
ceded having received the Lattimore memorandum "until after learning that I
knew the contents."
JESSUP REPLIES TO CHABGE
Tonight, Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup, who had been accused by Sen-
ator McCarthy of "accepting" contributions for the American Council of Institute
of Pacific Relations from Frederick Vanderbilt Field, denounced this as a false
"insinuation" that the council was "being paid to peddle the Communist Party
line."
Mr. Jessup declared in the first place that he was not, as alleged by Mr. Mc-
Carthy, largely in control of the organization. At the time in question, 1942 and
1943, the Ambassador added, its head was Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul, president
of the University of California, and sponsors for a drive for funds included
Henry Luce, the magazine publisher, and Juan Trippe of Pan-American Airways.
Mr. Field's contributions of $3,500, Mr. Jessup said, were part of $200,000
taken up, much of it from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corp., and
large industrial concerns.
Of Messrs. Luce and Trippe, Ambassador Jessup observed :
"Surely these gentlemen would never have accepted payments from Mr. Field
or anyone else for 'selling the Communist Party line.' Neither would I if I had
been in control."
Senator McCarthy had called Mr. Field a known Communist.
Exhibit No. 280-B
[From the New York Times, April 4, 1950]
Text of Lattimore's Memorandum on United States Far Eastern Policy
Washington, April 3 (AP). — Following is the text of Owen Lattimore's mem-
orandum on United States policy in the Far East, drafted for a State Department
advisory committee last August and made public today by Mr. Lattimore :
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 929
"In clearing the way for a fresh approach to the problems of United States
policy in the Far East, several negative statements can usefully be made.
"1. The type of policy represented by support for Chiang Kai-shek does more
harm than good to the interests of the United States, and no modification of this
policy seems promising. Chiang Kai-shek was a unique figure in Asia. He is
now fading into a kind of eclipse that is regrettably damaging to the prestige of
the United States, because the United States supported him. His eclipse does
not even leave behind the moral prestige of a good but losing fight in defense of
a weak cause.
"On the contrary, he put up the worst possible fight in defense of a cause that
was originally strong and should have won. The kind of policy that failed in
support of so great a figure as Chiang Kai-shek cannot possibly succeed if it is
applied to a scattering of 'little Chiang Kai-sheks' in China or elsewhere in
Asia.
"2. China cannot be economically coerced by such measures as cutting off trade.
Nothing could be more dangerous for the American interest than to underestimate
the ability of the Chinese Communists to achieve the minimum level of economic
stability that will make their regime politically secure. Sound policy should
allow for a cautious overestimate of the ability of the Chinese Communists in this
respect, and avoid a rash underestimate.
'•3. It is not possible to make Japan a satisfactory instrument of American
policy. There are two alternatives in Japan. The first alternative is to keep
Japan alive by means of American "blood transfusions' of raw materials and
credits. Under this alternative Japan can be made to put on the surface appear-
ance of a strong ally ; but the reality will be an overcommitment of American
resources to a distant and vulnerable region.
"Under the second alternative Japan can keep herself alive by coming to terms,
economically and politically, with its neighbors in Asia, principally China. Under
this alternative Japan cannot serve as a trusted American ally. Its own interests
will compel it to balance and bargain between what it can get out of Asia and
what it can get out of America.
"4. South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the interests and policy
of the United States. It is doubtful how long the present regime in South Korea
can be kept alive, and mere effort to keep it alive is a bad advertisement, which
continually draws attention to a band of little and inferior Chiang Kai-shecks
who are the scorn of the Communists and have lost the respect of democratic
and would-be democratic groups and movements throughout Asia.
"5. The colonial and quasi-colonial countries of southeast Asia cannot be forced
to grant priorities to the economic and military recovery of Europe at the
expense of their own economic and political interests. In this region as a
whole there is a rapid development of combined political and military resistance
to coercion which can be indefinitely sustained by local resources. On the
other hand, attempts at reconquest by European countries are so expensive that
they defeat their own ultimate purpose, which is the strengthening of the country
attempting the reconquest.
"The situation can now be handled only by convincing the Nationalist leaders
in those countries that any sacrifices they are asked to make are matched by
sacrifices made by their former or titular rulers, and are not designed to give
priority to the interests of these rulers, but to bring joint benefits both to the
ruling countries and to the colonial country, on terms that satisfy the colonial
aspiration to equality.
"6. The United States cannot assume that Russia will move in to take over
direct control in China, and will thus be subjected to heavy strategic and
economic strains. It is dangerous to assume that there will be a diversion and
commitment of Russian resources in Asia which will limit Russian ability to
maneuver in Europe. Recent developments in the Far East have been favorable
to Russia, but not in a way that lessens the resources that Russia can deploy
toward Europe.
"Policy toward Russia and policy toward the Far East meet at the point where
such a move as the imposition of an economic cordon sanitaire around China
is considered. Such a move would increase Chinese dependence on Russia ; but
it would probably not make it necessary for Russia to undertake a large-scale
program in China. The Russians would get credit in Asia, multiplied by
propaganda, for any grants they might make to China, but would probably
not have to make grants large enough to distort or strain their own resources,
"It would be possible, therefore, if the mistake is made of waiting for the
Chinese Communists to come hat in hand to ask for American terms, for United
930 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
States policy to encounter another set-back in Asia, without even the compensating
advantage of hampering Russia's ability to apply pressure in Europe.
"The foregoing statement defines negative aspects of the situation in Asia,
limiting the freedom of maneuver of United States policy. Within these limita-
tions, it seems advisable that a number of positive objectives should be defined.
"1. Policy in the Far East and policy toward Russia have a bearing on each
other. It certainly cannot yet be said, however, that armed warfare against
communism in the Far East, on a scale involving a major commitment of Amer-
ican resources, has become either unavoidable or positively desirable. Nor can
it be said with any assurance that, in the event of an "armed conflict imdertaken
for the purpose of forcing Russia back from Europe, the Far East would be an
optimum field of operation.
"There are still two alternatives before us — a relatively long peace, or a rapid
approach toward war. If there is to be war, it can only be won by defeating
Russia — not Northern Korea, or Viet Nam, or even China. Sound policy should
therefore avoid premature or excessive strategic deployment in the Far East.
"If there is to be a long peace, the primary factor in making peace possible will
be a stabilization of relations between the United States and Russia, Sound
policy should therefore maintain a maximum flexibility. If and when negotiated
and mutually acceptable agreements with Russia become possible, American
policy in the Far East should be in a position to contribute to Russo-American
negotiations. It should not be so mired down in local situations that direct
American-Russian negotiations are actually hampered.
"2. Any new departures in United States policy in the Far East must be able
to fend off any accusation of 'appeasement' of local or Russian communism.
In view of the effectiveness of the Russian issue as a weapon in in-fighting in
American party politics, it would seem that the advice of experts on domestic
politics should be coordinated with the opinions of those who are consulted on
foreign policy.
"The dilemma is simple, but not easy to solve; but unless it can be solved,
no successful United States policy in the Far East is possible. Any United
States policy that is interpreted in various countries in the Far East as pressure
applied for the purpose of creating a league against Russia will merely increase
the ability of those countries to bargain with both the United States and Russia.
"It will also increase the identification, in those countries, between local
nationalism and local communism. On the other hand, any proposed United
States policy in the Far East that is attacked in America itself as a bid for
better relations with Russia runs the danger of being defeated.
"3. The success of United States policy in the Far East will be measured
largely by the contribution that it makes to the recovery of economic relations
between the Far East and Europe. This^recovery will be possible only if the
assent and good will of the far eastern countries are won.
"Assent and real cooperation, in turn, can only be won if the representatives of
the far-eastern countries, including those that are still technically the subjects
of European countries, are convinced that they have as direct access to the
highest American authorities as do the European representatives, and if they are
convinced that their economic needs and political standards are not being given
a second priority, lower than that of the European countries involved in the
same negotiations.
"The two test cases in southeast Asia on which the leaders of various nation-
alist movements will rate the difi'erence between what can be attained tlirough
friendly association with representatives of the United States and what can be
attained through outright defiance of a European country which has strong
economic support from the United States are Indonesia and the Viet Nam regime
under Ho Chi Minh.
"If the negotiations between Dutch and Indonesians, brought about largely
through benevolent United States pressure, eventuate in a settlement which
seems, in Indonesia, to contain too much of hope deferred, while the resistance
in Indochina under Ho Chi Minh achieves more and more of hope fulfilled,
the results throughout southeast Asia will be adverse to the United States in-
terest.
"Heavy and primary United States commitments in Western Europe makes
it diflicult to bear constantly in mind that when the Dutch-Indonesian negotia-
tions are consummated, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of popular opinion in
Indonesia, will have wider repercussions tlian the satisfaction or dissatisfaction
of Dutch public opinion.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 931
"It is a fact, nevertheless, that Indonesian opinion is more difficult to satisfy
than Dutch opinion, and it is also a fact that the rei^ercussions will be more
serious if Indonesian opinion is not satislied than if Dutch opinion is not satis-
fied. These facts mark an important difference between prewar and postwar
colonial Asia. They are facts that Americans fully accepted; but they are
also facts that are critical for the formulation of an over-all United States
policy in Asia.
"4. The foregoing considerations indicate that the major aim of United States
policy in the Far East should be to convince the countries of the Far East that
they can get along well with the United States and with the countries of
Western Europe. They must be persuaded that they can get along well because
of the mutual benetits to themselves, to the United States, and to "Western Eu-
rope.
"They must not be made to suspect that the real aim of the United States
is an ulterior aim of using them against Russia.
To put it in another way, the aim of the United States policy should be to
enable the countries of the Far East to do without Russia to the maximum ex-
tent.
This is a much more modest aim than an insistence on and organization of
hostility to Russia ; but it is an attainable aim, and the other is not.
"A few suggestions for implementation are appended.
"1. Conferences with tlie independent governments of the Far East, on
the basis of helping them to build their own economies, to revive their trade
with Europe, and to expand their trade with us. Emphasis on positive steps
that can be taken. No negative conditions, such as prohibitions of trade with
Russia or Communist China ; no conditions that could be interpreted as Amer-
ican regulation of their political parties.
"2. Working relations, and a refusal to be bound by a protocol, with legitimate
nationalist leaders in countries whose full political aspirations have not been
met by their European rulers.
"3. The United States should not allow any European country, in its relations
with any country in the Far Elast, to state openly or to imply by propaganda
that its iwlicy is 'backed by the United States.' European representatives, in
negotiating with the representatives of countries in Asia, should be discouraged
from stating or implying that they are authoritative interpreters of United
States policy, or intermediaries without whom the United States cannot be
approached.
"4. It should be made clear that if there is delay or difficulty In establishing
relations between the United States and Communist-controlled countries, such as
China, the trouble comes from the Communist side and not from the United
States side.
"5. It should be made clear that friendly and beneficial relations with the
United States depend essentially on the inherent friendliness or unfriendliness
of the nation concerned, and not on the formalities of diplomatic recognition.
In order to facilitate the contrast between countries which are on friendly terms
with the United States and countries which are not, the number of countries
formally recognized by the United States should be increased.
"As a first step, tlie United States should accept the list of countries recom-
mended for admission to the United Nations by Mr. Tryg\'e Lie, Secretary-
General of the United Nations. In the first place, it would at this time be a
good move for the United States to accept with good will an initiative from
the Secretariat of the United Nations. In the second place, the list is on balance
more favorable to the United States than to the Soviet Union. In the third place,
and with particular reference to the Far East, the move would bring within the
scope of United States diplomatic activity the Mongolian People's Republic
(Outer Mongolia), an increasingly important potential listening-post country
in the heart of Asia.
"6. The United States should disembarrass itself as quickly as possible of its
entanglements in South Korea."
Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the views expressed by Latti-
more in the record ?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. Yes.
The Chairman. You say you have read this ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, I have read that memoranda. That memo-
randa covers many of the points that Mr. Lattimore made in the con-
932 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ference. The memoranda among other things calls for liquidation
of American responsibilities in Korea. That was a point which Mr.
Lattimore made during the conference. This was in October 1949.
Professor Lattimore took the position of prompt recognition of Red
China. He was very careful to say we should bargain with them
when we were doing it, but nevertheless we should recognize them.
Professor Lattimore was opposed to dividing economic aid in Asia.
He wanted to give economic aid to Communist countries equally with
non-Communist countries.
Mr. Morris. Did you hear expressed at the conference, Professor,
a sentiment as to the disposition of Formosa ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Governor Stassen made a very strong appeal to de-
fend Formosa to the letter. I said something on that subject myself.
I particularly commended the acceptance of General MacArthur's
concept of what is now called the MacArthur line, namely from Ko-
rea, Formosa, Okinawa, the Philippines, and around to Hawaii.
Senator Ferguson. Doctor, do you know that on October 26, if that
is the exact date, 1949, the State Department sent a message to the
Nationalist government in China notifying them they would not give
them any more military aid?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Wlien did you learn that ?
Mr. CoLEGRO\"E. I didn't learn that until I saw that in the news-
papers.
Senator Ferguson. That was after this meeting?
Mr. Colegrove. That was shortly after this meeting.
Senator Ferguson. So the policy was really laid down before you
went to this meeting as far as Formosa was concerned ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. In your opinion, with respect to Formosa and
breaking the so-called MacArthur line they were therefore aiding
the Communists of China ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. Specifically^ Governor Stassen has spent a
good deal of time on maintaining Formosa and I believe — I am speak-
ing without any record here — I believe that Joseph Ballantine said
something on that subject that is favorable to holding Formosa.
Mr, Morris. Professor, did General Marshall attend that confer-
ence ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes, General Marshall was present at every session.
He was one of the first ones there.
Mr. Morris. Did he take part in this discussion at all ?
Mr. Colegrove. No. General Marshall sat in the same seat at the
end of the room, not at the conference table, about 5 feet from the
end of the conference table, opposite Ambassador Jessup.
Mr. Morris. And was he sitting near Owen Lattimore?
Mr. Colegrove. He was about 5 feet away from Owen Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. Did he hear Owen Lattimore express his views on
those occasions?
Mr. Colegrove. I assume he heard Owen Lattimore talk the 13 or
14 times.
Mr. Morris. Thirteen or fourteen times Lattimore spoke?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Now could you testify whether or not Rosinger had
an active part in this conference ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 933
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Not as active a part as Owen Lattimore. He spoke
probably six times, and all of his speeches, his comments, were very
favorable to Red China.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that we
have had testimony in the past that Benjamin Kizer and John K. Fair-
bank, whom Professor Colegrove has included with this group domi-
nated by Lattimore, to the effect that both of those were members of
the Communist Party also.
How many times did you speak at that conference, Professor Cole-
grove ?
Mr. Colegrove. I believe I spoke about 8, 9, or 10 times.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in view of the line of questioning
developed by Senator Eastland on the importance of the actual prepa-
ration of the letter of transmittal on the white paper, I was wonder-
ing if you thought it necessary that we should ask the State Depart-
ment for the facts behind that letter of transmittal.
The Chairman. I shall be very glad to write a letter. I may not
be able to get any more information than I have, however.
Senator Ferguson. I move, Mr. Chairman, that you do write a
letter, that we keep on trying, because I thinly this is so vital to the
Congress and to the people that we should not be discouraged.
Professor Colegrove, have you anything further to say about the
letter of transmittal ?
Mr. Colegrove. I objected to that letter of transmittal because of
the bland statement that the white paper had given all of the evidence
and presented a very unbiased view of it. It was very obvious that
it had not given all the evidence. Even the Wedemeyer report was
slightly expurgated as published by the State Department. All rec-
ords as to Korea were pulled out of that report and it did not have
the Wallace report in it. I felt that the State Department had glossed
over the trouble between the State Department and General Hurley.
They had not given both sides of that story.
What I objected most strongly to in the letter of transmittal was the
argument that the letter made in favor of our policy, favored by with-
drawing help to Chiang Kai-shek, and glossing over what help we had
given the Chinese Reds, and in particular that paragraph at the end
where the State Department sums up, in which it says that the United
States Government had done everything that was possible to save the
Nationalist government and that the United States had left undone
everything that would have been helpful to Red China.
Senator Eastland. Do you not really think there was a conspiracy
by people in the State Department to throw China to the Communists ?
Mr. Colegrove. I have been of that opinion for quite a while.
Mr. Morris. Professor Colegrove, have you testified to the best of
your ability on the question that arose at the conference we have been
discussing on the possibility of sending economic aid alike to Com-
munist and non-Communist countries? Is there anything more you
can testify to on that score ?
Mr. Colegrove. At least four members took strongly the position
that no economic aid — of course no military aid — should be given to
Communist countries in Asia. That would include Governor Stassen,
myself, Mr. Brodie, and Mr. Ballantine.
Mr. Morris. You say you four took opposition to that ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
934 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Yourself, Mr. Brodie, Mr. Ballantine, and Governor
Stassen ?
The Chairman. In other words, the four whom you mentioned, in-
cluding yourself, took the position that aid should go to Nationalist
China?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes ; and in no way to Red China.
The Chairman. Now the other group ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. The other group took the position that economic aid
should go to to Communist and non-Communist countries alike.
Senator Jenner 
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